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Objective, definitions, method and some history
Haiku, you ku, he
She, or it kus, we ku, you
Ku, they ku. Thang ku.
Ted Hipple, The traditional grammarian as poet
(cited in Wales, 1996: 1)
1.1 The feat of Domingo de Santo Tomás
The history of linguistic investigation is full of discoveries. One of those discoveries
was made by a Spanish friar known by the name of Domingo de Santo Tomás. By
way of introduction, the story of his insight will be told here to illustrate the theme
and the approach of the present investigation.1
In 1540, the Dominican friar Domingo de Santo Tomás set sail from Spain on his way
to Perú. He belonged to a group of missionaries that were recruited by Francisco
Martinéz Toscano to work in this newly discovered part of South America. At that
moment, only seven years after the defeat of the Inca empire by Francisco Pizarro, the
journey to this new Spanish territory was full of perils and uncertainty. Yet, Domingo
de Santo Tomás survived the trip and managed to do his missionary work among the
native people of Perú. His catechistic work made him an expert in the ‘lengua gen-
eral’, the general language spoken in the region, nowadays referred to as Quechua. In
                                                 
1 The (sparse) biographical materials on Domingo de Santo Tomás are from Rodolfo Cerron-Palomino,
as added to the 1994 facsimile edition of the original text of de Santo Tomás (1560).
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1555, after 15 years of missionary work, Domingo de Santo Tomás returned to Spain,
determined to do a load of work. Among many other things, he had taken up the task
to inform the authorities in Spain about the miserable situation of the native people of
Perú. Further, he wanted to take care in person of the printing of his grammar-cum-
dictionary of the Quechua language. This resulted in the Grammática o arte de la len-
gua general de los Índios de los Reynos del Peru, which appeared in 1560, printed in
Valladolid in an astonishingly large edition of 1500 copies. The outline of this
Quechua grammar follows the traditional descriptions of the grammar of Latin. How-
ever, there are numerous details where the Latin format does not suffice for the intri-
cacies of the Quechua language. In many aspects, this language is different from Latin
and the classical descriptive format had to be enhanced to explain the structure of
Quechua. One of the inventions that Domingo de Santo Tomás introduces in his
grammar is an explanation of the difference between the two forms for ‘we’ that are
found in Quechua. He explains that one of the two forms is used for ‘we, including
the person or persons that are spoken to’, and the other form is used for ‘we, exclud-
ing the person or persons with whom we are talking’. This difference, grammatical-
ised in Quechua, can be made explicit in English by adding extra linguistic material,
like we all here present for the inclusive meaning, or we, me and my friends for the
exclusive meaning. Today, almost 450 years after the publication of this explanation,
the analysis is still considered accurate. Even the terminology has remained; this op-
position is known today as a difference between an ‘inclusive’ and an ‘exclusive’ first
person plural.
‘El plural deste pronombre ñóca es ñocánchic o ñocáyco, que quiere dezir ‘nosotros’.
Y es de notar que entre ñocánchic y ñocáyco ay dos differencias, una intrínseca, de
parte de la significación dellos, otra extrínseca, de parte del verbo que les corresponde
… La primera es que, aunque ñocánchic y ñocáyco significan ‘nosotros’, el ñocánchic
significa ‘nosotros’, connotando & incluyendo en sí la persona con quien hablamos:
como hablando con indios, si quisiéssemos dar a entender que también entran ellos y se
incluyen en la habla que hablamos con este pronombre nosotros, como diziende: a
nosotros nos crió Dios, usaríamos de este pronombre ñocánchic, esto es ‘nosotros, in-
cluyendo también los indios’. Pero si los quisiéssemos excluir a ellos de la tal razón o
plática … en este langua (por ser más abundante) no ay necessidad de añadir determi-
nación alguna sino solamente usar de este pronombre ñocáyco, que quiere dezir
‘nosotros’, connotando que se excluye de aquella pluralidad la persona o personas con
quien hablamos.’ (de Santo Tomás, 1560: 8-9)
[The plural of this pronoun ñóca is ñocánchic or ñocáyco, which mean ‘we’. It is to be
noted that between ñocánchic and ñocáyco there are two differences, one intrinsic, due
to their meaning, the other extrinsic, due to the verb that corresponds to them. … The
first is that although ñocánchic and ñocáyco both mean ‘we’, ñocánchic means ‘we’,
with the connotation of including the person as such with whom we are speaking; like
when speaking with Indians, when we want to give to understand that they also take
part, and that they are included in the meaning of what we say with this pronoun we; as
when one would say: ‘God created us’, we will use that pronoun, ñocánchic, that is,
‘we’, including also the Indians. But if we want to exclude them from the meaning or
the speech … in this language (to be more explicit) it is not necessary to add any clari-
fication, except to use the pronoun ñocáyco, meaning ‘we’, with the connotation of ex-
cluding the person or persons with whom we are talking from the plurality.]
The merits of this discovery are not to be underestimated. Domingo de Santo Tomás
had to work out this aspect of the grammatical system of Quechua from scratch. The
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grammatical description of languages other than Latin or Greek was still in its in-
fancy.2 The difference between an inclusive and an exclusive variant of the word ‘we’
was unheard of, even inconceivable, in the occidental tradition of grammatical analy-
sis. None of the major languages in Europe and in the Near and Middle East show
such an opposition. The nearest languages (from a European perspective) which have
an inclusive/exclusive difference are some tucked-away Caucasian languages, the
Dravidian languages all the way down in southern India, and some Nilo-Saharan lan-
guages in the sub-Saharan savannah of Africa. As it turned out, the Quechua-speaking
people in far away South America were the first to direct Western attention to this pe-
culiar possibility of human language. Yet, once the difference between the two forms
of ‘we’ is explained, it appears to be a completely natural distinction. After some
time, one even starts wondering how it is possible to do without this very practical
device in linguistic interaction.3
The story of de Santo Tomás illustrates the basic impetus for cross-linguistic research,
which is the method that will be followed in the present work. Cross-linguistic re-
search attempts to learn about the possibilities of human language by studying the
various ways in which communities around the world put their linguistic competence
to work. A comparison of the structure of very diverse languages presents an opportu-
nity to escape the entrapment of the (linguistic) imagination. The scientific lore about
the extent of variation of human language is strongly biased by the structure of pres-
ently known languages. Certain possibilities of human language would never be con-
ceived if it were not for the fact that they happen to exist. It was the existence of an
overtly marked inclusive/exclusive opposition in Quechua that opened the eyes of the
Western linguistic tradition to the possibility of such categories.  In contrast, other
possibilities might be thought of as logically possible, but might turn out to be unat-
tested. In this study, I will use the variety of the world’s linguistic structures to sketch
an outline of the possibilities of human language – within a restricted domain.4 The
story of Domingo de Santo Tomás also illustrates the domain of the present study. As
can be learned from Quechua, some languages use two referentially different words
for the group of people that includes the speaker (ie the English word ‘we’). In this
study, I want to address the question of what possibilities human languages use to
mark the participants in a speech-act. Thus formulated, this is a rather extensive do-
main of inquiry. In all languages, there are many ways to refer to ‘me, myself and I’.
One finds expressions like ‘the undersigned’ or ‘the present author’; or simply ‘Mi-
chael’ or ‘Mr. Cysouw’; not to speak of the numerous other epithets that could be
                                                 
2 The first printed grammar other than of Latin or Greek is the Spanish grammar by Lebrija from 1492.
In total, Rowe (1974) counted only 10 languages other than Latin and Greek of which printed gram-
mars appeared before the Quechua grammar by Domingo de Santo Tomás – who was probably un-
aware of these other descriptions, except for the Spanish grammar of Lebrija.
3 More details on the history of the discovery of the inclusive/exclusive opposition can be found in
Haas (1969), Hardman (1972), Mannheim (1982), Suárez Roca (1992) and Adelaar (1993).
4 If a particular logically possible structure is not attested among this world’s languages, it is not neces-
sary to categorise it as ‘impossible’. The actual languages of this world do not necessarily exhaust the
possibilities of linguistic structure. However, the more languages are taken into the comparison, the
unlikelier it becomes for a non-attested structure to be an actual possibility for human language. Still,
it might be better to talk about ‘improbable’ instead of ‘impossible’ when talking about non-attested
structures in the world’s linguistic diversity.
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used to refer to this specific person. Once the full expressive power of any natural
language is taken into account, the possibilities to mark participants in a speech-act
become innumerable. Given the right context, almost every kind of word in a lan-
guage can be used to refer to a participant. To remain within workable limits, this in-
vestigation will only deal with an analysis of the PARADIGMATIC STRUCTURE of
SPECIALISED person marking. This definition of the subject introduces two important
restrictions on the domain of investigation. First, the person markers have to be
grammaticalised as a specialised part of a language. The markers have to be specifi-
cally devoted to person marking. The variety of referential possibilities is restricted in
this study to those linguistic elements that do nothing else besides person marking, as,
for example, the English words ‘I’ and ‘you’. Second, such specialised person mark-
ers are investigated from the structural context of the paradigm. Specialised person
markers are normally found to be part of a closed set of person markers that are
treated identically within the structure of a language. Such a set of equivalent markers
is called a ‘paradigm’. The precise referential value of a person marker can only be
specified in relation to the other person markers in the paradigm.
In this introductory chapter, miscellaneous definitional, methodological and historical
aspects are discussed. I suggest that the reader who is mainly interested in the actual
cross-linguistic comparison skips the considerations in this introductory chapter. At
the beginning of each chapter, the specific definitions, methodological issues and re-
sults of earlier research are discussed extensively. In this chapter, addressed to the
more-than-casual reader, a survey of the approach that is taken in the present study is
given. First, the definitions and delimitation of the domain are made explicit in sec-
tion 1.2. Subsequently, some methodological issues will be dealt with in section 1.3.
Next, in section 1.4, previous cross-linguistic work on person marking is discussed.
Finally, section 1.5 offers a survey of the structure of the book and leads to the core of
the present work: the cross-linguistic variation of the paradigmatic structure of person
marking.
1.2 Definitions and delimitation
1.2.1 Preamble
Language is a communicational device. Reference to the participants in a communi-
cational setting can be marked linguistically in various ways. A father who is talking
to his baby might refer to himself by using the word ‘daddy’ as in daddy is busy now.
In English, such self-reference by using a full noun is a marked construction, mainly
to be heard in motherese. However, in other languages, like Thai, this usage is much
more widespread, to be found throughout the various registers of the language
(Cooke, 1968: 44-55). In all languages, many different words can be used for self-
reference, although in some languages it will take more conversational preparation to
make the self-referring usage of a word intelligible. The problem is that words with
self-reference change their referential value depending on the person who is speaking.
For example, the understanding of such shifting reference is known to present major
difficulties to the language-learning child. Jespersen (1922: 123) tells a delightful
story of two playing children, one of whom does not get the shifting reference of the
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word ‘enemy’. We can envision the incredulous child shouting: ‘I am the enemy, not
you!’ Jespersen calls such linguistic elements ‘shifters’. All linguistic elements that
are used in a deictic (‘pointing’) function are shifters. Locational deixis (here, there),
time deixis (now, tomorrow) and participant deixis (me, you) all involve shifting ref-
erence of linguistic elements (Jespersen, 1922: 123-124; Bühler, 1934: 79-148; Jakob-
son, 1971; Hengeveld, 1997).
Amidst all these shifters, this study will deal only with specialised shifters used for
reference to speech-act participants. To be included in the investigation, the shifters
have to be ‘specialised’. This means that the shifters do not have any other possible
usage besides being a shifter. The words here, now and me are such specialised shift-
ers. In contrast, words like daddy or enemy can be used as shifters, but do not neces-
sarily function as such. Second, this investigation will deal only with shifters that are
used for reference to participants in the speech act. Basically, the speech-act dyad of
speaker and addressee will be the starting point for the present investigation. Summa-
rising, there are three criteria for linguistic elements to be included in the investiga-
tion: they have to be a shifter, specialised for that function, and used for reference to
speech-act participants. Henceforth, linguistic elements that adhere to these three cri-
teria are called PERSON MARKERS (see further section 1.2.2).
Person markers appear almost universally within the confines of a paradigm. Person
markers, as defined above, do not stand alone within a language. They are part of a
closed set of person markers that have an identical place in the structure of a lan-
guage. Such a set of elements is called a PARADIGM. This investigation addresses the
question to what extent the structure of person marking paradigms is found to vary
cross-linguistically. The survey of the variability of the paradigm structure can be
read as a prolegomenon to a theory of the ‘richness’ of a paradigm (see further section
1.2.3). Diachronically, person markers do not behave differently from other linguistic
elements. They grammaticalise from independent nouns into person markers. Also,
independent pronouns grammaticalise into inflectional person markers. All special-
ised participant shifters will be included in this study, irrespective of independent or
inflectional morphology. Moreover, all person marking ‘agreement’ is included. The
inflation of the word ‘agreement’ and the often assumed primacy of morphologically
independent person markers is countered (see section 1.2.4). Finally, some borderline
cases and some problems with the cross-linguistic delimitation of the domain will be
discussed (see section 1.2.5).
1.2.2 Person and number
‘Thus the speaker, the listener, and the things spoken about are three essential factors of
normal speech. To these must now be added the actual words themselves.’ (Gardiner,
1932: 28)
This study is concerned with specialised shifters that are used for reference to speech-
act participants. The (extra-linguistic) setting of a speech act invokes a few salient
cognitive categories. The principal categories of participant deixis are ‘speaker’ (the
originator of the speech) and the ‘addressee’ (the recipient of the speech). All deixis
that does not include either of these categories can be summarised negatively. The
‘other’ participant is everything (not necessarily human or animate) that is neither
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speaker nor addressee. These principal categories will form the basis of the present
investigation. The specialised linguistic elements that code these categories are called
person markers. Following the conventions of the occidental grammatical tradition,
the coding for speaker will be called ‘first person’; the coding for addressee will be
called ‘second person’; and the coding for any other participant will be called ‘third
person’. The linguistic coding of these three categories will be discussed extensively
in chapter 2.
There is more to a conversation than only speaker and addressee. In an analysis of
conversational practices, Goffman (1979) argues for a decomposition of the notions
‘speaker’ and ‘addressee’. The traditional notion ‘speaker’, he pleads, is a cluster of
various communicational functions, like ‘animator’ (ie ‘the sounding box’), ‘author’
(ie ‘the agent who scripts the lines’) and ‘principal’ (ie ‘the party to whose position
the words attest’) (Goffman 1979: 16-17, cf Levinson 1988: 169). Likewise, the tradi-
tional notion of ‘addressee’ is to be decomposed into, at least, the functions ‘hearer’,
‘unaddressed’, ‘over-hearer’, ‘bystander’ and ‘eavesdropper’ (Goffman 1979: 8-9). In
a thorough reappraisal of Gofmann’s proposals, Levinson (1988: 170-180) further
systematises the decomposition of ‘speaker’ and ‘addressee’. There are various rea-
sons why one would want to have a more finely grained description of the possible
functions of a participant. The most promising area of application is the ethnography
of speaking, as Levinson shows (1988: 192-221). However, for the analysis of gram-
matical structure, the merits of the decomposition of the traditional speech-act roles
are less obvious. The basic opposition between speaker and addressee is rather com-
monly grammaticalised among the world’s languages. In contrast, none of the finer
grained role distinctions are attested as grammaticalised categories.
‘The classical analysis has held up remarkably well in the face of recent comparative
analysis. The great majority of languages exhibit the three persons in a paradigm of
pronouns, verb agreement, or elsewhere.’ (Levinson, 1988: 182-183)
The predominant grammaticalisation of the traditional referential categories ‘speaker’
and ‘addressee’ is probably a result of functional pressures, Levinson argues. Proto-
typically, language is an interactional device with two speech-act participants who
organise their speech in a turn-taking sequence. The speaker/addressee roles in the
turn-taking system are prototypically reflected in the structure of language.
‘Quite probably, the universal tendency in languages to distinguish, in pronominal
categories or elsewhere, primarily and prototypically the two deictic categories of first
and second person, is related closely to the superordinate categories of speaker and ad-
dressee/recipient that are the basis of the turn-taking system.’ (Levinson,
1988: 176, 183)
However, by proposing this explanation, Levinson counters Goffman’s original mo-
tive for a finer grained distribution of referential categories. Of course, Goffman ar-
gues, the prototypical speech-act situation is a dyadic one, but many other configura-
tions are attested, and are probably just as common in daily speech-interaction.
‘The ratified hearer in two-person talk is necessarily also the addressed one, that is, the
one to whom the speaker addresses his visual attention and to whom, incidentally, he
expects to turn over the speaking role. But obviously two-person encounters, however
common, are not the only kind; three or more official participants are often found. In
such cases it will often be feasible for the current speaker to address his remarks to the
circle as a whole, encompassing all his hearers in his glance, according them something
like equal status. But, more likely, the speaker will, at least during periods of his talk,
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address his remarks to one listener, so that among official hearers one must distinguish
the addressed recipient form unaddressed ones.’ (Goffman, 1979: 9)
Goffman argues convincingly that much more is possible, but eventually, it is an em-
pirical question whether these possibilities are also used in the grammatical structure
of language. As it appears now, this is not the case. Earlier research did not come up
with any example, and during my investigations for the present work, I have also not
come across any new claims in this direction. Languages do not use more finely
grained interactional categories in their grammatical structure. Still, it is important to
keep open the possibility that grammatical markers have simply not been recognised
as such. For the present investigation, I will disregard any of these more finely
grained categories and restrict myself to the traditional gross categories ‘speaker’ and
‘addressee’.
On the basis of the principal categories ‘speaker’ and ‘addressee’, groups of partici-
pants can be formed. Groups of participants consist of more than one participant and
are thus necessarily plural. For example, speaker and addressee can make up a group,
or speaker and other, or speaker and addressee and other, et cetera. All theoretical
possible combinations will be discussed extensively in chapter 3. In that chapter, it
will also be argued that the notion ‘plural’ is not appropriate for these groups of par-
ticipants. Groups of participants consist of more than one individual, so they are plu-
ral by definition. However, they are plural in a completely different sense from that in
which normal nouns can be plural. As will be shown later in chapter 7, the notion of
‘number marking’ within the domain of person marking is better reserved for catego-
ries that are traditionally known as ‘dual’, ‘trial’, et cetera. Finally, there is a recurrent
claim in the literature that there are some languages with a special set of person mark-
ers, variously called ‘compound pronouns’ or ‘complex pronouns’. This phenomenon
will be discussed in appendix A. It will be shown there why I have chosen to disre-
gard these pronouns in the main line of the present work.
1.2.3 Paradigmatic structure
Grammaticalised person markers do not occur in isolation within a language. They
preferably appear in a PARADIGM of person markers. The structure of a person mark-
ing paradigm is the central aspect of the present inquiry. I will investigate the struc-
ture of paradigms that show at least an opposition between speaker and addressee in
the marking of singular participants. Some elucidation of the notion of a paradigm in
the present work will be given in this section.
First, a central assumption is that a person marking paradigm is a closed class of lin-
guistic elements that occur in complementary distribution. Stated differently, a para-
digm is a set of linguistic elements that occur in the same syntagmatic place in the
structure of a language. The syntagmatic-paradigmatic duality is taken in direct refer-
ence to the way it was introduced by de Saussure (1916: 170-180).5 For example, the
subject pronouns of English constitute a paradigm, as they occur in complementary
                                                 
5 In the literature, the syntagmatic/paradigmatic duality is rightfully connected to de Saussure. How-
ever, de Saussure uses the term ‘associatif’ instead of the expected term ‘paradigmatique’. He reserved
the word ‘paradigme’ for the traditional notion of declension (cf de Saussure, 1916: 15).
8 INTRODUCTION
distribution as subject of a predicate. The object form of the pronouns belong to a dif-
ferent paradigm because these forms are used in a different syntagmatic place in the
language.
Second, there is no impossible reference in a paradigm. That is to say, the mutual ex-
clusive elements in a person marking paradigm fill out the complete referential array
of possible participants. For example, singular reference is often divided into
‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and a third class. This third class consists of all reference that is
not either of the first two. This third ‘non-person’ simply fills all possibilities that are
not taken care of by the other elements in the paradigm. A similar tendency is attested
for plural marking. If there is no specialised element for any plural reference, then the
missing referential value is taken over by one of the other elements in the paradigm.
Preferably, a person marking paradigm is ‘referentially complete’.6 It is not the lan-
guage in which ‘tout se tient’, but the paradigm.
Third, I will interpret a paradigm as a closed space of alternative options. The indi-
vidual person markers in a paradigm do not arrive at their referential value intrinsi-
cally, but in mutual delimitation to the other elements in the paradigm. The space of
reference to all possible participants is subdivided into referential categories by the
available elements in the paradigm. The referential space that is allotted to a specific
element in a paradigm can only be defined in relation to the other elements. This per-
spective of the paradigm is reminiscent of the division of vowel space by the available
phonemic vowels. A low open vowel /a/ is a rather different vowel when it is found in
a three vowel system as compared to when it is found in a seven vowel system. An-
other analogous concept to the paradigm is the ‘Wortfeld’ in lexicography, as pro-
posed by Trier (1931), in which the meaning of a word is dependent on the meaning
of other closely related words.
Fourth, the present study will be concerned with the internal structure of person-
paradigms. Such a paradigm is only a small part of a complete language. Normally,
there are multiple person marking paradigms within a single language. English has
independent pronouns – both in a nominative and in an oblique form; then there are
possessive pronouns and finally there is a paradigm of person markers in the present
inflection. All in all, there are at least four different paradigms that share the referen-
tial work. I have not attempted to formulate a criterion that would set apart one of the
various paradigms as the primary one. Not the languages as wholes, but the individual
paradigms within each language are the crux of the comparison. The cross-linguistic
comparison in this investigation is on a sub-language level (cf the ‘item-based’ ap-
proach from Nettle, 1999). Consequently, a particular language can appear multiple
times in this investigation; each time with different paradigms. The result of this ap-
proach is an insight into the paradigmatic structure of person marking. Only indi-
rectly, will this help to understand the functioning of a whole language.7
                                                 
6 The word ‘preferably’ has been added because there are some exceptions, as there are always excep-
tions to a cross-linguistic generalisation. Specifically, problems arise in the case of a paradigm with
‘zero’ independent pronouns (see section 2.6). In a few extreme cases, there are only two independent
pronouns (one for speaker and one for addressee), and all other reference is ‘zero’ (see section 4.4).
Probably, it is better to consider these ‘zeros’ as non-existing. Such paradigms with non-existing
marking are not referentially complete.
7 The importance of a proper study into the paradigmatic structure can, for example, be inferred from
the generative analysis of pro-drop. In this proposal, the concept of ‘richness’ of a paradigmatic
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Combining this perspective of paradigmatic structure with the perspective of person
marking as explained in the previous section, I have arrived at the following definition
of the object of my investigation. I will investigate the structure of paradigms that
show at least an opposition between speaker and addressee in the marking of singular
participants. There are a few borderline issues concerning this definition. First, there
are cases that do not show an opposition between speaker and addressee, but that have
an opposition between speaker/addressee and other. These cases are included in the
investigation. Second, there are cases that have an opposition between speaker and
addressee, but that have an irregular paradigmatic structure. These cases are excluded
from this investigation.
The first of these issues (‘speaker/addressee’ versus ‘other’ opposition) is important
for the classification of the English inflection. The English present inflection is in-
cluded in this study as a borderline case of a person marking paradigm. Following the
definition of person marking as outlined in the previous section, the English inflection
should not be included because there is no opposition between the form of (I) speak
versus (you) speak. In both cases the inflection is zero. However, the English inflec-
tion has an opposition between speaker/addressee and any other singular participant:
(I/you) speak versus (he/she/it) speaks. I have decided to interpret this opposition as a
borderline case of person marking. In contrast, the (spoken) French inflection does not
have any opposition in the singular: (je) parl(e) versus (tu) parl(es) versus (il/elle/on)
parl(e). In all three forms, the inflection is zero. Speaker and addressee are not
marked in the French inflection, not even in combined opposition to any other partici-
pant. The decision to include structures like the English inflection, but exclude struc-
tures like the French inflection is a rather ad-hoc limitation that arose because I have
taken the marking of singular marking as the basis of the classification (see chapter
2).8
The second issue is important for the classification of a few troublesome cases in
which the marking of the speaker and addressee is syntagmatically different, yet both
markers belong to a single paradigm. The worst troublemakers are paradigms in
which the first person is marked by a suffix and the second person is marked by a pre-
fix, or vice versa. An example of such a paradigm is found in the Berber languages.
The subject inflection in Berber is a suffix in the first person singular, but a prefix in
the first person plural. Second person marking is a combination of prefixes and suf-
fixes.9 Another instance of a combination of prefixes and suffixes is attested in the
Muskogean languages of North America. The first person agent marking in the
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structure is crucial (Harbert, 1995: 222). However, I have not been able to find a precise definition in
the literature that explicates under what conditions a paradigm is to be considered ‘rich’. The present
investigation, specifically chapter 4 and chapter 5, can be read as an attempt to formulate a cross-
linguistically sensible definition of the ‘richness’ of a person marking paradigm. The resulting notion
of ‘explicitness’ of a person marking paradigm does not coincide with the presumed notion of ‘rich-
ness’ from the generative literature (see also section 2.5).
8 Except for French, I know of only a few incidental cases that have been excluded from this investiga-
tion because of this decision (see footnote 7 on page 40).
9 See, for example, the Berber language Tamazight (Willms, 1972: 196). This structure of Berber is
reminiscent of (and probably diachronically related to) the imperfect affixes of the Semitic languages,
as, for example, described for Cairene colloquial Arabic by Gary (1982: 100). The Arabic imperfect is
discontinuous. Most of the reference is marked by prefixes, but gender and part of the number refer-
ence are disambiguated by suffixes.
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Muskogean languages is a suffix, but all other person markers are prefixes.10 Finally,
the object marking in the Tequistlatecan languages of Mexico shows different affixa-
tion for first and second person. A first person object is marked as a prefix while all
other persons are marked as suffixes.11 To conclude, paradigms with a mix of prefixes
and suffixes for speaker and addressee reference occur, although they are not common
from a world-wide perspective. The few examples just mentioned are disregarded in
the present investigation. Less severe problems are the paradigms in which speaker
and addressee reference is syntagmatically identical (say, both are prefixes) but some
other material in the paradigm is syntagmatically different (say, the first person plural
is a suffix). In such cases, I will restrict the extent of the paradigmatic structure to
those elements that are syntagmatically identical to the speaker and addressee (in the
hypothetical example, this means that I only include prefixes into the paradigmatic
structure). An example will illustrate this restriction of the paradigmatic structure. An
inflected verb from Upper Bal (a dialect of the South Caucasian language Svan) is
shown in (1.1). The paradigm presented is the imperfect of a verb of Class A (Tuite,





2 Sg: x-ama:r-äs 2 Plur: x-ama:r-ad
3 Sg: -ama:r-a 3 Plur: -ama:r-a
The person marking from Upper Bal is analysed as two different paradigms, one pre-
fixal and one suffixal. The prefixal paradigm is the most genuine person marking de-
vice, distinguishing speaker from addressee (and even separating an inclusive). The
suffixal paradigm is a borderline case of person marking. There is no opposition be-
tween speaker and addressee reference, but speaker and addressee are marked by a
special morpheme different from other, and different from plural participants (cf the
English inflection).
(1.2) UPPER BAL
Prefixal paradigm: Suffixal paradigm:
1 Inclusive: l-… Singular Plural
1 Exclusive: xw-… 1:
2: x-… 2:
…-äs …-ad
3: -… 3: …-a
1.2.4 Specialisation and grammaticalisation
Only person markers that are specialised shifters are considered in this study. Inde-
pendent pronouns like I or you in English are such specialised shifters: the reference
                                                 
10 This structure is found throughout the Muskogean family. For data on Chickasaw, see Payne
(1982: 359); for data on Alabama, see Lupardus (1982: 66-74); for data on Koasati, see Kimball
(1985: 107) and for data on Choctaw, see Nicklas (1974: 31). Haas (1977) proposes an origin of the
person marking by grammaticalisation of auxiliaries.
11 For data on Highland Chontal, see Turner (1966: 65, 68) and for data on Huameltultec Chontal, see
Waterhouse (1967: 356).
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of these words has to shift with the speaking participant. It is impossible for them not
to shift.12 In contrast, words like daddy can be used as a shifter, but are not necessarily
used in that sense. Such words are excluded from the investigation. For languages like
English, this exclusion still leaves the specialised shifters. However, in some lan-
guages, it appears to be the case that nothing remains when all non-specialised shifters
have been removed. This situation seems to occur in many Southeast Asian lan-
guages. For example, Cooke (1968) has made an extensive investigation of person
marking in Thai, Burmese and Vietnamese. The amount of possibilities is over-
whelming. The usage of proper names, kin terms and normal nouns for speaker or ad-
dressee reference is completely normal.13 For Thai, Cooke mentions 27 more or less
specialised first person markers and 22 second person markers (1968: 11-18). Moreo-
ver, these are only a tiny portion of the possibilities as ‘not even personal pronouns
are listed in their entirety in each language, much less other pronominally used forms’
(Cooke, 1968: 2). And then it also turns out that most of the ‘specialised’ person
markers are still interpretable in the original (non-shifting) meaning. The shifters
mean, for example, something like ‘individual’, ‘crown of the head’ or ‘servant’. The
least one can say, is that ‘real’ person markers are a mystifying category in Thai. I
would even say that ‘real’ person markers do not exist. Of course, it is perfectly pos-
sible to perform self-reference in Thai; it is even possible to do so in many more ways
than in English. However, there is not one predominant way to do so. In order not to
confuse the analysis more than is necessary, I have excluded the person marking from
languages like Thai from the present investigation.14 Probably, specialisation of shift-
ers can occur by grammaticalisation from erstwhile nouns, as found in Thai.15 How-
ever, it turns out to be rather difficult to find good examples of this grammaticalisa-
tion. Once the person markers are specialised, the original nominal meaning is long
gone. A fairly good case is the Classical Malay noun sahaya, meaning both ‘servant’
and ‘I-humble/polite’, which turned into modern Indonesian saya, meaning ‘I-
neutral/non familiar’. The word sahaya no longer exists in Indonesian and saya does
not mean ‘servant’. In this case the semi-grammaticalised shifter sahaya turned into
the completely grammaticalised shifter saya (H. Steinhauer, personal communica-
tion).
Another, well documented, aspect of the grammaticalisation of person markers is
from independent pronouns to inflectional person marking (often called ‘agree-
ment’).16 Givón (1976) argues explicitly for this continuum to be interpreted as
                                                 
12 The only possibility for the English pronoun I not to shift with the speaker is in a meta-linguistic use,
as when talking about a novel one says: ‘It is the ‘I’ of the novel that is the murderer!’
13 Somewhat less exotic, this was also found in Swedish, ‘where until comparatively recently title and
name were used in place, or in avoidance of pronominal address’ (Howe 1996: 11, citing Mårtensson
1988: 143).
14 For a comparable system, though somewhat less elaborate than Thai, see Japanese (Shibatani,
1990: 371-388). Often, if a language in Southeast Asia has a specialised set of person markers, these
‘real’ person markers are only very sparingly used, as, for example, in Mandarin Chinese (Li &
Thompson, 1979).
15 Cf von Humboldt (1830) and Blake (1934).
16 There is much literature on the notion of agreement which tries to cope with the large variation of
agreement-like features among the world’s languages (Moravcsik, 1978; Corbett, 1979; Lehmann,
1982; 1983; Moravcsik, 1988; Corbett, 1994). The provisional conclusion is that agreement is about
[continued on next page]
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showing that there is no structural difference between the two forms of person mark-
ing. Person can be marked independently or inflectionally. The reasons for a particu-
lar language to choose either of these possibilities remains unclear. However, from a
cross-linguistic perspective, both strategies are not a priori different.
‘… the tacit assumption [is] that agreement and pronominalization are two distinct
processes. I will suggest below that they are fundamentally one and the same phe-
nomenon, and that neither diachronically nor, most often, synchronically could one
draw a demarcating line on any principled grounds.’ (Givón, 1976: 151)
Still, in most of the generative literature on pronominal marking, this continuum is not
accepted. Independent pronouns and inflectional person marking are considered to be
two completely different aspects of linguistic marking. The reason for the persistence
is probably the high status of the ‘projection principle’ as formulated by Chomsky
(1981: 29). This principle proposes a strong constraint on syntactic analyses and the
intermediate transformations. It implies that at every level of syntactic analysis, the
arguments of each predicate are to be present (overt or covert). Independent pronouns
are possible instantiations of arguments; inflectional person marking is seen as
agreement of the predicate with these arguments. Thus, a regular noun or an inde-
pendent pronoun has to be present at each level of syntactic analysis. There has been
an attempt to lessen the power of this principle by allowing argument status to inflec-
tional person marking (or clitics), and consider independent pronouns as optional ad-
juncts. This idea was originally proposed by Jelinek (1984).
‘I argue that the clitic pronouns do not constitute agreement (AGR) with a nominal …
My claim will be that verbal argument arrays (argument positions) in LS are satisfied
always and only in PS in Warlpiri by clitic pronouns, and that nominals are simply op-
tional adjuncts, with non-argumental functions.’ (Jelinek, 1984: 44)
Many a word has been written on the argumental status of inflectional person markers
since then. For example, Baker (1990; 1991) attempted to improve on the original
proposals. Others, like Saxon (1986: 142) in a description of Dogrib, oppose these
proposals. From a more descriptive point of view, some fuel has been thrown into the
discussion by Mithun (1986; 1991). Finally, the debate seems to have ended after the
publication of an article by Austin and Bresnan (1996) which shows that Jelinek’s
analysis of Warlpiri does not hold for close relatives of Warlpiri.
‘The clitic pronouns that Jelinek (1984) and others take to be the source of non-
configurationality in Warlpiri are simply an areal feature of Australian languages that is
independent of the characteristics of free word order, null anaphora, and split NP’s.
They do not provide the unifying explanation for non-configurationality of the Warlpiri
type.’ (Austin & Bresnan, 1996: 263)
Notwithstanding all the commotion, the idea that inflectional person markers could be
more important for the structure of a language than its independent pronouns does not
seem to have found its way into the generative canon. Generative textbooks like
(Webelhuth, 1995) and (Culicover, 1997) do not mention any of the arguments, nor
cite any of the literature dealing with this proposal. The independent pronouns are still
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covariation between two linguistic elements. Whether one of the two is controlling the other differs
from construction to construction, and from language to language.
‘the term agreement commonly refers to some systematic covariation between a semantic or formal prop-
erty of one element and a formal property of another.’ (Corbett, 1994, citing Steele 1978)
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considered to be the principal person marking system and the term ‘agreement’ re-
mains to be used practically as a synonym of inflectional person marking in most of
the syntactic literature.17
In contrast, I will follow Givón’s proposal, and treat independent pronouns and in-
flectional person marking as two different, though a priori equivalent ways of person
marking. Whether there is a difference between the two strategies is not clear before-
hand. I will include both inflectional person markers and independent pronouns in my
search for the variability of paradigmatic structure. I include (in principle) each and
every person marking paradigm of a language in the investigation without restrictions
as to the function of the paradigm within the language.18 I will not choose one para-
digm per language as representing the ‘real’ person marking system of the language.
1.2.5 Remaining delimitations
The objective of this book includes the marking of person in the singular and the non-
singular. The restriction to the combination person-number may sound natural to
many readers, but from a cross-linguistic perspective the separation of these two di-
mensions from other dimensions is far from obvious. With the risk of raising unnec-
essary suspicion, I want to show why it is not instantly clear how this domain can be
delimited by presenting a few examples of pronominal paradigms that cross the
boundary of person and number. The following selection of examples and references
is intended to show the inherent variability of human language. Even this seemingly
clearly distinct domain of linguistic structure will turn out to have no sharp edges.19
The first and most far-ranging restriction that is made is that I will disregard person
marking paradigms that distinguish gender. I will not only disregard the gendered
elements in the paradigms and retain the rest, but I will disregard the whole paradigm
when it contains gendered forms. The reason for this rather crude decision is that I do
not know which form to leave out when there are various gender forms. In fact, a
separate chapter on the interrelation between gender and person marking was planned,
but did not materialise. For more information on the interrelation between gender and
                                                 
17 Interestingly, the proposal that inflection is for some languages better considered as the ‘principal’
person marking system had already been developed by the classical Arabian grammarians from the 8th
century AD onward (Versteegh, 1997: 77-81). They ran into trouble in the 10th century AD when they
tried to reconcile Aristotelian logic (which was based on a separable predicate-argument structure)
with their traditional grammatical analysis (Abed, 1991).
18 In fact, there is one restriction on the paradigms included. Only person marking paradigms are con-
sidered that are used as argument in a clause or as one-word phrases. The other major grammatical
construction with person markers, viz pronominal possession, is disregarded in this study. The reason
for this restriction is a practical one. The original impetus for compiling the cross-linguistic data was
to look for the differences in argument status of person markers. It was only after most of the data-
collection and much of the analysis had been done that I decided that is impossible to analyse the ar-
gument status of a person marker without first analysing the structure of the paradigm. To control
whether the omission of pronominal possession influences the conclusions of this investigation, I have
had a look at the structure of such paradigms. This look has been more than just a spurious glance, al-
though it has not been representative enough to be reported on here. My impression is that the omis-
sion does not influence the conclusions as put forward in this work. The only place where a different
conclusion might be reached, concerns zero marking for speaker-reference (see section 2.6.2).
19 For a comparable survey of possible categories in person systems, see Mühlhäusler & Harré
(1990: 60-88).
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person, see Corbett (1991: 126-132) and Plank & Schellinger (1997). Only in a few
exceptional cases, when an omission would result in the disappearance of particular
rare paradigmatic structure from the investigation, have I retained paradigms that
maximally distinguish one or two gender forms in the third person singular. The
eventual occurrence of gender marking is always explicitly noted in the discussion of
the examples. The complete variation of gender marking in the domain of person
marking deserves more that just a spurious glance. To raise the interest for this sub-
ject, I will illustrate some of the more curious interrelations between gender and per-
son with two examples. The first example is from Barasano, an eastern Tucanoan lan-
guage spoken in Peru. The gender/person suffixes in Barasano mark gender and ani-
macy in the third person. Curiously, the inanimate suffix is also used for speech-act
participants.20
‘Agreement of person, number, gender and animacy between subject and verb is re-
quired, and is shown by subject agreement markers which occur in final position in the
phrase. … -ha is used for all inanimates, and for speech-act participants, i.e. first or
second person, singular or plural.’ (Jones & Jones, 1991: 73-74)
The second unusual structure is found in the Afro-Asiatic stock. It is widespread
throughout the Semitic, Cushitic and Berber languages. In these languages, the pro-
nominal prefixes often have the same form for the second person and for the third
person feminine. The morpheme for the third person masculine is different. In the
Cushitic languages, this third person masculine is often identical with the first person
singular; an ‘interlocking’ pattern, as it is called by Tucker (1966: 15-16).
Another major omission of the present work is that I will disregard honorific usage of
pronouns and specialised politeness forms of pronouns (Head, 1978; Mühlhäusler &
Harré, 1990: 131-167; Simon, 1999). This is a tricky delimitation, as it might be diffi-
cult to distinguish the ‘real’ referential usage from the ‘metaphorical’ polite usage of a
pronoun. As it turns out, most descriptions are quite clear on the distinction between
referential value and honorific usage. Also from conversational analysis, it appears
that the referential and the metaphorical instances of pronoun use are distinguishable
(Schegloff, 1996: 441-449). I will only present a single – somewhat unusual – case of
honorific usage of pronouns to exemplify the intricate complications that can arise in
this dimension. This interesting ‘metaphorical’ usage of person distinctions is found
in Galela, a West Papuan language spoken on Halmahera in Indonesia. In this lan-
guage, the difference between inclusive and exclusive first person plural is mixed
with honorific usage. In specific contexts, the inclusive form is used as a polite variant
of the first person exclusive.
‘… a situation as where a man asks members of another family to give money to his
own family … His own family is referred to by na- [inclusive] which is interpreted to
mean exclusive, polite. Sociolinguistically, what happens is that by including the ad-
dressee grammatically, the man relieves his embarrassment for having to ask for
money.’ (Shelden, 1991: 165-166)
A different kind of pronominal ‘politeness’ is attested in Australia. Some Australian
languages have specialised person markers that have to be used when referring to kin.
                                                 
20 See for a comparable structure, though in a completely different part of the world, the usage of zero
gender marking in Archi, a Nakh-Dagestanian language from the Caucasus (Corbett, 1991: 127-128).
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For example, in the Mamu-dialect of Dyirbal, a specialised pronoun is attested to refer
to the combination ‘self and spouse’ (Dixon, 1972: 50-51). Specialised kin-related
person markers are most prolifically found in the Arandic family, for example in the
languages Alywerre (Koch, 1997) and Mparntwe Arrernte (Wilkins, 1989: 126-128).
In these languages, complete sets of specialised pronouns exist, in which reference
depends on patrimoiety and generation.
Other traditional pro-nominal elements are disregarded, like interrogative pronouns,
indefinite pronouns, reflexive pronouns and reciprocal pronouns. However, in many
languages, the reflexive and reciprocal markers belong structurally to the person
marking paradigm. For example, the object paradigms in the Athabascan languages
include specialised reflexive and reciprocal morphemes.21 Another example of the
fluid division between reflexive, reciprocal and person marking is found in Mundani,
a Grassfields language from Cameroon. In Mundani, the object pronoun is used for
person reference, but also for reflexive and reciprocal marking. Structurally, there is





‘They are helping them’
‘They are helping themselves’
‘They are helping each other’ (Parker, 1986: 149)
In some person paradigms, the spatial configuration of the referents is specified in
more detail. An example of spatial specification is attested in the paradigm of inde-
pendent pronouns from Cuna, a Chibchan language from Panama. All independent
pronouns are characterised by a suffix …-i. However, this suffix is also added to the
demonstrative roots, distinguishing four grades of locational specificity: ‘this’, ‘the
same’, ‘that’ and ‘yonder’. These demonstrative roots are morpho-phonetically in-
cluded into the person marking paradigm (Holmer, 1946: 190). Another variant of
spatial specification in the person marking paradigm is attested in the Uto-Aztecan
language Ute. In the third person, an opposition between visible and non-visible is
grammaticalised (Givón, 1984: 356-357). Finally, a combination of spatial specifica-
tion and marking of visibility is found in Kwakiutl (Boas, 1947: 252). A variant of the
spatial specification is a discourse specification. Instead of marking the place of the
object in ‘real’ space, the place of the referent in the space of the discourse can be
specified by specialised pronominal forms. A specific way of grammaticalising dis-
course specification is by so-called ‘obviative’ third person markers. Obviative mark-
ers indicate that the intended referent is not the participant which is most prominent in
the discourse; it is ‘the other one’ that is intended. Obviative marking is most famous
as a characteristic of the Athabascan languages like Slave (Rice, 1989: 431) and Na-
vaho (Young & Morgan, 1987: 8). It is, however, widespread throughout North
                                                 
21 For data on Slave, see Rice (1989: 431) and for data on Navaho, see Young (1987: 8).
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American languages, as in the Algonquian languages, for example in Menomini
(Bloomfield, 1962: 44). Spatial specification in the third person is disregarded.
Some languages distinguish special logophoric pronouns. The precise extent of the
usage of logophoric pronouns differs from language to language, but the general idea
behind these pronouns is that they are used in quoting other people. I will disregard
such pronouns. For example, Babungo, a Grassfields language spoken in Cameroon,
has such specialised logophoric pronouns. The pronoun yì is a logophoric third person
pronoun that is generally used as a subject in embedded sentences (Schaub, 1985: 111-
113). The complex logophoric pronoun víyì is used for ‘semi-direct speech’. Semi-
direct speech is direct speech of a participant in a story (Schaub, 1985: 2). This is ex-
emplified in example (1.4). Instead of the logophoric pronoun, also the inclusive basic
pronoun nsôo or the third person plural pronoun v   could have been used (Schaub,
1985: 3).
(1.4) BABUNGO
f$káy gí la #a síi kà vìyì y	
 k
tortoise say that doubt can LOG do what
Tortoise said, “What can we do?” (Schaub, 1985: 2)
Still another aspect of person marking that will be disregarded in the present investi-
gation is the specialised portmanteau forms for transitive constructions. In many lan-
guages around the world, sentences like ‘I see you’ are not formulated by using two
separate pronouns, but by using one person marker that is specialised for this combi-
nation of subject and object. For example, in Diegueño, a Yuman language spoken in
the USA, such specialised person prefixes are attested for various transitive combina-
tions. The prefixes -…, m-…and -… are used for the first, second and third person
intransitive, respectively. Two other prefixes, nj-… and njm-…, belong to the same
paradigm, but these prefixes are used for the transitive combinations of
1subject/2object and 1object/2subject, respectively (Langdon, 1970: 139-140).22 The
occurrence of transitive portmanteau forms in Australian languages is extensively dis-
cussed by Heath (1984; 1991). More recently, Heath (1998) gives a quick but thor-
ough survey of such forms in American languages. Transitive portmanteau prefixes
will be disregarded in this study.
Finally, a solitary case of yet another specialised person marker that will be disre-
garded is found in , a Papuan language from New Guinea (Irwin, 1974: 14-15). For
this language, a special person suffix for ‘speaker alone’ is described. There is a
regular first person suffix …-m(in). This suffix is ambiguous in its reference because
it is used both for singular and plural reference. In some cases, another suffix …-l is
used to stress the fact that only the speaker alone is intended.23
                                                 
22 The actual interaction of the various prefixes and the various transitive combination of participants is
more complicated than this, but this quick review of the basic situation sketches the kind of structure
that is attested in the Yuman languages.
23 Irwin (1974: 14) uses the word ‘exclusive’ for this specialised ‘speaker alone’ form, but it is clear
from the description that this pronoun is rather different from what is normally called an ‘exclusive’
pronoun.
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This list of the many facets of person marking among the world’s languages is proba-
bly far from complete. The more languages are studied, the more strange and unex-
pected phenomena (from a Eurocentric perspective) will crop up. Every delimitation
that is proposed for a cross-linguistic study is bound to encounter exceptions and
problematic cases when confronted with the actual linguistic variation. Still, in this
variation it is not chaos that rules. In the remainder of this work, I will show that there
are still clear tendencies and near-universal generalisations to be made. However, the
balance between generalisations and exceptions is a precarious one. Forgetting the
exceptions might present a picture of the structure of human language that is over-
simplistic. In contrast, disregarding the gross generalisations amidst the variations
might suggest a massive variability of linguistic structure that is not representative of
the actual situation. I will seek a balance between the extremes.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Preamble
The present investigation consists methodologically of three different kind of studies.
Some parts use a cross-linguistic method, some parts use a typological method and
some parts use a crypto-diachronic method. In section 1.3.2, I will discuss the differ-
ence between the cross-linguistic method and the typological method. Basically, the
cross-linguistic method will be used to arrive at a firm basis for the typology. Next, in
section 1.3.3, I will discuss a few special methodological aspects of the construction
of the typology, specifically the question of sampling. Finally, in section 1.3.4, I will
present a somewhat hybrid method, a combination of cross-linguistic and diachronic
ideas, which I call ‘crypto-diachronic’. This method will be used to tap into the dia-
chronic dynamics of the paradigmatic structure of person marking. The result of this
crypto-diachronic study will be a cognitive map, which links paradigmatic structures
that are conceptually (and probably also diachronically) close to each other.
Before I turn to these themes, I want to speak a few words of gratitude and caution.
The words of gratitude are directed to the authors of the grammatical descriptions that
provide the necessary data for my investigation. The morphophonemic analysis of a
language may be taken as given. The methods to identify phonemes and morphemes
seems to be fairly accurate and stable. That is to say, the identification that there ex-
ists a certain morpheme in a language can normally be made with relative certainty.
Also, the acknowledgment of a paradigm in a language is usually rather straightfor-
ward. But the question of the function or meaning of the morphemes is a completely
different problem. I see the most important task of descriptive linguistics as a search
for the best fitting and most compelling analysis of the meaning of specific mor-
phemes (or combinations of morphemes). The present investigation builds on the
large body of work compiled by the authors of such invaluable descriptions of spe-
cific languages. I am writing this book standing on the proverbial shoulders of giants.
The words of caution concern the information on individual languages quoted in this
work. I have attempted to quote only original sources, tracking down all references to
their roots. Only in a few cases have I been unable to get hold of the original source.
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In those cases, I have added the name of the author of the original source to the refer-
ence in which I found the data. The data on all various languages have been copied as
accurately as possible from the original source. However, I cannot guarantee that I
have in all cases represented the data in the intended format. I suggest that any reader
who wants to quote data from this work, consults the original sources to prevent any
accumulation of misquotation.
1.3.2 Typology versus cross-linguistic research
There is a methodological difference between constructing a typology and doing
cross-linguistic research. Basically, the construction of a typology is only part of a
cross-linguistic investigation. However, the non-typological side of cross-linguistic
research is often taken for granted in methodological statements (pace Croft, 1990: 1-
18). For the present work, the cross-linguistic investigation has been of major impor-
tance for the subsequent typology. In fact, most of the research time has been spent on
cross-linguistic work, while the typology was compiled relatively quickly once the
parameters had been fixed.
A TYPOLOGY is always constructed on the basis of a ‘tertium comparationis.’ A typol-
ogy is senseless if it is not constrained by an explicitly formulated subject to be com-
pared in the world’s linguistic variation. On the basis of such a tertium comparationis
– which has to be formulated extra-linguistically – different languages can be catego-
rised on how they formulate that part of linguistic structure. However, a tertium com-
parationis is never theory-independent. It presupposes something to be universally
expressible in language. This universal hypothesis originates in the theoretical back-
ground on the basis of which the typology is made. In this strict interpretation, typol-
ogy is a hypothesis-testing methodology. Given a view about the structure of human
language, the world’s linguistic variation can be used to test this view by making a
typology. In the present study, the hypotheses to be tested will come from a CROSS-
LINGUISTIC investigation. I see cross-linguistic research as the attempt to understand
language by combining different viewpoints from different languages and different
grammarians into a coherent picture.24 The differences that are found in grammars are
not necessarily caused by the language, they could just as well be caused by the view-
point of the grammarian.25 However, as a matter of principle, I assume that all de-
scriptions are good reflections of the language. Every grammar is probably incom-
plete; certain aspects are omitted, other aspects are exaggerated. However, in most
cases the bias of a description is caused by a ‘bias’ in the structure of the language. A
                                                 
24 The philosophical background to this interpretation of cross-linguistic research is the insight that the
most difficult problem for scientific inquiry is to bypass the ‘spectacles of tradition.’ People cannot
observe objectively; there is always some prior experience or knowledge that interferes with the ob-
servation, colouring it and making every observation always an interpretation. One way to bypass this
obstacle is to combine different viewpoints. Different viewpoint are often caused by different ‘specta-
cles.’ On the presupposition that the alternative perspectives look in more or less the same direction,
but from different points of view or with different magnitudes of resolution, the different results ob-
tained from alternative perspectives can be used to understand the influences of the ‘spectacles’ on the
resulting picture. By combining the different views, a new level of understanding can hopefully be
reached.
25 In some cases, I have been able to correct clear errors in the description by comparing the data of
different sources of the same or of closely related languages. Such errors are checked with the original
author (if possible) and are always explicitly noted in footnotes to the data-presentation.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 19
specific language may structurally stress certain functions of human communication,
prompting a grammarian to spend more time dealing in greater depth with this par-
ticular function. The differences between the descriptions of the world’s languages are
better seen as a possible opening to new insights than as a nuisance that complicates
comparison.
Cross-linguistic research and typology follow each other in an interpretational circle.
For the cross-linguistic part of the research, traditional linguistic notions, like ‘pro-
noun’, ‘first person’ or ‘plural’, are taken as a starting point. These traditional notions,
and many others, are part of an ancient heritage of meta-language, of talking about
language, that have proven to be successful for that purpose. But being successful in
the past does not mean that these terms transcend theory. These words are (part of) a
theory about language, just as any other linguistic theory. These ‘traditional’ terms
propose a kind of format with which one can tackle the interpretation of linguistic
structures. They are words that help to understand the structure of a language, but it
should be realised that they do not necessarily have to be appropriate for all lan-
guages.26 In some cases, I will propose a slight reformulation of the interpretation of
traditional concepts to be able to deal better with the attested cross-linguistic varia-
tion. On the basis of these revised concepts, a typology of the world’s linguistic
variation will be made. This typology ‘tests’ the revised concepts, and the results of
this test can be used as a starting point for a next round of cross-linguistic research. In
the present work, the chapters 2, 3 and 7 employ a cross-linguistic method. Building
on this basis, the chapters 4, 5 and 8 describe the cross-linguistic diversity and present
a typology.
1.3.3 Sampling in typology
The typological side of this investigation needs some more methodological explica-
tion. The typological work consists of two different parts. The first part is the compi-
lation of the typology itself, and the second a quantitative analysis of this typology.
Let me first explain how the typology itself has been compiled. In chapters 4 and 8,
the various paradigmatic structures of person marking are classified into different
types. These types are based on the structure of the ‘first person complex’. The first
person complex is the set of categories that include at least the speaker (see chapter
3). This compilation of different paradigmatic types was mainly driven by the urge to
present the wide range of possibilities that is attested regarding person marking in the
world’s languages. The sample of languages for this compilation was not fixed be-
forehand. Of course, every part of the linguistic globe has been included in this typol-
ogy, but this diversity-constraint has only been taken as a base-line condition, not as a
guarantee for empirical success. Every single example of rare paradigmatic structures
has been included in the sample to show the inherent variability of human language.
The result is a broad typology that includes many cases that are only attested in one or
                                                 
26 With ‘traditional’ terminology, I refer to the same kind of theoretical assumptions as Dixon
(1997: 128-135) refers to by ‘Basic Linguistic Theory’:
‘Over the past few hundred years work has been done on language from every part of the world, with
many aspect of linguist theory being rethought, reformulated and refined as a result. The term Basic Lin-
guistic Theory has recently come into use for the fundamental theoretical concepts that underlie all work in
language description and change, and the postulation of general properties of human language.’ (Dixon,
1997: 128)
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two examples. On the other hand, not every case of the commonly occurring para-
digmatic structures is included. After a representative group of a specific common
paradigmatic structure had been described, I stopped the collection of more exemplars
of such common paradigms. This first part of the typological investigation uses a
qualitative method. Two qualities are searched for: to represent the word’s linguistic
diversity and to show roughly which structures in this diversity are common and
which are rare. On the basis of this qualitative typology, some quantitative analyses
are performed in chapter 5 and in the last part of chapter 8. These analyses use the set
of examples that had been compiled for the qualitative typology to perform some
quantitative calculations. As a result of this decision, the sample for these analyses is
not statistically constrained, as, for example, proposed by Rijkhoff & Bakker (1998).
Still, I believe that the results of these quantitative analyses are valuable. The number
of included cases is high, and the diversity of the sample is large. Even more strongly,
the sample covers each and every structure that I know of, including all quaint cases.
A methodology that is more strongly constrained by statistical representativeness
would probably find less diversity, not more. This means that any correlation that
holds for the present diversity-sample will surely also hold for a statistically con-
strained sample.
1.3.4 Crypto-diachrony
The chapters 6 and 9 have not been mentioned until now in this methodological expli-
cation. These two chapters use yet another method to reach yet another goal. I will
call the method ‘crypto-diachronic’, as it is a combination of cross-linguistic and dia-
chronic ideas. The main objective of this method is to get an inkling of the similarity
space of the paradigmatic structure of person marking.
The typological chapters 4, 5 and 8 have resulted in a set of paradigmatic structures
that are regularly encountered among the world’s languages. These paradigmatic
structures are not invariable instances of linguistic form, but perpetually changing
configurations of morphemes. Structures that are similar will change more easily from
one to the other. From the typological investigation, a hypothesis can be distilled on
the similarity of paradigmatic structure. I will use the crypto-diachronic method to test
the hypothetical similarity space of paradigmatic structure. In chapters 6 and 9, I will
look at groups of closely related languages that have slightly different paradigmatic
structures of person markers.27 The morphemes in these paradigms are individually
cognate. However, the paradigmatic configuration of the morphemes is slightly dif-
ferent. I assume that these paradigmatic differences are caused by a relatively recent
change in one direction or the other. In most cases, I do not propose a direction of
change. In this sense, I am not proposing any diachronic developments. However, I
conclude from such examples of recent change that the paradigmatic structures in-
volved are similar. By compiling a large set of such cognate paradigms, I will be able
to build a similarity map of paradigmatic structures. This method will only be used to
investigate the hypothetical similarity space that resulted from the typological investi-
gation.
                                                 
27 Cf the method of intragenetic comparison, as discussed by Greenberg (1969: 184-194).
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1.4 Previous cross-linguistic investigations
1.4.1 Preamble
There exists a massive literature on person marking, but the majority of these investi-
gations deals with the analysis of the pronominal elements of a particular language or
of a group of closely related languages. These studies mainly provide continuously
improved analyses of the pronominal systems of these languages. In some studies, a
theoretical hypothesis is confronted with the phenomena as found in the particular
language or language group. In others, idiosyncratic peculiarities of the language in
question bring about new grammatical concepts to describe linguistic phenomena.
Yet, in contrast to this plethora of individual studies, the amount of literature that
takes a cross-linguistic perspective on person marking is rather limited. In such cross-
linguistic work, the variety of structures that languages use for person marking is
compared in an attempt to arrive at a better understanding of what is meant with the
concept ‘person marking’. I will here discuss the few cross-linguistic investigations of
person marking that were published in the second half of the twentieth century. I do
not discuss specific claims about cross-linguistic variation that are made by the vari-
ous authors. The history of typological claims will be discussed wherever appropriate
throughout the present work. In this section, only the general approach and the meth-
odological issues of the studies are discussed.
The first extensive cross-linguistic collection and comparison of person marking was
compiled by Forchheimer (1953). I will discuss his work together with some of the
devastating critiques that were published at the time of publication in section 1.4.2.
Some cross-linguistic claims about person marking are found in the typological work
of Greenberg and his co-workers. I will review these works in section 1.4.3. Mühl-
häusler and Harré (1990) wrote a monograph predominantly dealing with the deictic
aspects of person marking, using data from a wide variety of languages. I will discuss
this work in section 1.4.4. Finally, I will discuss a shorter work by Laycock (1977) in
section 1.4.5; this investigation takes a structurally restricted perspective on person
marking as Laycock only looks at independent pronouns.28
1.4.2 Forchheimer and his critics
Over the last fifty years, the main reference point for anybody who wanted to know
anything about pronominal systems has been Forchheimer’s thesis The Category of
Person in Language from 1953. The enduring reference to this work stands in strong
contrast to the hostile reactions uttered shortly after the book was published. Fred
Householder’s review in Language (1955) was highly critical. He objects to the clas-
sification ‘of language phenomena in terms of some pre-established pattern of Latin
                                                 
28 In the generative literature, and particular in the wake of the ‘government & binding’ theory, there
has been a great deal of attention for the anaphoric use of pronominal elements. I do not feel compe-
tent to review this extensive literature, which, as a whole, could be interpreted as being ‘cross-
linguistic’ because many different languages are discussed by many different authors. However, the
main body of work in this tradition is based on analyses of Germanic and Romance languages. There
are a few attempts to reconcile the European-based analyses with phenomena found in other lan-
guages. To a relative outsider like me, the results do not look promising for a true cross-linguistic the-
ory (cf Mühlhäusler & Harré, 1990: 55-57; Huang, 1995).
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grammar or some triumph of logic’ (Householder, 1955: 94), and he argues for a more
explicit way of selecting data.29 Dell Hymes’ review in the International Journal of
American Linguistics (1955) is equally trenchant. He objects to the inaccurate pres-
entation of the data and the implicit diachronic argumentation.
‘Perhaps so weak a book should not have been written; on the other hand, it is the only
one in its field.’ (Hymes, 1955: 300)
There are indeed many points in Forchheimer’s study that call for criticism. However,
one can hardly expect such a ground-breaking kind of investigation to be perfect. The
work by Forchheimer is a first attempt at a cross-linguistic comparison of the struc-
ture of pronominal marking. Among the many problems, I believe there to be many
stimulating aspects in Forchheimers investigation, although the correct conclusions
are only covertly stated in the work itself. The main error, I believe, is the title of the
book, which puts the reader (and Forchheimer himself) on a wrong track.
Forchheimer’s study is truly cross-linguistic in nature. He explains that he has ‘ex-
amined a good five hundred grammars and word lists. … general works and collec-
tions on almost all areas’ (1953: 2), although only about 70 different languages are
actually discussed in the book (cf Ingram, 1978: 218). This wide array of linguistic
diversity that is included in the comparison is typical of the German tradition of lin-
guistic comparison and classification as it was found at the start of the twentieth cen-
tury (cf Müller, 1876-1887; Schmidt, 1926; Royen, 1929). Unfortunately,
Forchheimer followed this tradition at a time when nobody was really interested in
such work. The restriction to roughly 70 languages stems from Forchheimer’s primary
interest in the diversity of linguistic structure. He does not list all languages that he
has investigated, but only those languages that exemplify a particular type of struc-
ture.
‘Wherever I have found or suspected unusual or new material I have changed from the
extensive to an intensive study of that linguistic stock or area. … after a certain stage
had been reached, examination of more languages did no longer show new types.’
(Forchheimer, 1953: 2-3)
The types that he was interested in are various ‘person patterns’ or ‘person systems’
(Forchheimer, 1953: 2). However, his main interest lies not in the paradigmatic struc-
ture as I have defined it (see section 1.2.3), but in the morphological patterns of the
marking of number in the pronominal domain. This central occupation with the mor-
phological structure can be inferred from the kind of types that are distinguished in
the typology. His classification consists of types like ‘Languages with Morphological
Plural of Pronouns’ or ‘Languages without Morphological but with Lexical Plural at
least in the First Person’, et cetera. The result is a typology of the morphological
coding of the connection between person and number (Forchheimer, 1953: 11-19).
This goal of Forchheimer’s investigation can be directly connected to the influence of
                                                 
29 Householder starts off referring to Forchheimer as an amateur, indicating that he does not intend to
take the work seriously.
‘The linguistic amateur, like the amateur in other fields, has characteristic virtues and vices. He is usually
enthusiastic, sanguine, and industrious, often learned. His goals and ideals, on the other hand, may appear
strange, even futile, to his more conventional colleagues.’ (Householder, 1955: 93)
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the work of Wilhelm Schmidt (especially 1926: 316-334), an influence that is explic-
itly mentioned by Forchheimer in the acknowledgments to his book.
A central problem with Forchheimer’s study (criticised by both Householder,
1955: 94, and Hymes, 1955: 295) is that he does not explicate on what grounds he se-
lects the person-marking data from the various descriptions. He takes the term ‘person
marking’ to be a self-explanatory term, describing a certain universally applicable
concept of linguistic structure. Forchheimer implicitly took the rough equivalents of
West European pronouns as the data for his study. By definition, these elements will
mark for person, but the unanswered question is whether those element necessarily
form a special category. He does not give any criteria on the basis of which he decides
that a particular set of person marking morphemes form a category. It is surely true
that every language can mark person in some way, but whether every language has a
category of person remains unproven. This point leads to another problem with the
implicit assumptions in Forchheimer’s study. Not only does he assume a category of
person in all languages, he also claims to be able to extract the system of person-
marking for all languages:
‘From any fairly reliable grammar, be it conservative or modern, prescriptive or de-
scriptive, scholarly or written by an interested traveller, it is possible to work out the
system of person peculiar to a language.’ (Forchheimer, 1953: 1, italics added)
Many languages have an independent pronoun system alongside inflectional pro-
nominal systems. It remains unclear how Forchheimer decides which one is the sys-
tem. Sometimes, he takes an independent person marking paradigm as the system. In
other cases, he includes an inflectional paradigm in his sample as the pronominal
system.
‘Personal pronominal elements are found in different forms. They may occur either as
enclitics (affixes), or as so-called free, separate, independent, disjunctive, or absolute
pronouns. … After studying hundreds of systems, I became convinced that the affix-
pronouns often represent the pure pronominal elements.’ (Forchheimer, 1953: 23)
It seems that Forchheimer finds the system of person marking in all languages, not as
an empirical result, but because of an a priori assumption that there has to be such a
thing in all languages. In conclusion, it can be said that Forchheimer’s reasoning can
only be understood if the existence of a universal and unitary person system is taken
for granted and not as the result of his investigation. From this discussion it should
not be concluded that such an assumption is wrong altogether. It is only on the basis
of assumptions that questions can be asked and results can be reported. Problems arise
when the assumptions are confused with the research questions and the conclusions.
This occurs, for example, when Forchheimer claims universal status for his assumed
categories, as he occasionally does.
‘The distinction of speaker, addressed, and neither speaker nor addressed is universally
found.’ (Forchheimer, 1953: 39)
This conclusion is not correct, given the approach that Forchheimer uses. He assumes
that the person categories exist; he does not investigate whether they actually do.30
                                                 
30 Cf section 1.2.4 of this work and Housholder (1955: 96) on a negative answer to the question of
whether specialised person markers exist universally.
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One can regret the fact that Forchheimer took this perspective. He could indeed have
performed a different investigation, but, ultimately, he did what he did.
‘… he intends to concern himself mainly with the morphological and etymological re-
lationships of the actual forms in each language. What a lost opportunity! When he
could have actually studied the grammatical category of person, found out which lan-
guages do and which do not have such a category, determined the various systems in
the different languages and compare them … .’ (Householder, 1955: 94)
In general, besides rather overt flaws in the representation of the data (cf House-
holder, 1955: 97-99; Hymes, 1955: 294-295) and some confusions between assump-
tions and results, the work is an interesting effort to do cross-linguistic research at a
time when linguistics was not very interested in such work. Maybe the major mistake
Forchheimer made was the title of his study: The Category of Person in Language. He
does not investigate this theme, but assumes a priori that the category of person ex-
ists. It would have been better if he had called the book something like ‘Number
marking in Person Systems’.
1.4.3 Greenberg and his co-workers
The general reception of Joseph Greenberg’s famous 1963 article on universals of
grammar contrasts sharply with the hostile reaction to Forchheimer’s study. In only
ten years, the scientific climate had changed drastically, as some of the same points of
criticism that were raised against Forchheimer’s study can also be raised against
Greenberg’s article. The most important point of criticism to be made is that Green-
berg – just as Forchheimer – does not explicate on which grounds he selects his data.31
In the 1963 article, besides the well known universals on word order, there is also a
section on morphology where Greenberg makes some claims about pronominal ele-
ments. Greenberg claims universal status for three persons and two numbers:
‘Universal 42: All languages have pronominal categories involving at least three per-
sons and two numbers.’ (Greenberg, 1963: 96)
The almost identical claim was made by Forchheimer, but there is a slight difference
in phrasing between Greenberg and Forchheimer. Greenberg does not claim that there
is something like the pronominal system. He instead argues that there are three per-
sons and a number opposition somewhere in each language, but he does not claim a
single primary paradigm with these characteristics for each language. Yet, the same
criticism that was raised in the discussion of Forchheimer applies here. If the selection
criterion is to find elements comparable to the European pronominal elements in other
languages, one will probably always find them. The remaining problem is whether
those elements form a genuine category, as seen from the point of view of the struc-
ture of the language in question.
Following Greenberg’s approach to language universals, the Project on Language
Universals took place in Stanford between 1967 and 1976, directed by Charles
                                                 
31 Greenberg even explicitly states that ‘no attempt at definition of categories will be attempted’
(Greenberg, 1963: 92). He ignores this aspect because he wants to concentrate on other questions:
‘To have concentrated on this task, important in itself, would have, because of its arduousness, prevented
me from going forward to those specific hypotheses, based on such investigation, which have empirical
import and are of primary interest to the nonlinguist.’ (Greenberg, 1963: 74)
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Ferguson and Joseph Greenberg. The results of this impressive project were published
in 4 volumes in 1978. In the third volume Word Structure, there is an article ‘Typol-
ogy and Universals of Personal Pronouns’ by David Ingram. Here, even more strongly
than in the case of Forchheimer’s study, what is presented as results is assumption in
disguise. This is even more startling as Ingram is explicit about his assumptions and
questions. Still, he does not seem to notice that his conclusions are implied in his as-
sumptions. Ingram is explicit about the questions he will address. The main question
he asks is ‘what are the roles or combinations of roles in the speech act that each lan-
guage considers to be of sufficient importance to mark by a separate lexical form?’
(Ingram, 1978: 215-216). To investigate this question, Ingram chose to use the data as
presented by Forchheimer in his book. Yet, one should be very careful in using
Forchheimer’s data. In fact, Forchheimer’s data can only be used for the particular
goal for which they were compiled: to make a morphological typology of number
marking in the pronominal domain. Ingram does not realise that it is unsafe to formu-
late cross-linguistic conclusions about the paradigmatic structure of person marking
on the basis of the data presented by Forchheimer. He simply takes Forchheimer’s
data and computes the statistical frequencies of particular paradigmatic types.
Forchheimer’s sample, however, was designed to show the different morphological
possibilities to code number in the pronominal domain. Forchheimer’s data do not
give an accurate statistical survey of the world’s linguistic possibilities of paradig-
matic structure. Ingram’s conclusions thus stand on shaky ground.
‘Four systems … are more frequent than others. … The six person system [I, thou, he,
we, you, they] is by far the most common system in languages.’ (Ingram, 1978: 219)
More problematic still is Ingram’s proposal of universal features to analyse the sys-
tems found. He offers the features ‘speaker’, ‘hearer’ and ‘other’ for person and ‘sin-
gular’, ‘dual’, ‘trial’, ‘plural’ and ‘unmarked’ for number. These features are not re-
sults of the cross-linguistic study, but are explicit statements of the assumptions.
Householder comments as follows on these ‘results’:
‘He [referring to Forchheimer, but it also applies to Ingram] chose to investigate the
words which might conceivably translate I, thou, we, you, he, she, it, they. Could he
possibly have taken any other step which would as surely guarantee in advance that he
would discover nothing?’ (Householder, 1955: 94)
In the late 1980’s Greenberg started a project entitled The Diachronic Typology of
Pronominal Systems. Despite the name, the articles that he published during this pro-
ject (Greenberg, 1985; 1988; 1993) deal with cross-linguistic variation, more than
with typology or diachrony as such. He presents ample data showing the variability of
linguistic structures to be found in the world’s languages, and hardly claims any re-
strictions on the possible linguistic structures. Increasingly through the articles,
Greenberg is taken by the problem of the traditional terminology, thus questioning as
such the assumptions implied. The rhetorical structure in these articles is completely
different from the investigations I have discussed so far. In these articles, Greenberg
considers a particular traditional grammatical term to be a theoretical proposal for lin-
guistic analysis. He no longer takes these terms for granted (as they have been for
centuries), but discusses whether they might be improved upon. He shows different
instantiations of the terms in different languages and, finally, he asks whether the
phenomena attested form a category. Instead of assuming implicitly the correctness of
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the traditional terminology, he transforms the traditional terminology into a question.
For example, in the article about the category ‘first person inclusive dual’ (Greenberg,
1988), he notes that the category to indicate ‘you and me’ (if it exists in a particular
language) is ambiguous cross-linguistically. It is either a special category of person,
or a category of number. He concludes:
‘Thus the first person inclusive dual appears to be an ambiguous category. … We have
sacrificed the notion of a uniform and universally valid set of typological categories by
positing an ambiguous one.’ (Greenberg, 1988: 12)
In another article, Greenberg questions the traditional three-person analysis
(Greenberg, 1993). But although he shows that various linguistic phenomena do not
fit in with the three-person analysis (such as zero third persons and inclusive persons),
in the end he defends the three person analysis because it seems to occur so often
among the world’s languages.
‘the traditional notion of a pronominal category of person with three members seems
defensible. After all, the three-person pattern may be the result of historical accident,
but it is a recurrent one.’ (Greenberg, 1993: 20)
The approach taken by Greenberg in these later works will be followed in the present
investigation. The traditional categories that are used to analyse person marking are
not taken for granted, but tested on their accuracy against the available cross-
linguistic variation.
1.4.4 Mühlhäusler and Harré
The starting point for Mühlhäusler and Harré in their work Pronouns and People
(1990) is diametrically opposed to that of the authors discussed so far. The implicit, or
sometimes even explicit, goal of the preceding authors was to find universals of hu-
man language, or at least restrictions in the attested linguistic structures. Mühlhäusler
and Harré instead focus on the extent of linguistic relativity; they assume a tight inter-
relation between language and the social context and consequently stress the many
ways in which linguistic structure can vary. They approach pronouns from their deic-
tic side, leaving aside the anaphoric aspect of pronominal marking. To highlight the
deictic approach, I would rather want to talk about ‘person’ instead of ‘pronoun’, but
that is a minor terminological quibble.
‘A number of significant questions one might wish to ask about pronouns either have
never been asked or else have received only marginal attention. Instead, linguists have
chosen to address an issue, anaphoricity, that may be insoluble and that to us appears to
be of only minor interest.’ (Mühlhäusler & Harré, 1990: 59)
Mühlhäusler and Harré assume that person markers are found in small ‘closed sets’,
reminiscent of what I call a ‘paradigm’. However, they seem to imply that each lan-
guage has such a ‘closed set’, but I doubt that this is universally true (cf Thai, as dis-
cussed above in section 1.2.4). Still, the majority of the world’s languages indeed
seems to have such a ‘closed set’ of person markers.
‘The term [pronoun] has been used in grammatical classifications of words to refer to a
closed set of lexical items that, it is held, can substitute for a noun or a noun phrase …
When we talk of a ‘closed set’, we imply that in human language only a small, definite
repertoire of pronoun forms is found in each.’ (Mühlhäusler & Harré, 1990: 9)
Finally, Mühlhäusler and Harré stress the fact that the existing descriptive devices for
the analysis of grammatical structure are in need of reconsideration and improvement,
reminiscent of the approach of Greenberg in his later papers. Regrettably, Mühl-
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häusler and Harré note the problem, but do not really put forward a new proposal for
an improved cross-linguistic analysis of pronouns.
‘We thus need to have a descriptive apparatus sufficiently sensitive to describe all emic
distinctions people actually make in all the world’s cultures in relation to the subject
matter for which the etic concepts are designed, in our case the functioning of … pro-
nouns. As will be demonstrated eventually, the available etic tools may well be incom-
plete or even inadequate.’ (Mühlhäusler & Harré, 1990: 61)
In general, the work by Mühlhäusler and Harré is a valuable addition to the cross-
linguistic knowledge about the variability of person marking among the world’s lan-
guages. The main omission in their work, however, is the aspect opposite to variabil-
ity: the restrictions on the variation. Mühlhäusler and Harré do not investigate the
question of which of the many phenomena they discuss are common and which are
rare. Neither do they present a geographical or structural analysis of the variation.
Yet, they did not intend to cover these questions. Consequently, they leave those
questions to be answered by others. I will attempt to do so to some extent in the pre-
sent investigation.
1.4.5 Laycock on New Guinean pronouns
Laycock’s (1977) article on pronoun systems in Papuan languages is restricted in ex-
tent and scope. It deals only with an areally restricted set of languages, although from
an area that is generally seen as one of the most linguistically diverse regions of the
world: New-Guinea. Within this areal restriction, he only included independent pro-
nouns in his comparison.32 He acknowledges that most languages seem to have more
than one pronominal system, all of which can have a different internal structure.
‘A language may – and usually does – have a number of pronoun systems. Pronouns
may be free or bound, emphatic or non-emphatic, full or abbreviated; they may also
appear with different case-endings. Each such set may form a different system in that
different categories are distinguished.’ (Laycock, 1977: 33)
Other than the authors discussed previously, Laycock does not assume that there is
one central pronoun system without indicating how to select that system out of the
multiple possibilities. Laycock instead takes a formal characteristic to select his data:
he compares those sets of person markers that are morphologically independent. By
using this methodology, Laycock cannot draw any conclusions about the structure of
a complete language. It could very well be that a particular opposition is not attested
in the independent pronouns, but that this opposition can be found somewhere else in
the language (viz in the inflectional person marking). Because of this method, Lay-
cock cannot speak about the structure of language as a whole, but this drawback is
compensated by the fact that he is immune to the criticism of Eurocentrism. If one
searches for the presupposed categories known from ‘Standard Average European’
languages, one will probably find them somewhere in any language. The real question
should be whether the phenomena found form a category in the language. This was
one of Householder’s criticism of Forchheimer.
 ‘It is nonsense to talk of a category wherever a language ‘possesses the means for e x-
pressing a concept’ … since, by definition, any natural language possesses the means
                                                 
32 There are a few investigations of person marking that explicitly restrict the scope of the data to inde-
pendent pronouns, cf Chlenova (1973), Sokolovskaya (1980) and Schwartz (1986).
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for expressing anything. It is not the ability to express, but the inability to leave unex-
pressed that usually shows the presence of a category.’ (Householder, 1955: 94)
Laycock’s main conclusion is that the pronominal systems of Papuan languages are
not in conformity with Greenberg’s Universal 42 (‘all languages have pronominal
categories involving at least three persons and two numbers’, see section 1.4.3). He
finds pronominal systems consisting of only two or three members (Laycock,
1977: 35). I will specifically discuss this criticism of Greenberg’s Universal 42 in sec-
tion 3.6.2.
Laycock’s approach – to include only independent pronouns in the comparison – is a
methodologically coherent method, although it is restricted in its scope. I will extend
this approach by including each and every person marking paradigm, whether inde-
pendent or inflectionally marked (see section 1.2.3). The same pro’s and con’s arise.
On the negative side, this method does not leave any room for conclusions about the
structure of a language as a whole. Yet, on the positive side, it restricts the influence
of Eurocentrism, which can otherwise be found in the form of implicit decisions to
include the most familiar paradigm from a particular language in the investigation.
1.4.6 Conclusion
The focus and methodology of the present investigation have their clear precursors.
First, the focus on person deixis is shared with Mühlhäusler & Harré (1990). Second,
the interest for the paradigmatic structure is also found in the work of Laycock (1977)
and Ingram (1978). The concern to find a suitable meta-language for the cross-
linguistic variability of person deixis is shared with Mühlhäusler & Harré (1990) and
the later work by Greenberg (1988, 1993). The wish to lay out the cross-linguistic di-
versity that is attested among the world’s languages is also the goal of the work by
Forchheimer (1953) and Mühlhäusler & Harré (1990). Finally, the attempt to formu-
late typological restrictions on this diversity is also found in the early work by Green-
berg (1963) and in the work by Ingram (1978). In sum, these goals present an ambi-
tious plan for the present work.
1.5 Outline of the book
This book is divided into three parts. The first part (chapters 2 and 3) deals with per-
son marking. The second part (chapters 4, 5 and 6) investigates the paradigmatic
structure of person marking. These two parts form the core of the present study. The
third part (chapters 7, 8 and 9) adds an analysis of number marking to this core. The
results of the various parts are summarised in chapter 10.
Part One, Person Marking, starts off with a cross-linguistic analysis of singular person
marking (chapter 2). The three singular categories ‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and ‘other’,
which will be the basis for the investigation throughout this work, are introduced. A
typology will be presented of paradigms that do not distinguish all three categories.
Also, the status of zero marking of singular categories is investigated in detail.
Building on this foundation, the marking of plural person marking will be investigated
(chapter 3). The concept of ‘plural’ in the person marking domain is discarded and the
notion ‘group’ is proposed as a replacement. The various theoretically possible group-
categories are discussed against the background of the attested cross-linguistic varia-
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tion. Also, a first advance towards a typology of the marking of these group-
categories is made. A typology will be presented on the basis of the ‘first person com-
plex’, which is the set of groups that include at least the speaker.
Part Two, Paradigmatic Structure, investigates the structure of the singular and the
group categories combined. First, a complete typology of the attested paradigmatic
structures is presented (chapter 4). This compilation is a lengthy and somewhat boring
enumeration of case after case of paradigms of person marking. Along the way, a di-
vision into ‘common’ and ‘rare’ paradigmatic structures will be made. Some interme-
diate cases are classified as ‘semi-common’. On the basis of this qualitative typology,
I have made a quantitative analysis of the structure of the paradigmatic structure
(chapter 5). In this chapter, the focus will shift from the paradigms as a whole to the
specific oppositions that are marked in each paradigm. Many implications between
various oppositions are found, in the form of statements like ‘if a paradigm has oppo-
sition X, it will also have opposition Y’. Two major hierarchies are the result: the Ex-
plicitness Hierarchy and the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy. Finally, these hierar-
chies are reformulated as a hypothesis for diachronic change (chapter 6). Two para-
digms that are close to each other on these typological hierarchies are hypothesised to
be similar. Diachronic change is taken to follow roughly the typological similarity
space as described by the hierarchies. To test this hypothesis, cases of ‘cognate para-
digms’ are collected. It turns out that the hypothesis fares rather well.
Part Three, Number Incorporated, extends the core of person categories as discussed
so far with elements that explicitly mark number. Because I have replaced the tradi-
tional concept of ‘plural’ by the notion ‘group’ (in chapter 3), the traditional notion of
‘number’ has to be redefined within the person marking domain (chapter 7). Next, the
typology of the core categories can be extended with these redefined number catego-
ries (chapter 8). The resulting classification of the various paradigms attested will be
used for a quantitative analysis. These quantitative analyses result in a hierarchy that
will be tested on its diachronic interpretation (chapter 9). The outcome will be a net-
work of interconnected paradigms, which maps the similarity space of paradigmatic
structure.
Finally, the main conclusions from these chapters are summarised in chapter 10. Also,
some prospects for further research are presented there. When the main line of the
present work is thus finished, a further theme is taken up in appendix A. There is a
recurrent claim in the literature that there are languages with special person catego-
ries, called ‘compound pronouns’. In appendix A, I investigate these pronouns, and
present the arguments why I disregarded these elements in the main body of this
study. Appendix B and C present a survey of the typological classification as used for





‘In those days his true self was still fighting
with his assumed self, and winning. Person
and persona, the man and his mask had sepa-
rate identities then, he knew which was
which.’
Jeanette Winterson, Gut Symmetries
The term ‘person’ is as old as the Western tradition of grammatical analysis. The
English grammatical usage of the word ‘person’ is a loan-translation from the Latin
grammatical term ‘persona’. In turn, the Latin persona was adopted from Greek lin-
guistics, in which the equivalent word prósopon was used. This word is already at-
tested in the oldest linguistic text in the occidental tradition that is known today, the
Tékhne Grammatiké by Dionysius Thrax (c. 100 BC).
‘Prósopa tría, prôton, deúteron, tríton; prôton mèn af hoû ho lógos, deúteron dè pròs
hòn ho lógos, tríton dè perì hoû ho lógos.’ (Uhlig, 1883: 51)
‘There are three persons, first, second and third. The first is the originator of the utter-
ance, the second the person to whom it is addressed and the third the topic of the utter-
ance.’ (Kemp, 1987: 181)
The word prósopon was introduced comparing language metaphorically to a play. The
Greek word prósopon, like the Latin persona, is the word for ‘mask’ in the theatre,
hence for ‘dramatic character’ or ‘role’ (Lyons, 1977: 638). The language user can
take different roles in the linguistic interplay, changing his mask from speaker to ad-
dressee and back.
In this Part One, the various grammatical possibilities to mark person are investigated.
Chapter 2 deals with the three basic concepts, ‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and ‘other’. This
division is almost identical to the classical analysis by Thrax. In this chapter, I will
restrict myself to the singular usage of these concepts. Chapter 3 deals with the non-
singular marking of person. The classical approach fares less well here. To be able to
describe the cross-linguistic variation in non-singular marking, I will define the notion
of ‘group’ as a replacement for the concept ‘plural’ in the domain of person marking.

Chapter 2
One among the crowd
The marking of singular participants
2.1 Introduction
Pronominal paradigms vary widely among the languages of the world. It will be a
long journey to get this variation under control. I will proceed in small steps, limiting
myself each time to a conveniently arranged subset of the variation. Inevitably, this
will lead to some ad hoc decisions to include certain themes in one chapter or another,
but everything that has to be said will come up eventually. This chapter deals with
singular pronominal marking. This first step is a small step. In the introductory chap-
ter, I have defined pronominal systems as paradigms that show at least an opposition
between the marking for speaker and addressee. Both categories ‘speaker’ and ‘ad-
dressee’ refer to one singular participant. In this chapter, one category will be added
to these two: the category ‘any other singular participant’. Many pronominal para-
digms do not have one single morpheme for this category; the category is often split
into different morphemes for different referents, like in the case of gender marking.
However, some paradigms do have a single morpheme that is used for all ‘other’ sin-
gular referents. Only such paradigms will be considered in this chapter. Of these
paradigms, only the singular morphemes will be considered. This may seem as if al-
most nothing is left to talk about, but even with such a restricted set of categories,
there is enough variation among the world’s languages to fill a whole chapter. More
important still, the foundation for the chapters to come will be laid with these three
categories, which makes it necessary to be very precise at this point of the classifica-
tion.
A proper definition of the terminology used is a basic aspect of all scientific inquiry.
In a cross-linguistic comparison, this becomes even more prominent, as ‘exotic’ lan-
guages do not always behave as would be expected from a European point of view. In
particular, some additions have to be made to the intuitive notion of ‘singular’ within
the pronominal domain (section 2.2). When this groundwork has been finished, the
principal objective of this chapter can be taken up: a typology of singular pronominal
marking (section 2.3). Then follows a rather long discussion of pronominal paradigms
with ‘impoverished’ singular marking. Various kinds of homophony between the sin-
gular categories are attested (section 2.4). I will argue that the cross-linguistic varia-
tion does not corroborate the hypothesis that the ‘richness’ of a pronominal paradigm
is linked to the usage of independent pronouns (section 2.5). Subsequently, some at-
36 PART ONE: PERSON MARKING
tention will be paid to the occurrence of zeros in singular pronominal marking. The
question will be raised here whether these zeros should be considered as non-overt
marking, or maybe better seen as non-existing marking (section 2.6). Finally, the
content of this chapter will be summarised in section 2.7.
2.2 Definition of singular
From a West European point of view, singular pronominal marking may seem a
straightforward (sub)category of linguistic structure, but the concept is in need of a
more rigorous definition before it can successfully be applied to classify the world’s
linguistic variation. The first point to emphasise is that the use of the word ‘singular’
has to be taken literally: the forms that will show up in this section mark one single
person or object. This may seem self-evident, but there are two problematic phenom-
ena on the boundary between singular and plural marking that need some attention.
One of these phenomena is the so-called ‘inclusive’, which is semantically plural,
while some languages consider it structurally to be singular (cf Conklin, 1962). Not-
withstanding such analyses, the inclusive marking will be disregarded in this chapter.
The other problem is that the same pronominal elements are sometimes used for both
singular and plural referents. Strictly speaking, such elements are not only ‘singular’,
but they will still be included in this chapter as part of their meaning is singular. I will
take the independent pronouns and the pronominal inflection from Axininca Campa,
an Arawakan language from Peru, to exemplify these definitional considerations. The
pronominal elements from Campa are shown in Table 2.1.1
pronoun prefix suffix
speaker naaka no-… …-na
addressee eeroka pi-… …-mi
speaker & addressee aaka a-… …-ai
other (masculine) irirori ir-… …-ri
other (feminine) iroori o-… …-ro
Table 2.1: Campa pronominal marking (Reed & Payne, 1986: 324-325)
The first problematic aspect for the definition of the term ‘singular’ is the special pro-
nominal marker for the group of speaker and addressee combined, normally referred
to as ‘inclusive’. This inclusive is a special kind of pronominal marking that refers to
a group that consists minimally of the principal speech-act participants, speaker and
addressee, but more participants can be added. An inclusive is inherently plural as it
minimally refers to two participants. However, in Campa, as well as in some other
languages, the inclusive behaves morpho-syntactically like the singular persons. This
can, for example, be concluded from the marking of plurality. Nouns and independent
pronouns use the nominal plural suffix …-payee(ni). This plural suffix can also be
                                                 
1 The different Campa languages are not mutually intelligible. However, the same 5-way pronominal
paradigm is found all Campa languages. The data here come from the Apurucayali Ashéninca lan-
guage.
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found on the inclusive pronoun, as shown in (2.1 c). This indicates that the inclusive
can be interpreted both as singular (only speaker and addressee) and as plural
(speaker, addressee and others). For the plural interpretation, the plural suffix is
needed (Reed & Payne, 1986: 324).2 In this chapter, the definition of the term ‘singu-
lar’ is taken to mean ‘exactly one’. Consequently, inclusive marking will not be dis-
cussed here, as it is not a form of singular marking. In the next chapter, I will return





naak-payee ‘we (addressee excluded)’
c. aaka ‘inclusive’
aaka-payeeni ‘inclusive plural’
The second problem with the notion ‘singular’ is the occurrence of pronominal ele-
ments that cross the singular/plural boundary. The morphemes that are used for sin-
gular marking are, in some languages, also used when there is more than one person
indicated. The same element can mean ‘I’, but sometimes also ‘we’. In such lan-
guages, number marking is often not obligatory, sometimes even non-existent. This is
rather different from what is found normally in European languages, although the
double meaning of the English pronoun you (which can be both singular and plural) is
an example of this phenomenon. In Campa, the indeterminacy between singular and
plural is taken much further than in English. There are no special pronominal affixes
at all for plural marking in Campa. For example, the prefix no-… in its singular




‘I heard him’ (Reed & Payne, 1986: 325)
There are no separate element for meanings like ‘we’ or ‘they’ in the inflectional
paradigms, so, strictly speaking, there is no number marking in these pronominal
systems. There exists a way to mark plurality in Campa, by the (discontinuous) suffix
…-aiy-…-ni, exemplified in (2.3). It remains undetermined what is pluralised by this
suffix. Either, or both, of the participants in (2.3) could be pluralised by it. So, this




‘We heard him’, ‘I heard them’, or ‘We heard them’ (Reed & Payne, 1986: 325)
                                                 
2 The difference between the inclusive singular and the inclusive plural (also known as the augmented
inclusive) will be discussed in sections 3.6.5 and 4.7.
3 In section 4.5.2, this type of paradigm as it is found in Campa, will be reconsidered. There it will be
shown how it is possible that the ‘plural’ inclusive can sometimes fit in, structurally, with the singular
marking.
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Even in a looser sense, this plural suffix is no ‘real’ number marking, as it is in most
cases not used when there is more than one person indicated. When it is clear from the
context that it is a group of people to which the reference is made, then the plural
marking is considered superfluous:
‘A notable phenomenon of Axininca person pronominals is that they are generally un-
specific for number. The plural suffixes on verbs are ambiguous, except for context, as
to plural subject or plural object. Furthermore, the person affixes often occur without
the plural suffixes to indicate plural subjects of objects when it has been earlier speci-
fied in the discourse.’ (Payne, 1981: 34)
In most cases, an utterance like (2.2), without plural marking, will be used to express
statements like ‘we heard him’, ‘I heard them’ or even ‘we heard them’. The pro-
nominal affixes in Campa do not specifically mark singular participants. In fact, they
are unmarked as far as number is concerned. Such pronominal elements, that are un-
marked for number, are included here under the heading of singular marking. For this
chapter, the term ‘singular’ is taken to mean ‘minimally including singular refer-
ence’.4
Another definitional property of the subject of the present chapter is that subcategori-
sations are disregarded. In the example paradigms from Campa, there is a subcatego-
risation to gender in the third person; a distinction between the prefixes ir-… and o-….
It is an interesting question whether these two morphemes should be regarded as dif-
ferent subcategories of the third person or as two separate categories of pronominal
marking. For now, I settle this discussion by simply disregarding all paradigms that
do make these kind of distinctions, be it by gender or otherwise. In this chapter, I will
discuss only those pronominal paradigms that do not have any subcategorisations in
the singular. With this proviso, there is only a restricted (although still rather large)
group of paradigms left that all have a ‘basic’ system for singular pronominal mark-
ing. In these ‘basic’ systems, there are maximally three different morphemes: one for
speaker, one for addressee and one for any other. There can, of course, exist less than
three different morphemes, like in the case of the English pronominal inflection,
which has only two suffixes, …- and …-s.
To conclude, only those pronominal paradigms that show a morphological distinction
between the traditional categories ‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and ‘other’ are included in
this section.5 The Latin inflectional pronominal paradigm is exemplary. There are
three suffixes, …-o, …-s and …-t, and nothing else. Paradigms that have less than
these three morphemes will be the crux of this chapter.
                                                 
4 The distribution of forms that have both singular and plural reference will be taken up again in the
next chapter. A complete analysis can be found under the heading ‘horizontal homophony’ in section
5.6.
5 I am tempted to use the abbreviations ‘S’, ‘A’ and ‘O’ for speaker, addressee and other. However,
exactly the same letters are used to analyse ergative structures in the tradition of Dixon (1979). There,
the letters ‘S’, ‘A’ and ‘O’ stand for subject, agent and object. To preclude confusion, I have decided
to keep to the traditional numbers 1, 2 and 3 as abbreviations for speaker, hearer and other, respec-
tively. The use of numbers should not be interpreted as a sign of inherent ranking of the categories;
they are only used as abbreviations for reference to the basic speech act participants.
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2.3 Typology
The three-morpheme paradigm, like the Latin singular suffixes, occurs frequently in
the languages of the world. Still, there are cases where some of the three categories
are coded by the same morpheme. I have found examples of pronominal paradigms
with less than three singular morphemes in Germanic, among the non-Austronesian
languages from New Guinea and in many other incidental cases spread out over the
rest of the world. In such paradigms, different singular categories are marked by ho-
mophonous morphemes. In this section, a typology of these kinds of homophony will
be developed.6
There are four theoretically possible kinds of homophony within the boundaries of the
three persons. These four possibilities are shown in Table 2.2, along with the basic
case, where all three persons are distinct. The five possibilities will be referred to as
(Sa) through (Se); ‘S’ standing for singular. The capital letters in the table are vari-
ables designating identical morphemes by the same letter and different morphemes by
different letters. Other combinations of letters than the ones presented do not yield
any new possibilities. Type (Sb), for example, could just as well have been indicated
by the letters ‘B’ for speaker, and ‘A’ for the combination of addressee and other.
That would amount to the same paradigmatic structure. The present combinations of
capital letters result from my decision to start always with ‘A’ at the top of the table.
The Latin singular suffixes …-o, …-s and …-t form thus an (Sa) type paradigm. There
are three different suffixes for the three categories. The Latin suffixes will be taken as
a prototypical example of this first type (Sa). I will often refer to this type in the text
as ‘Latin-type (Sa)’, or simply as ‘Latin-type’. Prototypical examples of the other
types will be discussed later.
(Sa) (Sb) (Sc) (Sd) (Se)
speaker, ‘1’ A A A






Table 2.2: Theoretically possible kinds of homophony
The first three possibilities in Table 2.2, (Sa), (Sb) and (Sc), have an opposition be-
tween speaker and addressee. Possibilities (Sd) and (Se), however, do not have this
opposition. The opposition between the marking for speaker and for addressee is the
defining characteristic of PERSON marking, and, consequently, (Sd) and (Se) do not
mark person in the strict sense. Possibility (Sd) will be included in this section as a
borderline case of person marking. It has at least an opposition between the speech-act
dyad (speaker and addressee) and any other participant. However, possibility (Se) is
                                                 
6 The word ‘homophonous’ is used as a purely descriptive label. It indicates that two categories, distin-
guished beforehand on independent grounds, are marked by the same morpheme. The frequency of
certain kinds of homophony could be used as an argument against the distinguished categories. How-
ever, I do not have any theoretical presuppositions on which kinds of homophony would be expected,
nor is there something a priori significant about certain kinds of homophony. The empirical results
will point the way how to interpret the attested kinds of homophony.
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excluded. With no person oppositions at all, it is not clear whether a paradigm really
marks person, or rather something else. For example, consider the irrealis suffixes
from Waskia, a Papuan language from New Guinea. The singular forms of these suf-
fixes are shown in Table 2.3, just as they are presented in the grammar (Ross & Paol,
1978). The future and the imperative paradigms clearly mark person; they are Latin-
type (Sa). However, the desiderative paradigm does not mark person. The suffix
…-ako only marks the desiderative mood; there is no distinction between the three
person categories ‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and ‘other’.7
future imperative desiderative
speaker, ‘1’ …-iki …-iko …-ako
addressee, ‘2’ …-i …-ko …-ako
other, ‘3’ …-uki …-uko …-ako
Table 2.3: Waskia irrealis suffixes, singular only (Ross & Paol, 1978: 68)
Pronominal paradigms of the Latin-type (Sa), with three different singular forms, are
common among the world’s languages. This structure is well known and will not be
exemplified further. I will come back to the Latin-type paradigm in section 2.6 to dis-
cuss the distribution of zeros in this kind of paradigms. The other three types – (Sb),
(Sc) and (Sd) – are less common and less well known.8 In the next section I will dis-
cuss all examples of such paradigms that I know of. They turn out to be uncommon,




Some pronominal paradigms in the world’s languages do not distinguish all three sin-
gular categories – ‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and ‘other’ – by different morphemes. Three
different kinds of homophony will be considered in this section. The three kinds of
homophony are summarised in Table 2.4. They will be discussed in turn. In the last
                                                 
7 One could think of French inflectional person marking as an example of a homophony type (Se).
There is no person marking in the singular (there is no difference in pronunciation; there is of course a
difference in writing). However, there is an inflectional difference in the plural between the first and
second person: chantons versus chantez. To my knowledge, this situation is highly unusual among the
world’s languages. The only other examples known to me are the Icelandic Middle inflection
(Thráinsson, 1994: 162) and the past suffixes from the Papuan language Kapau (Oates & Oates,
1969: 33-35). In all these cases there is an opposition between first person plural and other plural cate-
gories, but no opposition between the different singular categories. Notwithstanding these cases, I
choose to hold on to the strict definition of person marking, which asks for an opposition between
speaker and addressee, and consequently interpret the paradigms from French, Icelandic and Kapau as
exceptional cases. Also note that the opposition chantons versus chantez does not clearly oppose
speaker to addressee, as the addressee can be included in the reference of chantons (the ‘inclusive’
reading of the first person plural, see section 3.4).
8 For example, Noyer (1992: 151-152) only discusses examples of the (Sd) homophony, and uses the
existence of such cases to argue for a feature [± participant] in morphology. This argument becomes
devoid of content in the light of the existence of the other kinds of homophony as shown in the next
section.
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column of the table, the type is labelled with the name of a well-known example of
this structure. These names will be used to facilitate the reference to the various pat-
terns.
Type description mnemonic label
(Sb): speaker vs. the rest first vs. non-first ‘Dutch-type’
(Sc): addressee vs. the rest second vs. non-second ‘Spanish-type’
(Sd): other vs. the rest third vs. non-third ‘English-type’
Table 2.4: Different kinds of singular homophony
2.4.2 Dutch-type homophony (Sb)
A homophony of type (Sb), ie an opposition between speaker and the rest, is, for ex-
ample, found in the Dutch pronominal inflection.9 In the Dutch present, there is an
opposition between a bare stem, which is used for the first person singular, shown in
(2.4 a), and a stem with a suffix …-t, which is used for second and third person, shown











‘He/she/it walks’ (own data)
In Dutch it is necessary to use an independent pronoun. A sole inflected verb stem is
not a complete utterance in Dutch. It is often argued that an independent pronoun is
necessarily added because of the structurally impoverished inflectional paradigm.
However, this is not a necessary requirement for human language. There are also lan-
guages with the same Dutch-type inflectional paradigm, but without obligatory use of
independent pronouns. In Lengua, a Mascoian language from Paraguay, the pronomi-
                                                 
9 When I classify Dutch as (Sb), I refer to the inflection in Standard Dutch, with canonical word order
subject-verb. The different Dutch dialects show a wide variety of homophony. All the different types
distinguished in Table 2.2 are found within the dialectal variation of the Netherlands (van den Berg,
1949: 7). Besides the dialectal variation, there is also variation within the Standard variety. The Stan-
dard Dutch inflection changes with the word order, a rather exotic phenomenon. In some contexts
(like questions or when temporal adverbs are fronted for emphasis), the subject follows the finite verb.
In these cases, the pronominal inflection is of type (Sd), with a zero first and second person, and a suf-
fix …-t for the third person.
10 Within the Germanic family, the same Dutch-type homophony is found in the present inflection of
the Icelandic ‘weak’ verbs. These verbs all have a zero first person singular, and identical marking for
second and third person. The morphemes that are used for the combined second/third person differ,
though, according to the class of the verb (Thráinsson, 1994: 158-161).
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nal prefixes show a homophony like Dutch, exemplified in (2.5). Unlike the Dutch
situation, it is not necessary to add an independent pronoun in Lengua. It is left to
pragmatic inference to identify the referent. Independent nouns (or independent pro-




‘I go’ (Susnik, 1977: 98)
b. ab-lïngàé
2/3-hear/feel
‘You hear/feel’, ‘He/she/it hears/feels’ (Susnik, 1977: 99)
c. ab-waaktêyïk se nçlït
2/3-return man,DEM
‘That man returns’ (Susnik, 1977: 99)
The pronominal suffixes in Chitimacha, an extinct language from the USA, also show
a structure of the Dutch-type (Sb), exemplified in (2.6). As in Lengua, it is not felt
necessary to clarify the ambiguity of the ‘non-first’ suffix in Chitimacha:
‘The [non-first] includes reference to either second or third person, and the actual refer-
ence in particular situations depends on the context. Ambiguity may be avoided by the
use of the [independent] personal pronoun …, but apparently the possibility of confu-
sion is not as great as one might suppose, for sentences without independent pronouns







‘You beat’, ‘He/she/it beats’ (Swadesh, 1946: 317)
The Dutch-type homophony is relatively common among the Papuan languages from
New Guinea (see, for example, the references in Haiman, 1980: xl). Among these lan-
guages, the morpheme for the ‘non-first’ is sometimes zero. This is the opposite
markedness situation as in the case of Dutch, where the first person morpheme was
found to be zero. Apparently, it is possible for either of the two elements in an (Sb)-
paradigms to be zero. A zero non-first morpheme is found, for example, in the Papuan
language Wambon, as shown in (2.7). In Wambon, just as in Lengua and Chitimacha,
the use of independent pronouns is not obligatory. They can be used to disambiguate
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b. andet--mbo
eat-2/3SG-PAST
‘You/he/she/it ate’ (de Vries, 1989: 24)
To conclude this survey of the Dutch-type (Sb) homophony, I quickly review a few
examples from around the globe. First, the pronominal prefixes for intransitive subject
in the Siberian Chukotko-Kamchatkan languages (viz Chukchee, Koryak, and Kam-
chadal) show this structure (Comrie, 1980a). Second, a Dutch-type homophony is
found in some of the Nakh-Dagestanian languages from the Caucasus. Helmbrecht
(1996: 136-138) presents the languages Tsakhur, Zakatal’, Akhvakh and Megeb as
showing an opposition between first and non-first. Both in the Chukotko-Kamchatkan
and in the Nakh-Dagestanian case, the non-first categories are marked as zero. Fi-
nally, in Kenuzi-Dongola, a Sudanic language in Africa, there is a regular homophony
between second and third person, through all tenses and aspects. The examples in










‘He/she/it beats’ (Reinisch, 1879: 67)
2.4.3 Spanish-type homophony (Sc)
In paradigms of type (Sc), the marking of speaker and other is identical, as opposed to
the marking of addressee. In other words, there is an opposition between the marking
of second person and the marking of non-second person. Seen in this way, (Sc) is a
complementary structure to the Dutch-type (Sb) homophony, which had an opposition
between first and non-first person. Examples of type (Sc) are rare, even compared to
the scarcity of examples of (Sb). Still, paradigms of type (Sc) exist. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, this type of homophony is found in the Spanish inflection. It is not found in all
inflectional paradigms, but still in quite a few. It is exemplified in (2.9) with forms of
the ‘pretérito imperfecto’. For the rest of this section, I will use the label ‘Spanish-
type’ as a mnemonic device, interchangeably with (Sc). In Spanish, this homophony
is not only found in the pretérito imperfecto. In fact, is it found in many of the various
tense-aspect-mood inflections. In Table 2.5, all non-periphrastic inflectional tense-





‘I spoke’, ‘He/she/it spoke’
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b. habla-bas
speak-2SG,PAST
‘You spoke’ (Hallebeek et al., 1994: 114)
The frequent occurrence of this homophony may be surprising as Spanish is often
quoted as a prototypical example of a language with ‘rich agreement’ (eg Harbert,
1995: 221-222). Rich agreement in turn is presented as one of the preconditions for
pro-drop. Spanish shows indeed pro-drop, so the attested homophony between the
first and third person would still qualify these paradigms as ‘rich’. Some doubts will
be raised on this analysis in section 2.5.11
(Sa) ‘Latin type’ (Sc) ‘Spanish type’
indicativo presente indicativo pretérito imperfecto
indicativo pretérito indefinido indicativo condicional
indicativo futuro subjuntivo (all tenses)
Table 2.5: Spanish non-periphrastic tense-aspect-mood paradigms
The next example of a Spanish-type homophony is found in the Papuan language
Koiari. In Koiari, the portmanteau suffixes for person-tense-mood display a typical
Papuan realis-irrealis opposition. In the realis paradigms, the first person singular is in
all tenses equivalent to the third person singular (using the suffix …-nu or …-ma) but
different from the second person singular (using a suffix …-nua or …-a). This is










‘He/she/it saw it’ (Dutton, 1996: 24)
The defective pronominal paradigm in Koiari is supplemented by independent pro-
nouns. These pronouns in Koiari are obligatorily used. This can be seen as all exam-
ples in the short grammatical sketch by Dutton (1996) have an overt subject, either by
an independent pronoun or a full noun phrase. The use of an independent pronoun
does not add emphasis. Instead, pronouns are fronted to add emphasis, and there is a
special suffix …-ike used in those cases. When such a fronted emphatic pronoun is
                                                 
11 The other favourite example of a language with ‘rich agreement’ is Italian. Indeed, standard Italian
does not show any homophony in the singular. However, Spanish-type homophony is found in some
regional Italic languages. An example is the ‘imperfetto’ inflection from Siciliano (Bigalke, 1997: 60-
61).
12 In the closely related language Ömie, a comparable non-second person homophony is attested, nota-
bly in the present tense (Austing & Upia, 1975: 544).
CHAPTER 2: ONE AMONG THE CROWD 45
used, the ‘unmarked’ independent pronoun still shows up in the sentence, as shown in
(2.11). This indicates that the independent pronoun is obligatorily present.
(2.11) KOIARI
da-ike, kailaki-ge da guramarero
1SG,PRON-EMPH PLACE-LOC 1SG,PRON sit 13
‘I live at Kailiki’, ‘I am the one who is living at Kailiki’ (Dutton, 1996: 64)
Another example of a Spanish-type homophony is found in Ika, a Chibchan language
from Peru. Most morphology in Ika is suffixed, but the pronominal elements are pre-
fixes. For the marking of the subject there is only one prefix in the singular: a second
person n-…. There is no overt marking for the other singular participants. This
amounts to a homophony of type (Sc), with a zero for the non-second person marking.
Immediate Past Past Far Past
speaker ‘1’ -tsua uwin -tsua ukuin -tsua-na-rua
addressee ‘2’ n-tsua ukuin n-tsua uzin n-tsua-na
other ‘3’ -tsua win -tsua uzin -tsua-na
Table 2.6: Ika singular person marking (Frank, 1985: 89)
Just as in Koiari, the language Ika has a mechanism to disambiguate first person from
third person. All ambiguity in Ika vanishes once the total marking in the sentence is
taken into account. However, in Ika, ambiguity is not resolved by the use of inde-
pendent pronouns, but by the special structure of auxiliaries. There is ample use of
auxiliaries in Ika. The auxiliaries incorporate the marking of tense and evidentiality,
among other aspects. Interestingly, time deixis interferes with person deixis in these
auxiliaries. In Table 2.6, the singular forms of the various past tenses of the verb tsua,
meaning ‘to see’, are shown. Note that the same form of the auxiliary, ukuin, is used
for immediate past in the second person, but also for unmarked past in the first per-
son. The use of this auxiliary thus implies some sort of person deixis. It is unclear
whether these auxiliaries should be interpreted as tense markers or as person markers.
They are something in between tense and person markers. The author of the grammar
concludes:
‘Considered as markers of ‘degree of relevance’ or ‘distance between verbs and refer-
ence point’, the [auxiliaries] make more sense. Person, time and (un-)witness all enter
into the relationship between an event and the speech situation.’ (Frank, 1985: 90)
Note that the independent pronouns are normally not used (Frank, 1990: 26). Most of
the participant reference, besides the discussed inflectional marking, is zero in Ika
discourse (Frank, 1990: 121-122).
Finally, examples of the Spanish-type (Sc) homophony are also found in the Ger-
manic family. Currently, it is found in the preterit inflection of ‘weak’ verbs in mod-
ern Icelandic. The morphophonological form of these suffixes in Icelandic falls apart
in 6 classes, but all show the same structural (Sc) homophony (Thráinsson, 1994: 158-
161). Despite this homophony, the pronouns are not used obligatorily in Icelandic
                                                 
13 This verb is in an irrealis tense, which is not marked for person (Dutton, 1996: 23).
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(Thráinsson, 1994: 168-169). The Spanish-type homophony in the preterit is also
found in older versions of Germanic languages, notably in Gothic, Middle Dutch
(Schönfeld, 1959: 144-146) and in Old English (Robertson & Cassidy, 1954: 141). In-
terestingly, the Old English impoverished paradigm was not connected to the obliga-
tory use of the subject pronoun. The pronoun could be dropped in Old English, al-
though an overt subject reference should not be too far away:
‘In PDE [Present Day English] it is obligatory for the subject position … to be filled …
In early OE [Old English], the NP was facultative, as in Latin … However, in OE,
‘subjectless’ sentences were restricted to cases where the subject had been named in the
preceding clause.’ (Görlach, 1997: 91)
In all early Germanic languages, the independent pronouns were not as strictly
obligatory as they are today, but they were still regularly used (Howe, 1996: 11-13).
The distribution of zeros among the presented examples of the Spanish-type homoph-
ony is asymmetric. All examples from the Germanic languages have a zero for non-
second person and overt marking for the second person. The same distribution of ze-
ros is also found in Ika. I have not found an example of the opposite distribution (non-
second overt and second zero) among the languages of the world. As there are only a
few examples of (Sc), it should not be concluded that it is impossible for a paradigm
of type (Sc) to have a zero second person. Maybe, if more paradigms of this type are
collected, examples will turn out to exist. Up till now, I know of none.
2.4.4 English-type homophony (Sd)
In paradigms of type (Sd), speaker and addressee are marked identically, as opposed
to the marking of the category ‘other’. This paradigm is a borderline case of PERSON
marking, as there is not opposition between speaker and addressee. English is one of
the ‘exotic’ cases that show this homophony in the marking of singular participants.
English has a homophony of type (Sd) in its inflectional marking: zero for first and
second person, …-s for third person. I will use the label ‘English-type’ as a mnemonic
device for this paradigmatic structure of person marking, interchangeably with (Sd).
The same English-type homophony, but with opposite markedness as in English, is
found in the present tense of the Caucasian language Hunzib, a Nakh-Dagestanian
language from the Caucasus. The present tense suffix has two different forms: …-c(o)
for first or second person and zero for third person. Examples are shown in (2.12).
The same homophony of speaker and addressee reference is also found in the related
Nakh-Dagestanian language Lak (Helmbrecht, 1996: 131).
(2.12) HUNZIB
a. d hyaa-c cu
1,PRON open-1/2,PRES door
‘I (shall) open the door’
b. m bok’o.l-co hee
2,PRON gather-1/2,PRES walnut
‘You will gather nuts’
c. oul hyaa- cu
DEM open-3,PRES door
‘He/she opens the door’ (van den Berg, 1995: 83)
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This paradigmatic structure is also found in the imperfect tense of the South Cauca-
sian language Svan, a neighbour of Hunzib, though unrelated to it. It is questionable
whether this marking really should be considered pronominal marking. It is probably
better to consider it as tense marking, with a slightly different status of the third per-
son in the paradigm (Tuite, 1997: 23-29). Just as in Ika, in the previous section, differ-
ent deictic categories (time and participant deixis) are intermingled, making it difficult
to classify the paradigm as one or the other.
A paradigm of the English-type with both third and non-third overtly marked, is
found in the Papuan language Waskia. Waskia has a typical Papuan realis-irrealis dis-
tinction in the verbal inflection. The realis marking consists of three tenses (present,
past habitual, past simple). All three have a English-type homophony. The forms of
the present tense are shown in (2.13). Examples (2.13 a,b) show the suffix …-sam, that
is used both with first and with second person. Example (2.13 c) shows the suffix
…-so that is used with third person.
(2.13) WASKIA
a. ane itakta yu na-sam
1,PRON now water drink-1/2SG,PRES
‘I am drinking water now’ (Ross & Paol, 1978: 67)
b. 'ai ni ait omu arigi-sam i?
hey 2,PRON bird DEM see-1/2SG,PRES WH
‘Hey, do you see that bird?’ (Ross & Paol, 1978: 112)
c. Gagi kaemkasik ko nagu-so
NAME evil spirit about fear-3SG,PRES
‘Gagi fears the evil spirit’ (Ross & Paol, 1978: 49)
Independent pronouns are regularly used to clarify the subject, like in examples
(2.13 a,b). The author of the grammar remarks that the subject is normally overtly pre-
sent:
‘In unmarked sentences … the subject is not normally omitted from declaratives and
questions, but it is often deleted from imperatives. It is also missing in all impersonal
sentences.’ (Ross & Paol, 1978: 8, emphasis added, MC)
In the grammar (Ross & Paol, 1978), there are not enough examples of singular sub-
jects to check this statement. However, a different picture emerges when all subject
marking is counted in the short accompanying text (Ross & Paol, 1978: 110-115). It
turns out that, contrary to the above quote, it is rather normal to omit the subject.
Relative to the 46 inflected verbs in the included text (counting all three persons, im-
peratives omitted), there are only 26 overt subjects (46%). Slightly more than half of
the subjects are omitted in this text. This indicates that the presence of a subject is not
really obligatory, although it is common.
Finally, I know of two examples of English-type homophony from American lan-
guages. The first example is the Oto-Manguean language Pame that has a suffix …-p
for third person and a suffix …-k for non-third (Manrique, 1967: 344). The second ex-
ample is the Sahaptin language Nez Perce. In intransitive constructions, as shown in
(2.14), the third person is marked by a prefix hi-… and the non-third by zero marking.
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‘He arrived’ (Rude, 1985: 31)
2.4.5 Summary
This concludes the survey of languages that show some kind of homophony in the
marking of singular participants. Table 2.7 summarises the cases presented. In the ta-
ble, the three different types – (Sb), (Sc) and (Sd) – are subdivided as to the occur-
rence of zeros in one of the categories.
Homophony Type Occurrence of Zeros Examples
no zeros: Lengua, Chitimacha, Kenuzi-Don-
gola
‘Dutch-type’ (Sb) first is zero: Dutch, Icelandic
non-first is zero: Wambon, Chukchee, Koryak,
Kamchadal, Tsakhur, Akhvakh,
Zakatal’, Megeb
no zeros: Spanish, Siciliano, Koiari, Ömie
‘Spanish-type’ (Sc) second is zero: –
non-second is zero: Ika, Icelandic, Gothic, Old English,
Middle Dutch
no zeros: Waskia, Lak, Nez Perce
third is zero: Hunzib, Svan‘English-type’ (Sd)
non-third is zero: English, Pame
Table 2.7: Typological summary of the examples
Only one of the resulting nine possibilities is not attested in this survey. Perhaps this
last case will appear when the search is continued. I see no reason why this one pat-
tern would not be possible, if all the others are.14
                                                 
14 However, as it stands now, the one missing case from Table 2.7 precisely corresponds to a claim
made by Uspensky (1972).
‘If a zero expression occurs in the form of a certain person in the indicative mood, then, in-
cluded in the meanings thus expressed (ie by a zero mark) we find the meaning of the 3rd person
or that of the 1st person.’ (Uspensky, 1972: 68)
[continued on next page]
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Homophony of singular pronominal marking is a relatively rare phenomenon, but it
definitively is a possibility for a human language. The large number of examples that
were presented in this section might suggest that it is common for a pronominal para-
digm to have a homophony in the singular. However, it is not. First, only a restricted
set of all the pronominal paradigms of each language shows the homophony. The 28
languages that are mentioned in Table 2.7 have a homophony somewhere in the lan-
guage; it is not a characteristic of all pronominal paradigms in the language. Second,
all other languages that I have studied do not show any singular homophony at all.
Relative to the approximately 350 languages that are mentioned in the present work,
the 28 cases with a singular homophony make up only 8%. However, even this figure
is grossly overestimated, as I have included every example of a singular homophony
that I have found, but skipped over numerous non-homophonous cases. My guess
would be that a controlled sample would yield no more than 1% of languages with a
singular homophony somewhere in the language. A homophony in the singular is a
well-known phenomenon in the Germanic languages, but other than that it is only
found in rather ‘exotic’ languages (see Table 2.8). With this in mind, the Germanic
structure of inflectional person marking suddenly becomes rather ‘exotic’.
Europe: English, Old English, Icelandic, Gothic,
Dutch, Middle Dutch, Spanish, Siciliano
Caucasus Hunzib, Lak, Tsakhur, Akhvakh, Zakatal’,
Megeb, Svan
Siberia: Chukchee, Koryak, Kamchadal
New Guinea: Wambon, Koiari, Ömie, Waskia
America: Nez Perce, Chitimacha, Pame, Lengua, Ika
Africa: Kenuzi-Dongola
Table 2.8: Geographic stratification of the examples
For the Germanic languages, it is known that historically the ‘impoverished’ singular
marking arose because an original three way distinction of the Latin-type wore off
through time. For most of the other examples that have been discussed in this section,
there are no historical records. Moreover, often not enough data for a comparative re-
construction are available. It is thus impossible to say anything definitive about the
way these singular paradigms arose. However, it seems perfectly possible that ‘im-
poverished’ paradigms can arise in other ways than through wear. Constructively, a
                                                 
[continued from previous page]
The data that led to this claim are not made explicit by Uspensky, but he seems to have formulated his
claim in exactly these words to account for the various inflectional structures of the Germanic lan-
guages. There is no sign in the short 1972 article that he knew of all the different possibilities that I
have sketched in this section. Still, the formulation turns out to be a masterful generalisation over the
cases that I have found. The only problem is that I can see no reason why this one case would be im-
possible for a human language. Also, there are a few counterexamples to Uspensky’s claim. They will
be presented in the section 2.6.2. These counterexamples are Latin-type paradigms with a zero second
person. This means that the counterexamples have different (overt) forms for first and third person
reference (different from the missing Spanish-type (Sc) paradigm, that would have had the same form
for first and third person).
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morpheme for ‘speaker’ might arise alone, leaving the rest unmarked. In the same
way, a morpheme for ‘addressee’ might arise without counterpart. Another path to-
wards a homophonous paradigm might lead through mixed marking of different deic-
tic categories, as in Ika and Svan. There may be a difference between the kinds of
homophony that arise by wear and kinds of homophony that can arise constructively.
However, more in-depth studies of languages with singular homophony are needed to
be able to approach such a hypothesis.
An important generalisation over the examples that were presented in his section is
that the different examples of singular homophony are all found in inflectional para-
digms. I have not come across a homophony in a paradigm of morphologically inde-
pendent pronouns.15 This generalisation can be formulated as an implication:
(2.15) Homophony Implication
singular homophony  inflectional paradigm
This implication can be reversed: independent pronouns never have a homophony in
the singular. For independent pronouns it is necessary to clearly distinguish the three
main singular categories. This amounts to the following implication:
(2.16) Homophony Implication (reversed formulation)
independent pronouns  speaker  addressee  other
It should not be concluded from this implication that all languages have at least three
different overt independent pronouns – one for speaker, one for addressee and one for
other. This conclusion is not allowed for two reasons. First, there are languages that
do not have ‘real’ independent pronouns (see the introductory chapter). For those lan-
guages, the antecedent of the universal is not met. Second, the ‘other’ category is not
as straightforward as the ‘speaker’ and the ‘addressee’ categories. In many languages,
the ‘other’ category is not marked by a specialised pronominal morpheme. All that is
implied in the statement in (2.16) is that the marking for ‘other’ is not identical to the
marking of ‘speaker’ or ‘addressee’. The implication makes no claim for the specific
linguistic form of the marking of the singular categories; they could also be zero.
More specific claims about the form of paradigms that differentiate all three singular
categories will be discussed in section 2.6. However, first I will discuss another aspect
of singular homophony: the consequences for the structure of the rest of a language
when there is singular homophony. The conclusion will be that languages do not treat
paradigms with a singular homophony necessarily as an impoverished form of person
marking. Although such paradigms mark less person distinctions, some marking is
still considered better than none. In the following section, I will argue that structurally
‘impoverished’ paradigms with singular homophony are not necessarily functionally
inferior to paradigms without singular homophony.
                                                 
15 Noyer (1992: 151, citing Lipkind 1945) mentions the Siouan language Winnebago as an example
with a singular homophony in the independent pronouns. The pronoun nee is used for reference to the
speaker and the addressee; the pronoun ee is used for reference to any other participants. I have been
unable to get hold of the original source, nor of any other primary source on Winnebago to check this
claim.
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2.5 Singular homophony and pro-drop
In some languages, a singular homophony is seen as a problem. The contemporary
West Germanic languages, but also Koiari, Waskia and Ika, show a tendency to dis-
ambiguate the homophonous singular persons in some way. In Germanic and in
Koiari, the disambiguation is achieved by using independent pronouns that are co-
referential with the homophonous inflection. In Ika, a more intricate combination of
various linguistic devices do the same job without the use of the independent pronoun
(see section 2.4.3). For other languages, in contrast, it is noted explicitly in the de-
scriptions that the singular homophony in the pronominal paradigm does not lead to a
surplus of other markings. In Wambon, Lengua, Chitimacha, Spanish, Icelandic, Old
English and Nez Perce, it is no problem that the singular homophony creates some
ambiguity in the structure of the language. Most of the time, enough information is
present in the discourse to fill the referential gaps that are left by a homophonous
paradigm. The speakers of many languages do not find it necessary to disambiguate
the three singular persons all the time. Seemingly, it is perfectly possible for a human
language to do without a morphological distinction between all three persons.
To exemplify the different approaches to singular homophony, I will make a short
comparison of the person marking in Wambon and English. Wambon and English are
both languages with a singular homophony. In the English inflection, the speaker and
the addressee are marked identically. In the Wambon inflection, the addressee and the
other are marked identically (see page 42). Still, there is an important difference be-
tween these languages. English uses its independent pronouns obligatorily; Wambon
does not. To show the differences and correspondences between the person marking
in Wambon and English, I have analysed the use of the inflection and the independent
pronouns as they occur in the Wambon texts in the grammar by de Vries (1989). I will
concentrate on the marking of first person subjects, and compare the Wambon struc-
ture with the structure of the English translation by de Vries. This kind of comparison
is full of pitfalls as the structure of Wambon differs strikingly from English. For ex-
ample, Wambon makes ample use of switch-reference and serialisation. Both phe-
nomena strongly influence the structure of the sentence. Still, I think that a compari-
son of the Wambon texts with the English translation is possible. Remarkably enough,
the English translation consists of syntactically correct sentences of English while the
style is rather poor. This poor style probably reflects the intention of the grammarian
to translate the Wambon text as closely as possible to the original. I interpret the
translation as being the closest possible reflection of the original stories in syntacti-
cally correct English. From this assumption it is possible to compare the way pro-
nominals are used in the structure of both languages. The results of the counts are pre-
sented in Table 2.9.16
                                                 
16 The counts are based on two texts from the grammar by de Vries (1989). The two texts (‘the pig
hunt’, p 117-118, and ‘Sawing’, p.120-128) are chosen because they have numerous first person sub-
jects. I counted first persons singular and plural for these texts. In the plural, Wambon also has a ho-
mophony with an opposition between first and non-first person, so the markedness situation is compa-
rable to the singular. If I had only counted the singular pronominal elements, the number of instances
would have been much smaller, and the results less revealing.
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Wambon English
Finite Verbs 74 92
Independent Pronoun 9 80
Pronouns per Finite Verbs 12% 87%
Table 2.9: First person marking compared between Wambon and English
For the original Wambon texts, as well as for the English translation, the number of
independent pronouns in subject function has been counted. The independent pro-
nouns of Wambon hardly occur (only 9 cases). By contrast, independent pronouns are
often used in the English translation (80 cases). Then, the number of finite verbs that
are marked for first person subject is counted for Wambon (74 cases). For English,
this count is not so straightforward, as there is no inflectional first person marking. In
the English translation, I counted the number of finite verbs that have a first person
subject (92 cases).17 The percentage of pronouns per finite verbs gives a rough indi-
cation of the differences in use between the independent pronouns of both languages.
Wambon uses a pronoun for 12% of the finite verbs, against 87% for English. Also,
the sparse use of the Wambon independent pronoun is not determined by a regular
syntactic structure. The function of the independent pronoun of Wambon is to put
emphasis on the subject.18 On the other hand, the number of independent pronouns in
English (80 cases) roughly matches the number of person-marked finite verbs in
Wambon (74 cases). From these counts, I tentatively conclude that the Wambon pro-
nominal inflection functions roughly like the English independent pronouns. The
Wambon inflection is the central person marking device in the language, not the inde-
pendent pronouns. The person inflection in Wambon has a homophony of second and
third person. Even though this language has an ‘impoverished’ person-marking sys-
tem, it is not necessary to use the independent pronouns for disambiguation. English
also has a singular homophony, and in this cases it is necessary to use the independent
pronouns. This shows that the often-heard argument that English obligatorily uses its
independent pronouns because of the impaired inflectional system does not hold as a
universal characteristic of human language. As can be seen from the Wambon case, it
is also possible for a human language to have an ‘impaired’ inflectional pronominal
paradigm, but still not to use the independent pronouns obligatorily.
This conclusion is at odds with the ‘pro-drop’ hypothesis or, at least, it restricts the
space for its interpretation. Pro-drop, the hypothesis states, is licensed by ‘rich-
agreement’.
‘It has been long noted that pro-drop tends to occur in languages with rich subject-
agreement morphology, such as Spanish and Italian, but not in languages such as
                                                 
17 The number of English finite verbs (92 cases) is higher than the number of independent pronouns (80
cases) due to conjunction reduction (‘equi-NP deletion’). A sentence like ‘I pursued it and saw it lying
close’ has only one first person subject pronoun (‘I’) while there are two finite verbs that have a first
person subject (‘pursued’ and ‘saw’).
18 To make a better argument, the use of the independent pronouns should of course be investigated
from the structure of the discourse. A full analysis of Wambon-discourse is beyond the scope of the
present work. Impressionistically, the independent pronouns in Wambon are used at turning points of
the story. This indicates that the use of the independent pronouns is at least partially regulated by the
structure of the discourse.
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French and English, which have relatively impoverished agreement morphology.’
(Harbert, 1995: 222)
To my knowledge, it has never been made explicit what it means exactly for a per-
sonal agreement paradigm to be ‘rich’. However, it can be concluded from the exam-
ples in this chapter that it is possible to conflate the reference between the three basic
singular categories and still have pro-drop. Thus, singular homophony does not nec-
essarily make the paradigms less ‘rich’. The proposal that pro-drop is licensed by the
structure of the inflectional pronominal paradigm is not unequivocally true. An
equivalent singular structure to the one that licences pro-drop in Wambon (and other
languages) prompts English (and other languages) to prevent pro-drop. To conclude,
the ‘richness’ of a pronominal paradigm does not reside in the marking of singular
participants. Maybe the richness of a pronominal paradigm can be found in the non-
singular forms. This possibility will further be investigated in the following chapters.
However, I will conclude eventually that singular homophony is the least explicit kind
of paradigmatic structure (see especially section 5.5). This conclusion makes it highly
improbable that the structure of a pronominal paradigm correlates cross-linguistically
with ‘pro-drop’ characteristics.
2.6 Zeros in paradigms without homophony
2.6.1 Preamble
In the vast majority of pronominal paradigms in the world’s languages, there is no
singular homophony in the paradigm; all three singular persons are marked by differ-
ent morphemes. In such paradigms, each of the three participants (speaker, addressee
and other) could, in principle, be zero. However, it turns out that not all participants
are equally likely to be zero. It is very unusual to find paradigms with a zero for
speaker or addressee reference. The few examples that I have found are discussed in
section 2.6.2. In contrast, it is easy to come up with numerous examples of zeros for
‘other’ reference. Examples of third person zeros will be discussed in section 2.6.3.
Moreover, for many of the cases with a zero third person, it is questionable whether
this zero really exists. It might be better to consider a zero as non-existing in such
cases. This argument will be presented in section 2.6.4.
2.6.2 Zero speaker or addressee
Zero marking for speaker or addressee reference is only scantily found among the
world’s languages (Koch, 1994: 31-37; Siewierska & Bakker, 2000). Many of the ex-
amples that appear, at first glance, to have zero marking for speaker or addressee, turn
out to be rather poor cases. On closer inspection, either different descriptions of the
same language do not agree on the analysis, or the zero turns out to be only one of the
possible allomorphs for the first or second person marking.19
                                                 
19 Questionable zeros were attested in the descriptions of Wiyot, Auyana, Maba, Rumanian and Mar-
ghi. In the Algic language Wiyot, a zero described for speaker reference by Reichard (1925: 74), but a
later description only lists zero as a possible allomorph for a suffix …-a (Teeter, 1964: 71). There is no
analysis of the factors that govern this allomorphic alternation. In the Papuan language Auyana, a zero
is attested for addressee reference. However, the zero alternates with a suffix …-a, but it is not clear
under which conditions (Bee, 1973: 188). A comparable situation is found in the Nilo-Saharan lan-
guage Maba. Tucker (1966: 202) present paradigms with a zero second person, but it turns out later
[continued on next page]
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First person zero marking is rare. I have not come across any clear example.20 How-
ever, zero marked first persons occurs in the marking of kin-term possession (Croft,
1990: 145-146; Koch, 1994: 51-54). In the context of kin-term possession, the first
person seems to be the unmarked participant and, consequently, it is sometimes found
marked as zero. I can not judge whether the preference for zero first person marking is
far-reaching in such constructions, because I have not included the marking of pro-
nominal possession in the present investigation. Next, I turn to pronominal paradigms
with a zero addressee reference. Such cases are slightly more frequent compared to
paradigms with a first person zero, although the overall number of examples is so low
that it is difficult to judge whether this difference is typologically valid. The first ex-
ample with a zero addressee comes from Bongo, a Nilo-Saharan language from Su-
dan. In Bongo, the pronouns cliticise in front of the verb in the past tense, as in
(2.17 a), but remain independent when there is another word in between the pronoun
and the verb, as in (2.17 b). The first person singular pronoun ma cliticises as m-…,
see (2.17 c), but the second person singular pronoun i disappears altogether, leaving a




‘He/she/it ate (Santandrea, 1963: 62)
b. 'da bu dukpa amony 'bu kururi kpáu
then 3SG,PRON after eat eggs python all
‘So he then ate all the eggs of the python’ (Santandrea, 1963: 62, 94)
                                                 
[continued from previous page]
that this zero is only one of the possible allomorphs (Tucker & Bryan, 1966: 195). Also in Rumanian, a
zero first person is found, but only in the a-conjugation (Posner, 1996: 43), see also page 108 of the
present work. Finally, Burquest (1986: 77) lists a zero for the speaker reference in the aorist of the
Chadic language Marghi. However, this is probably a misinterpretation of the data in the original
source. Burquest based his data on the description by Hoffmann (1963: 174). Hoffmann gives a para-
digm in the aorist without first persons, but this is probably because the examples in the paradigm are
questions. Questions to the speaker (ie yourself) are probably left out because they are pragmatically
strange. There are other examples of aorists in the texts as presented by Hoffmann. In these examples,
speaker reference is marked overtly.
20 The only predicatively used pronominal paradigm with a zero marker for speaker reference, as far as
I know, is found in the pronominal inflection in Alagwa and Burunge, two Southern Cushitic lan-
guages from Tanzania. All Cushitic languages mark gender in their pronominal inflection, so these
paradigms do not count as ‘pure’ person marking following the definitions as presented in section 2.2.
The gender marking complicates the paradigmatic structure as there is a regular homophony between
the second person and the third person feminine (a common feature in Semitic languages). However,
because these are the only example of a zero for the marking of speaker reference, I still want to men-
tion the two languages here. It may be clear that it is not the most obvious and clear example. Data on
Alagwa can be found in description by Whiteley (1958: 32-33) and Mous (in prep: 54-55). On Bu-
runge, see Kießling (1994: 124). On first view, there is no zero first person in the closely related lan-
guage Iraqw (Elderkin, 1988: 81-82). Still, after some cumbersome morphophonological analyses,
Elderkin (1988: 87) concludes that ‘verbs with obstruent stems seem to have  marking first person.’
21 A comparable phenomenon is found in the related language Bagirmi. For Bagirmi, a disappearing
second person pronoun clitic is described in Gaden (1909: 10, 15). In a short description of another re-
lated language, Beli, it is noted that there are no clitic forms of the pronoun (Santandrea, 1963: 110).
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c. m-ony
1SG-eat
‘I ate’ (Santandrea, 1963: 62)
d. -ony
2SG-eat
‘You ate’ (Santandrea, 1963: 62)
Another example of a zero marked addressee reference is found in Grebo, a Kru lan-
guage from Liberia. Grebo, like all Kru languages, has independent pronominal ele-
ments. There is no pronominal inflection. In many Kru languages, the first and second
person independent pronouns can be omitted when they come directly in front of cer-
tain auxiliaries; in those cases the person distinction is marked by different tones on
the auxiliary (Marchese, 1978: 121). Grebo is a special case among the Kru languages.
In Grebo, the pronouns can be omitted with all indicative verbs (also without the
presence of an auxiliary). The bare verbs also show tonal differences to mark person
(Innes, 1966: 62-63). However, when the pronouns are overtly present (so there is no
person marking tone), then there is no overt marking of the second person in the in-
dicative mood (Innes, 1966: 50, 61). The second person exist in other moods (and in
the indicative of other Kru languages, Marchese, 1978: 117-118) but not in the indica-
tive of Grebo, as exemplified in (2.18).
(2.18) GREBO
a. ne1 du1 n4 ne3
1,PRON pound
‘I have pounded it’
b.  du4 n4 ne3
2,PRON pound
‘You have pounded it’ (Innes, 1966: 61)
Another kind of zero addressee marking is linked to the imperative. Imperatives are
prototypically directed to the addressee; addressee reference is the unmarked situation
for an imperative. Consequently, imperatives are normally zero marked for addressee
reference (Kurylowicz, 1964: 241; Greenberg, 1966: 44; Koch, 1994: 57-59). Impera-
tives are a possible source for zero marked addressees in other constructions. How-
ever, in most languages, the imperative is a special construction, not marked for per-
son at all. In some languages, the imperative is generalised to include other ‘manipu-
lative speech-acts’ (Givón, 1990: 806-824). In such cases, this mood-variant of the
predicate is often marked for person. This is, for example, found in the Papuan lan-
guage Daga. The imperative in Daga has a ‘debitive’ meaning: ‘the imperative suf-
fixes cover the area of meaning of ‘must’ and ‘should’ (Murane, 1974: 56). This
meaning is also relevant with first and third person subjects. The person marking of





‘I must get (it).’
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b. wat-
get-2SG,DEB
‘You must get (it)’, ‘Get (it)!’
c. war-ep
get-3SG,DEB
‘He must get (it)’ (Murane, 1974: 56)
A comparable case with zero addressee reference is found in the irrealis suffixes in
the Papuan language Waskia. These suffixes were shown earlier in this chapter in
Table 2.3 on page 40. They can be analysed as showing a suffix …-i for future and a
suffix …-ko for imperative. In both cases, the addressee marking is zero. Just as in
Daga, this imperative in Waskia is better analysed as a debitive:
‘The imperative … denotes not only the imperative as in English … but also concepts
expressed in the English modal verbs ‘must’, ‘should’ and ‘ought to’.’ (Ross & Paol,
1978: 69)
To conclude, a second person zero is not common, but it is certainly possible for a
human language. However, when all three singular persons are marked differently, the
speaker and addressee reference will almost universally be overtly marked. In con-
trast, the ‘other’ reference is often marked zero. This kind of zero marking will be
discussed next.
2.6.3 Zero other
Zero marking for speaker or addressee is rare among the languages of the world. In
contrast, a zero for the marking of the ‘other’ participant is found commonly, in all
parts of the world.22 To conclude that a language has a zero is principally a dangerous
statement. A zero is not directly observable, and there should be good reasons to pro-
pose an empty category. This is a general problem in all morphological analysis, but it
becomes particularly important in the case of a zero third person. In contrast to the
first and second person, the third person is not a positively defined category: a third
person is defined negatively as the category that is not first or second. A good argu-
ment is necessary to propose zero marking for this ‘non-person’ (Benveniste,
1966: 228-231). A reasonable argument for the existence of a zero third can be made
when the first and second person marking are overt inflections. When an uninflected
stem occurs that is paradigmatically equivalent to first and second person, and that is
functionally in complementary distribution with first and second person, then it is
fairly safe to propose a zero third person. I will now present some cases of zero third
persons in inflectional pronominal marking. Afterwards, in section 2.6.4, I will devote
some attention to third person zeros in independent pronominal marking, and discuss
the question whether zeros really exist in those cases.
                                                 
22 Hagège (1982: 96) found in his sample that only 24% of the world’s languages have a ‘real’ third
person pronoun. He does not present the data on which he bases this claim, except for a footnote that
sounds impressive, but remains rather vague:
‘en ce qui concerne le corpus qui sert de base au présent ouvrage, on en a élargi le plus possible
les dimensions: l’échantillonnage est constitué de 754 langues (également réparties sur les cinq
continents), décrites dans les fiches personnelles de l’auteur, et dans d’autres sources: Trubetz-
koy, Hagège-Haudricourt, Greenberg-Ferguson-Moravcik.’ (Hagège, 1982: 12)
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The Mongolian language Buriat is an example of a language with zero third person
for subject reference, shown in (2.20). Note that the first and second person are suf-
fixes, different from each other, and that the third person does not have a suffix. The
verbs without suffix have a different reference. These verbs do not refer to speaker or










‘He/she/it goes’ (Poppe, 1960: 57)
This phenomenon is found regularly in the languages of the world. The following list
presents a rough outline of the geographical distribution. This is not intended as an
exhaustive listing of this phenomenon, but it should give an impression of the areas
where inflectional third person zero forms are found. To start, it is rather unusual to
find zero third persons in Africa. There are only some incidental cases within Nilo-
Saharan.23 Travelling through the Eurasian continent, zero third persons are rarely
found within Indo-European. Only the languages of the Brythonic subgroup of the
Celtic languages have a zero third person.24 It is found more often in Uralic, both in
the Ugric languages and in the Samoyedic languages.25 Also, zero third persons seem
to be widespread in Altaic.26 In contrast, zero third persons are only rarely found in
the Semitic family.27 A zero third person has been reconstructed for proto-Sino-
Tibetan, and still a large part of the languages actually show a third person zero
(DeLancey, 1987: 806-809). Because there is hardly any bound pronominal marking
among the languages from mainland Southeast Asia, there is also no chance to find a
                                                 
23 Eg Madi (Crazzolara, 1960: 72-73, 83-84), Temein (Tucker & Bryan, 1966: 258-259), Didinga
(Odden, 1983: 154-157, 166), and Tubu – a dialect of Teda (Lukas, 1953: 111).
24 Eg Breton (Stephens, 1993: 373-375) and Cornish (George, 1993: 446-447).
25 In Ugric: eg Hungarian (Tompa, 1968: 167), Mansi (Keresztes, 1998: 399-400) and Khanty
(Abondolo, 1998a: 372-374). In Samoyedic: eg Nganasan (Helimski, 1998: 502-504) and Nenets
(Salminen, 1998: 533-534).
26 Eg Buriat, shown in example (2.20) and Turkish (Lewis, 1967: 106).
27 In roughly all Semitic languages/dialects the third person masculine of the perfect is zero. I do not
include this as a case of third person zero in this list because there is generally an overt third person
feminine suffix in the same paradigm. That is, I follow the general analysis of occidental linguists to
put the feminine suffix in the same paradigm as the other pronominal suffixes, and, consequently, the
third person is not completely zero. Note though, that the classical Arabic linguistic tradition did not
include the feminine suffix among the pronominal suffixes, for rather good reasons (Versteegh,
1997: 80-81). There is a real zero third person found in some of the modern Aramaic variants, in the
enclitic personal pronoun. This enclitic personal pronoun does not have an overt third person in Man-
daic (Macuch, 1965: 155) and Neo-Aramaic Assyrian (Tsereteli, 1978: 57, 60).
‘The classical imperfect died out, being replaced by the special Neo-Aramaic present, consisting
of the particle q, qa, qi followed by the active participle with the enclitic personal pronoun.’
(Macuch, 1965: 256)
58 PART ONE: PERSON MARKING
zero third person on the basis of inflectional patterns. The same holds for many Aus-
tronesian languages, which have mainly independent pronominal marking. Impres-
sionistically, it seems that zero third person forms are rare among the few languages
with inflectional person marking. In contrast, third person zeros are common among
the non-Austronesian languages in New Guinea. It is interesting that they are found
regularly in paradigms for inflectional undergoer marking.28 In Australia, roughly half
of the languages have pronominal clitics. These show regularly third person zeros.29
In North America, third person zeros are common; in South America they seem to
occur much less.30
2.6.4 Non-existing other
The zeros in the inflectional morphology, as discussed in the previous section, are
rather straightforward. However, there are also languages that seem to have a zero
third person marker in the paradigm of morphologically independent pronouns. These
‘missing’ markers are much more prone to be misinterpreted when they are called ‘ze-
ros’. Often, a third person independent pronoun simply does not exist. The function
that is fulfilled by an overt third person pronoun as attested in West European lan-
guages, is taken care of by other linguistic means in such languages. There are nu-
merous possibilities for a language to express the function of an independent third
person pronoun. For example, a demonstrative (‘this’, ‘that’ etc.) can be used, or a full
noun phrase (‘the man’), or a proper name (‘John’). As every language already has
multiple means to express third person, it seems better to assume a priori that non-
bound third person pronouns do not exist. Such an approach seems better than to gen-
erate needless zeros.31
The kind of argument that shows that ‘zero’ third person independent pronouns are
sometimes better interpreted as ‘non-existing’ is exemplified here with the pronomi-
nal marking from Yidi, a Pama-Nyungan language from Australia. Yidi has inde-
pendent first and second person pronouns and no pronominal inflection or clitics on
the predicate, as is shown in (2.21 a, b). The third person pronoun is ‘zero’. Normally,
no marking at all is present for a third person subject, as shown in (2.21 c). Other lin-
guistic means, like demonstratives or full noun phrases, can be used for clarification,
but often these are not used because the reference is clear from the context. Moreover,
there is positive evidence that the absence of pronominal marking does not imply the
presence of a zero. In Yidi, the meaning ‘third person’ cannot be inferred from the
                                                 
28 Eg Daga (Murane, 1974: 44), Yagaria (Renck, 1975: 21) and Siroi (Wells, 1979: 28).
29 Dixon (1980: 363-370) gives Western Desert langauges and Walmatjari as examples.
30 In North America, zero third person are found consistently in, for example, the Yuman languages (eg
Maricopa, Gordon, 1986: 15-21) and the Muskogean languages (eg Chickasaw, Payne, 1982: 359).
Other cases are found in Tonkawa (Hoyer, 1933: 72-76), and Kwakiutl (Boas, 1947: 252). In South
America, examples are much more difficult to find. Incidental examples are the object affixes in Ika
(Frank, 1990: 52) and the object affixes in Quechua, for example in the Huallaga Quechua variant
(Weber, 1986: 334).
31 The same problem (whether non-overt independent pronouns are zero or simply do not exist) arises
by the zero second person independent pronoun in Grebo from example (2.18). I do not want to con-
clude too much from one sole example, but my impression is that the zero in Grebo is indeed better
interpreted as non-existing. This is also the way it is dealt with in the description of Grebo (Innes,
1966: 50, 61).
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absence of any marking because it is also possible for first or second person subject to
be zero, as shown in (2.21 d). It has to be contextually determined who is the subject





‘I had to run’ (Dixon, 1977: 527)
b. undu gana waga:in
2SG,PRON try get up,IMPERF
‘You try to wake up’ (Dixon, 1977: 516)
c. uga:
run,PAST
‘He ran away’ (Dixon, 1977: 528)
d. bani:ldau bama abi
find,come person many
‘I came and found lots of people (Dixon, 1977: 531)
The crucial argument for the existence of a zero form is that the counterpart (here:
speaker and addressee marking) is obligatorily marked in a certain ‘slot’ of the lin-
guistics structure. The emptiness of this slot can then be interpreted as having a
meaning.
‘[A zero] is therefore possible only under specific circumstances and in a specific con-
text, namely one that allows, or even favours, the evocation of the (absent) paradig-
matic counterpart. A hearer, however, can be expected to notice an absence ‘automati-
cally’ only if the missing counterpart is itself ‘automatic’ – ie very probable – in the
particular context. In short, a syntactic zero is possibly only when the non-occurring
(positive) alternative is so likely that it in fact constitutes the norm.’ (Garcia & van
Putte, 1989: 369-370)
In case of inflectional marking, this is obviously true. Inflectional paradigms have
– by definition – a fixed linguistic ‘slot’ and the non-occurrence of any marking in this
slot can be given a linguistic interpretation. In the case of independent pronouns, this
is not necessarily the case. Often, independent pronouns are relatively free to occur in
various places the sentence, and the absence of a pronoun is not a linguistic sign. As is
illustrated by the example from Yidi, the absence of an independent pronoun cannot
be interpreted as a reference to third person. Consequently, languages that have op-
tionally marked independent pronouns with a ‘zero’ third person are better analysed
as having a ‘non-existing’ third person.
These non-existing ‘zero’ independent third person pronouns are frequent among the
languages of the world. A thorough inspection of this phenomenon would have to
compare the independent pronouns with the demonstratives of a language, because
often the same elements are used, but the homophony is not always noted explicitly
by grammarians. As the study of demonstratives falls outside the scope of the present
work, I do not have a complete survey of the distribution of this phenomenon in the
languages of the world. As a conclusion, I will just have a few random jumps through
the languages of the world, and end with some quotes and references to languages
60 PART ONE: PERSON MARKING
where demonstratives are used for third person reference. Demonstratives for third
person reference are found, for example, in Turkish (Lewis, 1967: 67-68, 71) and in
the Nakh-Dagestanian languages in the Caucasus.32 It is not common in Indo-
European, but it does occur in Indo-Aryan:
‘A number of [Indo-Aryan] languages lack 3rd person personal pronouns, using deictics
(demonstratives) instead. These are differentiated for a minimum of two categories
(distant/proximate) and in some languages for as many as four: eg, Sinhalese
meka/oka/arake/eka ‘this one, that one (by you), that one (yonder) that one (not in
sight, only spoken about)’. They may be differentiated for gender as well.’ (Masica,
1991: 251)
An example from New Guinea is found in Yimas, a Sepik Ramu language from Papua
New Guinea:
‘True pronouns in Yimas only belong to the first-and second-persons, ie refer to the
speaker and addressee. The so-called third-person pronouns refer to participants absent,
or not directly interacting in the immediate, ongoing speech act, and belong to the word
class of deictics in Yimas.’ (Foley, 1991: 111)
In Australia, non-existing third person pronouns are attested regularly:
‘Many languages are like Dyirbal in having just a set of definite determiners – with
obligatory specification of distance – in place of anything that could be called ‘third
person (singular)’. Sometimes there are also 3 dual and 3 plural pronouns, as in Dyir-
bal, but a number of languages lack even these.’ (Dixon, 1980: 357)
Finally, in a survey of the linguistic structures of the languages of Central America, it
is commented that:
‘… formally third person is frequently expressed not by a pronoun but by a demonstra-
tive.’ (Suárez, 1983: 81)
Demonstrative third persons are found often. In all those cases, the concept ‘zero’ in-
dependent pronoun is at the very least a highly troublesome one. More daringly put:
zero independent third person pronouns do not exist.
2.7 Conclusion
Much is possible in human language. There are numerous possibilities to mark sin-
gular participants, even when only the three basic categories – ‘speaker’, ‘addressee’
and ‘other’ – are considered. A few general tendencies have been extracted out of the
diversity. First, it has been shown that homophony between any two of the three cate-
gories is possible, such homophonous paradigms are not numerous among the lan-
guages of the world. Examples of almost all logical possibilities exist (only one of
nine possibilities has not been attested). Examples of singular homophony only exist
in inflectional paradigms, or, in a reversed formulation, independent pronouns do not
show homophony. For homophonous inflectional paradigms, it is often argued that it
is necessary to add independent pronouns for clarification, as these ‘impoverished’
paradigms have lost some of disambiguating power. As I have shown, this is not nec-
essarily the case. In most cases, languages with singular homophony are still ‘pro-
drop’. They do not obligatorily disambiguate the conflation of second and third per-
son. Further, when all three categories are marked differently, then it is highly unusual
                                                 
32 Eg Hunzib (van den Berg, 1995: 60), Lezgian (Haspelmath, 1993: 184, 190, 401-404) and Tsez
(Comrieet al., 1999).
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to use a zero for the marking of speaker or addressee. More commonly, the ‘other’
category is marked zero. However, in the case of an unmarked ‘other’ it is difficult to
argue for the existence of the zero form. Only in the case of inflectional marking, can
good arguments be made for the existence of a zero ‘other’. In the case of independent
pronouns, a zero ‘other’ is probably better interpreted as the non-existence of a third
person pronoun.
Now the groundwork has been done, it is time to proceed and expand the investiga-
tion of person marking on these foundations. The three singular categories that have
been the subject of this chapter (‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and ‘other’) will now be used




Redefining plurality in the pronominal domain
3.1 Introduction
After singular comes non-singular. In this chapter, the first – cautious – steps are
taken into the domain of non-singular pronominal reference. The diversity of non-
singular pronominal marking is so extensive that all the following chapters will deal
with some aspect of this theme. In this chapter, the basic framework for the analysis
of non-singular marking will be developed. This framework is built on the basis of the
singular categories from the previous chapter. The major part of this chapter will be
devoted to the question how to deal with the marking of groups of participants. Mor-
phemes that refer to such a group of participants are normally referred to as ‘plural’
pronominal elements. The main objective of this chapter is to redefine the notion of
‘plurality’ in the pronominal domain. The notion of ‘group’ marking is proposed to
replace ‘plurality’. This perspective is not completely different from the traditional
one. The difference between ‘plural’ and ‘group’ marking only amounts to a small
change, but the new perspective allows for a cross-linguistically more sensible typol-
ogy. A few consequences of the new definition are discussed in this chapter, but the
full typology on the basis of the new perspective is postponed to the next chapter.
This chapter starts with a discussion of the definition of the phenomena to be re-
viewed. In general, a cross-linguistic comparison only makes sense when the objects
of comparison are comparable. This implies that the definition of the boundaries is
one of the most important aspects of a comparison. Once the boundaries are defined
properly, the actual comparison follows almost automatically. These definitional
questions will be discussed in section 3.2. Next, the terminology that is needed to talk
about non-singular marking will be discussed in section 3.3. In this section, the
known problems with the traditional notion ‘plural’ are summarised. The notion
‘group’ is proposed to improve on the deficiencies of ‘plural’. Equipped with a proper
definition and terminology of ‘group’ marking, the possible categories within these
definitional boundaries are reviewed in section 3.4. A complete typology on the basis
of the possible categories turns out to be rather laborious. Therefore, only part of the
complete typology will be taken up in this chapter. In section 3.5, the typology of the
‘first person complex’ is discussed. The first person complex consists of the catego-
ries that are subsumed under the meaning of the English pronoun ‘we’. The typology
of the other group-categories is postponed till the following chapter. As for this chap-
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ter, the different attested marking patterns of the ‘first person complex’ in the world’s
languages are discussed in section 3.6. Some generalisations are drawn on the basis of
this partial typology in section 3.7. Finally, the content of this chapter is summarised
in section 3.8.
3.2 Definition
The previous chapter discussed the marking of pronominal elements with singular
reference. The subject of the present chapter is the marking of pronominal elements
with non-singular reference. However, this definition has to be more strictly specified
to be able to restrict the diverse manifestation of pronominal marking in the world’s
languages to a workable format. The basic definitional property for a pronominal
morpheme to be included in the present discussion is that it has to refer to more than
one person or object. Four extra criteria will be added onto this basic definition.
Summarised shortly, these four criteria are the following. First, the multiple persons
or objects have to be regarded as a group. Second, the morphemes have to be un-
marked to the specific amount of elements. Third, the morphemes should not include
the regular reference for singular persons or objects. Finally, paradigms with secon-
dary distinctions, like gender or honorifics, will be disregarded. These four criteria
will now be discussed in turn.
The first extra criterion is that the multiple persons or objects are to be interpreted as a
group. A sentence like ‘the students lifted the heavy table’ refers to a situation where
the students form a group and act together (the subject of the sentence has collective
reference). However, it is not necessary to act together to form a group. A sentence
like ‘the students passed the exam’ normally means that all students individually
passed the exam (it has a distributive reference). Still, ‘the students’ in the second
sentence are defined as one group in the present study. The only condition to form a
group is that the persons or objects are in the same predicative role. This condition is
important because there are languages that have pronominal elements that refer to
more than one person, but these persons are not in the same predicative role. An ex-
ample is presented in (3.1), from the Yuman language Mojave. The pronominal prefix
ny-… refers to two persons. In one possible meaning, the two persons are first person
subject and second person object (glossed as ‘12’). In another possible meaning of
the prefix ny-…, the two persons are third person subject and first person object
(glossed as ‘31’). No other meaning is possible for this prefix. Concluding, the pro-
nominal prefix ny-… refers to more than one person or object, so it fits in with the ba-
sic property of the definition. However, the persons or objects referred to by ny-… are





‘I’m afraid of you’, ‘He’s afraid of me’ (Munro, 1976: 12)
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The next two extra criteria are concerned with the specification of the number of par-
ticipants. The basic definition states that reference should be made to more than one
person or object. However, the specific number of persons or objects should not be
specified. Special pronominal elements for reference to a specific number of persons,
like dual, trial or paucal, are excluded here. These elements will be taken up again in
part Three. In this chapter, only those elements are included that are unmarked for the
number of participants. Also, elements that can refer to singular participants are ex-
cluded. This is an important restriction. Often, there are no grammaticalised plural
forms in a pronominal paradigm. The singular forms are used for the plural as well.
For example in Mojave, the pronominal prefixes distinguish first, second and third
person singular. However, there are no special prefixes that mark a group of more
than one person. The same singular prefixes are used for plural marking. As shown in
(3.2), there is often no number marking at all in a Mojave sentence. The subject can
be either singular ‘I’ or plural ‘we’. The meaning has to be recovered from the dis-
course. It is possible in the Yuman languages to specify plurality, but it is never




‘I put him in jail’, ‘we put him in jail’ (Munro, 1976: 15)
Elements like the prefix -… of Mojave, that both mark for singular participants and
for groups of participants, are not included in this chapter.2 Only specialised pro-
nominal elements for group marking are included. A consequence of this strict defini-
tion is that there are paradigms, like the pronominal prefixes from Mojave, that do not
have any (specialised) morphemes for group marking.
There is a last criterion to restrict the phenomena to be discussed in this chapter. This
restriction was already introduced in the previous chapter (see section 2.2); I will only
briefly repeat it here. All pronominal paradigms that include sub-categories, like gen-
der or honorifics, are excluded. The status of these sub-categories within pronominal
paradigms is a problem that deserves a study in its own right. To achieve a clear ty-
pology of personal pronominal marking, I have chosen not to include these compli-
cating factors in this survey. For now, and for the following chapters, I disregard all
pronominal paradigms that make secondary distinctions in the referential categorisa-
                                                 
1 The marking of plurality in the Yuman languages is quite complex, using affixes, stem changes or
even completely different verbal stems for singular and plural subjects. All in all, there are about 25
different ways to mark plurality (eg on Mojave see Munro, 1976: 224-232), the distribution of which is
still a puzzle to the specialists:
‘Some efforts have been made in previous descriptions of Yuman languages to class certain plu-
ral markers as indicating collective as opposed to distributive plural … or to refer to semantic
similarities among the verbs which take a given plural marker. … However, I do not feel that
any of these typologies adequately explains the puzzling distribution of plural markers.’
(Munro, 1976: 227)
2 This criterion is the counterpart to one of the criteria used for the definition of singular marking in the
previous chapter. In section 2.2, pronominal elements that cross the singular/plural boundary were
considered to be singular. In this chapter, the same criterion is used to exclude these elements in the
discussion of plurals.
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tion of pronominal elements. In a few incidental cases, I deviate from this restriction
to discuss a very special case of paradigmatic structure. These cases, all with a gender
distinction in the third person singular, will be explicitly noted in the discussion of the
examples.3
3.3 Terminology
Now that the definition is clarified, it is time to take a look at the terminology. Over
the last century, there has been an ongoing, but rather covert, discussion about a suit-
able meta-language to approach the marking of person in human language. Many
deficits of the traditional approach have been noted. However, there is still no widely
accepted replacement for the traditional term ‘plural’, which turns out, on closer in-
spection, to be a rather awkward concept for the description of non-singular pronomi-
nal categories. I will make an attempt for the long overdue reformulation by replacing
‘plural’ with ‘group’.4 The reasons for this reformulation will be laid out in this sec-
tion. All that follows in the present work can be read as a prolonged argument for the
new terminology.
Pronominal elements that refer to a group of persons or objects, as defined in the pre-
vious section, are normally called ‘plural’. However, there is a problem with the term
‘plural’. The notion of ‘plural’ within the domain of pronominal marking is rather dif-
ferent from the standard notion of ‘plural’. Normally, a singular morpheme, like the
English word ‘chair’, refers to a single object that falls into the class of chairs. A plu-
ral, like ‘chairs’, refers to a group of objects, each of which belongs to the class of
chairs. Transferred to the pronominal domain, this would mean that a ‘first person
singular’ refers to a person that belongs to the class of speakers. No problem up to
here. However, the consequent next step would be that a ‘first person plural’ refers to
a group of persons that all individually belong to the class of speakers. In other words,
a ‘first person plural’ is literally a ‘group of speakers’. The English pronoun ‘we’
would, in this analysis, mean something like ‘the group of persons currently speaking
in unison’. This is clearly not what ‘we’ prototypically means. ‘We’ normally refers
to a group of people, only one of whom is currently speaking (Jespersen, 1924: 192;
Benveniste, 1966: 233; Lyons, 1968: 277; Moravcsik, 1978: 354, fn. 12). The most
common meaning of ‘we’ strongly resembles the meaning of a nominal case marker
that is known as the ASSOCIATIVE. An associative case marker is, for example, found
in Hungarian. Hungarian has a nominal plural suffix …-ok, as in (3.3 a). This phrase
can, for example, be used to refer to a group of people that all have the name John.
There is a different associative suffix …-ék, as in (3.3 b). With this suffix, the phrase
means something like ‘John and his group’.
                                                 
3 This restriction could in principle lead to a skewed picture of the distribution of the different types of
pronominal paradigms. However, my impression is that this is not the case. When I came across a
pronominal paradigm with gender or honorific distinctions, I have always checked whether the para-
digm did show an unusual structure, not attested in any other paradigm. It never did. Also, my impres-
sion is that no type is grossly underrepresented in the current set of examples because of the omission
of paradigms with special gender or honorific categories.
4 Howe (1996: 9) also uses the term ‘group’ instead of the term ‘plural’.




‘More than one John’
b. János-ék
NAME-ASSOC
‘John and associates’, ‘John and his group’ (Corbett & Mithun, 1996: 5)
The prototypical meaning of ‘we’ is associative. ‘We’ means something like ‘I and
my associates’, in which the associates could be either addressees or others. A real
‘plural I’ is possible, but rather odd. For the ‘second person plural’, the situation is dif-
ferent. Here, both the plural reference ‘you all, present audience’ and the associative
reference ‘you and your associates’ make sense. The prototypical meaning of the
‘second person plural’ is probably associative (see section 3.4 for an extensive discus-
sion). For the ‘third person plural’, both the plural and the associative meaning are
completely normal, but the prototypical meaning is probably plural (Moravcsik,
1994). The meaning of the so-called ‘plural’ pronominal elements contain both plural
and associative notions. This makes the term ‘plural’ in the domain of pronominal
marking semantically awkward and somewhat confusing. It is better to avoid this
term.
This theoretical argument can be supplemented with an empirical observation. It is
rather uncommon to find pronominal paradigms that use nominal strategies to mark
plurality. Normally, the ‘plural’ in the pronominal domain is marked differently from
the plural of regular nouns in the language. Benveniste (1966) already made this ob-
servation.
‘… l’identité des formes pronominales au singulier et au pluriel demeure l’exception.
Dans la grande majorité des langues, le pluriel pronominal ne coïncide pas avec le
pluriel nominal, du moins tel qu’on le représente ordinairement.’ (Benveniste,
1966: 233)
Examples of nominal plural marking in pronouns exist, but they are generally hard to
find. Note that it is rather common to find pronouns with transparent plural forms;
plurals that are built by regular derivation from the singular forms. However, the
PRONOMINAL marking for plurality is in most cases (synchronically) different from the
NOMINAL marking for plurality.5 In those few cases where a nominal marker is found
in the pronominal paradigm, it is either found in part of the paradigm only, or it is
functionally empty (ie the singular and plural forms are still different if the plural
marker would be removed), or it is only optionally used. It is really uncommon for a
pronominal paradigm to use a nominal plural marker as the only identification of plu-
rality. An example of such a rarity is found in Trumai, to be discussed below. After
the case from Trumai, I discuss two cases (from Korean and Canela-Kraho) that come
near, but even in these cases the pronominal plural marking is not completely regular.
                                                 
5 Regular pronominal marking for plurality is commonly related to nouns like ‘fellow’ or ‘people’. The
marking ‘I-fellow’ or ‘I-people’ should probably be read as marking an associative case: ‘I and my
fellows’ or ‘I and my people’ (cf section 4.4.2).
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An instance of a complete overlap between pronominal and nominal number marking
is attested in Trumai, a genetically isolated language from Brazil (Monod-Becquelin,
1975: 175). The person markers ha and hi (meaning ‘I’ and ‘you’ respectively) are
combined with the plural postposition uan to form ‘we’ and ‘you-plural’. The same
pluraliser is also used with nouns. From the accompanying texts (Monod-Becquelin,
1975: 226-247), it appears that this pluraliser is used obligatory with pronouns and
human nouns, but it is not consistently used with non-human nouns.
‘Il est clair que les deux personnels <ha> et <hi> se combinent avec le pluralisateur =
<ha uan> = 1re personne + pluriel = nous; comme <kiki>, <un homme>, <kiki uan> =
<les hommes>. (Monod-Becquelin, 1975: 175)
In Korean, the plural marking is used obligatorily in polite levels of address in all but
the first person plural:
‘In non-deferential levels of address, there is a separate stem for 1st plural; However,
the other persons use the same stem [as the singular, MC], but are obligatorily marked
by a number suffix.’ (Sohn, 1994: 284)
For example, in the ‘level II’ pronouns in Korean (used when the addressee of third
person referent is generally equal or lower than the speaker, yet he or she is an adult)
the second person singular pronoun is tangsin and the second person plural pronoun is
tangsin-tul (Sohn, 1994: 287). The suffix …-tul is the regular number marker for
nouns, used obligatorily when the noun is definite (Sohn, 1994: 268-269). However,
the first person plural is wuli; rather different from the first person singular ha. Wuli is
only optionally extended with the nominal suffix …-tul. Thus, it can be concluded that
there is some nominal plural marking in pronouns, but only in a restricted part of the
paradigm.6
Another example where pronominal elements use the same plural marking as regular
nouns is found in Canela-Kraho, a Gé language from Brazil. The plural particle me is
found with pronominal arguments, as in (3.4 b), as well as with nominal arguments, as
in (3.4 c). However, this particle is not obligatorily used in the language and even
when it is used, the context has to make clear whether it is the subject or the object
that is meant to be plural.
‘Number is sometimes expressed by the particle ‘me’, ‘plural’, usually where the refer-
ent is human and more specifically, Indian. … The context alone indicates whether the
subject or the object is being pluralized.’ (Popjes & Popjes, 1986: 185)
(3.4) CANELA-KRAHO
a. Capi te i-pupun
NAME PAST 1-see
‘Capi saw me’ (Popjes & Popjes, 1986: 175)
b. Capi te me i-pupun
NAME PAST PLUR 1-see
‘Capi saw us (exclusive)’ (Popjes & Popjes, 1986: 175)
                                                 
6 The independent pronouns from the Siouan language Lakhota are comparable in structure to these
Korean pronouns. The Lakhota pronouns are discussed in section 3.6.6, example  (3.18). The plural
suffix …-pi that is found in the pronouns is also used occasionally to pluralise nouns, although it is not
suffixed on the noun, but on the verb (Van Valin, 1977: 60-62).
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c. humre te me rop cahhyr
man PAST PLUR dog beat
‘The men beat the dog’ (Popjes & Popjes, 1986: 186)
To sum up, the marking of non-singular pronominal elements is neither semantically
nor morphologically similar to nominal plural marking. A much better approach for
the analysis of pronominal paradigms is to talk about ‘group marking’ instead of ‘plu-
ral marking’. This may seem like a terminological quibble, but this slight change in
perspective leads to a rather different typology; one that is better suited to tackle the
cross-linguistic variation of ‘plural’ pronominal marking. Basically, the change in
perspective from plural marking to group marking is a change in emphasis from
NUMBER to KIND. In different words, a change will be proposed from a QUANTITATIVE
to a QUALITATIVE criterion.
The traditional terminology of ‘plural’ marking highlights the number of participants:
there are singular (one) and plural (more than one) pronouns. The difference between
the two is one of quantity. From this perspective, there are three basic singular par-
ticipants (speaker, addressee and other) and, likewise, there are also three basic plural
participants (speaker-plural, addressee-plural and other-plural) – in total six kinds of
pronominal elements. This traditional classification is not only semantically awkward,
as set out above, it also gets tangled up when it incorporates the difference between an
inclusive and an exclusive first person plural. The difference between an inclusive (a
first person plural that includes the addressee) and an exclusive (a first person plural
that excludes the addressee) is found regularly among the world’s languages. How-
ever, as this distinction has no place in the basic six-way typology, a new dimension
is introduced to take care of this opposition. However, the inclusive-exclusive oppo-
sition is not at all independent of the six-way typology. The inclusive-exclusive oppo-
sition is only found in the first person plural. There is no inclusive-exclusive distinc-
tion in the second, nor in the third person. A complete new dimension to account for a
single extra form is rather a waste of apparatus.
The perspective that will be taken here is a different one. It does not emphasise the
number of participants, it emphasises the kind of participants in a group. In this view,
there are groups of participants, as opposed to singular participants. These groups are
analysed according to the kind of participants of which it is composed. A group, for
example, can consist of a speaker and the addressee, or of the addressee and some
other participant, et cetera. The number is not important, only the kind of participants
involved is important. The group-perspective is a qualitative approach to non-singular
marking. The group-perspective on pronominal elements, which will be developed in
the next section, is semantically less awkward, and it will incorporate the inclusive-
exclusive distinction automatically. A consequence of this approach is that a group
could also consist of multiple speakers, or of multiple addressees. Both these ‘real
plural’ meanings are part of the logically possible groups of participants. However,
these possibilities will be thrown out of the typology, on empirical grounds, in the
next section. These ‘real plurals’ do not occur as grammaticalised elements in the lan-
guages of the world.
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3.4 Towards a typology of groups
Based on the threefold division of singular participants (1: speaker, 2: addressee, 3:
other), there are seven logical possibilities to form groups. The seven possibilities are
shown in Table 3.1. The numbers in the table refer to the kind of participants, the
amount of each kind is not important.7
1+1 ‘we’, mass speaking
1+2 ‘we’, including addressee, excluding other
1+3 ‘we’, including other, excluding addressee
1+2+3 ‘we’, complete
2+2 ‘you-all’, only present audience
2+3 ‘you-all’, addressee(s) and others
3+3 ‘they’
Table 3.1: Different groups of participants 8
Of the seven possible groups, there are four that include the speaker; 1+1, 1+2, 1+3
and 1+2+3. These are all subsumed under the meaning of English ‘we’ (Quirk et al.,
1985: 340). Franz Boas was the first to distinguish these four possible meanings of the
English pronoun ‘we’. He also concludes that a ‘true first person plural’ (ie 1+1) is
impossible.
‘When, therefore, we speak of a first person plural, we mean logically either self and
person addressed [1+2], or self and person or persons spoken of [1+3], or finally, self,
person or persons addressed, and person or persons spoken of [1+2+3]. A true first per-
son plural [1+1] is impossible, because there can never be more than one self.’ (Boas,
1911b: 39, number-notation and italics added, MC)
However, interpreted slightly different, the ‘true first person plural’ 1+1 exists as a
conceptual category. Boas interpreted the ‘first person’ as reference to the SELF, and
of course, only one ‘self’ can speak at a time.9 When ‘first person’ is interpreted as
reference to the SPEAKER, as is done here, then a ‘true first person plural’ (1+1) can be
interpreted as a group of speakers, speaking together in unison. Mühlhäusler & Harré
                                                 
7 Cf Sokolovskaya (1980: 90), Plank (1985: 130-152), Henderson (1985), Greenberg (1988: 13-15) and
Noyer (1992: 147-148) for comparable approaches, but using slightly different notations.
8 It is an old practice to abbreviate inclusive and exclusive with the number 1 & 2 and 1 & 3 respec-
tively. Jespersen (1924: 213) remarks that the notation ‘1/2’ and ‘1/3’ has been used in ‘some works
dealing with Amerindian languages’. I have been unable to track down an instance of this notation.
The first complete analysis of plural pronouns as combinations of singular participants is probably by
Hollenbach (1970), although she does not use the ‘+’ sign. An early usage of the ‘+’ sign for inclusive
and exclusive first person plurals can be found in Lounsbury (1953). The ‘+’ sign is for the first time
consistently used by Zwicky (1977). The notation with a ‘+’ has become en vogue to analyse plural
pronominal elements in the descriptive literature from the eighties onward (eg Roberts, 1987: 210-
211). It is unclear to me what has given it this sudden boost. There is some variation in the current lit-
erature, as sometimes ‘1+1’ is found for the first person plural exclusive, where I use ‘1+3’, eg various
articles in Wiesemann (1986a) and also in Hale (1973: 315).
9 The ‘self’ is a much debated concept in philosophy and ethnology. For a summary of the relevant
aspects of this debate for linguistics, see Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990: 104-122) and Foley
(1997: 261 ff.). For the analysis of linguistic structure, the concept of the ‘self’ is a theoretical burden,
rather than a blessing. The concept ‘speaker’ is more appropriate for the present purpose. Alterna-
tively, for the analysis of language use, the concept ‘self’ is indispensable.
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(1990: 201-205) note that the use of ‘we’ in the meaning of a ‘group of persons
speaking in unison’ is found in the phenomenon of MASS SPEAKING:
‘… football chanting, ritual mass speaking, as in a church service, the mass speaking of
children at play and finally the reactions of a concert audience. There are many other
forms of mass speaking, such as what occurs at political rallies. … In order for there to
be mass speakings at all, the members of the speaking group or groups must achieve a
high degree of co-ordination of their actions.’ (Mühlhäusler & Harré, 1990: 201-202)
An example is we are the champions, sung by a soccer audience after their team has
won, or we want more shouted by a concert audience. This is a rather marked usage of
the English pronoun ‘we’, but it can be used that way. Still, this does not make 1+1 a
linguistic category. For it to be a linguistic category, the notion of ‘mass speaking’
should exist as a grammaticalised category at least in some languages in the world.
However, as far as I know, there is no language in the world that distinguishes a sepa-
rate morpheme for ‘mass speaking’. It seems that Boas was on the right track when he
proclaimed that 1+1 was an impossible category. His rationale does not hold, but his
intuition was right. 1+1 is semantically a feasible category, but it is not linguistically
salient. For the rest of the discussion here, I will disregard this category altogether.10
Just as 1+1, the category 2+2 is not widely recognised as a viable linguistic category.
It is a viable category at least in principle. The category 2+2 is a semantically feasible
category. When addressing a group a people, there is in principle a difference whether
‘you (more than one person)’ addresses only the present audience and no one else, or
whether other people, not directly addressed, can be included. The reference only to
the present audience is indicated here by 2+2; the general group address is indicated
by 2+3. Lyons describes this difference as follows:
‘A distinction might also be made between an ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ use of the
‘second person plural’ (in a slightly different sense of ‘inclusive’ vs. ‘exclusive’). The
English pronoun you may of course be either singular or plural … . As a plural form, it
may be either ‘inclusive’ (referring only to the hearers present – in which case is the
plural of the singular you, in the same sense as cows is the plural of cow) or ‘exclusive’
(referring to some other person, or persons, in addition to the hearer, or hearers).’
(Lyons, 1968: 277)
A lot of the situations, where in English ‘you (more than one person)’ is used, are in-
stances of 2+2. One could think of a situation like school class address. A teacher
asking should I tell you more about this? in class, is referring only to the present audi-
ence (2+2), not to all his students, some of which might be absent. However great the
semantic plausibility, the category 2+2 is not found grammaticalised in the languages
of the world (Moravcsik, 1978: 356; Greenberg, 1988: 14; McGregor, 1989: 450, fn.
8). I have found one source where a morphological difference between 2+2 and 2+3 is
claimed. Hewitt (1979) notes that in the Caucasian language Abkhaz, a difference is
made between an exclusive and an inclusive ‘second person plural’. The exclusive
form soart indicates ‘you excluding them’, which ends up identical in meaning to
what I have called 2+2. The inclusive form s oa(rà) indicates ‘you including them’;
what I have called 2+3.11 This opposition is not very strong within the language: the
                                                 
10 Cf Zwicky (1977: 731, fn. 1) for the same reasoning.
11 Hewitt’s analysis of an inclusive-exclusive opposition in the second person plural probably goes
back to S .K. Aristeva et al. (1968) Grammatika abxazskogo jazyka; fonetika i morfologija [Grammar
[continued on next page]
72 PART ONE: PERSON MARKING
exclusive forms are hardly used; the ‘inclusive forms may and usually do appear
where one would expect the exclusives’ (Hewitt, 1979: 156-157). Also, this opposi-
tion remains a special characteristic of Abkhaz; it is not found in any of the other
Northwest Caucasian languages.12 On the whole, it seems rather implausible, if not
impossible, for a language to have a grammaticalised category 2+2.13 I will disregard
this category from now on.
The categories 1+1 and 2+2 are thus possible categories in principle, but they are not
attested as linguistic categories. These semantic categories do not grammaticalise in
human language. This can be explained by noting that the conversational settings in
which the semantic categories 1+1 and 2+2 are attested are extremely marked. Speech
in unison must be carefully planned, and eye contact with more than one person is
only achieved in a specific situation, like class-address (McGregor, 1989: 440). Both
in the case of multiple speakers (mass speaking) and of multiple addressees (present
audience), the group has to act as if it were a single entity. The multiple speakers have
to ‘speak as one’, and the multiple addressees have to ‘be conceived as one’. For a
linguistic theory of pronominal marking, it is not necessary to consider combinations
like 1+1 or 2+2 as separate categories. In this way, a remarkable reduction of the
meta-languages as proposed by Plank (1985: 130-152) and Greenberg (1988: 13-15)
can be achieved. They both distinguish all cases with multiple occurrence of the num-
ber 1, 2 and 3 as feasible linguistic categories. However, as 1+1 is unnecessary, so is
1+1+3, and 1+1+1+3, et cetera. By the exclusion of 2+2, the same argument can be
made for the exclusion of 2+2+3, 2+2+2+3, et cetera. Also, combinations like
1+1+2+3 or 1+2+2+3 are unnecessary, for the same reason. The fact that the catego-
ries 1+1 and 2+2 are not necessary for a linguistic theory of pronominal marking sub-
stantiates the group-approach as outlined in Table 3.1.14
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of the Abkhaz language; phonetics and morphology] Suxumi, Alas ara. On page 35, it says that hara is
inclusive first person plural and hart is exclusive first person plural. Then it is commented that ‘The
second person plural is formed analogously: shvara, ‘you-plural’ and shvart, ‘you-plural’.’ Thanks to
R. Smeets for finding the original reference. He also explains that the effect of the suffix …-t is proba-
bly comparable to the function of the French postposition autres in nous autres en vous autres. The
same suffix …-t is found in the Abkhaz demonstrative elements, but then in the function of a plural-
iser.
12 Abkhaz is part of the Northwest Caucasian family. The difference between an inclusive and an ex-
clusive second person plural is not noted for any of the other Northwest Caucasian languages (cf the
descriptions in Hewitt, 1989: 101, 176-177, 298, 378).
13 Comrie (1980b: 837) mentions Southeast Ambrym as an example of a language with the same pecu-
liarity as Abkhaz. He does not give any reference to substantiate this claim. Plank (1985: 147) takes
over the claim on face value. The claim probably goes back to Parker (1970: ix, 43) who lists two dif-
ferent forms for ‘you-plural’ in his dictionary of Southeast Ambrym: xami, which is glossed as ‘you
plural inclusive’ and xamim, which is glossed as ‘you plural exclusive’. However, I have not been able
to find any description of this phenomenon in the literature on other variants of Ambrym (cf Paton,
1971: 13-18, 119-124).
14 In a reply to a comparable argument by McGregor (1989), Greenberg (1989) raises the important
issue of the function of a typological classification. He argues that a classification is not only a de-
scription of attested possibilities, but that it should also point towards distinctions which might exist,
but have not been noted until now because the linguistic meta-language did not allow them to be de-
scribed.
‘It is a fact of ordinary experience, that a single speaker often addresses several hearers simulta-
neously both on informal occasions and in public address. I cannot, in fact, produce a single ex-
ample of a language which does make a clear distinction between (2+2…) and (2+3…), but [it]
[continued on next page]
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Five categories remain after these two have been dismissed. Three of the remaining
categories include the speaker. These are 1+2, 1+3 and 1+2+3. These categories all
exist as grammaticalised categories in the world’s languages. However, in English,
they are not distinguished morphologically. All three have to be translated into Eng-
lish by the pronoun ‘we’. They will be quickly introduced here. The categories 1+2
and 1+2+3 include reference to the addressee. They are both known as an ‘inclusive
first person plural’. In English, there is no specialised pronominal element for these
referential values. To express its content, a paraphrase like ‘we, you also’ has to be
used. Some pronominal paradigms in the world’s languages distinguish between the
two categories 1+2+3 and 1+2. In such paradigms, the category 1+2+3 refers to a
group that includes the speaker, the addressee and at least one other. This is known in
the literature as an ‘augmented inclusive’. On the other hand, the category 1+2 is
known in the literature as the ‘minimal inclusive’. In this case, only the present audi-
ence is included, prototypically only one singular addressee. More discussion of these
categories will be presented in section 3.6. The category 1+3 refers to a group ex-
cluding the addressee. This is generally known as the ‘exclusive first person plural’.
In English, it has to be paraphrased as something like ‘we, I and the ones I was talking
about, not including you’. The other two categories are well-known and do not need
of explanation. The categories 2+3 and 3+3 are equivalent to the ‘second person plu-
ral’ and ‘third person plural’, respectively. As far as these categories are concerned,
the ‘group’ perspective is not much different from the ‘plural’ perspective.
3.5 A partial typology: the first person complex
The five different group categories – 1+2+3, 1+2, 1+3, 2+3 and 3+3 – can be marked
linguistically in numerous different ways. At one side of the spectrum, they can all
five be marked with a different morpheme. That would amount to a maximally differ-
entiated paradigm. At the other extreme, none of the categories could have a special-
ised morpheme. All group reference could be marked using only the singular pro-
nominal elements and no other morphemes. That would amount to a minimally differ-
entiated paradigm. In between these two extremes there are all kinds of different ways
to group the categories together. Counting all the possible combinations, there turn
out to be 203 theoretically possible patterns.15 To find a way through the bewildering
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is obviously an empirical possibility to whose occurrence we should be alert.’ (Greenberg,
1989: 454, italics added, MC)
I agree that we should be alert to hypothetical other distinctions, but in this case, it seems to me rather
a waste of apparatus to include all the encumbering multiple combinations of 1 and 2 in the meta-
language only because of some non-attested possibilities.
Besides this theoretical argument, Greenberg presents a few languages to argue for the necessity of
multiple addressees in the meta-language. However, these examples do not convince me. The cases of
Palaung and Sierra Popoluca are interesting, but they do not argue for multiple addressees (see section
8.5.5 and 4.5.2, respectively, for an extensive discussion of these cases). A third case presented by
Greenberg concerns the Philippine pronouns. The Pampangan pronoun tamu is probably built from the
parts ta (1+2) and mu (2), but its meaning is clearly 1+2+3, not 1+2+2 as Greenberg wants to have it
(Gonzales, 1981: 172). Also, the equivalent pronoun tayo in the related language Ilocano is built from
the parts ta (1+2) and yo (2+3), see also section 3.6.5.
15 The total of 203 possible combinations is calculated by taking the sixth so-called ‘Bell number’. A
Bell number Bn represents the total number of possible dissections of a set of n different elements. In
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amount of 203 feasible patterns, I will start off with a subset of the five categories.
The typology will be slowly built up from there. The point of departure will be the
‘first person complex’; the set of categories that include the speaker. There are three
categories that include the speaker, 1+2, 1+3 and 1+2+3.16 With only three categories,
and the possibility of non-existence, there are 15 possible patterns.17 In this section, I
will show which of these 15 patterns are attested among the world’s languages. In
section 3.6, I will give a description of the attested patterns. I will draw some gener-
alisations on the basis of the attested patterns in section 3.7. The distribution of the
other two categories – 2+3 and 3+3 – relative to the patterns of the first person com-
plex is a long story. This will be taken up in the next chapter. All patterns that are
theoretically possible with the three categories from the first person complex are
shown in Table 3.2. A capital letter in this table indicates that there is a specialised
morpheme for this category – or combination of categories. A dash indicates that this
category is linguistically coded for by a morpheme that also marks a singular cate-
gory. In case of a dash, there is no specialised morpheme for the referential category.
The possibilities are ordered according to the number of specialised morphemes that
are present. The first pattern distinguishes three different morphemes for the three dif-
ferent categories. Next follow the six possible patterns with two specialised mor-
phemes. Then the seven possibilities with only one specialised non-singular mor-
pheme are shown. Finally the only possible pattern with no specialised morpheme for
either of the three non-singular categories closes the list of possible patterns. In total,
this makes 15 different patterns. I have found ten of these 15 patterns in the world’s
linguistic variation – they are marked with an arrow in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Possible patterns of first person complex
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this case there are five different categories (1+2, 1+3, 1+2+3, 2+3 and 3+3) and the possibility of non-
existence. The number of possible dissections of these elements is B6 = 203.
16 It is also possible to start with the ‘second person complex’. This would be the set of all categories
that include the second person, 1+2, 1+2+3 and 2+3. Or indeed, it is possible to start from the ‘third
person complex’, which consists of the categories 1+3, 1+2+3, 2+3 and 3+3. A priori, there is no rea-
son to prefer one of these perspectives over the others. The numeral ‘1’ is only shorthand for
‘speaker’, and there is no reason to start with the speaker for the construction of the typology. The or-
der of the numbers in the notation does not have an inherent meaning. The individual numbers in
‘1+2+3’ are just conveniently placed in numerical order. The groups ‘2+3+1’ or ‘3+2+1’ are identical
to ‘1+2+3’. To see what it would bring, I also analysed the data from the viewpoint of the ‘second per-
son complex’, but this didn’t bring any new interesting insights. There is a small group of pronominal
paradigms where the discussion would benefit from a ‘second person complex’ perspective (see espe-
cially the discussion of ‘vertical’ homophony in paradigms with an inclusive/exclusive opposition in
section 5.3.3). However, some beautiful generalisations would be missed from that perspective. I did
not consider the ‘third person complex’ perspective seriously. This perspective would not make the
discussion much easier, as there are four categories in this complex that can be combined into 52 dif-
ferent patterns. This is too much to take up at once, and still retain a clearly structured discussion.
17 With three different categories (1+2, 1+3 and 1+2+3) and the possibility of non-existence, the total
number of dissections is B4 = 15 (see also footnote 15).
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The ten attested patterns are repeated in Table 3.3. They are separated in two groups.
The first five are common among the world’s languages. They are designated for ease
of reference as (Pa) through (Pe). The last five patterns – (Pf) through (Pj) – are rare.
The distinction between common and rare is rather clear-cut. There are dozens of ex-
amples of the common patterns, but only one, or maximally two, examples of the rare
patterns. This indicates that the five ‘common’ patterns are indeed a rather different
sort. They are the preferred structures for pronominal paradigms.
(Pa) (Pb) (Pc) (Pd) (Pe) (Pf) (Pg) (Ph) (Pi) (Pj)










Table 3.3: Attested patterns of the first person complex
3.6 Different kinds of ‘we’
Ten out of the fifteen possible types for the first person complex are attested. The
pattern of the first person complex of these types will be exemplified in this section.
The first five types are common. The common patterns ask for more attention than
can be dealt with in this chapter. Although the amount of logically possible alterna-
tives is reduced enormously by only looking at these five patterns of the first person
complex, these five common patterns still show many different combinations with the
other two categories (2+3 and 3+3). The full discussion of the geographical distribu-
tion and the structural variability of these common types is postponed till the next
chapter. The (extensive) list of examples of the common patterns, as presented in the
next chapter, should be a reasonable argument for the commonness of these patterns.
In this chapter, only a rough outline of the structure of the common patterns will be
presented. The other five types are found only in incidental cases. All paradigms at-
tested of these rare types will be completely described in this section.
3.6.1 Type (Pa): ‘unified-we’
The structure of type (Pa) is well known. This is the structure that is found in English
independent pronouns, with a single undifferentiated form of ‘we’. The meaning of a
morpheme like the English ‘we’ is best characterised as a group of more than one per-
son, including the present speaker, but unmarked as to the other persons in the group.
It unifies the referential categories 1+2, 1+2 and 1+2+3 in one morpheme. I will use
the name ‘unified-we’ for this type of paradigm. The complete variability of this type
is discussed in section 4.3. Two paradigms of the ‘unified-we’ type will be given
some special attention here, because they are classified differently in the literature.
These two paradigms, from Assiniboine and Nyulnyul, are presented as special para-
digmatic structures by Greenberg (1988: 9) and McGregor (1996: 40-41). However,
following the definitions as used in the present work, these paradigms are cases of the
well-known ‘unified-we’ type.
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Greenberg (1988: 9) presented the active prefixes from the Siouan language Assini-
boine as an example of a special paradigmatic structure, which he, accordingly, called
the ‘Assiniboine-type’ paradigm. There are indeed paradigms of this Assiniboine-type
attested among the world’s languages (they will be discussed here as type (Pf) in sec-
tion 3.6.6), but Assiniboine itself is not among them. The problem is that the special
opposition Greenberg reported for Assiniboine is not marked inside the pronominal
paradigm itself. The special characteristic of Assiniboine is that there is a difference
between the category 1+2 (speaker and addressee, no others) and all other categories
in the first person complex. There is thus a difference between ‘we: I and you’ and all
other forms of ‘we’. These other forms of ‘we’ consists of both inclusive and exclu-
sive reference. This is indeed a very special division of the first person complex. Two
example sentences from Assiniboine are presented in (3.5). Sentence (3.5 a) shows an
example with 1+2 reference; sentence (3.5 b) shows an example with all ‘we’ refer-




‘I and you chop off something’ (Levin, 1964: 31)
b. u k-ákipta-pi
1PLUR-argue-PLUR
‘We argued with him’ (Levin, 1964: 32, 93)
However, the crucial difference between the two sentences is not found in the form of
the pronominal prefix. The prefix ‘u k-… is in both cases identical. The difference
between the two kinds of reference is marked by the presence or absence of the plu-
rality suffix …-pi. Without this suffix, the reference is 1+2; with the suffix …-pi, the
reference is 1+2+3 or 1+3. This is a very interesting referential division, but it is not
marked in the pronominal paradigm. The pronominal paradigm has only one form
u k-… for all referential possibilities of ‘we’. The pronominal prefixes from Assinibo-
ine are thus of the ‘unified-we’ type.
Following Greenberg’s analysis, McGregor (1996: 40-41) argues that the pronominal
prefixes from the Australian language Nyulnyul are also of the ‘Assiniboine-type’. He
argued rightly that Nyulnyul resembles Assiniboine strongly, but the consequence is
that Nyulnyul does not have a special pronominal paradigm, for the same reason as
Assiniboine did not have one. There is only one pronominal prefix for ‘we’ in Nyul-
nyul, the prefix ya-…. McGregor explains that this prefix is sometimes attested with-
out number marking, in which case the reference is to 1+2.
‘[ya] occasionally occurs without the number marking prefix when it refers to the
speaker-hearer dyad: that is, when reference is made to the 1&2 minimal category.’
(McGregor, 1996: 40)
However, the prefix itself is identical in all referential variations. It is the number suf-
fix …-rr- that marks the special referential properties of the two ways to say ‘we’ in
Nyulnyul. In this case, the problems are even stronger, as the opposition between
presence and absence of the number suffix is not completely regular, judging from the
example sentences that are given by McGregor (1996). The example presented in
(3.6) seems to have 1+2 reference, but there is still a plural suffix in the verb.
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(3.6) NYULNYUL
ngay a juy ya-li-rr-jid Derby-ung
I and you 1PLUR-IRR-PLUR-go PLACE-all
‘You and I might go to Derby’ (McGregor, 1996: 42)
Both the active prefixes from Assiniboine and the pronominal prefixes from Nyulnyul
are of the ‘unified-we’ type, following my definitions. The kind of paradigm that
Greenberg originally intended to describe as the ‘Assiniboine-type’ exists, but the As-
siniboine and Nyulnyul cases are not part of that type. The paradigms attested of
‘real’ Assiniboine-type paradigms will be discussed in section 3.6.6.
3.6.2 Type (Pb): ‘no-we’
Paradigms of type (Pb) are the diametrical opposite of the previous type. Instead of
one overarching form for all ‘we’ categories, (Pb) paradigms have no specialised pro-
nominal element for ‘we’ at all. Most examples of pronominal paradigms without any
form for ‘we’ do even not have any specialised group marking at all. This is, for ex-
ample, found in the English inflectional marking, where all the plural forms are iden-
tical to the first and second person singular; they are all zero. The English person in-
flection is a pronominal paradigm of type (Pb). I will use the name ‘no-we’ alterna-
tively instead of (Pb) for this type of paradigmatic structure.





1+3 – B C
Table 3.4: the ‘no-we’ patterns (Pb)
Pronominal paradigms of type (Pb), with no specialised marking for ‘we’, are less
well known than the other common types of paradigms. It has even been claimed that
‘we’ is a universally grammaticalised category for human languages. This claim im-
plies that the ‘no-we’ type should not exist. The most explicit formulation of this
claim is found in Ingram (1978):18
                                                 
18 The claim for the universal existence of the first person plural has been around for a long time. An
early hint, and implicit explanation, to this claim is made by Schmidt (1926):
‘Denn gerade bei der Erfassung der Person, besonders der ersten Person, tritt der Begriff der individuellen
Einheit am stärksten hervor. Gerade die scharfe Erfassung der Einheit ist aber auch die notwendige psy-
chologische Vorbedingung für die Herausarbeitung der Mehrheitsformen.’ (Schmidt, 1926: 316)
Forchheimer (1953), who builds on the work of Father Schmidt, transforms this into a true claim of a
universal first person plural:
‘My research has borne out Schmidt’s statement for the plural without exception … I have found several
languages where the word for ‘I’ can also serve to express ‘we’, they all possess, besides that, a word for
‘we’. The only exception is Chinese Pidgin English. … I found no record of a language distinguishing
‘thou’ and ‘you’, but not ‘I’ and ‘we’, whereas the opposite is frequent.’ (Forchheimer, 1953: 12)
A comparable claim, though less strong, returns as Greenberg’s Universal 42: All languages have pro-
nominal categories involving at least three persons and two numbers (Greenberg, 1963: 96). Moravcsik
(1978) remarks on Greenberg’s universal that it should be interpreted as meaning that the first person
universally shows a plural:
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‘Universal 1: there are at least four persons in every language: I, thou, he, we.’ (Ingram,
1978: 227)
Note that in this universal, Ingram talks about ‘languages’. He claims every language
has a forms for ‘we’. In contrast, I look at the structure of individual paradigms in a
language. In fact, there are two different versions of the universal claim. A strong and
a weak version, that have to be distinguished. The strong version claims that every
pronominal paradigm has at least four persons:
(3.7) Universal ‘we’, strong version:
There are at least four persons in every PARADIGM: I, thou, he, we.
As the English inflection shows, it is very well possible for an individual paradigm to
have no form for ‘we’. Such paradigms are even relatively common among the
world’s languages. The complete distribution of this paradigmatic type is discussed in
section 4.4. The strong version of the universal ‘we’ is clearly not true. Accordingly,
the claim by Ingram must be interpreted as a weaker version of this universal. A pos-
sible interpretation is that a particular paradigm may have no form for ‘we, but then
there will be another paradigm somewhere in the language that fills this gap. The
English inflection may have a ‘no-we’ structure, but English has also independent
pronouns with an overt form for ‘we’. This weak version of Ingram’s universal shown
in (3.8) holds when all languages that have a ‘no-we’ pronominal paradigm have an-
other pronominal paradigm that includes at least an element for ‘we’.
(3.8) Universal ‘we’, weak version:
There are at least four persons in every LANGUAGE: I, thou, he, we.
However, even in this weaker version, this universal is not absolute. There are a few
counterexamples, although they are very rare. The clearest case of a language that
contradicts the weak universal is the Brazilian language Mura Pirahã. Mura Pirahã has
singular pronouns, and clitics that are derived from the pronouns. The pronouns and
clitics can optionally be used co-referentially, as shown in (3.9).
(3.9) MURA PIRAHÃ
ti gíxai gí xibáobá
1 2,PRON 2,CLIT hit
‘I hit you’ (Everett, 1987: 249)
Besides the pronouns and the related clitics, no other pronominal paradigms exist. The
special property of the pronouns (and the clitics) is that they do not have any group-
marking elements. They have only elements with singular reference.
‘The three basic Pirahã pronouns are worthy of attention because they comprise one of
the simplest pronoun systems known. They are often optional in discourse, meaning
that their functional load is not as great as that for pronouns in many languages (espe-
cially given the fact that Pirahã has no form of agreement marked on the verb aside
from clitics and cliticized pronouns).’ (Everett & Thomason, n.d.)
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‘although … in all languages there will be some context where number distinctions in all three persons will
be significant, this does not mean that the personal pronominal paradigm consisting of free forms will have
number distinctions manifested in all three persons. The generalization concerning the number distinctions
in free personal pronominal forms seems to be this: it is universally present in the first person but not in the
second and third.’ (Moravcsik, 1978: 352)
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There are no markers of number anywhere in the language. There is simply no way to
refer overtly to a group of more persons in a grammaticalised form. Other construc-
tions have to be used.
‘Pirahã not only has no plural pronouns, it has no number anywhere in its grammatical
system – no number agreement, no singular-plural distinctions in nominals, and no nu-
merals at all. Moreover, there is no direct evidence of plural forms in any surviving
Mura or Pirahã data of any period.’ (Everett & Thomason, n.d.)
The only way to mark groups of participants is by conjunction of pronouns (Everett,
1986: 281). This pronominal conjunction is zero marked, as shown in (3.10).
(3.10) MURA PIRAHÃ
ti gíxai pío ahápií
1 2,PRON also go
‘You and I will go (ie we will go)’ (Everett, 1986: 281)
Other languages that contradict the weak version of the universal ‘we’ are Classical
Chinese and the Yuman language Maricopa. In Classical Chinese, there probably was
no number marking at all. In any case, nouns and pronouns knew no distinction be-
tween singular and plural forms (Norman, 1988: 89). In Maricopa, numerous ways to
mark number exist, but number is never marked in a pronominal paradigm (Gordon,
1986: 21-23, 58, 90-101). Finally, a last language that contradicts the weak version of
the universal is the Siouan language Hidatsa. The pronominal prefixes only distin-
guish between first, second and third person, and there are no plural forms of these
prefixes. There is a plural suffix on the verb, but the reference of the plurality is not
fixed. As shown in (3.11), both the subject and the object can be interpreted as plural.
As far as can be said from the sources, there are no other pronominal elements in Hi-




‘When we cut it’, ‘When I cut them’ (Robinett, 1955: 171)
3.6.3 Type (Pc): ‘only-inclusive’
The next two pronominal paradigms, type (Pc) and (Pd), both distinguish between an
inclusive ‘we’ – the categories 1+2 and 1+2+3 combined – and an exclusive ‘we’ –
the category 1+3. The central difference between the inclusive and the exclusive is the
status of the addressee. The inclusive ‘we’ includes the addressee; there is a ‘2’ in
both categories. The exclusive, oppositely, excludes the addressee; it means some-
thing like ‘we, I and people associated with me outside the present speech-act’. In the
case of paradigms of type (Pc), the exclusive ‘we’ does not have a specialised mor-
pheme. In most cases, though not all, the exclusive ‘we’ is marked by the same mor-
pheme that is used for the first person singular. I will use the mnemonic name ‘only-
inclusive’ for this pattern of non-singular marking. The complete list of examples of
this type will be presented in section 4.5.
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Table 3.5: The ‘only-inclusive’ pattern (Pc)
This pattern is exemplified here with sentences from Maká, a language from Para-
guay. Maká has pronominal prefixes that show a large range of allophonic variation
(Gerzenstein, 1994: 98). In the examples presented here, the prefix hoy-… is used both
for the first person singular, as in (3.12 a), and for the exclusive first person 1+3, as in
(3.12 b). The two meanings are distinguished by a plural suffix …--i. The important
point here is that there is no specialised morpheme for the marking of the category
1+3 within the pronominal prefixes. The category 1+3 is marked with the same prefix




‘Yo bailo’ (I am dancing) (Gerzenstein, 1994: 106)
b. hoy-otoy-i tse-kheen
1-dance-PLUR FEM-DEM
‘Yo y ella bailamos’ (We -she and I- are dancing) (Gerzenstein, 1994: 103)
By way of contrast, the inclusive ‘we’ is marked by a specialised prefix. The prefix
xi(t)-… is used for the reference to the speech-act dyad ‘I and you’, as shown in
(3.13 a). The same prefix can also by used together with a plural suffix, as shown in
(3.13 b).19 With this plural suffix, the reference is to a group of type 1+2+3: speaker,
hearer and others also. The categories 1+2 and 1+2+3 are combined into one ‘inclu-




‘Tú y yo bailamos’ (We -you and I- are dancing) (Gerzenstein, 1994: 103)
b. inekhewel xi-yi-lan-xu’ na’ qametenaX
1+2+3PRON INCL-3-kill-PLUR DEM tiger
‘A nosotros, el tigre nos mata’ (The tiger killed us) (Gerzenstein, 1994: 176)
3.6.4 Type (Pd): ‘inclusive/exclusive’
Paradigms of type (Pd) also distinguish inclusive ‘we’ from exclusive ‘we’ in the
same way as in the previous ‘only-inclusive’ (Pc) pattern. However, in the case of
(Pd) both categories are marked by specialised morphemes. This pattern will be re-
                                                 
19 The referents of xi(t)-… in example (3.13 b) are in an object role. For participants in an object role a
different plural suffix is used as for participants in a subject role; cf this sentence to the sentence
(3.12 b) above (Gerzenstein, 1994: 138).
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ferred to as ‘inclusive/exclusive’. It is an extremely common pattern, with lots of
variation. The complete variability will be laid out in section 4.6.
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Table 3.6: The ‘inclusive/exclusive’ pattern (Pd)
This pattern is exemplified here with some examples from Apalai, a Carib language
spoken in Brazil. A specialised inclusive pronominal prefix s(y)-… is found in the
subject prefixes of Apalai. The two example sentences in (3.14) show that this prefix
can be both used for only the present speaker and addressee – ie 1+2; see (3.14 a) – and
for reference to a general inclusive – ie 1+2+3; see (3.14 b); syt-… being an allomorph
of s(y)-….
(3.14) APALAI
a. s-yty-tase kokoro j-epe, tykase
INCL-poison fish-IMP tomorrow 1-friend,POSS say
‘ “Let us poison fish tomorrow, my friend”, he said’
(Koehn & Koehn, 1986: 69)
b. otoko xixi a-htao eramavko ropa syt-a-tose
where sun COP-when turn back again INCL-COP-PRES,PLUR
‘When will we all turn back?’ (Koehn & Koehn, 1986: 59)
The inclusive prefix s(y)-… is different from the exclusive prefix ynan(y)-…, as
shown in (3.15a). The exclusive prefix is also a specialised non-singular prefix, which
is the essential difference between these prefixes from Apalai and the prefixes from
Maká in the previous section. The reference to a speaker in Apalai is marked by a pre-
fix y-…, which might historically be related to ynan(y)-…, but synchronically it is a
clearly different prefix.
(3.15) APALAI
a. mame more ynan-urumekane ropa maikuato-hpe exiryke
then that EXCL-leave again ant-infested place
‘Then we abandoned that place again because of its
being infested with ants’ (Koehn & Koehn, 1986: 78)
b. y-pipohno
1-hit
‘I hit it’ (Koehn & Koehn, 1986: 108)
3.6.5 Type (Pe): ‘minimal/augmented’
The last common type, (Pe), distinguishes three different forms for ‘we’. The inclu-
sive ‘we’ from the previous section is divided into two different forms, called a
‘minimal inclusive’ and an ‘augmented inclusive’. The minimal inclusive refers only
to the speech-act dyad of speaker and addressee; ie 1+2. The augmented inclusive re-
fers to any group of participants that at least includes the present speaker and ad-
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dressee, but possibly also others; ie 1+2+3. This opposition is added on top of the op-
position between an inclusive and an exclusive ‘we’, as in the previous type (Pd). The
resulting threefold distinction will be named a ‘minimal/augmented’ paradigm.
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Table 3.7: The ‘minimal/augmented’ pattern (Pe)
As a general characteristic of the description of such a paradigm in a grammar, the
meaning of the three different forms for ‘we’ is described in terms like ‘dual’, ‘inclu-
sive’ and ‘exclusive’. Many different approaches to describe the three forms can be
found in the literature. Notwithstanding the plethora of descriptive terminology, I
have decided to take all these paradigms together and consider them as one and the
same type. There are two main criteria for paradigms to be included within this type.
First, all pronominal paradigms of this category have three different forms for ‘we’
(which distinguishes this type from the other types that are discussed in this chapter)
and, second, these pronominal paradigms do not have any dual forms for the second
or third person (which distinguishes this type from paradigms with duals as discussed
in section 8.4). It then turns out that this seemingly exotic paradigmatic structure is
found relatively frequent among the world’s languages. A full description of the
known cases of such paradigms will be presented in section 4.7. In the rest of this
section, I will discuss some historical developments that led to the present analysis of
this kind of paradigm.
Franz Boas (1911: 39) – as quoted in section 3.4 above – first acknowledged the pos-
sibility of these three different forms for ‘we’, but he did not know of any language
that actually has all three as different morphemes. The meaning of 1+2 and 1+2+3,
Boas says, may differ in reference but are not expressed by separate morphemes in
any language. If this were true, this would mean that the minimal/augmented type
(Pe) does not exist as a distinct type of pronominal paradigm.
‘I do not know of any language expressing in a separate form the combination of the
three persons [1+2+3], probably because this idea readily coalesces with the idea of
self and person spoken to [1+2].’ (Boas, 1911b: 39, number notation added, MC)
However, the distinction between 1+2 and 1+2+3 is found among the world’s lan-
guages. The oldest description where this distinction is explicitly noted, is the de-
scription by Foster & Foster (1948) of the Mixe-Zoque language Sierra Popoluca in
Mexico:20
‘The exclusive plural excludes the person or persons addressed [1+3]. The limited in-
clusive plural includes the speaker and the person or persons addressed, and excludes
                                                 
20 Although this quote from the grammar of Sierra Popoluca describes exactly a division of type (Pe), I
will not classify this language as belonging to this type. The reason is that the pronominal elements of
Sierra Popoluca consist of pronominal prefixes and number suffixes. Following the definitions that I
use, the pronominal prefixes are classified as ‘only-inclusive’ (Pc), with separate number marking. See
section 4.5.2 for a discussion.
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any other who may be present or referred to [1+2]. The generalized inclusive plural in-
cludes the speaker, person or persons addressed, and any other person or person pre-
sent, or absent and referred to [1+2+3].’ (Foster & Foster, 1948: 19, number-notation
added, M.C.)
The idea of this ‘generalised’ inclusive only caught on in the scientific literature in the
wake of a short article by Thomas (1955) on the pronouns in the Philippine language
Ilocano. He argued that the traditional description of the Ilocano pronouns is not satis-
factory. The traditional description of Ilocano, shown in Table 3.8, distinguishes be-
tween an inclusive and an exclusive plural, but also adds a special form for the dual
(Bloomfield, 1942: 194). The default description of such a language with three differ-
ent forms for ‘we’ is a division by the terms ‘inclusive’, ‘exclusive’ and ‘dual’. Tho-
mas formulates two points of criticism on this traditional analysis. These two prob-
lems will be discussed here shortly. First, the referential properties of the ‘dual’ in
these paradigms are more restricted than the name implies and, second, there is no
other dual around somewhere else in the language.
‘The 1st dual label is not completely accurate, as the use is restricted to cooperative ac-
tion by one speaker and one hearer; no one else may be included. … There is no sub-
stantiation from the structure of the rest of the language for the existence of a dual








Table 3.8: Traditional analysis of Ilocano pronouns 21
To clarify the first of these problems, I discuss the account of a comparable pronomi-
nal paradigm from a recently published grammar of Limbum, a Grassfields language
from Cameroon. In the grammar the following description is found of the three forms
for ‘we’:
‘Limbum differentiates between exclusive, inclusive and dual ‘we’. The form wìr is
used when the speaker wants to exclude the hearer(s) and sìì when the speaker wants to
include the hearer(s). When there are only two people involved, i.e. the speaker and the
addressee, the dual form sò is used.’(Fransen, 1995: 179)
In the quote, an ‘inclusive’, an ‘exclusive’ and a ‘dual’ form are mentioned. This is
widely known terminology, and that is probably the reason why this terminology is
still found abundantly in the descriptive literature. Intuitively, a dual form refers to a
group of two persons, but in the quoted description it can be read that the ‘dual’ nec-
essarily includes the addressee. This ‘dual’ is not used for a pair in which the ad-
dressee is excluded. The aspect of duality is not a complete description of the mean-
ing of the Limbum ‘dual’. The reference of the form is more specific than that. It is
better called a ‘dual inclusive’ (see also Table 3.9).
                                                 
21 In this discussion of Ilocano, the third person pronouns are troublesome. Thomas (1955) argues that
they are not real pronouns, but more like number markers. I include them here as if they were normal
third person pronouns to preclude confusion; cf section 4.7.3.












Table 3.9: Different interpretations of ‘dual-inclusive-exclusive’ in Limbum
The second, and most important, argument against the traditional terminological trin-
ity ‘dual-inclusive-exclusive’ is that the paradigms that distinguish these three forms
of ‘we’ normally do not have any other dual forms in other parts of the language.22
These paradigms all look like the example paradigm from Ilocano above. There are no
other duals, except for the ‘dual inclusive’.23 For Ilocano and Limbum, and many oth-
ers, the pronominal ‘dual inclusive’ is the only dual form in the language. To invoke a
completely new category – the dual – for the analysis of one morpheme is a waste of
apparatus. In the wake of Thomas’ ground breaking analysis for Ilocano, Conklin
adds, slightly ironical, that the traditional analysis is ‘hardly elegant, economical, or
convincing’ (1962: 134). A better approach to paradigms with three different forms
for ‘we’ is to focus on the KIND of participants, instead of the NUMBER of participants.
Going back to the Ilocano pronouns, the opposition between the dual ta and the inclu-
sive tayo is better labelled by different terms. Using the terminology as developed in
section 3.4, the opposition can be expressed as a difference between including only
the addressee in the case of ta (ie 1+2) and including the addressee and others in the
case of tayo (ie 1+2+3).
In the original article, Thomas (1955) generalised the opposition between 1+2 and
1+2+3 to the whole paradigm, as shown in Table 3.10. He aligned 1+2 with the sin-
gular persons and analysed 1+2+3 as the ‘plural’ of 1+2. As the terms ‘singular’ and
‘plural’ are obviously inadequate, he used the terms ‘simple’ vs. ‘more’:
‘… a third analysis … would present the oppositions of Speaker : Hearer : Speaker-
Hearer persons and simple : «more» or «plus» numbers. This «more» component indi-
cates that there is more than just the primary person.’ (Thomas, 1955: 208)
Conklin (1962: 135) introduced the terms ‘minimal membership’ versus ‘nonminimal
membership’ instead of ‘simple’ vs. ‘more’. Today, this phenomenon is normally re-
                                                 
22 This claim is substantiated by the data as presented in table 11 from Plank (1996: 131). In the large
database on various forms of dual marking that has been compiled by Plank and his co-workers, there
is only one language that combines the marking of a ‘first person inclusive dual only’ with nominal
dual marking. The special status of the first person pronominal marking for the occurrence of dual
forms was already noted by von Humboldt (1827: 156) and later reinforced by Plank (1989: 305, 311-
312; 1996: 130-131). Humboldt also presents an explanation for the preference of a dual in the first
person: the combination of speaker and addressee form a ‘natural pair’.
23 There are a few pronominal paradigms among the world’s languages that distinguish three
‘we’-categories and also have a dual for the second and third person. These paradigms are, conse-
quently, interpreted as a different group. They will be discussed in the chapter on dual marking, in
section 8.4.
CHAPTER 3: GROUP MARKING 85
ferred to as an opposition ‘minimal’ vs. ‘augmented’, following McKay (1978).24
Taken at face value, this analysis presents a nice coherent picture of the paradigmatic
structure. Surely, when compared to the traditional analysis, as shown in Table 3.8
above, the minimal/augmented analysis present an impressive improvement. Still,
there are two problems with this analysis. Both problems concern the generalisation
of the opposition between 1+2 and 1+2+3 to the whole paradigm, not the opposition
between 1+2 and 1+2+3 as such.
Minimal Augmented
1+2 ta tayo 1+2 +3
1 co mi  1 +3
2 mo yo  2 +3
3 na da  3 +3
Table 3.10: Minimal/augmented analysis of Ilocano pronouns
The first problem is that the MORPHOLOGICAL structure of these paradigms does not
confirm the minimal/augmented analysis. If the minimal/augmented opposition were
valid for the whole paradigm, then one would expect to find at least some pronominal
paradigms with morphologically transparent marking of the four augmented catego-
ries. In such a paradigm, the four augmented categories would be derived morpho-
logically from the four minimal categories by way of a regular ‘augmented’ mor-
pheme. However, I have never come across such a morphologically transparent
minimal/augmented paradigm among the world’s languages. The second problem
concerns the HISTORICAL CONNECTION of the minimal/augmented paradigm to other
paradigms. The generalised analysis as shown in Table 3.10 seems to argue for a con-
nection to the ‘only-inclusive’ type (Pc). The only-inclusive paradigm looks like the
minimal set of a minimal/augmented paradigm, and a historical development form the
only-inclusive of the minimal/augmented paradigm seems a reasonable guess. How-
ever, it turns out to be impossible to find any good evidence for this transition.25
There is much better evidence for the transition from the ‘inclusive/exclusive’ type
(Pd) to the minimal/augmented paradigm (cf Greenberg, 1988: 6). The full evidence
for this transition will be presented in section 6.4.2. Anticipating that discussion, the
connection to inclusive/exclusive (Pd) paradigms can be made plausible by looking at
the Ilocano paradigm. The pronoun tayo in Ilocano is the odd one out as it is the only
one which is disyllabic. It looks like tayo is a later addition, made up from the 1+2
pronoun ta and the 2+3 pronouns yo. Interestingly, in the closely related language
Pampangan, the equivalent pronoun tami is also the only disyllabic pronoun, but in
                                                 
24 As a result of this analysis, there is a small current in the descriptive literature to call the minimal
inclusive a ‘fourth’ person, as this inclusive goes along with the other ‘singular’ marking (eg Hard-
man, 1966: 56; Osborne, 1974: 38; Gerzenstein, 1994: 83). This usage of ‘fourth’ person is semantically
awkward and conceptually confusing. It should be avoided (cf Hymes, 1972: 105).
25 There are many examples of only-inclusive (Pc) paradigms that can be pluralised. In these cases, the
plural forms have the same referential values as an augmented set. However, these plurals are never
marked directly in the pronominal system. In all cases I have seen, the plural marker for a (Pc) para-
digm is marked independently from the pronominal elements, eg the plural marker is a suffix, while
the pronominal elements are prefixes.
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this case it is made up from the 1+2 pronoun ta and the 2 singular pronoun mi
(Gonzales, 1981: 172-173). The two different structures of this pronoun argues for a
late addition. Also, there are many Philippine languages that have an inclu-
sive/exclusive (Pd) pattern (cf Reid, 1971), but I know of none that has an only-
inclusive pattern (Pc). For these reasons, paradigms like the Ilocano pronouns will be
presented in yet a different analysis in the present work. The paradigms will be dis-
played with two columns, distinguishing the singular and the group morphemes, as




1 co mi 1+3
2 mo yo 2+3
3 na da 3+3
Table 3.11: Singular-Group analysis of Ilocano pronouns
3.6.6 Rare types
Finally, five other patterns of the first person complex are attested among the world’s
languages, but these patterns are extremely rare. The examples of these patterns are
incidental cases, probably only to be explained separately for each case with its own
peculiar history. I will only synchronically describe all these rare cases in this section,
and disregard them in later chapters. The structures of the first person complex are
repeated in Table 3.12.
(Pf) (Pg) (Ph) (Pi) (Pj)








Table 3.12: Rare patterns of the first person complex
These five structures seem to fall in two classes. The first two patterns (Pf) and (Pg)
do not have any overlap between singular and non-singular categories, and these two
are both attested in more than one case. In the other three patterns, an overlap between
singular and non-singular is found and these three patterns are each represented by
only one case. However, the number of examples is so small that it is difficult to
judge whether this distinction is typologically salient. Future research has to bear out
                                                 
26 Forchheimer (1953) seems to hint at a distinction between the minimal/augmented analysis (cf Table
3.10) and the singular-group analyses (cf Table 3.11) on the basis of the morphological structure of the
forms for ‘we’. His type IV-A4 can be compared to the ‘singular-group’ analysis, and his IV-A2 to the
‘minimal/augmented’ analysis (ibid.: 83-84). However, I do not see any difference that is crucial in
this respect between the presented paradigms from Winnibago (ibid.: 88) and Sierra Popoluca
(ibid.: 93).
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whether the first two patterns have a different status compared to the others. The un-
usual structures of the pronominal paradigms that will figure in this section will be
described by using the scheme as developed in Table 3.11. The first column shows the
singular forms, the second column will show the plural forms.
The first of these rare types, paradigms of type (Pf), has two different forms for ‘we’.
Taken at face value, this might resemble an ‘inclusive/exclusive’ type (Pd) paradigm,
but actually the referential values of the two morphemes are different. In the case of
(Pf), there is a specialised morpheme for the speech-act dyad and another specialised
morpheme for all other references of ‘we’. This second morpheme includes all exclu-
sive reference, but also some inclusive reference.27 I know of three cases of this kind
of paradigms, the first two of which are inflectional. In both these inflectional cases,
the referential values of the inflectional morphemes can be exactly established be-
cause the independent pronouns in both languages distinguish between 1+2+3 from
1+3. The two different pronouns are cross-referenced by the same affix on the verb.
Shown in (3.16) is the first example of this unusual paradigmatic structure. This is the









2 mi-… gu-… 2+3
3 i-… i-… 3+3
Shown in (3.17) is the second inflectional example of (Pf): the paradigm of the imper-
fect suffixes from the Papuan language Kunimaipa. In the case of Kunimaipa, other
inflectional paradigms in the language are attested with different structures, one of
which will follow shortly. The contrast between the various paradigmatic structures
ensures that the strange looking structures are genuine (cf Pence, 1968: 110; Geary,
1977: 26).29 The final example of type (Pf) is the paradigm of the independent pro-
nouns of the Siouan language Lakhota (Van Valin, 1977: 74-75).30
                                                 
27 Greenberg (1988: 9) uses the name ‘Assiniboine-type’ for these paradigms, after the Siouan language
Assiniboine. However, the case of Assiniboine is strictly speaking not of type (Pf) by my definitions.
Assiniboine person marking consists of pronominal PREFIXES of the ‘unified-we’ type (Pa) with sepa-
rate number SUFFIXES. The number suffixes are used in a special way, turning the prefixes into a (Pf)-
like paradigm. However, by my definitions, only the prefixes are included in the typology. See section
3.6.1 for an extensive discussion of the Assiniboine prefixes.
28 The independent pronouns from Bardi make up a minimal/augmented paradigm. They can be found
in Metcalfe (1975: 49-50, 129).
29 The independent pronouns from Kunimaipa have a unusual structure involving also dual forms. See
section 8.6 for a discussion of these independent pronouns from Kunimaipa.
30 The independent pronouns from Northern Sierra Miwok and the neighbouring Plains Miwok might
also belong to this (Pf) type of paradigm. The inclusive pronoun is translated as meaning ‘I and you’,
indicating that it might be only used for the dual inclusive 1+2 (cf section 9.3). However, it is not
completely clear whether it is exclusively used for the speaker-addressee dyad, or whether it might
[continued on next page]

















2 niye’ niye’pi 2+3
3 iye’ iye’pi 3+3
Paradigms of type (Pg) distinguish a separate form for 1+2+3, but unite the references
to 1+2 and 1+3. This paradigmatic structure is found in the subject pronouns from
Yaouré, a Mande language from Ivory Coast. There are two different forms of ‘we’ in
Yaouré. The special morpheme for 1+2+3 is the odd one out, as its morphophonologi-
cal behaviour is different from the other pronouns. Possibly, this 1+2+3 pronoun is a
recent addition to the pronominal paradigm.31
‘kàà, which has an inclusive reference (the speaker and a group of listeners) and k,
which has either a dual reference (you and I) or an exclusive reference (the others and
I). … The kàà form of the first person plural frequently reacts differently from the other





1 ã	 k 1+3
2 
 ka 2+3
3 e o 3+3
Another example of a (Pg) type paradigm is found in the Australian language Gooni-
yandi. The independent pronouns with a (Pi) structure are shown in (3.20). The differ-
ence between the two possible meanings of ngidi can be disambiguated by number
                                                 
[continued from previous page]
also be used in other, less prototypical, inclusive reference (Callaghan, 1974: 386; 1984: 296-297;
1987: 397-398).
31 In Dan, another Mande language from Ivory Coast, there is a full 8-way pronominal system, with
distinct elements for the categories 1+2, 1+3 and 1+2+3 (Doneux, 1968: 45-47). This indicates that the
Yaouré structure is probably an exceptional structure, not only exceptionally world-wide, but also ex-
ceptionally within its own family.
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suffixes. However, these number suffixes are only optionally used (McGregor,





1 nganyi ngidi 1+3
2 nginyi gidi 2+3
3 niyi bidi 3+3
A paradigm of type (Ph) separates the two different forms of the inclusive ‘we’ (1+2
and 1+2+3), already a rather exotic thing to do from a West European perspective.
Moreover, the paradigm fails to explicitly refer to the exclusive ‘we’ 1+3. The only
example of a paradigm of type (Ph) that I am aware of comes from the Australian lan-
guage Tiwi. The subject prefixes from Tiwi come in different variants. The version
that is of interest here is the paradigm that is used when there is a masculine third per-
son object, and the tense is non-past. This paradigm is shown in (3.21) below. Other
prefixal paradigms from Tiwi do not show this structure. Even within the language







3 a-… wu-… 3+3
The perfective suffixes from Kunimaipa have a different structure compared to the
imperfective suffixes that were shown in (3.17). The perfective suffixes, shown in
(3.22), are the only example of a paradigm of type (Pi) that I am aware of. In this
paradigm, the 1+2 reference is made by the same morpheme as is used to refer to the
speaker. The other referential possibilities of ‘we’ are taken together with the second










A pronominal paradigm of type (Pj) shows the inverted structure of the ‘only-
inclusive type (Pc). Both (Pj) and (Pc) have only a single grammaticalised form for
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‘we’, but the meaning of this ‘we’ is exactly the opposite. In the case of (Pc), the spe-
cial ‘we’-form has an inclusive reference: combining 1+2 and 1+2+3 but excluding
1+3. In the case of (Pj), the special ‘we’-form has the opposite referential value. The
morpheme for ‘we’ refers to a group of category 1+3, and it is not used for reference
to 1+2 or 1+2+3. One of the singular forms is used for the reference of 1+2 and
1+2+3. I know of only one example of this type (Pj), found in the inflection of the
Papuan language Binandere. Shown in (3.23) are the ‘past II stative’ suffixes, but all







1 …-ana …-ara 1+3
2 …-ata …-awa 2+3
3 …-evira …-ara 3+3
In general, there seems to be a slight preference for the inflectional marking among
these rare patterns. However, the number of examples is so small and the structures
are so heterogeneous that it is difficult to draw any conclusive generalisations about
this group. The main point that can be made is that these structures are unusual for a
human language.
3.7 Generalisations
Five patterns out of the 15 theoretical possibilities for the first person complex are
common among the world’s languages. These five patterns are repeated here in Table
3.13. The only paradigms attested that do not belong to one of these five types were
discussed in the previous section 3.6.6. The relative frequency of the five common
patterns will be discussed extensively in the next chapter. In this section, I will for-
mulate some preliminary generalisations on the structure of the marking of the first
person complex. These generalisations will separate the five common patterns from
the rare or unattested patterns. These generalisation will be further refined in chapter
5, after the discussion of all the details of the variation attested in chapter 4.





1+3 – B C
Table 3.13: Common patterns of first person complex
In the majority of the world’s languages, there is no separation between 1+2 and
1+2+3. Together these two categories form the ‘inclusive’ category, as opposed to the
‘exclusive’ 1+3. In Table 3.14 all theoretical possible marking patterns with only
these two referential clusters are shown. These five possibilities are indeed all at-
tested, although the last pattern (Pj) is one of the rare patterns as described in section
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3.6.6. This pattern is possible, but not probable for a pronominal paradigm. The other
four cases are common.
(Pa) (Pb) (Pc) (Pd) (Pj)




Table 3.14: Inclusive-exclusive marking patterns
When the single example of (Pj) is disregarded, an interesting generalisation arises. A
specialised inclusive can exist without a specialised exclusive, but not vice versa. An
exclusive can not exist without an inclusive.32 When the types (Pa) and (Pb) are taken
together – both are cases with no opposition between an inclusive and an exclusive –
then this generalisation can also be formulated as an implication:
(3.24) Addressee Inclusion Implication I 33
Exclusive  Inclusive
The argument behind this implication is illustrated by the cross-tabulation in Table
3.15. In words: if there is specialised marking for the exclusive in a pronominal para-
digm, then there is specialised marking for the inclusive. Or formulated in reverse or-





Exclusive No (Pc) (Pa), (Pb)
Table 3.15: Implication ‘exclusive  inclusive’
Next, the inclusive can be divided into two categories: a minimal inclusive (1+2) and
an augmented inclusive (1+2+3). The split between the categories 1+2 and 1+2+3 is
almost exclusively found in the form of a paradigm of the minimal/augmented type
(Pe). There are only a few incidental cases of differently structured paradigms with a
split between 1+2 and 1+2+3 (see section 3.6.6). These rare variants will be disre-
garded here. The first generalisation on such split inclusives is that both parts (1+2
and 1+2+3) are overtly marked. More interestingly, in case of a split inclusive, there
is always a specialised exclusive. This generalisation can also be formulated as an im-
plication:
(3.25) Addressee Inclusion Implication II
Split Inclusive  Exclusive
                                                 
32 With ‘specialised’ I mean that there is an overt morpheme that specifically codes for this function
and not for any other functions in the pronominal paradigm. For example, a ‘specialised inclusive’ is a
non-zero morpheme that only marks the inclusive categories 1+2 and 1+2+3, nothing more, nothing
less.
33 Cf Universal 43 from Sokolovskaya (1980: 95).
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The rationale behind this implication is illustrated by the occurrences as shown in
Table 3.16. In words: if there is a split inclusive in a pronominal paradigm, then there
is specialised marking for the exclusive 1+3. Or formulated in reverse order: there can




Exclusive No – (Pa), (Pb), (Pc)
Table 3.16: Implication ‘split inclusive  exclusive’
These two implication can be combined into a hierarchy, but some care has to be
taken in the formulation of this hierarchy. It might be tempting to concatenate the two
implications to something like ‘split inclusive  exclusive  inclusive’, but that is
logically not a valid generalisation. The implications can be combined into a hierar-
chy when they are read as conditions. This is clear when both ‘reversed’ formulations,
as I have called them above, are taken together. These ‘reversed’ implications are re-
peated here as (3.26):
(3.26) Reversed Addressee Inclusions Implications
– there can only be an exclusive when there is also an inclusive;
– there can only be a split inclusive when there is also an exclusive.
Combined, this means that there has to be an inclusive for there to be an exclusive,
and there has to be an exclusive for there to be a split inclusive. This hierarchy of
conditions is set out as a hierarchy of questions in Table 3.17.
Is there any specialised form for ‘we’?
No Yes
Is the inclusive specialised?
No Yes
Are both the inclusive and the exclusive specialised?
No Yes






no-we unified-we only-inclusive inclusive/exclusive minimal/augmented
(Pb) (Pa) (Pc) (Pd) (Pe)
Table 3.17: Hierarchy of types of the first person complex
The first choice in the hierarchy is whether there is any specialised marking for the
first person complex at all. If there is, then the next question is whether there is spe-
cialised marking for the inclusive. If that is available, the next decision is whether
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both the inclusive and the exclusive are overtly marked by a specialised morpheme.
Finally, if all of this is the case, then the inclusive can be split into a minimal inclu-
sive and an augmented inclusive. The result is an implicational hierarchy of paradig-
matic types. The hierarchy consists of a series of conceptual choices that have to be
made. These choices are interdependent. After each choice, only one of the possible
decisions leads to a new choice. These choices form a hierarchy, and consequently the
resulting types form a hierarchy as well. This hierarchy of types can be summarised
by as shown in (3.27).
(3.27) First Person Complex Hierarchy
no-we > unified-we > only-inclusive > inclusive/exclusive > minimal/augmented
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter started with some criticism on the concept ‘plurality’ within the pro-
nominal domain. ‘Plurality’ is semantically a rather awkward term for pronominal
elements. ‘Plural’ pronouns are not always plural; more often their meaning is asso-
ciative. Instead of ‘plural’, the perspective of ‘group’ marking was introduced, and
followed throughout the chapter. The group perspective is not only semantically better
equipped for the analysis of pronominal elements, it also naturally includes the wide-
spread distinction between inclusive and exclusive ‘we’.
There are seven theoretical possible groups. Five of these seven different categories
are actually attested in the world’s linguistic variation. The five categories in the
group perspective are: 1+3 (exclusive ‘we’), 1+2 (minimal inclusive ‘we’), 1+2+3
(augmented inclusive ‘we’), 2+3 (plural ‘you’) and 3+3 (‘they’). These five categories
can be combined theoretically into 203 different marking patterns. As a start, only the
marking patterns of the first person complex were taken up in this chapter. The first
person complex consists of the categories that include reference to the speaker: 1+3,
1+2 and 1+2+3. These three categories are all subsumed under the English pronoun
‘we’. The three categories of the first person complex can be combined theoretically
into 15 different marking patterns. Of these 15 theoretical patterns, ten are attested in
the world’s languages. Only five out of these ten are common, the other five are only
found in incidental cases. The five common patterns of the first person complex are
described in Table 3.18 (see next page).
A few generalisations can be made on the basis of the structure of these five common
cases. There are two implicational universals that can be combined into a kind of hi-
erarchy. The following terminology is used for the formulation of the universals. A
specialised morpheme for the category 1+3 is called ‘exclusive’ and a specialised
morpheme for the combination 1+2 and 1+2+3 is called ‘inclusive’. If the two inclu-
sive categories are both marked by a separate morpheme, this is called ‘split inclu-
sive’. These two universals are repeated here as (3.28) and (3.29).
(3.28) Exclusive  Inclusive
(3.29) Split Inclusive  Exclusive
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Name of type Description of pattern
unified-we all three categories (1+2, 1+2+3, 1+3) are
marked by one specialised morpheme
no-we none of the three categories (1+2, 1+2+3,
1+3) is marked by a specialised morpheme
only-inclusive the categories 1+2 and 1+2+3 are marked by a
specialised morpheme; the category 1+3 is
not marked by a specialised morpheme
inclusive/exclusive the categories 1+2 and 1+2+3 are marked by a
specialised morpheme; the category 1+3 is
marked by a separate specialised morpheme
minimal augmented All three categories (1+2, 1+2+3, 1+3) are
marked by a separate specialised morpheme
Table 3.18: Common marking types of the first person complex
These two universals can be combined into a hierarchy of conditions. There has to be
an inclusive for there to be an exclusive, and there has to be an exclusive for there to
be a split inclusive. The types that are the result of the different fulfilled conditions
are shown in (3.30) as a hierarchy.
(3.30) no-we > unified > only-inclusive > inclusive/exclusive > minimal/augmented
It should be kept in mind that this is only a preliminary version of the definitive
model of paradigmatic variation that will be developed in the next chapters. In general
outline it is accurate, but some refinements and additions will be necessary once more
categories and historical considerations are taken into account. However, I will first
turn to a complete description of the paradigmatic variability of the five common




‘By focusing attention upon a small range of rela-
tively esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scien-
tists to investigate some part of nature in a detail and
depth that would otherwise be unimaginable.’
Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions
The grammatical term ‘paradigm’ comes from the Greek parádeigma, which simply
means ‘example’. In the course of the first centuries BC, this word acquired the spe-
cific meaning of a prototypical exemplar for grammatical declension or inflection, as
in the famous series amo, amas, amat or rosa, rosae, rosae, rosam, rosa. In the mod-
ern usage, the meaning of the term ‘paradigm’ refers to a set of grammatically condi-
tioned forms that are all derived from a single root or stem. This sense of the term
‘paradigm’ is attributed to Ferdinand de Saussure. In essence, this attribution is right,
yet de Saussure used rapport associatif for what is today called a ‘paradigm’, and re-
served the word paradigme for the classical meaning of declension and inflection (de
Saussure, 1916: 15, 170-180). Much later, Thomas Kuhn, in The structure of scientific
revolutions, adopted the term ‘paradigm’ in imitation of the traditional grammatical
usage of the word: ‘In its established usage, a paradigm is an accepted model or pat-
tern, and that aspect of its meaning has enabled me, lacking a better word, to appro-
priate ‘paradigm’ here’ (Kuhn, 1962: 23).
In this Part Two, I will investigate the structure of paradigms (in the modern sense of
the word) that are used for person marking. In chapter 4, an extensive typology of the
attested paradigmatic structures will be presented. The first goal of this chapter is to
present the wide variety of possibilities that is attested among the world’s languages
and to classify this variation into a typology. Second, and most importantly, I will
categorise the various types on a continuous scale between ‘common’ and ‘rare’, so as
to add some relief to the monotone listing of possibilities. In chapter 5, this typology
will be analysed quantitatively, resulting in two hierarchies: the Explicitness Hierar-
chy and the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy. Finally, in chapter 6, these hierarchies
will be put to the diachronic test. If the typological hierarchies make any sense, then
diachronic changes are expected to follow roughly along the lines of the hierarchies.
This hypothesis will be tested in this chapter.

Chapter 4
The diversity of the core
A survey of possible patterns for singular and group marking
4.1 Introduction
In the classical analysis of the pronomen, various accidentia (‘attributes’) of the pro-
noun were distinguished. For example, in the Téchne  Grammatike  by Dionysius
Thrax ‘persons, genders, numbers, cases, shapes, species’ are mentioned as possible
attributes of pronouns (Uhlig, 1883: 64; Kemp, 1987: 182). Somewhat differently, in
the Ars Minor by Donatus the attributes ‘quality, gender, number, form, person, case’
are listed (Chase, 1926: 33). Many slightly different version of the list of attributes can
be found in the classical literature, but all agree on one basic point: there is an unor-
dered list of characteristics that are equally relevant to the analysis of pronouns. This
classical analysis is rather different from what is found in more recent grammatical
work. Today, the personal pronouns have been put on top as the most important kind
of pronouns, and the attributes ‘person’ and ‘number’ have become the central pivot
for their description. However, there has never been a clear decision to change the
perspective. Over the ages, the special status of the combination person/number has
diffused slowly and largely unnoticed into the grammatical practice. It dates back at
least to De Emendata Structura (1524) by Thomas Linacre. He gives these two attrib-
utes a special place among the others because they occur with all declinable word
classes (Luhrman, 1984: 185, 205).1
Over the following centuries, the combination person/number virtually becomes the
basic framework to describe pronouns. Today, the special status of the person/number
combination can be found in almost all grammars of particular languages, but also in
more general works on personal pronouns, like Forchheimer (1953) and Kurylowicz
(1964: 148-157) to name just a few. The general acceptance of the primacy of the per-
son/number-combination indicates that there is a sense in which these two belong to-
gether, although a justification is never made explicit. The correctness has always
been tacitly assumed. Not everybody, however, agrees on the special status of the
combination person/number. Especially, many of the more theoretically oriented
works on grammatical structure still treat ‘person’ as an individual attribute, separate
                                                 
1 The same special treatment of the combination person/number is also found in De Causis (1540) by
Julius Scaliger (Luhrman, 1984: 243). The first prolegomena to the prominence of the person/number
combination can also be found in early descriptions of English (Vorlat, 1975: 199-218) and Dutch
(Dibbets, 1995: 204-206).
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from number (Jespersen, 1924: 212-215; Lyons, 1968: 276-281; 1977: 636-646; Croft,
1990: 149-150).
From this short historical survey it can be inferred that there is a sense in which per-
son marking in the singular and in the plural is at the core of pronominal marking.
However, at the same time, the dimensions ‘person’ and ‘number’ seem to be two dif-
ferent dimensions. In this chapter, I will present a position in between these two lines
of thought. For a proper cross-linguistic comparison, it seems most promising to di-
vide the dimensions ‘person’ and ‘number’ slightly differently from the traditional
usage. The dimension ‘number’ is split into two parts: ‘general’ non-singular refer-
ence (ie plural) and ‘restricted’ non-singular reference (ie dual, paucal, etc.). ‘Gen-
eral’ non-singular reference is defined as the marking that makes no difference as to
the cardinality of the included referents, as long as the number is greater than one. In
contrast, for ‘restricted’ non-singular reference, the cardinality of the set of referents
is of crucial importance. In this chapter, ‘general’ non-singular is taken together with
the singular. This combination forms the set of pronominal elements that is unmarked
for number (see Figure 4.1). The discussion of ‘restricted’ non-singular reference will




















Figure 4.1: Different divisions of the dimension ‘number’ in pronouns
The unity of singular and general non-singular becomes an obvious combination
when the notion of ‘plural’ is replaced with the notion of ‘groups’, as argued in the
previous chapter. Different kinds of groups of persons were distinguished on the basis
of various combinations of the three singular participants. Five kinds of groups turned
out to be salient linguistic categories. The three singular persons and the five groups
of persons make up a core of eight categories for person reference.2 Not all pronomi-
nal paradigms grammaticalise all eight referential categories. Some paradigms mark
them all, others distinguish only a few different morphemes. In this chapter, I will
present the attested diversity of paradigmatic structures, ranging from paradigms with
only two different morphemes up to paradigms that maximally distinguishing all eight
categories by different morphemes. Much is possible, even when only these eight
                                                 
2 In fact, this means that in the present work the two attributes ‘person’ and ‘number’ are combined by
tacitly including ‘number’ under the heading of ‘person’. Interestingly, this is highly similar to what is
found in two ancient Dutch grammars: ‘Twe-spraack’ (1584) and ‘Ont-werp der Neder-duitsche letter-
konst’ (1649). In both grammars, the attribute ‘number’ is not mentioned in the discussion of pro-
nouns; the plural forms are added to the discussion of the person-categories without using an extra
dimension of ‘number’ (Dibbets, 1995: 204-205).
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‘core’ categories are taken into account. However, not everything is equally likely to
be found. The main goal of this chapter is to decide which paradigmatic patterns are
common, and which are rare.
This chapter has been set up as follows. In section 4.2, the meta-language for the de-
scription of the various paradigms is explained. This meta-language will be used
throughout the chapter, casting all examples in the same mould. The result of this uni-
fication is that the various structures can easily be compared. Also in section 4.2, the
criterion for distinguishing between ‘common’ and ‘rare’ is defined. The following
five sections of this chapter will consist of a discussion of the variation within the five
major types of the first person complex, as established in the previous chapter. The
presentation in these sections 4.3 to 4.7 will be rather lengthy, listing example after
example of many different paradigmatic structures. This perhaps somewhat boring
part had to be compiled to be able to draw the more interesting conclusions after-
wards. The structural analysis of the variation attested can be found in the following
two chapters. This chapter concludes with a summary of the attested variation in sec-
tion 4.8.
4.2 Method of classification
The presentation of the various paradigmatic structures in this chapter is streamlined
by using the same meta-language for all paradigms. In this way, the different struc-
tures can be easily compared. This meta-language consists of eight different catego-
ries: the three singular categories (1, 2 and 3) and the five different groups that were
distinguished in the last chapter (1+2, 1+2+3, 1+3, 2+3 and 3+3). This 8-way division
is an improvement compared to the traditional 6-way division. First, it avoids the se-
mantically troublesome notion of ‘plural’ in the pronominal domain. Second, it takes
care of the inclusive-exclusive distinction in an integrated way, as argued extensively
in the preceding chapter. This 8-way division will be used instead of the traditional 6-
way division as a reference structure for the discussion of pronominal paradigms. The
paradigms will be shown in a fixed graphic format with the singular categories in the
leftmost column and the group-categories in the rightmost column. This format is pre-
sented in Figure 4.2. The various labels that are used for the different categories are










addressee 2 2+3 second person plural
other 3 3+3 third person plural
Figure 4.2: Outline for presentation of paradigmatic structures
Different categories that are marked by one morpheme are shown as contiguous
blocks without lines in between the categories. The term ‘homophony’ is used in a
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theory-neutral sense to talk about different kinds of combinations of the various cate-
gories. I distinguish between three different kinds of homophony. A SINGULAR
HOMOPHONY is a combination of different singular categories into one morpheme.
The possible variants of singular homophony were already discussed in chapter 2. A
VERTICAL HOMOPHONY is a combination of different non-singular categories into one
morpheme.3 Finally, a HORIZONTAL HOMOPHONY is a combination of a singular with a
non-singular category into one morpheme. These three kinds of homophony are ex-
emplified in Figure 4.3. In this figure, only homophony is shown between categories
that happen to be contiguous blocks in the graphic format that is used. This is not nec-
essarily so. Sometimes, non-contiguous categories are homophonous. In such cases,
the blocks are connected with small corridors, as can, for example, be seen in exam-














Figure 4.3: Different kinds of homophony
In the previous chapter, I argued that the first person complex is the central classifi-
catory device for the typology of paradigmatic structure. The first person complex is
the set of group morphemes that include at least the first person, viz the categories
1+2, 1+2+3 and 1+3 (see also Figure 4.2 above). Five of the 15 possible patterns of
the first person complex account for the far majority of the attested paradigmatic













1+3 – B C
Table 4.1: Major patterns of first person complex
                                                 
3 More precisely formulated, a vertical homophony is a combination between categories from the first
person complex and the second or third person plural into the reference of one morpheme. Another
possible combination that is also classified as a vertical homophony is the combination of the second
and third person plural. The various combinations of the three different kinds of ‘we’ into the marking
of one morpheme are not considered to be cases of vertical homophony.
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Other structures of the first person complex were also attested, but these turned out to
be only incidental cases. To give an indication of the difference between the five ma-
jor patterns and the other ‘minor’ structures, a summary of the upcoming cases of the
paradigmatic variation is presented in Table 4.2. In this chapter, 257 examples will be
discussed, all showing one of the five major patterns for the first person complex. Of
the minor patterns of the first person complex, I know of only 8 incidental cases, in-
cluding every curious reference that I have come across. These 8 cases almost all have
a different paradigmatic structure, adding to the impression that they are only inci-






Number of examples 257 8 265
Paradigmatic structures 55 6 61
Table 4.2: Frequencies of the major and minor patterns of the first person complex
The five major patterns of the first person complex can be combined in various ways
with the remaining group categories (2+3 and 3+3) and the singular categories (1, 2
and 3). In total, I have found 55 different paradigmatic structures with these eight
categories. The 55 different paradigmatic structures are not equally distributed over
the world’s linguistic variation. I will make a twofold distinction as to how frequent a
pattern is. First, a certain pattern can be ‘common’. There are two criteria for a pattern
to be common: the pattern should be attested widely dispersed over the world’s lan-
guages and it should be a typical pattern for at least a few genetic families. The first
criterion assures that the pattern is found independently in different languages, beyond
the influence of common genetic origin or areal contact. The second criterion assures
that the pattern is relatively stable, as the paradigms attested are not all exceptional
variants within their genetic group. Of the 55 different paradigmatic structures that
will be discussed in this chapter, nine will be classified as ‘common’. In contrast, a
structure is ‘rare’ if there is one, or maybe a few, examples and if these examples are
clearly incidental. Typically, in such ‘rare’ cases, genetically closely related lan-
guages do not show the same paradigmatic structure.
The distinction between ‘common’ and ‘rare’ is not rigorously clear cut. The judge-
ments that I present in this chapter are to be interpreted as a proposal to bring some
order in the bewildering number of possibilities. The two classes are part of a contin-
uum, which is only divided into these discrete classes to make it more accessible. The
continuous nature of the variability makes the boundary between ‘common’ and ‘rare’
at times rather troublesome. There are a few ‘semi-common’ cases that fall in between
‘common’ and ‘rare’. These ‘semi-common’ paradigmatic structures do not occur of-
ten, but still there is a sense in which they are more common than the other ‘rare’
structures. Judging from the frequency, these ‘semi-common’ paradigms are nearer to
the class of ‘rare’ paradigms than to the class of ‘common’ paradigms. Likewise, the
boundary between ‘rare’ and ‘non-attested’ is troublesome. Although many different
paradigms are attested, there are still many more theoretically possible structures that
are not attested. I will not give any interpretation to the fact that some structures are
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attested, albeit rarely, and others are not attested. The circumstance that a particular
‘rare’ paradigm occurs in the present sample, as opposed to other paradigms that do
not occur, is probably incidental. If I had studied more languages, or if there had been
more languages in the world, some more ‘rare’ cases would probably turn up. When
confronted with the wide variety of linguistic structures present in the world’s lan-
guages, I do not see any reason why a certain pattern would be impossible for a lan-
guage. There are clearly structures that are improbable, but nothing seems to be im-
possible. I will present all rare patterns that have been attested to show the inherent
variability of linguistic structure. As a result, all generalisations that will be formu-
lated in the next chapter will have some counterexamples. Typological generalisations
are never to be interpreted as ‘universals’ in the strict sense, but as preferred patterns
of linguistic structure.
The presentation of all the cases will be ordered along the lines of the marking of the
first person complex. There are five different sections, each devoted to one of the five
patterns from Table 4.1. Within these five sections, the type of vertical homophony
will be the principal guideline for the classification of the various paradigmatic struc-
tures. First the ‘split’ patterns will be discussed, ie the patterns that do not have any
vertical homophony. Then the paradigmatic structures with a vertical homophony will
be presented. The paradigmatic structures that are classified as ‘common’ all turn out
to be ‘split’. Separate subsections are devoted to show that each of these ‘common’
paradigmatic structures is indeed frequent among the world’s languages. For these
paradigms, the list of paradigms attested is not complete. Given more time and en-
ergy, the lists of the common paradigmatic structures could be expanded with more
examples. However, at present the main goal is to argue that these patterns are com-
mon, not to establish the precise fraction of the world’s languages that have such
common paradigmatic structures. Following the discussion of the common patterns,
the examples of the various ‘rare’ and ‘semi-common’ paradigmatic structures are
presented. These listings of rare patterns are intended to show the inherent variability
of the structure of human language.
4.3 Variants of the ‘unified-we’ type
4.3.1 Preamble
The ‘unified-we’ type of the first person complex is characterised by combined
marking of all referential values for ‘we’. The three different kinds of ‘we’ – 1+2,
1+2+3 and 1+3 – are all marked with the same specialised morpheme. The English





1+3 – B C
Table 4.3: The ‘unified-we’ pattern
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All possible combinations of the ‘unified-we’ with the categories 2+3 and 3+3 are
shown in Table 4.4. There are five possible distributions, all of which are attested
among the languages of the world. The first pattern is called ‘split’ as it distinguishes
three non-singular categories. The other four patterns are called ‘homophonous’ pat-
terns as some of the three non-singular categories are marked by one morpheme.
homophonous patterns
split
1/2 1/3 2/3 unified
1+2





3+3 C B A
B
Table 4.4: Non-singular marking patterns for ‘unified we’
These five patterns do not exhaust the possible variation of a pronominal paradigm.
More specifically, these five patterns only classify the possibilities of VERTICAL ho-
mophony. A pronominal paradigm can also show SINGULAR homophony, HORI-
ZONTAL homophony, or both. All the different kinds of homophony will figure
prominently in the discussion of the various examples. The discussion will be stream-
lined by following the form of the VERTICAL homophony, as this will turn out to be an
important factor for the cross-linguistic variability of paradigmatic structure.
First, the SPLIT paradigms will be discussed. Among these paradigms, there are three
paradigmatic structures that have a special typological status, for two reasons. First,
they occur relatively often and widespread throughout the world’s languages. The ex-
amples come from various families from different parts of the globe, a distribution
that can only be explained by assuming that the patterns arose multiple times inde-
pendently of each other. Second, the examples are found to be characteristic for the
languages throughout a few linguistic families, indicating that the patterns are not all
incidental cases. Each of the three common variants is characterised by one particular
paradigmatic structure. They will be called the LATIN-TYPE paradigm, the SINHALESE-
TYPE paradigm and the BERIK-TYPE paradigm. These paradigmatic structures are
schematically presented in Figure 4.4. Not only are these three pattern widespread
over the world’s languages, even more important is that all cases show exactly the
same paradigmatic structure. The number of cases is high and the amount of variation
is low. This distinguishes these three patters from the other patterns to be discussed
later. In the discussion of these structures, a rough outline of the geographical and ge-
netic stratification of the three common patterns will be presented. The references
only indicate that these paradigmatic structures are indeed commonly found among
the languages of the world and give an impression how the occurrence of each pattern
is distributed over the world. It is rather easy to find examples of these patterns, and it
will probably be fairly easy to expand the list of examples that are presented. The
Latin-type paradigm will be discussed in section 4.3.2, the Sinhalese-type paradigms
106 PART TWO: PARADIGMATIC STRUCTURE
in section 4.3.3, and the Berik-type paradigm in section 4.3.4. Other variants of split




1 1+3 1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.4: Common paradigmatic structures with ‘unified we’
The various patterns with a VERTICAL HOMOPHONY will be discussed in sections 4.3.6
to 4.3.9. These patterns are clearly less common than the ‘split’ pattern. Some of the
paradigmatic structures are still found widely distributed over the globe and they
might even be attested as a general characteristic of a particular linguistic family, but
the number of examples per paradigmatic structure is low. A few of these cases are
characterised as ‘semi-common’. However, most of these ‘vertical’ homophonous
paradigms are only scarcely found; the examples are mostly atypical within their ge-
netic family and show many different kinds of singular and horizontal homophony. In
general, these patterns are not unheard of, but they are clearly not a common thing to
happen to a human language. Section 4.3.10 summarises the presented variation of the
‘unified-we’ paradigms.
4.3.2 Latin-type paradigm
The Latin-type paradigm is well known as a structure of pronominal paradigms. In
these paradigms, there is a threefold distinction between the non-singular categories
‘we’, ‘you-all’ and ‘they’. These categories are distinct from each other and they are
also distinct from the singular marking. A prototypical example of this pattern is the
Latin inflection. In (4.1), the suffixes of the Latin present indicative are shown. The
same inflectional paradigmatic structure can still be found in the inflection of the
southwestern Romance languages, as in Portuguese, Catalan and Italian (Posner,
1996: 39-43).4 The Latin-type of paradigmatic structure is often considered the proto-
typical pattern of all pronominal marking. As I will show in the rest of this chapter, it
is in fact only one of the patterns that can be found regularly among the languages of
the world. Other patterns can also be regarded as typical of the structure of human
language. The Latin-type paradigm is indeed a common pattern, but it is not the only
common one.
                                                 
4 Many paradigm of independent pronouns in West European language have roughly this kind of para-
digm. However, there are almost always gender distinctions in the third person singular and some-
times even in other categories, like gender in the Spanish first and second person plural (Plank &
Schellinger, 1997: 70). In some cases, there are even homophonous forms between singular and plural
categories, like ‘you’ in English or ‘sie/Sie’ in German.





2 …-s …-tis 2+3
3 …-t …-unt 3+3
Paradigms of the Latin -found widespread among the Indo-European inflections, al-
though they are not so widespread as is often assumed.5 The Indo-European inde-
pendent pronouns often have gender distinctions, or use demonstrative elements in the
third person. Such paradigms are close to the Latin-type, but they are not prototypical
examples. Still on the Eurasian continent, paradigms of the exact Latin-type are com-
mon in the Uralic inflection.6 It is also found in the Turkish inflection (Lewis,
1967: 106-107). Most African languages have gender distinctions (or class marking)
in their pronominal paradigms. Due to this extensive paradigmatic variation in the
third person, most African paradigms are not included in this chapter. Cases of para-
digms without gender or class marking can be found among the independent pronouns
of the Mande languages  and the Nilotic languages.7 Many Southeast Asian languages
do not have grammaticalised morphemes for group marking, and consequently these
do not have a Latin-type paradigm. Modern Chinese developed a six-way independent
person system, and in some variants there is even an inclusive-exclusive distinction
(Norman, 1988: 117-121, 157-158). Further south, into the Pacific, there are only ex-
ceptional examples of a Latin-type paradigm among the Austronesian languages, be-
cause most pronominal paradigms have an inclusive/exclusive opposition.8 In con-
trast, paradigms of the Latin-type seem to be widespread among the Papuan languages
from New Guinea.9 Finally, Latin-type paradigms are found throughout the American
languages, but they are not as common in this area as elsewhere in the world.10
                                                 
5 Eg among the Iranian languages (Sims-Williams, 1998: 144-149), among the Slavic languages
(Andersen, 1998: 445-446) and in the Brythonic languages Breton (Stephens, 1993: 373-375) and Early
Cornish (George, 1993: 446-447).
6 Short descriptions of Uralic languages can be found in Abondolo (1998b). Most Uralic languages
have a Latin type inflection. See, for example, Estonian (pp. 140-141), Finnish (pp. 171-174), Mordva
(pp. 197-201), Mari (pp. 229-231) and Udmurt (pp. 289-291).
7 For Mande, eg Vai (Welmers, 1976: 43), Mauka (Ebermann, 1986: 74), Koranko (Kanstenkolz,
1987: 17-20) and Kpelle (Westermann, 1924: 14-15). For Nilotic, eg Maasai (Tucker & Mpaayei,
1953: 200), Lotuho (Muratori, 1938: 72), Southern Nilotic (Rottland, 1982: 137-139, 151, 194, 229, 248-
249) and Dinka (Nebel, 1948: 15).
8 Lynch (1998: 101) mentions the independent pronouns of the Siau family in the West Sepik Province
of Papua New Guinea (eg Sera, Sissano, Ali, Tumleo and Ulau-Suain), Kiribati and possibly one or
two varieties of Fijian.
9 A few random examples of Latin-type paradigms from new Guinea are the Daga inflection and inde-
pendent pronouns (Murane, 1974: 34, 42-44, 63-69), the Waskia future inflection (Ross & Paol,
1978: 68) and the Asmat subject suffix (Voorhoeve, 1965: 85). This type of pronominal paradigm
seems to be widespread, as can be seen from the surveys of Papuan languages by (Voorhoeve, 1975)
and (Wurm, 1975b).
10 Eg the West Greenlandic intransitive inflection (Fortescue, 1984: 288), the Ika independent pronouns
(Frank, 1990: 26) and in the Epena Pedee independent pronouns (Harms, 1994: 186, 58).
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4.3.3 Sinhalese-type paradigm
The next common type of paradigmatic structure is only slightly different from the
Latin-type paradigm from the previous section. The defining characteristic of the Sin-
halese-type paradigm is that it does not have a specialised element for the category
3+3, the ‘third person plural’. There are two specialised forms for non-singular
marking: one for the first person complex, and one for the second person plural. The
third person plural is marked together with the third person singular. An example of
this paradigmatic structure is shown in (4.2). This is the a-conjugation in the Ruma-







2 …-i …-tsi 2+3
3 …-a 3+3
In the case of independent pronouns, it is possible (but not necessary) for the catego-
ries 3 and 3+3 to be marked outside the pronominal system. Both categories can be
marked by demonstratives, or other linguistic material, which strictly speaking does
not belong to the pronominal domain. An example of this type of paradigm is shown
in (4.3). These are the independent pronouns from Sinhalese, an Indo-Aryan language
from Sri Lanka (Gair, 1970: 32-33). I will consider these two, the inflectional and the
independent version in (4.2) and (4.3) to be instances of the same paradigmatic struc-







2 ohee oheela 2+3
3 (demonstratives) 3+3
The Sinhalese-type paradigm is found in Eurasia, albeit scarcely. Next to Rumanian
and Sinhalese, some more cases are attested among Indo-Aryan languages where third
persons are demonstratives (Masica, 1991: 251). It is also found in some other lan-
guages on the Eurasian continent that do not have third person marking within the
pronominal domain, like, for example, the independent pronouns from Buriat, an Al-
taic language from Siberia (Poppe, 1960: 49-52) or Lezgian, a Nakh-Dagestanian from
the Caucasus (Haspelmath, 1993). Sinhalese-type paradigms are also uncommon in
Africa. It is, however, a general characteristic of the Southern Nilotic subject prefixes.
The structure with five different prefixes is found throughout the Southern Nilotic
languages. The third person is always overtly marked in Datooga and Omotik, but
only occasionally in the Kalenjin languages; in the latter it is often zero. The recon-
structed forms for Proto-Southern Nilotic from (Rottland, 1982: 243-244) are shown
in (4.4).







2 *-… *-… 2+3
3 *k/-… 3+3
Paradigms of the Sinhalese-type are common among North American languages. It is,
for example, generally found in the Salish pronominal systems (Newman, 1980: 156)
and in the Muskogean pronominal affixes. It is exemplified here in (4.5) with the pa-







2 chi-… hachchi-… 2+3
3 -… 3+3
A few other examples are added to show the common nature of this paradigmatic
structure in America. A Sinhalese-type paradigm is found in the Nootka indicative
suffixes (Swadesh, 1936: 82), shown here in (4.6). It was probably also found in the
extinct South American language Muisca (Gonzáles de Pérez, 1987: 74). The inde-















2 mue mie 2+3
3 as 3+3
Finally, there are also a few examples of languages from New Guinea with a pro-
nominal paradigm of the Sinhalese-type. This pattern is, for example, found in the in-
dependent pronouns from Sentani (Cowan, 1965: 16) and Asmat (Voorhoeve,
1965: 143). The Asmat independent pronouns are shown in (4.8).
                                                 
11 The same structure is also found in other Muskogean languages; eg Alabama (Lupardus, 1982: 66-
74) Koasati (Kimball, 1985: 107) and Choctaw (Nicklas, 1974: 31).







2 wa ma 2+3
3 na 3+3
4.3.4 Berik-type paradigm
The third common paradigmatic structure has even more horizontal homophony. In
this type of paradigm, only one non-singular morpheme is grammaticalised. A mor-
pheme exists for the first person complex, nothing else. In contrast, the other two
group categories (2+3 and 3+3) are marked by the corresponding singular mor-
phemes. This means that the morpheme for 2 also marks the category 2+3 and the
morpheme for 3 also marks the category 3+3. This paradigmatic structure will be
called a BERIK-TYPE paradigm. This paradigmatic structure is exemplified here by the
independent pronouns from Berik, a Tor language spoken on New Guinea. Shown in
(4.9) is the paradigm referred to as ‘Subject1’ in the description. There are many more
formally and functionally different forms of the independent pronouns, but they all









The same paradigmatic structure is also found in Kuman, another language from New
Guinea. The independent pronouns from Kuman are shown in (4.10), as presented by
Foley (1986: 70, citing Piau 1985).12 The pronouns from Kuman resemble the ones
from Berik, but they are at most distantly related and spoken in completely different









Before I proceed with the other examples of the Berik-type paradigm, a word of cau-
tion is in place. The Berik-type paradigm is highly similar to another paradigm that
will be discussed later in this chapter, the ‘Sierra Popoluca-type’. Some extra care has
                                                 
12 This language is referred to as ‘Kamanagu’ by Capell (1940: 54) and Forchheimer (1953: 65-66).
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to be taken to ensure a paradigm is of the Berik-type. The two similar paradigms are
shown schematically in Figure 4.5. They might appear rather different, but in practice









2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.5: The difference between The Berik-type and the Sierra Popoluca-type
The significant correspondence between the two paradigms is that they have only one
non-singular morpheme, and in both cases this morpheme is to be translated into
English as ‘we’. Taken at face value, both paradigms seem to consist of four different
elements: ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he/she/it’ and ‘we’. However, the two variants of ‘we’ are rather
different. In the case of the Berik-type, this morpheme has both the inclusive and the
exclusive reading. In the Sierra Popoluca-type, the morpheme ‘we’ has only an inclu-
sive reading. The main argument to classify a paradigm as a case of the Berik-type,
and not as a case of the Sierra Popoluca-type, is by transitive uses of this ‘we’, like in
sentences as ‘we see you’. An important presupposition of this sentence is that the
object ‘you’ is not part of the subject ‘we’. The sentence ‘we see you’ can normally
only be interpreted if the ‘we’ has exclusive reading. This fact can be used to distin-
guish the two paradigms. If the specialised form of ‘we’ can be used in sentences like
‘we see you’, then the ‘we’ can also be used to mark the exclusive. In this case, the
paradigm is of the Berik-type.
Paradigms of the Berik-type are found in the Siouan language family from North
America. It is exemplified in (4.11) with the active prefixes from Mandan (Mixco,
1997: 17). As can be seen from the transitive sentence (4.12), the meaning of the pre-
fix ru -… can also be exclusive. The addressee is the object of the verb ‘to tell’, so this












‘We will tell you’ (Mixco, 1997: 17)
This structure is also found in another Siouan language, Assiniboine. The active pre-
fixes from Assiniboine are shown in (4.13 ), taken from Levin (1964: 31-32). The pre-
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fix u (k)-… can have both inclusive and exclusive reading, as shown in (4.14). Exam-
ple (4.14 a) is explicitly described as having an inclusive meaning. Example (4.14 b) is
a transitive sentence with an addressee as object. Because the addressee is in object
function here, it is not part of the subject. This means that the ‘we’ subject does not
include the addressee; the ‘we’ subject is exclusive in reference. The same structure as
in Assiniboine is also described for Lakhota by Van Valin (1977: 5, 10-13). Although
not all Siouan languages belong to this type, still there are numerous examples to be












‘I and you chop off something’ (Levin, 1964: 31)
b. cazé-u-ni-yata-pi
?-1PLUR-2-call-PLUR
‘We call you’ (Levin, 1964: 64)
Another group of languages with a pronominal paradigm of the Berik-type is the
Eastern Nilotic family, a subgroup from the Nilo-Saharan stock in Africa. The struc-
ture of the subject prefixes from these languages is exemplified here with the prefixes
from Turkana (Dimmendaal, 1982: 120), shown in (4.15). From the example sen-
tences in (4.16), it can be seen that the prefix ki-… can have both an inclusive and an
exclusive reading. There is an inclusive-exclusive difference in the independent pro-












‘We (exclusive) will go’
                                                 
13 For other Eastern-Nilotic languages, the same structure is found in Teso (Tucker & Bryan,
1966: 470), Maasai (Tucker & Mpaayei, 1953: 53) and Lotuho (Tucker & Bryan, 1966: 470). For a
general discussion of the form of the prefixes, see Dimmendaal (1983: 279).




‘We (inclusive) will go’ (Dimmendaal, 1982: 122)
Finally, I know of one incidental case of a Berik-type paradigm from South America.










It is not so easy to find examples of the Berik-type, compared to the abundance of ex-
amples of the previously discussed Latin-type and Sinhalese-type. Still, there are two
families where the Berik-type is found throughout the family, and there are some in-
cidental cases. There is a good geographical spread of these examples over the world.
This is enough to grant this type the status of common, although it should be kept in
mind that it is clearly less common than the two previous types.15
4.3.5 Rare variants of split ‘unified-we’
There are a few examples of the split-type that do not belong to one of the three
common paradigmatic structures. These leftovers are all incidental patterns. They will
be discussed in turn.
English-type paradigm
Probably the most famous case is the paradigm of the English pronouns, shown in
(4.18). The formerly plural element ye/you has taken over the reference of the singular
thou/thee (Howe, 1996: 170-175). Exactly the same structure is attested in South
American Spanish pronouns, where the formerly plural pronoun vos has taken over
the reference of the singular tu. The same change did take place in the history of
Dutch, but the distinction between a singular and plural second person has been re-
stored by the addition of a new plural pronoun jullie (Howe, 1996: 220-227). Because
these well known and extensively described languages all three underwent this
                                                 
14 These are probably the same forms as the ‘nominative’ forms as described by Wiesemann
(1986b: 363). However, the paradigm as presented by Wiesemann also distinguishes number in the
second and third person, and gender in the third person, so it might be that Xokleng is not a good ex-
ample of a Berik-type paradigm. I decided to include it here as Xokleng is at least a candidate for a
Berik-type paradigm, and should be considered in this context.
15 Forchheimer (1953: 65-66) also mentions the Korean independent pronouns as an example of the
Berik-type paradigmatic structure. Based on more recent descriptions, the independent pronouns from
Korean are not a good example of a Berik-type paradigm, although they might historically be derived
from such a structure. Synchronically, the independent pronouns have a separate stem for the first per-
son plural in non-deferential contexts. The other non-singular forms do not have a separate stem.
However, these non-singulars are obligatorily marked by a number suffix (Sohn, 1994: 284-287). I in-
terpret this number suffix as part of the pronominal paradigm. Consequently, the paradigm is not en
example of the Berik-type, but of the Latin-type (see also section 3.3).
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change, it is sometimes thought off as a common change. It might be a common
change, but its end-state is not common at all. The paradigmatic structure of English
pronoun, as shown in (4.18), is not attested commonly. Even for English, the over-
arching form ‘you’ is mainly found in the standard language. In a thorough study of
present-day English by Wales (1996), it is noted that ‘many dialects and varieties of
English seem to find a formal distinction extremely useful between a single addressee








3 he/she/it they 3+3
Another case of the same paradigmatic structure as in English is also found in the
‘pronouns’ from Xokleng, a Gé language from Brazil. Note that just as in English,








3 ti/i  3+3
Vanimo-type paradigm
A somewhat odd-looking variant is shown in (4.20). These are the actor prefixes from







2 m-… -… 2+3
3 h/b-… d-… 3+3
                                                 
16 The ‘English-type’ structure is a possibility for human language, but it is not a commonly attested
possibility. Compare the structure of the ‘English-type’ to the opposite structures of the ‘Ainu-type’
that will be discussed in section 4.4.2. The Ainu-type paradigm has no opposition in the first and the
third person; there is only a difference between singular and non-singular in the second person. In the
present sample, the Ainu-type kind of paradigm is roughly just as often found as the English-type
paradigm.
17 In the description of Wiesemann (1986b: 363), these pronouns are called ‘non-nominative’. It may
seem like there is a separate 2+3 form in this description, but that form is made by adding the plural
marker me. This plural morpheme me  is an independent element in most Gé languages, and is strictly
speaking not part of the pronominal paradigm (Popjes & Popjes, 1986: 185; Wiesemann, 1986b: 361).
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In this case, there is a homophony between the second person non-singular and the
first person singular. This homophony also is an extremely uncommon structure; I
know of no case besides Vanimo. Note that there is a masculine-feminine distinction
in the third person singular (Foley, 1986: 134, citing Ross 1980).
Spanish-type paradigm
Finally, there are a few incidental examples that have a ‘split’ non-singular, but a ho-
mophony in the singular. This type of paradigm is, for example, found in the Spanish
‘imperfecto’ suffixes, presented in (4.21). Roughly half of the different suffixal para-
digms in Spanish have this structure. The other half has a Latin-type structure with
three different singular forms (Hallebeek et al., 1994: 114). Exactly the same para-
digmatic structure, with a first-third person homophony in the singular, but three dif-






2 …-bas …-bais 2+3
3 …-ba …-ban 3+3
Icelandic-type paradigm
Still another singular structure is found in the Icelandic ‘weak present’, as shown in
(4.22). In this case, there is a different homophony in the singular compared to the










The last example that I want to present is the paradigm of the ‘imperfect’ suffixes
from Siciliano, San Fratello dialect, shown in (4.23). This case is interesting as it
shows that it is possible for a singular homophony and a horizontal homophony to ap-
pear without a vertical homophony in the non-singular. However, it remains the only








3 …-va …-vu 3+3
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These last three paradigmatic structures seem to be extremely unusual. If there are
three different specialised forms of the non-singular, then there is a strong tendency
for there to be also three different forms in the singular. Horizontal homophony is
common among split paradigms, but singular homophony is only exceptionally found
in some European languages.
4.3.6 The 1/2-homophony of ‘unified-we’
After the discussion of the split paradigms, I will now turn to the vertical homo-
phonous variants of ‘unified we’. The different kinds of vertical homophony are re-
peated in Table 4.5. These four cases will be discussed in turn. Among these para-
digms, singular homophony is relatively common but horizontal homophony is ex-
tremely uncommon. Six paradigmatic structures are slightly less rare compared to the
others. These six will be categorised as ‘semi-common’.









Table 4.5: Vertical homophonous patterns of ‘unified we’
The first kind of homophony to be discussed is characterised by a combination of the
first person complex with the second person plural into one specialised morpheme.
There is one genetic family where this pattern is found consistently. Other than that, I
have found seven incidental examples of this homophony, distributed widely dis-
persed over the world. This is not as frequent as the previous three ‘common’ pat-
terns, but still common enough to take note of. These cases are distributed over five
different paradigmatic structures. The paradigms with a 1/2-homophony show a large
amount of variation. Within this variation, the most widely occurring structure has
three separate singular morphemes, a structure presented in Figure 4.6 as the SLAVE-
TYPE paradigm. Among the cases presented in this section, there are a few paradigms
that also have a homophony of the singular categories. All logically possible singular
homophonies are attested, but the most widely occurring singular homophony is the





1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.6: The semi-common structures with 1/2-homophony
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Slave-type paradigm
Paradigms of the Slave-type are attested as the regular structure of the independent
pronouns of the Athabascan languages. The pronouns from the Slavey variant of
Slave are presented in (4.24). The same paradigmatic structure can be found in many
Athabascan languages.18 The prefixal object marking in all Athabascan languages
shows the same structure, throughout the family. However, these prefixal paradigms
distinguish two different kinds of third person marking – regular and ‘obviative’ (eg








3 edi egedi 3+3
I know of two examples outside the Athabascan family where exactly the same Slave-
type paradigmatic structure is found. The first is shown in (4.25). These are the inde-









3 we se 3+3
The last example of the Slave-type is the pronominal inflection from the Tommo-so
variant of Dogon, shown in (4.26). There are many different portmanteau forms for
the category 3+3, fused with aspect and an eventual negation. The presented form








3 …- …-e 3+3
Svan-type paradigm
In the following paradigmatic types, the singular categories show some kind of ho-
mophony. These examples of singular homophony are all found in inflectional para-
digms; a generalisation that was already established in the previous chapter. The most
                                                 
18 Other examples of the Slave-type among the Athabascan languages are found in the independent
pronouns of Chiricahua Apache (Hoijer, 1946: 76, 78, 83), Navaho (Young & Morgan, 1987: 7-8), Kato
(Goddard, 1912: 33) and Hupa (Goddard, 1905: 29).
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obvious case is a homophony between the first and second person singular. This sin-
gular homophony is a mirror image of the non-singular homophony. This structure is
exemplified with the imperfect suffixes from the South Caucasian language Svan,
shown in (4.27). Note that there are also pronominal prefixes in Svan that co-occur
with these suffixes. These prefixes are of a completely different paradigmatic type, to









3 …-a …-ax 3+3
There are two more cases with the same Svan-type structure. The first case is found in
the Papuan language Waskia, shown in (4.28). The suffixes presented are the past









3 …-am …-un 3+3
The final example of a Svan-type paradigm is found in the North American language
Nez Perce. In the perfective and irrealis, the number prefix pe-… is found together










3 hi-… hipe-… 3+3
Lak-type paradigm
A slight variation on the Svan-type is found in Lak, a Nakh-Dagestanian language
from the Caucasus. The non-past suffixes from Lak are shown in (4.30). A horizontal
homophony is added here, this time between the third person singular and non-
singular (Helmbrecht, 1996: 131).











Not all examples with a singular homophony show a mirror-structure between the
singular and the non-singular. There are also some cases with a vertical 1/2-
homophony that have a different homophony in the singular. The first of these is
found in Kenuzi-Dongola, an Nilo-Saharan language from Sudan. The suffixes shown
in (4.31) mark the present of the Dongola dialect. This paradigm shows a different












The last example of a 1/2-homophony comes from South America. The subject pre-
fixes from Ika, a Chibchan language from Peru, are shown in (4.32). In this case, there








3 -… ri/win-… 3+3
To conclude, there turns out to be rather a lot of examples of the 1/2-homophony, but
these examples show a great deal of internal variation. Only the Slave-type and the
Svan-type paradigms have been attested in more than one instance. However, the fre-
quency of these two paradigmatic structures comes nowhere near the frequency of the
split-paradigms. The Slave and Svan paradigms are classified as ‘semi-common’.
4.3.7 The 1/3-homophony of ‘unified-we’
Characteristic for the 1/3-homophony is the similarity between the first person com-
plex and the third person non-singular. This is not really a common pattern; it is only
regularly found in a group of languages on the southeastern tip of Papua New Guinea.
Outside that area, I know of only a few languages that show this homophony. The two
paradigmatic structures in Figure 4.7 are the most common among this restricted set
of examples. The OMIË-TYPE paradigm distinguishes three different morphemes for
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the singular categories. The MIDDLE DUTCH-TYPE paradigm shows the 1/3-




1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.7: The semi-common structures with 1/3-homophony
Omië-type paradigm
The first of the 1/3-homophony paradigms is exemplified in (4.33) with the past suf-
fixes from Omië, a Papuan language from the southeastern tip of Papuan New Guinea







2 …-ane …-arije 2+3
3 …-ade …-are 3+3
An Omië-type paradigm is also found in the pronominal inflection of the neighbour-
ing language Orokaiva. The Orokaiva marking is exemplified here with the so called
‘indicative Mid Past B’ paradigm, shown in (4.34). Other suffixal paradigms in Oro-
kaiva have the exactly the same paradigmatic structure (Healey et al., 1969: 62). This
paradigmatic structure is also found in the related language Korafe (Farr & Farr,
1975: 747-749). Orokaiva and Korafe belong to the Binanderean family, which is only
distantly related to Koiarian family to which Omië belongs. However, the resem-







2 …-a …-awa 2+3
3 …aja …ara 3+3
A last example of an Omië-type paradigm is found in Bagirmi, a Nilo-Saharan lan-
guage from Chad. The presented forms in (4.35) are the independent pronouns as
found in isolation (Gaden, 1909: 10).19
                                                 
19 Non-singular marking with a 1/3-homophony possibly also exists in inflection of the Toro variant of
Dogon, a Niger-Congo language from Mali, although the description is not completely clear on this
[continued on next page]







2 i se 2+3
3 ne d’e 3+3
Middle Dutch-type paradigm
In some cases, the homophony between 1 and 3 is mirrored in the singular. This is, for
example, found in the inflection of Middle Dutch. Shown in (4.36) are the suffixes of
the Middle Dutch ‘praeteritum’ (Schönfeld, 1959: 144-145). The same paradigms,
also with singular 1/3 homophony, is attested in the past inflection of contemporary







2 …-es …-et 2+3
3 …- …-en 3+3
Another example of a Middle Dutch-type structure is the Omië present, shown in
(4.37). The same homophony between 1 and 3 is found both in the singular and in the







2 …-anue …-aruje 2+3
3 …-aje …-arue 3+3
Bagirmi-type paradigm
Finally, there are a few cases of a 1/3-homophony in which there is horizontal ho-
mophony as well. In these cases, the non-singular category 2+3 is combined with a
singular category. Such a link between singular and non-singular is attested in two
different version. The first variant is paradigm of the subject clitic from Bagirmi,
shown in (4.38). In this clitic paradigm, the marking of 2+3 is identical to 2; they are
both zero. The subject clitic shown here is a reduced version of the pronoun; cf (4.35)
above (Gaden, 1909: 10).
                                                 
[continued from previous page]
point (Calame-Griaule, 1968: xxxv). Note that there is a completely different set of inflectional person
markers described for the Tommo-so variant of Dogon, discussed as (4.26) above.








3 n-… d’-… 3+3
German-type paradigm
Another link between the singular and the non-singular is attested in German. The
present suffixes from German are shown in (4.39). Different from the Bagirmi struc-
ture above, in German the categories 2+3 and 3 are marked identically (Eisenberg,
1994: 367-371). In the Sudanic language Midob, the suffixes for complete action show
exactly the same structure as the German suffixes in (4.39), with a homophony be-





2 …-st …-t 2+3
3 …-t …-en 3+3
4.3.8 The 2/3-homophony of ‘unified-we’
Characteristic of this type is the conflation of the categories 2+3 and 3+3, resulting in
an opposition between ‘we’ and ‘non-we’. The non-singular 2/3 homophony is not
that widely attested. It is rather often documented for highland Papuan languages of
New Guinea. However, in most of these cases, also dual forms are included in the
paradigm. The discussion of these paradigms with dual forms is postponed to section
8.3.3. Outside New Guinea, I know of only a few incidental cases, mainly to be found
in America. The most widely occurring structure with a 2/3-homophony is a paradigm
of the NEZ PERCE-TYPE, as shown in Figure 4.8. In another ‘semi-common’ set of the
examples that will be discussed below, the structure of the singular marking mirrors
the non-singular. Such paradigms have an KOMBAI-TYPE structure with a homophony




1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.8: The semi-common structures with 2/3-homophony
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Nez Perce-type paradigm
The first case of this homophony is the ‘unmarked’ form of the Nez Perce independ-
ent pronouns, shown in (4.40). There are other paradigms of independent pronouns in
Nez Perce, besides the one presented here, but all have exactly the same paradigmatic











Exactly the same Nez Perce-type paradigm is found in Warekena, an Arawakan lan-
guage from Venezuela. The independent pronouns from Warekena are shown in
(4.41), but the same structure is also found in the inflectional marking. Note that the
third person singular is marked by demonstrative elements. This pronominal pattern is
probably an innovation of Warekena, as it is not found in any other Arawakan lan-











It has been claimed in the literature that this pattern is typical for languages from the
highlands of New Guinea. For example, Foley (1986: 72) calls it ‘the typical high-
lands conflation of second and third persons in the nonsingular’. He even reconstructs
a paradigm of independent pronouns for Proto-Gorokan with a Nez Perce-type para-
digm, although it should be noted that, purely synchronically spoken, none of the
Gorokan languages has this kind of independent pronouns (Foley, 1986: 248-249).
Indeed, in the verbal inflections of the highland languages of New Guinea, a homoph-
ony between 2+3 and 3+3 is often found, but almost always in combination with a
dual with the same homophony.20
Kombai-type paradigm
The only clear example without dual marking of a conflation between 2+3 and 3+3
that I have found in New Guinea is the suffixal paradigm from Kombai, as shown in
(4.42). The morphemes can probably be analysed as a first person marker …-f and a
plural marker …-o (de Vries, 1989: 145). Note that this paradigm is different from the
                                                 
20 Eg the present neutral from Yagaria (Renck, 1975: 87-88), the independent pronouns from Wiru
(Foley, 1986: 72, citing Kerr 1966) and the subject suffixes from Fore (Foley, 1986: 74, citing Scott
1978); see also Wurm (1975b: 476). These paradigms will be discussed in the chapter on dual marking
(see especially section 8.3.3).
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The Kombai-type paradigm is also found in the pronominal inflection of Chitimacha,
an extinct language from the USA, shown in (4.43). Just as with the suffixes from
Kombai above, the suffixes from Chitimacha may be analysed as consisting of a sepa-











The last examples of this type comes from South America. In (4.44) the pronominal
prefixes from Lengua, a Mascoian language from Paraguay, are shown. Note that
there is considerable morphophonological variation; the presented prefixes are only
one of the possible series of forms. There does not seem to be a possibility to separate












Finally, there is one special case of a paradigm with a 2/3-homophony. This example
is found in the Chukotko-Kamchatkan languages, here exemplified in (4.45) by the
indicative intransitive prefixes from Koryak (Comrie, 1980a: 64, 67). Instead of sepa-
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4.3.9 The unified-homophony
The final kind of vertical homophony is the unified-homophony. Characteristically,
paradigms with a unified-homophony have only one specialised morpheme for all
non-singular categories. In a sense, this is a combined form of all the previous kinds
of vertical homophony. This structure is rather rare and highly varied. The few exam-
ples that I know of all have a different marking structure of the singular categories.
Lango-type paradigm
The first example of a structure with a unified homophony is the paradigm of the ha-
bitual prefixes of Lango, a Nilotic language from Sudan, shown in (4.46). Compara-
tive data indicate that this paradigm has lost some of its non-singular distinctions










The other cases of a unified-homophony that have been attested show also a homoph-
ony in the singular. A paradigm with a singular homophony between 2 and 3 is found
in the pronominal inflection of Standard Dutch. The suffixes for the present, without
inversion, are shown in (4.47). The usage of a second person non-singular suffix …-t












Almost the same structure is found in the present suffixes of the Papuan language
Waskia, shown in (4.48). Other than in the case of Dutch, there is a singular homoph-
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Old English-type paradigm
Finally, the Old English past suffixes show a singular homophony between 1 and 3
(Robertson & Cassidy, 1954: 141). Concluding, the unified-homophony, that is char-
acterised by one morpheme for all non-singular categories, is attested throughout the










To conclude this wide variety of examples, this section will summarise the major ty-
pological features of the ‘unified-we’ paradigms. The frequencies that are reported in
this section are counts of the presented examples. In Appendix B, a detailed account




1 1+3 1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.9: common paradigmatic structures with ‘unified-we’
In Figure 4.9, the three common paradigmatic structures with ‘unified-we’ are re-
peated. These three structures are attested frequently throughout the world’s lan-
guages. Structurally, the LATIN-TYPE can be interpreted as the most ‘complete’ type,
relative to which the SINHALESE-TYPE loses the distinction between singular and non-
singular in the third person. The BERIK-TYPE paradigms also neutralises the singu-
lar/non-singular difference in the second person. This structural hierarchy is mirrored
in the attested frequency of these three patterns. As can be seen in Table 4.6, there is a
difference in frequency between the three common paradigms. The Latin-type is more








Table 4.6: Number of cases of the common paradigms
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The special status of the three common paradigms relative to all other paradigmatic
structures is striking. The three common types account for 67 examples. This means
they occur on an average in 22.3 cases per paradigmatic structure. All other attested
paradigmatic structures together account for 41 examples. These 41 examples are dis-
tributed over 20 different paradigmatic structures. This is roughly ten times less fre-
quent than the common paradigmatic structures. However, the uncommon paradig-
matic structures are not all equally uncommon. The distinction between common and
uncommon is more like a continuum than a clear cut division. In Figure 4.10 below,
the most frequent of the ‘rare’ paradigmatic structures are presented. These six struc-
tures account for 22 of the uncommon cases, a mean of 3.7 examples per structure
(the remaining 15 uncommon structures account for 19 cases, a mean of 1.3 examples
per structure). The amounts for the three classes are summarised in Table 4.7.
common semi-common rare
examples 67 22 19
paradigmatic structures 3 6 15
examples per structure 22.3 3.7 1.3
Table 4.7: Frequencies of unified ‘we’ paradigms
Generalising on the ‘semi-common’ structures, the notable characteristic is that they
do not show any horizontal homophony. In all six structures, the singular and non-
singular are strictly separated. In contrast, all these structures show vertical homoph-
ony. Either the first person complex is homophonous with 2+3 (the Slave-type), or the
first person complex is homophonous with 3+3 (the Omië-type), or 2+3 and 3+3 are
homophonous (the Nez Perce-type). In the other cases, the vertical homophony is mir-




1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3




1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3




1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.10: Semi-common paradigmatic structures with ‘unified-we’
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4.4 Variants of the ‘no-we’ type
4.4.1 Preamble
The ‘no-we’ type is characterised by non-existing marking for the first person com-
plex. It is rather unusual (though not impossible) for a whole language not to mark
any form of ‘we’ (see section 3.6.2). However, for a single paradigm within a lan-
guage, no specialised form for ‘we’ is frequently attested. The variability of these





1+3 – B C
Table 4.8: The ‘no-we’ type
When the ‘no-we’ first person complex is combined with the categories 2+3 and 3+3,
there are five theoretical possibilities, as shown in Table 4.9. The dashes represent
categories that are not marked with a specialised non-singular morpheme. All first
person complexes are marked with a dash in the table, this being the definitional
property of the present class of paradigms. The capital letters in the table represent
categories that are marked differently from the first person complex.
homophonous patterns
split
1/2 1/3 2/3 unified
1+2





3+3 B A –
A
Table 4.9: Theoretical possible marking patterns of ‘no-we’
The first of these theoretical possible pattern is called ‘split’ as the three non-singular
categories are marked differently. The other four patterns show some kind of ho-
mophony between the three categories. These patterns are indicated by the kind of
homophony, for example ‘1/2’ meaning that the first person complex and the second
person non-singular are marked identically. Only four of the five possibilities from
Table 4.9 are attested among the world’s linguistic variation. I have not been able to
find an example of the 1/3-homophony. The other homophonous patterns are also
relatively rare, so the absence of even a single example of the 1/3-homophony is
probably only due to chance. The split-type is by far the most common pattern. This
variation of the various split paradigms will be discussed in section 4.4.2. The few
examples of homophonous examples will be presented in section 4.4.3. The variation
of the all these ‘no-we’ paradigms will be summarised in section 4.4.4.
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4.4.2 Split variants of ‘no-we’
Among the split paradigms of ‘no-we’, there is one paradigmatic structure that is by
far the most common. This structure is shown in Figure 4.11. This structure can occur
both in inflectional paradigms and in morphologically independent paradigms. I will
discuss these two possibilities separately because there are some special considera-
tions for both kinds of marking. First, I will discuss this common structure in inflec-
tional paradigms under the heading of the MARICOPA-TYPE paradigm. Next, I will turn
to the independent paradigms under the heading of the SALT-YUI-TYPE paradigm. Fi-
nally, I will turn to the few exceptional cases of split paradigms that have a difference






Figure 4.11: Common paradigmatic structure of ‘no-we’
Maricopa-type paradigm
An inflectional split is found frequently in the languages of America. The paradig-
matic structure is exemplified in (4.50) with the intransitive prefixes from Maricopa, a
Yuman language from the USA (Gordon, 1986: 15-21). The categories 1+2, 1+2+3
and 1+3 are taken together with 1, the category 2+3 is taken together with 2 and the
category 3+3 is taken together with 3. The group-categories are divided along the
lines of the Latin-type paradigm, but the marking of these non-singular categories is
not specialised. In most of the languages that have such a pattern, there are affixes








This pattern, as described for Maricopa, can be found in all Yuman languages.21 In
general, it is found regularly in the languages of America.22 Interestingly, I do not
know of any inflectional split examples from other parts of the world.
                                                 
21 Eg Mojave (Munro, 1976: 10-14), Diegueño (Langdon, 1970: 139-140), Yavapai (Kendall, 1976: 5-8)
and Yuma (Halpern, 1946: 281-282).
22 Travelling north to south through America, let me just mention a few other rather randomly chosen
examples of inflectional split. Pronominal prefixes of this type are found in some of the Siouan lan-
guages, eg Hidatsa (Robinett, 1955: 177; Matthews, 1965: 55, 71) and Crow (Lowie, 1941: 31-36). The
pronominal prefixes from Acoma Keresan are of this type. There are number suffixes added for dis-
ambiguation (Maring, 1967: 77-79, 83-85). Pronominal prefixes with number suffixes are also found in
[continued on next page]
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Salt-Yui-type paradigm
A split ‘no-we’ paradigm is also frequently attested among independent pronouns. In
these paradigms, it is often difficult to say whether the marking of the group-
categories are taken over by the singular pronouns, or whether there is no marking at
all for the group-categories (cf section 2.6.4 on the third person singular). Both op-
tions seem to occur, although a clear dividing line between these options can not be
drawn. The independent pronouns of the American language Acoma Keresan are a
case where the extension into the non-singular pronouns does not seem possible. The
Acoma pronouns only distinguish two forms: hínumé and his umé. These two words
are strictly used to mark speaker and addressee. They can not be used for ‘we’ or
‘you-plural’ respectively. This pronominal paradigm only consists of two elements,
the rest of the categories are non-existing (Maring, 1967: 43-44, 113-114). A different,
and more common, situation is found in Salt-Yui, a non-Austronesian language from
Papua new Guinea. Just as in Acoma, there are only two independent pronouns. In
Salt-Yui, the two pronouns are na and ni. These pronouns are used for speaker and
addressee reference. There is no third person pronoun; other linguistic material is used
to mark this function. Also, there is no number distinction in this pronominal para-
digm.
‘Two personal pronouns occur distinguishing first and second person. Third person is
shown by the specific noun optionally followed by a demonstrative, that is, there is not
third person pronoun as such. … Number is not distinguished in the pronouns.’ (Irwin,
1974: 32)
However, in the case of Salt-Yui, the independent pronouns can also be used for plu-
ral reference. As shown in (4.52 a), the first person pronoun can also be used for ‘we’.
In (4.52 b), a second person pronoun is used for ‘you-plural’. A plural noun yasu,
meaning ‘two people’, is added for clarification. In another example (not shown here)
the noun yalhobi, meaning ‘fellows’ is used to clarify the plurality of ni (Irwin,
1974: 74). The paradigmatic structure of the independent pronouns of Salt-Yui, as
shown in (4.51), is probably identical to the Maricopa structure, as shown in (4.50).
Some caution has to be taken, as there is no clear example of an inclusive use of the








                                                 
[continued from previous page]
Pame, an Oto-Manguean language from Mexico (Manrique, 1967: 343-344). In South America, the
inflectional prefixes from Ayoreo, a Zamucoan language from Paraguay, are of this type (Susnik,
1973: 52-57). Finally, the pronominal marking of Mura Pirahã is of this type. Interestingly, in Pirahã
there is no number marking whatsoever (see section 3.6.2).
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(4.52) SALT-YUI
a. na ama ha holo wamga …
1 girls talk collecting walk
‘When we court the girls …’ (Irwin, 1974: 135)
b. ni yasu ala mol dibilge
2 two people inside COP say
‘You are both inside!’ (Irwin, 1974: 61)
In many languages, number is not marked inside the pronominal paradigm. Often plu-
rality is only marked as an overt addendum to pronouns. In Salt-Yui, words like ‘peo-
ple’ and ‘fellows’ are used to mark plurality. In Golin, a language from New Guinea
related to Salt-Yui, the word kobe, meaning ‘people’ is used (Foley, 1986: 70, citing
Bunn 1974).23 In many Southeast Asian languages, there are so-called associative
markers that can be used to produce group-marking reference from singular referen-
tial elements (see section 3.3). Such associative markers turn a pronoun ‘I’ into
something like ‘I and my fellows’, which can be translated as ‘we’, although only in
the exclusive meaning. In modern Cantonese a suffix …-dei is used, as exemplified in
(4.53). This suffix is not only found with independent pronouns, but also with proper




ngo-dei I and associates, ‘we’
lei you
lei-dei you and associates, ‘you-all’
ah Ling dei Ling and his associates, Ling and that crowd
In Vietnamese, the nominal element dowq meaning ‘group’ is used to mark plurality
of independent pronouns. In Vietnamese, this addition seems to be obligatory to mark
plural reference (Cooke, 1968: 76-77). In the case of Vietnamese, the associative
marking is grammaticalised as part of the pronominal paradigm. Consequently, it is
not a case of ‘no-we’ anymore, but an example of a Latin-type paradigm. In other
languages, however, the addition to disambiguate nouns is only needed when the
context requires it. The optional use of associative marking is also found in Classical
Chinese, where a word meaning ‘group’ or ‘associates’ could be used to overtly mark
plurality (Norman, 1988: 89-90). A final example of independent pronouns without
overt marking of plurality is Thai. In Thai, many pronouns can be used indifferently
as to number. However, there are a few pronouns that, when used in a specific honor-
ific setting, are basically singular or plural.
                                                 
23 Separate marking for plurality of pronouns is also found in Manem, another non-Austronesian lan-
guage from Papua New Guinea, not directly related to Salt-Yui and Golin (Voorhoeve, 1975: 416).
The short grammatical notes in the source do not mention the precise function of this pluraliser.
24 These data on associative marking come from a data file compiled by Edith Moravcsik, collected
through a query on the Linguist list, see Moravcsik (1994). On Cantonese, see also Norman
(1988: 219-220). On Japanese, see also Shibatani (1990: 371-372).
132 PART TWO: PARADIGMATIC STRUCTURE
‘Personal pronouns, like nouns, do not have number as an obligatory formal category,
but not all forms are ambiguous as to number … [eg the form] /raw´/ (first person) …
occurs freely in either singular or plural usage, with or without overt plural expressions
accompanying them. However, in singular usage, /raw´/ is a somewhat restricted first
person form used chiefly by royalty speaking to commoners, or between intimate
equals. In plural usage it is a general term which may serve as the corresponding plural
of all first person singular forms except terms used to royalty.’ (Cooke, 1968: 19)
A split in independent pronouns is a rather widespread phenomenon. The preceding
examples show that is common in Southeast Asia and in New Guinea. It is also regu-
larly found among the languages of America.25 The independent case of ‘split’ to-
gether with the inflectional cases from the Maricopa-type form a common type of
paradigmatic structure.
Big Nambas-type paradigm
Finally, there are a few examples of split-type paradigms that have neither a Mari-
copa-type paradigm, nor a Salt-Yui-type paradigm. These patterns are incidental
cases. There is one case that distinguishes singular from non-singular only in the third
person. Shown in (4.54) are the person prefixes from Big Nambas, a language spoken
on the island Malekula, part of Vanuatu in the Pacific. There are other affixes in the
language that indicate number, so the difference between the singular and the plural is






3 i-… a-… 3+3
Ainu-type paradigm
There are a few cases that only distinguish singular from non-singular in the second
person. The first example comes form Classical Ainu, shown in (4.55). The presented
prefixes are used for transitive subject marking (Shibatani, 1990: 25). Contemporary





2 e-… eci-… 2+3
3 -… 3+3
                                                 
25 Southeast Asian and New Guinean examples have been discussed extensively in the preceding sec-
tion. Let me add two more examples from South America to stretch the geographical distribution of
this kind of pronominal paradigm. The independent pronouns from Xerente, A Gé language from Bra-
zil, is probably of the Salt-Yui type, although the description is not completely clear on this point
(Wiesemann, 1986b: 361, 364-368). The independent pronouns from Paez, a language from Colombia,
is clearly described as a Salt-Yui type paradigm, although there are different forms for gender (Rojas
Curieux, 1991: 52-53).
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Exactly the same paradigmatic structure is found in the independent pronouns of Tai-
rora, a highland language from New Guinea, shown in (4.56). These pronouns are re-
lated to the pronouns from Usarufa, as shown below in (4.60). The data on Tairora are
from Foley (1986: 255). Still another example with the same structure is the paradigm
of the personal affixes from Gubden, a dialectal variant of Dargi, shown in (4.57).
Dargi is a Nakh-Dagestanian language spoken in Dagestan. This paradigm is related
to the suffixes of literary Dargi, as shown below in (4.61). The data on Gubden are











2 …-de …-da 2+3
3 …- 3+3
Suki-type paradigm
A very special case is the paradigm of the independent pronouns form the Papuan
language Suki, shown in (4.58). The first person complex is homophonous with the





2 e de 2+3
3 u i 3+3
Aztec-type paradigm
A slightly different structure is shown in (4.59). These are the pronominal prefixes
from Classical Nahuatl, an Aztec language from Mexico. The same ‘diagonal’ ho-
mophony as in Suki is found here. The only difference is the homophony in the third
person. Note that there is also a suffix …- that disambiguates the homophony of
‘you-singular’ and ‘we’ (Newman, 1967: 193). This structure is commonly found in
the contemporary Aztecan languages.26
                                                 
26 Cf the Milpa Alta variant of Nahuatl as described by Whorf (1946: 384) and Pipil, as described by
Campbell (1985: 54).





2 ti-… am-… 2+3
3 -… 3+3
4.4.3 Homophonous variants of ‘no-we’
After the large number of split patterns, I now turn to the few examples of homo-
phonous variants. There are four different theoretical possibilities of vertical homoph-
ony, repeated here in Table 4.10. The possibility of a 1/3-homophony is not attested in
the current sample. However, the number of examples of each of the attested kinds of
homophony is generally low when compared to the relative ubiquity of the common
paradigms. The absence of the 1/3-homophony is likely to be a chance phenomenon.
In contrast to the homophonous paradigms with ‘unified-we’ (see section 4.3), there
are no ‘semi-common’ paradigmatic structures among the following cases.









Table 4.10: Homophonous patterns of ‘no-we’
Usarufa-type paradigm
A few cases of ‘no-we’ paradigms use the same morpheme for the first person com-
plex and for the second person non-singular. Such a paradigmatic structure is attested
in the independent pronouns from Usarufa, a highland language from New Guinea,
shown in (4.60); data from Foley (1986: 255). This paradigm is related to the inde-






3 we ye 3+3
Dargi-type paradigm
A slightly different pattern is found in literary Dargi. In this case, the third person
non-singular is marked together with the third person singular. It is possible to disam-
biguate the 2+3 form by using a suffix …-ya, but this suffix is not obligatorily used
(van den Berg, 1999: 155-156). Some dialectal variants of Dargi have a separate mor-
pheme for 2+3; for example Gubden, shown above in (4.57).








Finally, there are some cases in which the 1/2-homophony is found both in the singu-
lar and in the non-singular. The Nez Perce prefixes for progressive and habitual are
shown in (4.62). Number can be marked by suffixes (Rude, 1985: 30-39). Another ex-
ample of the same paradigmatic structure are the past suffixes from the Caucasian










There are also only a few ‘no-we’ examples with a 2/3-homophony. The first case is
the paradigm of the pronominal suffixes from Gadsup, a highland language from New










Another case of a 2/3-homophony is formed by the pronominal suffix from the Cau-
casian language Megeb (Helmbrecht, 1996: 138). In this case, the non-singular ho-










Finally, I know of two cases of a ‘no-we’ paradigm where all non-singular categories
are marked identically. The most famous of these cases with a unified-homophony is
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found in English. The present inflection of English verbs is shown in (4.65). All











The unified-homophony seems to be rare. The only other example that I know of is
found in Koiari, a non-Austronesian language from Papua New Guinea. The pre-
sent/imperfect suffixes from Koiari are shown in (4.66). Just as in English, all group-
categories are marked identical, with a suffix …-a, and this same suffix is also used
for the second person singular. The same paradigmatic structure is also found in the








Two common paradigmatic structures were discussed: the Maricopa-type and the
Salt-Yui-type. The only reason to separate these two structures was their morphologi-
cal status. The Maricopa-type paradigms are inflectional; the Salt-Yui-type paradigms
are morphologically independent. However, structurally these two types are identical.
From now on, I will consider both types to be variants of one paradigmatic structure






Figure 4.12: The Maricopa/Salt-Yui-type paradigmatic structure
Many other paradigmatic structures are attested, but these are almost all incidental
cases. The examples that are presented in the text are summarised in Table 4.11. The
reported frequencies are accounted for in Appendix B. Twenty cases are presented of
the common Maricopa/Salt-Yui-type paradigmatic structure. Other than that, 16 ex-
amples were discussed of 11 different uncommon paradigmatic structures, a mean of
1.5 examples per structure. The frequencies of the different varieties of ‘no-we’ para-
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digms are comparable to the variation as was found with ‘unified-we’ paradigms in
the previous section (cf Table 4.7). The common paradigms have roughly 20 exam-
ples per structure, the rare cases have roughly 1.5 examples per structure. The main
difference is that there are no ‘semi-common’ structures attested here. The distinction
between common and uncommon is rather clear-cut in the case of ‘no-we’.
common rare
examples 20 16
paradigmatic structures 1 11
examples per structure 20.0 1.5
Table 4.11: Frequencies of ‘no-we’ paradigms
4.5 Variants of the ‘only-inclusive’ type
4.5.1 Preamble
The next type of marking for the first person complex is characterised by a special
form for the inclusive ‘we’ and the absence of a specialised morpheme for the exclu-
sive counterpart. This is the first kind of paradigmatic structure that distinguishes
between inclusive and exclusive. This distinction between inclusive and exclusive





1+3 – B C
Table 4.12: The ‘only-inclusive’ type
The ‘only-inclusive’ marking of the first person complex is attested in one common
paradigmatic structure, mnemonically called the SIERRA POPOLUCA-TYPE paradigm.
The form of this common paradigmatic structure is presented in Figure 4.13. There







Figure 4.13: Common paradigmatic structure of ‘only-inclusive’
4.5.2 Sierra Popoluca-type paradigm
The only common variant of ‘only-inclusive’ is a pattern with only one specialised
morpheme for group-marking. Besides an inclusive ‘we’, there are no other non-
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singular morphemes. One pattern is found in the majority of all cases. In this common
pattern, the category 1+3 aligns with 1, 2+3 with 2 and 3+3 with 3. This is exempli-
fied in (4.67) with the prefixes from Sierra Popoluca, a Mixe-Zoque language from
Mexico (Foster & Foster, 1948: 17-19; Elson, 1960: 207). By using a plural suffix
…-tám, the difference between the singular reference and the group reference is dis-
ambiguated. This is shown in (4.68 a, b). Note that it is also possible to use the plural
suffix with the inclusive prefix ta-…. By using this combination, it is possible to dis-

















‘we (inclusive) will sleep’
d. ta-mo-tám-pa
1+2-sleep-PLUR-IMPERF
‘we (inclusive plural) will sleep’ (Foster & Foster, 1948: 19)
Example sentences like (4.68 a) are crucial to classify a pronominal paradigm as
‘only-inclusive’. The Sierra Popoluca-pattern is strongly alike to the pattern of the
Berik-type. Both patterns have only one non-singular morpheme, which is in both
cases to be translated as ‘we’. However, the possible referents for this ‘we’-morpheme
in Sierra Popoluca is different from Berik, as shown in Figure 4.14. The difference
between the two patterns is the marking for the category 1+3. In the Berik-type, the
category 1+3 is marked identical to the categories 1+2 and 1+2+3, adding up to a
general form like the English ‘we’. Alternatively, in the Sierra Popoluca-type, the
category 1+3 is marked identical to the speaker, leaving 1+2 and 1+2+3 as sole
                                                 
27 The pronominal system of Sierra Popoluca is described by Foster & Foster (1948: 17-19) as being of
the minimal/augmented type. In fact, this description is the first known description of a mini-
mal/augmented pronominal system (see section 3.6.5). I do not follow the Fosters in this analysis. By
the classification as used in the present work, the pronominal prefixes of Sierra Popoluca are separated
from the other affixes (cf Elson, 1960: 207). Notably, the separate number suffix is not included in the
discussion of the pronominal prefixes. Only when the pronominal prefixes would be considered to-
gether with this number suffix, eight different referential values would be distinguished (comparable
to the eight different forms of a minimal/augmented paradigm).
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meanings of the form ‘we’. Taken at face value, the two types might look alike, as
both only have one non-singular form to be translated into English using the pronoun
‘we’. However, the structures are significantly different, and should be clearly distin-




1 1+3 1+3 1  1+3 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.14: The Sierra Popoluca-type compared to the Berik-type
From the graphic form of the Sierra-Popoluca paradigm, it is understandable that
these paradigms are often analysed as 4-person systems. Analysed as such, the para-
digm from Sierra Popoluca would look as shown in (4.69). This ‘4-person’ analysis is
entirely analogous to my analysis, as presented in (4.67), only stripped down to the
essentials. I will stick to the more burdensome analysis as in (4.67) for it to be compa-
rable with the other patterns that are discussed in this chapter. However, for the de-
scription of individual languages that have a pronominal paradigm of this sort, an






This paradigmatic structure is a typical pattern of languages of South America. The
pronominal prefixes from Trio, a Carib language from Surinam, are shown in (4.70).
This is a clear example of a Sierra Popoluca-type paradigm (Carlin, 1997). The same
paradigmatic structure is also found in another Carib language from Surinam, con-








A few more examples from South America follow. First, the pronominal inflection of
Maká, a Guaicuran language from Paraguay, show this structure (Gerzenstein,
1994: 83-97). Next, the independent pronouns and the pronominal inflection from
Jaqaru, an Aymaran language from Peru, both have a Sierra Popoluca-type paradigm
(Hardman, 1966: 79). The pronominal prefixes from Canela-Kraho, a Gé language
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from Brazil are another example (Popjes & Popjes, 1986: 175). Finally, the pronomi-
nal affixes and the independent pronouns from the Campa languages (a subgroup of
Arawakan) have this paradigmatic structure, although they distinguish two gender
forms in the third person (Wise, 1971: 67; Payne, 1981: 34; Reed & Payne, 1986: 324-
327). The only example in North America is shown in (4.71): the prefix paradigm









Paradigms of the Sierra-Popoluca type are also found among the Papuan languages of
New Guinea. Shown in (4.72) are the pronominal prefixes from Nimboran. The same
roots are also used for morphologically independent pronouns (Anceaux, 1965: 167).
Other examples of this paradigmatic structure in New Guinea are found in the Border
family. Both the independent pronouns of Imonda (Seiler, 1985: 44) and the short









A final example of this type is the paradigm of the subject prefixes from the South
Caucasian language Svan, shown in (4.73). Just as in Sierra Popoluca, there are suf-
fixes in Svan to disambiguate the number-reference of these prefixes. These suffixes









The number of examples of the Sierra Popoluca-type is not overwhelming, but there
are enough cases, widely dispersed over the world’s languages, to grant this pattern
the classification ‘common’. This is different from what has been claimed in the lit-
erature, where this type is often depicted as rather exotic and exceptional, as, for ex-
ample, would appear from the comment by Plank (1985). He says that:
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‘… diese Paradigmen in einer Hinsicht, das Verhältnis von Person und Numerus betref-
fend, eher untypisch sind.’ (Plank, 1985: 143)
Paradigms of the Sierra Popoluca-type are not atypical structures for pronominal
paradigm; on the contrary, they are completely normal patterns for a human language.
4.5.3 Rare variants of ‘only-inclusive’
There is a small group of examples of other paradigmatic structures with an ‘only-
inclusive’ first person complex. This group of exceptional examples is not only small,
it also consists of incidental examples of each structure. The scarcity and variability of
these rare variants clearly illustrates that there is a large difference between the one
common paradigmatic structure, the Sierra Popoluca-type, and the other rare variants.
Warrwa-type paradigms
In the actor clitics/prefixes of the Australian language Warrwa exceptional kinds of
horizontal homophony are attested. The paradigms for the clitics differ slightly ac-
cording to the tense and the verb class. In the future of verb class I, a pattern with only
a horizontal homophony in the first person is found, shown in (4.74 a). In the non-
future of verb class I, a horizontal homophony of first and second person is found,
shown in (4.74 b). Finally, in (4.74 c), the future of verb class 2, shows a homophony







2 mi-… ku-… 2+3













2 nga-… wa-… 2+3
3 ku-… 3+3
Algonquian-type paradigm
The remaining examples of rare paradigmatic structures all show some kind of verti-
cal homophony. However, if there is any vertical homophony, then there is also a
horizontal homophony. Together, these different kinds of homophony result in intri-
cately structured paradigms. The most famous example of this type is found in the
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languages of the Algonquian family. Verbs have pronominal prefixes in the Algon-
quian languages. The prefixes for intransitive verbs are exemplified in (4.75 a) with
data from Southwestern Ojibwa (Schwartz & Dunnigan, 1986: 305).28 In this para-
digm, the exclusive marking (1+3) is identical to the marking of the speaker (1) and
the inclusive (1+2, 1+2+3) is marked differently. In the case of Ojibwa, the inclusive
marking (1+2, 1+2+3) is identical to the marking of the second person plural (2+3),
which is in turn identical to the singular addressee (2); they are all marked by the pre-
fix kit-…. It should be added that the Algonquian languages use obligatory suffixes to
mark number. In combination with the prefixes, these suffixes disambiguate seven













1 int-… int-…-min 1+3
2 kit-… kit-… m 2+3
3 -… -…-wak 3+3
Huave-type paradigm
Another vertical homophonous case of ‘only-inclusive’ is found in the Mexican lan-
guage Huave. The pronominal prefixes of Huave are shown in (4.76 a).29 Interestingly,
the inclusive is not grouped here with the second person, but with the third person.
Again, there are number suffixes. Once these number suffixes are taken into account,










                                                 
28 Schwartz & Dunnigan (1986) use the name ‘Ojibwe’ in stead of ‘Ojibwa’. For data on other Algon-
quian languages, eg Eastern Ojibwa (Bloomfield, 1956: 44) and Menomini (Bloomfield, 1962: 36-40).
Bloomfield (1946: 97-99) presents the same structure as a general characteristic of Algonquian lan-
guages on the basis of a comparison of Fox, Cree, Menomini and Ojibwa.
29 There is massive allomorphy in these pronominal affixes, and the prefixes that are described here are
a strongly idealised picture of the present prefixes of verb class A.




1 sa-… sa-…-an 1+3
2 i-… i-…-an 2+3
3 a-… a-…-ïw 3+3
Lenakel-type paradigm
The last rare variant with an ‘only-inclusive’ first person complex comes from Le-
nakel, an Austronesian language from Vanuatu, shown in (4.77). The vertical ho-
mophony between inclusive and third plural that has been attested in Huave is also
found here. However, in Lenakel there is no horizontal homophony in the third person
(Lynch, 1978: 45). Comparable patterns are found in some other languages of the







3 r-… k-… 3+3
4.5.4 Summary
The ‘only-inclusive’ first person complex includes one common paradigmatic pattern.
This common paradigm, repeated here in Figure 4.15, is called the Sierra
Popoluca-type of paradigmatic structures. This kind of paradigm is found in a wide






Figure 4.15: The Sierra Popoluca-paradigm
Besides the common pattern, a few incidental cases of other paradigmatic structures
patterns are attested. The counts as presented in Table 4.13 are specified in Appendix
B. The distinction between common and rare is rather clear-cut in this case.
 common rare
examples 15 7
paradigm structures 1 6
examples per structure 15.0 1.2
Table 4.13: Frequencies of ‘only-inclusive’ paradigms
                                                 
30 Cf the paradigm from Kwamera that is shown on page 261.
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4.6 Variants of the ‘inclusive/exclusive’ type
4.6.1 Preamble
The ‘inclusive/exclusive’ type distinguishes both an overtly marked inclusive and an
overtly marked exclusive form of ‘we’. Both forms for ‘we’ are marked by a special-
ised morpheme; a morpheme that is not used to mark singular referents. In such ‘in-
clusive/exclusive’ paradigms, at least these two different forms for ‘we’ are special-
ised non-singular morphemes. Most examples, though, have more non-singular forms






1+3 – B C
Table 4.14: The ‘Inclusive/Exclusive’ type
Three paradigmatic structures of the inclusive/exclusive type are common. These
structures are presented in Figure 4.16. These three structures are attested widely
scattered through the world’s linguistic diversity. I will discuss these three common
patterns first, in separate subsections. The MANDARA-TYPE will be discussed in sec-
tion 4.6.2 and the TUPI-GUARANI-TYPE will be discussed in section 4.6.3. The
KWAKIUTL-TYPE is attested throughout the world’s languages, but it is never found as
the prototypical paradigmatic structure of a whole linguistic family. This pattern is
classified as semi-common. The known examples are discussed in section 4.6.4. Other
paradigmatic structures are attested, but they are very rare. I know of only incidental
examples for each of the rare structures. These rare patterns will be discussed in sec-
tion 4.6.5.
Mandara-type Tupí Guaraní-type Kwakiutl-type
1+2 1+2 1+2
1+2+3 1+2+3 1+2+3
1 1+3 1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.16: (Semi-)common paradigmatic structures with ‘inclusive/exclusive’
4.6.2 Mandara-type paradigm
The paradigmatic structures of the Mandara-type was characterised by Ingram
(1978: 219) as one of four structures that is ‘more frequent than the others’. Indeed,
this paradigmatic structure is found widespread among the world’s languages. Inter-
estingly, the cases with this structure seem to have a clear preference for morphologi-
cally independent marking. I know of only a few examples of an inflectional Man-
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dara-type paradigms. This paradigm is exemplified in (4.78) with the non-completive





1 yá á 1+3
2 ká kwá 2+3
3 á tá 3+3
Patterns of the Mandara-type are indeed numerous and easy to find. In Africa, cases
of Mandara-type are attested mainly south of the Sahara. In the Afro-Asiatic stock, it
is found among the Chadic and the Cushitic languages.31 In the Nilo-Saharan stock, it
is described for all languages from the Teso-Turkana subgroup.32 Finally, in the Ni-
ger-Congo stock, this type of paradigm is encountered in the basic pronouns of some
of the Grassfields languages and in the subject pronouns of some of the Atlantic lan-
guages.33 An inclusive/exclusive opposition might not be a prototypical characteristic
of African languages, but still it is quite commonly found (contrary to claims that it is
a rare phenomenon in Africa (cf Nichols, 1992: 123-124). In the Eurasian continent,
paradigms of the Mandara-type are uncommon, but attested in widely dispersed lan-
guages. It is found, for example, in the Caucasus and in Siberia.34 In Chinese, the
Mandara-type is encountered in most modern northern varieties, but it was not present
in the classical language (Norman, 1988: 89, 157-158). It is possible that an inclusive
developed through areal influence from the Siberian or Mongolian languages. How-
ever, the opposite development – loss of the inclusive-exclusive distinction – has oc-
curred in Mongolian (Sanzheyev, 1973: 74). The Mandara-type paradigm is not en-
countered in the Indo-European stock except for independent pronouns in the Indo-
Aryan languages Gujarati (Tisdall, 1892: 18) and Marathi (Pandharipande,
1997: 376, 381). Probably, both languages borrowed the inclusive-exclusive opposi-
tion from the neighbouring Dravidian languages (Masica, 1991: 251). The contact
situation between Dravidian and Indo-Aryan shows again (just as in the Chinese-
Mongolian situation) that the influence can go both ways. The inclusive/exclusive op-
position is not found in the Dravidian language Kannada, probably under influence of
the neighbouring Indo-Aryan languages (Sridhar, 1990: 205). Interestingly, an inclu-
                                                 
31 For Chadic, eg the independent pronouns from Podoko and Mandara (Burquest, 1986: 78, 83). For
Cushitic, eg the ‘enclitics’ from Somali (Kirk, 1905: 29-30, 103-104). Note that there is a gender dis-
tinction in the Somali third person singular.
32 Eg the independent pronouns from Turkana (Dimmendaal, 1982: 207) and Karimojong (Novelli,
1985: 107).
33 For the Grassfields languages, see, for example, Aghem (Hyman, 1979: 47, 49). This structure is also
found in the Beboid language Noni (Hyman, 1981: 15). The Mandara-type structure is only found in
the basic pronouns of these languages. In both languages, there are also compound pronouns with a
rather different structure (see Appendix A). For the Atlantic languages, see, for example, Adamawa
Fulfulde (Taylor, 1921: 32) and Palor (D'Alton, 1983: 201-203).
34 For the Caucasus, eg the independent pronouns from Chechen (Nichols, 1994: 32). For Siberia, eg the
independent pronouns from the language-isolate Gilyak (Austerlitz, 1959; Gruzdeva, 1998: 25-26). A
Mandara-type paradigm is also found in the pronominal inflection and in the independent pronouns
from the Tungusic languages Even (Malchukov, 1995: 12, 16) and Evenki (Bulatova & Grenoble,
1999: 33).
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sive-exclusive opposition is common among the Dravidian languages, but the Man-
dara-type paradigm is not so often found.35 Most pronominal paradigms of Dravidian
languages are of the Tupí Guaraní-type that will be discussed in the next section.
Travelling into the Pacific, the Mandara-type paradigm is described regularly for
Austronesian languages.36 In contrast to the abundance of cases among the Austrone-
sian languages, it is sometimes assumed in the literature that an inclusive-exclusive
distinction is exceptional among the non-Austronesian languages of New Guinea and
the surrounding islands (Lynch, 1998: 167). However, independent pronouns with a
Mandara-type paradigm are attested regularly among the Non-Austronesian languages
in the Bird’s Head (Vogelkop) of New Guinea, leading over the ‘neck’ of the Bird’s
Head towards Mainland, and in Non-Austronesian languages on the islands west of
New Guinea.37 This can be explained as an Austronesian influence. However, influ-
ence in the opposite direction is also attested. The Siao family, a group of Austrone-
sian languages spoken on the eastern mainland of New Guinea, have lost the inclu-
sive-exclusive distinction, probably under influence of the non-Austronesian lan-
guages (Lynch, 1998: 101). The Mandara-type paradigm is only incidentally found in
Australia, as most pronominal paradigms with an inclusive-exclusive distinction also
distinguish dual forms.38 These paradigms with duals will be discussed in section
8.5.2. Finally, the Mandara-type paradigm is described for geographically widely dis-
persed American languages, although it is not attested very frequently.39 Note that the
inclusive/exclusive opposition in any of its various forms is found very often among
American languages. It is only this particular Mandara-type paradigmatic structure
that turns out to be rather uncommon.
                                                 
35 A Mandara-type paradigms is found in the pronominal inflection in Koya (Tyler, 1969: 92) and in
Tamil (Asher, 1982: 173-174). Note that both inflectional paradigms have gender distinctions in the
third person.
36 Among the Oceanic branch of Austronesian, the Mandara-type paradigm is, for example, found in
the independent pronouns from Motu, Mono-Alu, Nakanamanga, Pulawat (Lynch, 1998: 100-101) and
Big Nambas (Fox, 1976: 30). Examples of independent pronouns of this type from Austronesian lan-
guages outside the Oceanic branch are Toba Batak (Nababan, 1981: 77) and Chamorro (Topping,
1973: 107). There are also some Austronesian languages that have an inflectional Mandara-type para-
digm eg Uma (Esser, 1964: 36), Trukese (Lynch, 1998: 103-104), Tondano (Sneddon, 1975: 104, 113)
and Toba Batak (Nababan, 1981: 77).
37 Voorhoeve (1975) lists many examples of independent pronouns of the Mandara-type. A large part
of these data are from preliminary field reports. However inconclusive, these descriptions indicate that
this paradigmatic structure is rather common in Irian Jaya (ie the western part of New Guinea). Voor-
hoeve mentions as examples the Mairasi-Tanah Merah stock (ibid.: 424-425), the West Bomberai
stock (ibid.: 433-434), the South Bird’s Head family (ibid.: 438-439) and the Inanwatan family
(ibid.: 440). The Mandara-type is also found among the Island Non-Austronesian languages, west of
Irian Jaya (Capell, 1975: 693-696). Both these rather preliminary descriptive surveys do not present
any information on inflectional paradigms. I know of two non-Austronesion languages in this area
with an inflectional Mandara-type paradigm: the language-isolate Warembori (Donahue, 1999: 28-30)
and the North Halmahera language Galela (Shelden, 1991: 162). There are probably more inflectional
cases, but it is difficult to find good data.
38 An incidental case is the paradigm of the pronominal inflection from Gunin (McGregor, 1993: 44-
46).
39 Eg the independent pronouns from Shuswap, a Salish language from Canada (Kuipers, 1974: 59), the
pronouns from Ojibwe, an Algonquian, language form the USA (Schwartz & Dunnigan, 1986: 296)
and the pronouns from Retuarã, a Tucanoan language from Colombia (Strom, 1992: 34-35). Note that
in Retuarã gender distinctions are found in the third person.
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4.6.3 Tupí Guaraní-type paradigm
Paradigms of Tupí Guaraní-type are only slightly different from the previous Man-
dara-type. The only difference is a homophony in the third person. The categories 3
and 3+3 are marked identically. This homophony is not found extremely often when
compared to the abundance of examples of the Mandara-type. Still, there are enough
cases to grant the Tupí Guaraní-type the status ‘common’. Paradigms of the Tupí
Guaraní-type are the general structure that is found in the intransitive prefixes of the
Tupí-Guaraní family in South America.40 The paradigms are so strongly alike that the
paradigmatic structure can even be confidently reconstructed for proto-Tupí-Guaraní





1 *a-… *oro-… 1+3
2 *ere-… *pe-… 2+3
3 *o-… 3+3
The independent pronouns of Dravidian languages are often of the Tupí Guaraní-type.
Shown in (4.80) are the pronouns from Toda (Emeneau, 1984: 95, 98). The third per-
son pronouns are not specialised person markers, but general referential elements that
are also used as demonstratives. This paradigmatic structure is a general characteristic





1 o.n em 1+3
2 ni. nïm 2+3
3 (demonstratives) 3+3
The same situation as in Dravidian is found in the Tucanoan languages, spoken
around the border of Colombia, Brazil and Ecuador. In some Tucanoan languages, the
third person pronouns are identical to the demonstrative pronouns, as, for example, in
Macuna (Smothermon et al., 1995: 35), Siona (Malone, 1988: 126) and Koreguaje
(Gralow, 1993: 15). In other Tucanoan languages, the third person pronouns and the
demonstratives are alike, but not identical (Malone, 1988: 126).
                                                 
40 Eg Guajajara (Bendor-Samuel, 1972: 86-92), Guarani (Adelaar & Silva Lôpez, 1988: 31-35), Aché
(Susnik, 1961/62: 98), Asurini (Harrison, 1971: 30) and Mundurukú (Crofts, 1973: 69-70, 88-91).
41 Eg Malayalam (Asher & Kumari, 1997: 258, 266), Tamil (Asher, 1982: 143-144, 148-149) and Koya
(Tyler, 1969: 59-60). For a general account of Dravidian pronominal structure, see Caldwell
(1856: 414-415, 420).










Finally, I will present a few incidental cases of the Tupí Guaraní-type paradigm. First,
the imperfective pronouns from Ngizim, a Chadic language from Nigeria, are shown
in (4.82). This case is interesting because, differently from the previous examples, the
Ngizim independent third person pronoun is not a demonstrative item (Burquest,
1986: 76). Next, the transitive subject prefixes from Colloquial Ainu are shown in
(4.83); data from Shibatani (1990: 28). A final case (not shown here) are the pronomi-
nal prefixes from Ticuna, a language isolate spoken mainly in Brazil. Note that the





1 naa jàa 1+3






1 ku-… ci-… 1+3
2 e-… eci-… 2+3
3 -… 3+3
4.6.4 Kwakiutl-type paradigm
The Kwakiutl-type paradigm is a semi-common pattern of the inclusive/exclusive
type. This pattern is found well distributed over the world’s diversity, but it is never
attested as a general characteristic of a close-knit family. As a result, this paradigm is
not common – following the criteria for commonness that have been formulated in
section 4.2. However, this kind of paradigm occurs far more often than the ‘rare’
paradigms. Therefore, it is classified as ‘semi-common’. The Kwakiutl-type paradig-
matic structure has both a horizontal homophony between 3 and 3+3 and one between
2 and 2+3. An example of this type is found in Kwakiutl, a Wakashan language from
Canada. Shown in (4.84) are the subject suffixes from Kwakiutl (Boas, 1947: 252).42
                                                 
42 The system for spacial deixis is disregarded here. I interpret this spatial system as a separate system,
although it cross-cuts through the pronominal system. The same structure as in Kwakiutl is found in
the related language Heiltsuk (Rath, 1981: 77).





1 …-En(L) …-Enusx8u 1+3
2 …-Es 2+3
3 …- 3+3
Three other examples of paradigms of the Kwakiutl-type are shown below, all from
South America. First, the intransitive prefixes from Apalai, a Carib language from
Brazil, are shown in (4.85). The (non-collective animate) independent pronouns have
the same paradigmatic structure (Koehn & Koehn, 1986: 95, 108). Next, the intransi-
tive suffixes from Huallaga Quechua, a Quechuan language from Peru, are shown in
(4.86); data from Weber (1986: 334). Finally, the intransitive subject pronouns from
Maxakali, a Gé language from Brazil, are shown in (4.87) Other pronominal para-
digms in Maxakali have an identical structure (Popovich, 1986: 352-353, 356). It is
noted that ‘the particles under discussion are separate words, except where they are
phonologically bound tot he preceding words by fusion’ (Popovich, 1986: 351). It is
difficult what to make of this statement; I will consider the Maxakali pronominal



















1 ‘u g ‘u gmu g 1+3
2 ‘a  2+3
3 ‘u  3+3
I know of two other examples of a Kwakiutl-type pronominal paradigm outside
America. First, the ‘object’ prefixes from Svan, a Caucasian language from Georgia,
are shown in (4.88). The separate exclusive pronoun is probably an innovation in
Proto-Svan (Tuite, 1997: 23). Second, the independent pronouns from Acehnese are
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presented in (4.89). Note that there are different honorific versions of these pronouns.












1 kee kamoe 1+3
2 kah 2+3
3 jih 3+3
4.6.5 Rare variants of ‘inclusive/exclusive’
Only a few instances of other paradigmatic structures with specialised inclusive and
exclusive marking are attested. All these ‘rare’ examples have some kind of vertical
homophony. Three different kinds of vertical homophony are found: between the in-
clusive and 2+3, between the exclusive and 3+3 and between 2+3 and 3+3. The most
striking aspect is that there are only so few cases. Surely, when compared with the
large amount of vertical homophonous cases that were found among the ‘unified-we’
paradigms (41 cases), the seven examples attested make a real exceptional impres-
sion.
Tiwi-type paradigm
The first set of examples all have a vertical homophony between the inclusive and the
second person plural. The first case is the object marking in the Australian language





1 mni-… mwni-… 1+3
2 mni-… mani-… 2+3
3 -… wni-… 3+3
Sanuma-type paradigm
The second case is found in Sanuma, a Yanomam language from Venezuela/Brazil.
Shown in (4.91) is the paradigm of the non-emphatic independent pronouns
(Borgman, 1990: 149). This paradigm is almost like the one from Tiwi, except for the
horizontal homophony in the third person. The unusual vertical homophony between
‘we’ and ‘you’ is exemplified in sentence (4.92 a). There is a special exclusive ‘we’
morpheme. This exclusive form is exemplified in sentence (4.92 b). In this sentence,
the speaker is telling about a group of non-present co-workers, using an exclusive
‘we’ indicating that the addressee listening to the story was not part of that group.





1 sa samakö 1+3
2 wa makö 2+3
3 (classifiers) 3+3
(4.92) SANUMA
a. makö kali-palo mai kite
1+2/2+3 work-REPET NEG FUT
‘We/you (Plur) are not going to work’ (Borgman, 1990: 150)
b. Poa Pisita ha ‚ samakö pewö kali-palo
PLACE LOC REL 1+3 all work-REPET
‘In Boa Vista we all work’ (Borgman, 1990: 153)
Nama-type paradigm
The third case of a vertical homophony between the inclusive and the second person
plural is found in Nama. The pronouns of the Khoisan language Nama consist of two
parts, which Hagman (1977: 43) calls the ‘pronominal root’ and the ‘png-suffix’.
Haacke (1977) argues even stronger that these two parts have a completely different
status in the grammar of the language. Following Haacke, I consider them to be two
different pronominal paradigms. The ‘pronominal root’ has a vertical and a horizontal
homophony, shown in (4.93). The inclusive reference is identical to the second person











The next examples all have a vertical homophony involving the exclusive (1+3). In
these examples, the exclusive is identical to the third person plural. The first example
of this homophony is the paradigm of the intransitive suffixes of Shuswap, a Salish
language from Canada. In Shuswap, the exclusive is marked identical to the third per-
son singular and non-singular, shown in (4.94). An independent pronoun k x  is used





1 …-wn …-s 1+3
2 …-x  …-p 2+3
3 …-s 3+3
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Waiwai-type paradigm
An almost identical paradigm is attested in the intransitive pronominal prefixes from
Waiwai, a Carib language from Brazil, shown in (4.95). Just as in Shuswap, the ex-
clusive is marked identical to the third person singular and non-singular. Again just as
in Shuswap, this unusual pattern of Waiwai needs disambiguation. The difference
between the category 1+3 and the third person has to be clarified by the use of an in-
dependent pronoun amna for the exclusive ‘we’. A pair of examples demonstrating
the Waiwai equivalents of the exclusive and inclusive are shown in (4.96). Different
from Shuswap, the Waiwai pronominal prefixes also show a horizontal homophony in











‘We (exclusive) roasted it’ (Hawkins, 1998: 179)
b. tî-htînoyasî amn e
1+2-know later
‘We (inclusive) will know it later’ (Hawkins, 1998: 179)
Kunama-type paradigm
Finally, a third form of vertical homophony is found in Kunama, a Nilo-Saharan lan-
guage from Eritrea, shown in (4.97). In this paradigm, there is a vertical homophony
between the second and third person non-singular. The presented suffixes are used











Two paradigmatic structures with an ‘inclusive/exclusive’ first person complex are
attested commonly among the world’s languages (the Mandara-type and the Tupí-
Guaraní-type). A third pattern (the Kwakiutl-type) is also attested regularly, but it
                                                 
43 The same paradigmatic structure as in Waiwai is also found in another Carib languages, Hixkaryana
(Derbyshire, 1979: 146-149). In this language, the independent pronoun ‘amna’ is also used to clarify
the referent as exclusive.
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does not satisfy all criteria that were raised for a paradigm to be classified as ‘com-
mon’. This paradigmatic type is ‘semi-common’. The paradigmatic structure of these
(semi-)common patterns is outlined in Figure 4.17. These three common paradigmatic
structures are reminiscent of the three common structures of ‘unified-we’ (see Figure
4.9 on page 126 above). Those three common ‘unified-we’ patterns are identical to
the three patterns as shown here, except for the inclusive-exclusive distinction.
Mandara-type Tupí Guaraní-type Kwakiutl-type
1+2 1+2 1+2
1+2+3 1+2+3 1+2+3
1 1+3 1 1+3 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 4.17: (Semi-)common paradigmatic structures of ‘inclusive/exclusive’
Structurally, the Mandara-type paradigms can be interpreted as the ‘complete’ pat-
terns, relative to which the Tupí Guaraní-type does not distinguish between singular
and non-singular in the third person. Besides, the Kwakiutl-type also neutralises the
singular/non-singular distinction in the second person. This hierarchical interpretation
of the three structures is substantiated by the relative frequencies of the paradigms, as
shown in Table 4.15. The Mandara-type is the most common. The number of exam-
ples of the Tupí Guaraní-type is already down to roughly half of that. The Kwakiutl-







Table 4.15: Number of cases of the (semi-)common paradigms
Relative to the three (semi-)common paradigmatic structures, only very few other
paradigmatic structures are attested. Only seven cases of ‘rare’ paradigmatic struc-
tures are attested, relative to 60 cases of the three (semi-)common structures. The dis-
tinction between common and rare is rather clear-cut in the case of ‘inclu-
sive/exclusive’ first person complex.
common semi-common rare
examples 52 8 7
paradigmatic structures 2 1 6
examples per structure 26.0 8.0 1.2
Table 4.16: Frequencies of the ‘inclusive/exclusive’ paradigms
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4.7 Variants of the ‘minimal/augmented’ type
4.7.1 Preamble
The final kind of paradigmatic structures to be discussed is characterised by a ‘mini-
mal/augmented’ first person complex. This paradigmatic structure has three different
forms that are to be translated with the English pronoun ‘we’. These three different
forms of ‘we’ are traditionally referred to as ‘dual’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’. This
traditional tripartite division is renamed here as ‘minimal inclusive’ (1+2), ‘aug-






1+3 – B C
Table 4.17: The ‘minimal/augmented’ pattern
Theoretically, many different paradigmatic structures could be made by combining
the marking of the ‘minimal/augmented’ first person complex with the remaining
categories in the paradigm. However, pace two cases, all examples of the ‘mini-
mal/augmented’ type belong to one and the same paradigmatic structure, as presented







Figure 4.18: The Maranao-type paradigmatic structure
4.7.2 Maranao-type paradigm
The independent pronouns from Maranao, an Austronesian language from the Philip-
pines, are presented in (4.98). The paradigm consists of eight different forms. In this
paradigmatic structure, the category 1+2 is referentially a dual form. It refers to the
two participants of the speech-act dyad: the speaker and the addressee. However,
calling it a ‘dual’ does not seem to be the best analysis. The most important argument
against the term ‘dual’ is that paradigms like the one from Maranao do not have any
other dual forms. To invoke a completely new category ‘dual’ for the analysis of such
a paradigm is a waste of apparatus. The ‘singular-group’ analysis proposed here takes
care of the category without any new terminological dimension. All pronominal para-
digms that have three different forms for ‘we’, and that do not have any second of
third person dual or trial forms, are classified as minimal/augmented paradigms. Not-
withstanding the plethora of descriptive terminology that is found in grammars to de-
scribe this kind of paradigm, I have decided to take them all together and consider
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them as one and the same type. It then turns out that this seemingly exotic paradig-




1 ako kami 1+3
2 ka kano 2+3
3 sekanian siran 3+3
The description of Maranao-type paradigms without the use of the term ‘dual’ started
with the analysis of some Philippine languages in the fifties (Thomas, 1955). It is not
a surprise that this analysis first arose with the description of a language in this part of
the world, as paradigms of the Maranao-type are abundantly found on the Philippines.
Well known cases are Maranao (McKaughan, 1959) and Hanunóo (Conklin,
1962: 134-135). A large number of examples of this paradigmatic structure are de-
scribed in a collection edited by Reid (1971: 1-43). This author presents short descrip-
tions of the phonology and pronominal categories of 43 ‘minor’ Philippine languages.
Of these 43 languages, 31 are described as having a Maranao-type paradigm. The
other 12 languages have only one inclusive form, and are classified as instances of
‘inclusive/exclusive’ paradigms.44 Both types of languages occur distributed equally
over the geographical area of the Philippines and through all linguistic (sub)families.
Reid (1971:x) hints in his introduction that the languages without the opposition be-
tween the two different inclusive categories originally had a paradigm of the Ma-
ranao-type, but lost the opposition between 1+2 and 1+2+3. Examples of Maranao-
type paradigms are attested frequently among the non-Pama-Nyungan languages from
Australia.45 It is found in the inflection of the Daly river languages. Properly speak-
ing, it is not the verb itself that is inflected, but the so-called auxiliary verb that al-
ways accompanies a verbal stem.46 A Maranao-type paradigm is also attested in the
independent pronouns of the Daly language Malakmalak. Note that these pronouns
make a gender distinction in the third person singular (Birk, 1976: 30-31). The same
situation, a Maranao-type paradigms with gender in the third person singular, is de-
scribed for the independent pronouns of Tiwi (Osborne, 1974: 54). Some more exam-
                                                 
44 The following names of languages are taken from the collection by Reid (1971: 1-43). The names
between brackets are the names of a subvariety of a certain language, normally an indication of the
location where it is spoken. A difference between 1+2 and 1+2+3 is found in Agta, Atta (Pamplona),
Balangaw, Batak (Palawan), Bilaan (Korondai and Sarangani), Binukid, Bontoc (Guinaang), Dumagat
(Casiguran), Ifugao (Amganad, Batad and Bayninan), Inibaloi, Isneg, Itneg (Binongan), Kalagan,
Kalinga (Guinaang) Kallahan (Kayapa Proper and Keleyqiq), Kankanay (Northern), Manobo (Diba-
bawon, Ilianen, Sarangani and Western Bukidnon), Samal, Sambal (Botolan), Sangil (Sarangani Is-
lands), Sangir, Tagabili, Tagbanwa (Aborlan) and Tausug. An identical morpheme for 1+2 and 1+2+3
is found in Gaddang, Ilongot (Kakiduge:n), Itbayaten (Batanes Islands), Ivatan (Batanes Islands),
Mamanwa, Manobo (Ata, Kalamansic Cotabato and Tigwa), Mansaka, Subanun (Sindangan), Suba-
non (Siocon) and Tagbanwa (Kalamian).
45 Dixon (1980: 351-356) speculates whether a Maranao-type paradigms might be reconstructed for
Proto-Australian, but this seems implausible. A more fruitful proposal is to reconstruct a Maranao-
type paradigm only for the non-Pama-Nyungan languages (Blake, 1988: 7; 1991: 222).
46 Eg Maranungku (Tryon, 1970: 17-42) and Malakmalak (Birk, 1976: 47-81). For a wider view on the
Daly river auxiliary verbs and their person suffixes, see Tryon (1976: 679).
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ples of the Maranao-type paradigm in Australia are found among the independent
pronouns of the Nyulnyulan languages.47 An incidental case of a Maranao-type para-
digm is attested in southeastern New Guinea. The independent pronouns from Papuan
language Mountain Koiali show this paradigmatic structure. Other related Koiarian
languages do not have such a paradigm (Garland & Garland, 1975: 429, 434-435). A
final example in the Pacific of a Maranao-type paradigm is countered in the East Pap-
uan languages Santa Cruz and Nanngu, spoken in Solomon Islands (Wurm, 1969: 77-
83). Quite unexpectedly, the Maranao-type paradigm shows up rather frequently in
Africa. All examples are found in the ‘elbow’ of Africa, mainly in Cameroon and Ni-
geria. The Maranao-type occurs in both in the Niger-Congo stock and in the Chadic
family (Afro-Asiatic stock).48 I know of no examples from the Nilo-Saharan stock.
Finally, the Maranao-type paradigm is also found in some languages from the West
Coast of the USA (California and Oregon).49 In this region, some examples of inflec-
tional paradigms of the Maranao-type are found. Still, most examples of the Maranao-
type seem to be independent pronouns.
4.7.3 Rare variants of ‘minimal/augmented’
Only two cases are attested that distinguish the three different forms for ‘we’ (as in
the Maranao-type paradigm), but that do not have precisely the same paradigmatic
structure. These exceptional paradigms are found in Ilocano and in Tiwi.
Ilocano-type paradigm
The first explicit discussion of a Maranao-type pronominal system was by Thomas
(1955) for the Philippine language Ilocano. The independent pronouns of Ilocano are
shown in (4.99). In his article, Thomas criticised the traditional analysis with a ‘first
person dual inclusive’ as name for the category 1+2. He also criticised the categorisa-
tion of na and da as third person pronouns. He concluded that: ‘it is readily seen that
na and da are not true pronouns but may be simply number indicators’ (Thomas,
1955: 207).
                                                 
47 Eg Bardi (Metcalfe, 1975: 48-50) and Nyulnyul (McGregor, 1996: 23).
48 Among the Niger-Congo languages, the Maranao-type paradigm is attested in the basic pronouns of
the Grassfields languages in Cameroon, for example Limbum (Fransen, 1995: 179-180), Bamileke
(Anderson, 1985: 63, 68) and Babungo (Schaub, 1985: 193-194). It is also found in Dii, an Adamawa
language from Cameroon (Bohnhoff, 1986: 126-127) and in Dan, a Mande languages from Côte
d’Ivoire (Doneux, 1968: 45-47). Among the Chadic languages, the Maranao-type paradigm is found in
the independent pronouns from Marghi (Hoffmann, 1963: 73-74; Burquest, 1986: 77, 82) and Gude
(Hoskison, 1983: 48). The Margi pronouns seem to cliticise when occurring behind the verb.
49 A Maranao-type paradigm is attested in the independent pronouns and in the pronominal prefixes of
the northern languages of the Uto-Aztecan family. It is described extensively for Ute-Southern Paiute.
However, there are gender oppositions and special spatial forms (visible versus invisible) in the third
person (Sapir, 1930: 176-178; Press, 1975: 849-90; Givón, 1980: 50; 1984: 356). The same paradig-
matic structure is also found in Tübatulabal, another language of the Northern Uto-Aztecan branch. In
the description of Tübatulabal by Voegelin (1937a: 135), the exclusive form -(g)ila’a is glossed as
‘dual exclusive’, but this is a mistake. This morpheme can also have plural reference. This can be in-
ferred from the usage of this morpheme in text 27, especially in a scene where a group of 5 or 6 boys
are playing (Voegelin, 1937b: 225, sentences 116-134). The narrator, who was one of the boys, tells
the audience that ‘we were playing during the day’ using the exclusive form. This form clearly does
not have dual reference in this context. Outside the Uto-Aztecan family, but areally in close contact, a
Maranao-type paradigm is found in the independent pronouns and in the intransitive pronominal pre-
fixes of Southern Sierra Miwok (Broadbent, 1964: 43, 93).




1 co mi 1+3
2 mo yo 2+3
3 (number markers) 3+3
Tiwi-type paradigm
The only other variant on the minimal/augmented theme is attested in the Australian
language Tiwi. The intransitive subject prefixes in the non-past are presented in
(4.100). The precise function of the affix ‘p’ is unclear. It is, among other things,









3 a(p)-… wu-… 3+3
4.7.4 Summary
The examples of the minimal/augmented type show almost no variation in paradig-
matic structure. By far the majority of examples are of the Maranao-type paradigm. In







Figure 4.19: The Maranao-type paradigm
Only two other paradigmatic structures are attested in incidental cases. The frequen-
cies of the cases as discussed in this section are presented in Table 4.18. These num-
bers are accounted for in Appendix B. The distinction between common and rare is
rather clear-cut in the case of ‘minimal/augmented’ paradigms.
common rare
examples 22 2
paradigmatic structures 1 2
examples per structure 22.0 1.0
Table 4.18: Attested frequencies of the ‘minimal/augmented’ types
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4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, a wide variety of possible paradigmatic structures has been presented.
In total, 55 different structures have been described. Together with the 6 structures
from the previous chapter, a total of 61 pronominal paradigms has been found (all
these counts are accounted for in Appendix B). From this impressive variation, it can
already be inferred that the traditional six-way paradigm (ie first, second and third
person in the singular and plural) is not the only and probably also not the basic para-
digmatic structure for a pronominal paradigm. It seems rather far fetched to proclaim
all other kinds of paradigms to be either extended or corrupted versions of the six-way
paradigm. Accordingly, one of the major goals of this chapter has been to establish
which other paradigmatic structures are commonly found among the world’s lan-
guages and which ones are the ‘real’ exceptions amidst the massive variation. A sam-
ple has been constructed on the basis of the description of the diversity from this
chapter. This sample has been composed to perform all kinds of quantitative analyses.
The method to construct the sample and the results of the analyses will be described
extensively in the next chapter. However, this sample is used here to give an indica-
tion of the frequency of the various paradigmatic structures. The distribution of the
total sample of 265 cases over the 61 different paradigms is presented in Table 4.19.
common semi-common rare
C P C/P C P C/P C P C/P
unified-we 67 3 22.3 22 6 3.7 19 15 1.3
no-we 20 1 20.0 16 11 1.5
only-inclusive 15 1 15.0 7 6 1.2
inclusive/exclusive 52 2 26.0 8 1 8.0 7 6 1.2
minimal/augmented 22 1 22.0 2 2 1.0
others 8 6 1.3
Total 176 8 22.0 30 7 4.3 59 46 1.3
Table 4.19: Summary of frequencies, as counted in Appendix B
(C = number of cases, P = number of paradigmatic structures,
C/P = cases per paradigmatic structure)
Nine different paradigms were characterised as ‘common’, with a mean of 22.0 cases
per paradigm. The remaining cases are clearly less common, although seven paradig-
matic structures still occur relatively frequent. These seven paradigms were charac-
terised as ‘semi-common’, with a mean occurrence of 4.3 cases per paradigm. The
remaining 46 paradigms are clearly rare, with a mean occurrence of 1.3 cases per
paradigm.
The distinction between the ‘common’ and ‘rare’ has been made on partly qualitative
grounds. The common paradigmatic structures are attested often, widely dispersed
over the world’s languages and they are a general characteristic of at least a few ge-
netically close-knit groups. In contrast, the rare paradigmatic structures are only found
in incidental cases; even within their close family the same paradigmatic structure is
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normally not found. In the sample, the distinction between ‘common’ and ‘rare’ is a
continuum, mediated by the ‘semi-common’ paradigmatic structures. The continuum
is presented in Figure 4.20, showing the various paradigmatic structures from most
frequent to less frequent (only three of the 36 paradigmatic structures that are repre-
sented by one example are shown; the periods on the top of the figure indicate that
there are many more cases). From this continuum, it might be inferred that the divi-
sion in ‘common’, ‘semi-common’ and ‘rare’ is rather arbitrarily chosen. However, I
will argue that this division presents some interesting generalisations over the struc-
ture of the paradigms.
Figure 4.20: Continuum of occurrence of paradigmatic structures
(Only three of the 36 paradigmatic structures that are
represented by one case are shown in the figure)
The Latin-type and the Mandara-type paradigm, the two most frequent paradigmatic
structures, were characterised by Ingram (1978: 219) as ‘more frequent than the oth-
ers’. Indeed, these two are most frequent, but they are not qualitatively different from
the others. They are better seen as part of a continuum leading from more to less fre-
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quent. When the actual structures on this continuum are scrutinised, four qualitative
breaks can be discerned. The first qualitative break occurs after the first three para-
digmatic structures: these three structures are all ‘full’, ie they do not show any hori-
zontal, vertical or singular homophony. These three paradigms are shown in the left-



























Figure 4.21: Frequency continuum of the common and semi-common
paradigmatic structures, ordered to structural characteristics
The second qualitative break occurs after the next six paradigms, roughly between the
‘common’ and ‘semi-common’ structures. These six paradigmatic structures have
only horizontal homophony. The kind of horizontal homophony follows a hierarchy
3 > 2 > 1. These six paradigms are shown in the second column in Figure 4.21.50 The
third qualitative break is found after the next three paradigms, amidst the ‘semi-
common’ paradigms. The three most frequent of these ‘semi-common’ paradigms
only show vertical homophony (shown in the third column of Figure 4.21). The final
qualitative break is found again after three paradigms, dividing ‘semi-common’ from
‘rare’. The three remaining ‘semi-common’ paradigms have a vertical and a singular
homophony, which are mirror-images of each other. The remaining ‘rare’ paradig-
matic structures show all kind of combinations of the various kind of homophony.51
                                                 
50 The Kwakiutl-type paradigm is ‘semi-common’, but the structure of this paradigm belongs to the
other paradigms before the second qualitative break, together with the other ‘common’ types of para-
digms.
51 The three paradigmatic types that follow on the frequency-continuum are the English-type, the Ainu-
type and the Aztec type paradigm. These paradigms have only horizontal homophony, and no vertical
[continued on next page]
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This quick qualitative analysis presents a good prospect for the detailed structural
analyses that will follow in the next chapter. There seems to be a hierarchy in the kind
of horizontal homophony, third person above second above first. Also, the various
kinds of homophony seem to be kept rather distinct: horizontal homophony occurs
most likely without vertical or singular homophony. In contrast, singular homophony
is most likely to occur together with vertical homophony. The fine details of these
trends will be discussed in the next chapter.
                                                 
[continued from previous page]
or singular homophony. The English-type has a homophony between 2 and 2+3 (see page 114). The
Ainu-type has precisely the opposite structure of the English-type paradigm: the categories 2 and 2+3
do not show horizontal homophony (see page 134). Finally the Aztec-type has a ‘diagonal’ homoph-
ony between the first person complex and the second person singular (see page 134). I do not see any




Structural analysis of oppositions in the person paradigms
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the perspective changes from a ‘paradigmatic view’ into a ‘categorial
view’. In the previous chapter, the pronominal paradigms were presented in their en-
tirety; a perspective that I will return to in subsequent chapters. However, in this
chapter, the INDIVIDUAL MORPHEMES in the paradigm and their referential properties
will be scrutinised. A pronominal paradigm is interpreted as a sort of micro-
‘Wortfeld’ (Trier, 1931) in which the meaning of the individual items can only be
characterised in opposition to the other items in the paradigm. Various person-
oppositions that are found in pronominal paradigms turn out to be interrelated in the
sense that, cross-linguistically, the occurrence of specific oppositions is strongly pre-
dicted by the occurrence of other oppositions in the paradigm. It will be shown that
there are two different complexes of such interrelated oppositions, ordered along the
lines of two different hierarchies. Both these hierarchies are gradients of EXPLIC-
ITNESS of a pronominal paradigm. This amount of explicitness of a pronominal para-
digm in turn correlates with the morphological status of the paradigm. There is a
strong tendency for the more explicit paradigms to be marked as independent pro-
nouns and for the less explicit paradigms to be inflectionally marked.
5.2 Method and terminology
The data for the quantitative analyses to be presented are formed by the collection of
pronominal paradigms as described in the previous chapter (a summary of the crucial
characteristics of all cases can be found in Appendix B). In that chapter, 61 different
paradigmatic structures were presented. These cases included pronominal paradigms
that only grammaticalise singular and general non-singular (‘group’) marking. The
discussion of paradigms with specialised number marking (like dual and paucal) is
postponed to Part Three. Paradigms with sub-categorisations (like gender or honorif-
ics) were ignored, except for a few incidental cases with gender marking in the third
person singular. A sample has been selected of 265 paradigms on the basis of the
paradigmatic variation as presented in the previous chapter. The collection of the 265
cases has been guided by the wish to include the complete variation known and thus
to show the inherent variability of linguistic structure. In principle, all examples that
were described in the previous chapter are included in the sample. This means that all
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61 different paradigmatic structures, including all quaint cases, are represented in the
sample. The only constraint that has been added on the construction of the sample is
that genetic families never count for more than four cases. This restriction has been
introduced to avoid overrepresentation of paradigmatic structures that are commonly
found in large and widespread families. Because of this approach, the present ‘diver-
sity sample’ is not completely balanced over the world’s linguistic diversity as meas-
ured by quantity and genetic distance (cf Rijkhoff & Bakker, 1998). However, it is not
at all clear a priori whether genetic diversity is an important factor for paradigmatic
diversity. For example, in the next chapter it will be argued that there is much para-
digmatic variation within close genetic distances. Of course, a cross-linguistic sample
should draw data from the known linguistic diversity of the world’s languages. In
other words, genetic diversity should be taken as a basis for the construction of a
cross-linguistic sample. However, a tight method of genetic sampling only reduces the
possibility to highlight interesting cases. In the present collection, the number of cases
and the distribution of these cases of the world’s languages is wide enough to grant a
cross-linguistic interpretation. The 265 cases are taken as a sample of the world’s lan-
guages on the basis of which I will investigate what kind of oppositions are found in
which quantity in pronominal paradigms.
In practice, this investigation is carried out by making an inventory of the attested
combinations of the eight person categories, as developed in Part One. A maximally
explicit paradigm has oppositions between all eight referential categories, as shown in
Figure 5.1. Most paradigms do not mark all different categories by different mor-
phemes. These paradigms combine various categories into the referential properties of
one morpheme. In this chapter, I will show which combinations are found more often











addressee 2 2+3 second person plural
other 3 3+3 third person plural
Figure 5.1: Maximally explicit person marking
In this chapter, I will focus on three different kinds of combinations of the eight pro-
nominal categories, which will be called SINGULAR, VERTICAL and HORIZONTAL ho-
mophony. The three kinds of homophony are illustrated in Figure 5.2. This figure
only presents illustrative examples of the three kinds of homophony. There are many
more combinatorial possibilities for each kind of homophony. The term ‘homophony’
is only intended as a descriptive device to refer to certain kinds of combinations of
referential categories into one morpheme. I do not have any theoretical assumptions
as to which kind of homophony is ‘normal’ and which kind is ‘abnormal’. The quan-
titative analyses will show whether such a division between normal and abnormal is
justified, and if so, which kinds of homophony are more ‘normal’ than others. The
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three kinds of homophony are defined as follows. SINGULAR homophony is charac-
terised by the three singular categories (ie speaker, addressee and other) that are not
separated into three different morphemes. Reference to the three singular categories
can thus not be made explicit by only using these morphemes. The opposite situation
(ie the three singular categories are separated morphologically) is referred to as SPLIT
SINGULAR. Next, VERTICAL homophony is characterised by a second person plural
(2+3) and a third person plural (3+3) that are not separated from the first person com-
plex. There is vertical homophony when some kind of combination is found between
the categories 2+3 or 3+3 and any of the three categories 1+2, 1+2+3 or 1+3. The op-
posite situation (ie the categories 2+3 and 3+3 are both marked separately) is referred
to as SPLIT NON-SINGULAR. Finally, HORIZONTAL homophony is characterised by a














Figure 5.2: Different kinds of homophony in a pronominal paradigm
In various parts of this chapter, a person hierarchy is observed that governs the occur-
rence of the various forms of homophony. The – by now – traditional person hierar-
chy is shown in (5.1). This hierarchy will be slightly remodelled for the present pur-
pose.
(5.1) Person Hierarchy:
speaker > addressee > other
The concept of a person hierarchy is a much debated subject. Originally, the person
hierarchy was proposed as the upper part of an animacy hierarchy (Smith-Stark,
1974: 662-665; Silverstein, 1976: 122). Already in these two seminal papers, a differ-
ence in ranking of the persons in the hierarchy is found. Smith-Stark ranked speaker
above addressee, but Silverstein ranked addressee above speaker. Later authors
pointed out that there is no consistent ranking of speaker and addressee, either through
the world’s languages (Plank, 1985: 123-152; Comrie, 1989: 198) or through various
sub-domains of each language (Croft, 1990: 149). However, for the analysis of the
structure of pronominal paradigms, the traditional hierarchy still seems to work well
(Helmbrecht, 1999). I will interpret the person hierarchy as two nested hierarchies, as
shown in (5.2). The first part of the hierarchy ranks speaker and addressee above other
participants. The second part of the hierarchy internally distinguishes speaker as
ranked higher than addressee.
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(5.2) Person Hierarchy (two-stage version):
speaker, addressee > other
speaker > addressee
The first stage of this hierarchy is used to derive a person hierarchy for non-singular
reference, as shown below in (5.3). Categories that include reference to both speaker
and addressee rank above categories that include only reference to either speaker or
addressee. This, in turn, outranks categories that include reference to neither speaker
nor addressee.
(5.3) Person Hierarchy (non-singular version):
speaker AND addressee > speaker OR addressee > NEITHER speaker NOR addressee
Finally, this hierarchy is combined with the ranking of speaker above addressee to
form a complete person hierarchy, as shown in (5.4). This hierarchy turns out to gov-
ern the occurrence of various forms of homophony, as will be shown in this chapter.
The same hierarchy is also found to govern ‘dualworthiness’ (Plank & Schellinger,
2000).
(5.4) Person Hierarchy (complete version):
speaker AND addressee > speaker > addressee > NEITHER speaker NOR addressee
Equipped with this terminological and conceptual framework, the journey through the
data can begin. First, I will turn to the different forms of vertical homophony. There is
a large variety of this kind of homophony, but not all variants are equally ubiquitous
(section 5.3). Next, singular homophony will be discussed. A complete description of
the various forms of singular homophony has already been presented in chapter 2.
Here, I will only show that the occurrence of singular homophony is highly con-
strained by various other characteristics of the pronominal paradigm (section 5.4).
Then, the first large generalisation over the structural oppositions in pronominal para-
digms is presented: the Explicitness Hierarchy. This hierarchy brings together vertical
and singular homophony, together with the various marking patterns of the first per-
son complex (section 5.5). The occurrence of horizontal homophony shows a different
pattern, although its occurrence is also highly constrained. These constraints make up
the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy, which turns out to have interesting connec-
tions with the Explicitness Hierarchy (section 5.6). An important typological cut-off
point in these hierarchies is the presence of absence of an inclusive/exclusive opposi-
tion. The effect of this parameter will be presented in the form of a semantic map
(section 5.7) Both hierarchies are correlated with the morphological status of the pro-
nominal elements: the more explicit the marking, the larger the proportion of inde-
pendently marked paradigms (section 5.8). Finally, the main findings of this chapter
are brought together in a concluding section (section 5.9).
5.3 Vertical Homophony
5.3.1 Preamble
Vertical homophony is characterised by the fact that the categories 2+3 (‘second per-
son plural’) or 3+3 (‘third person plural’) are marked identically to any of the first
person complex categories, or identically to each other. Theoretically, many different
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kinds of vertical homophony are possible. If there is no vertical homophony (ie there
are two separate morphemes that mark for 2+3 and 3+3 and both morphemes do not
mark for any other non-singular category), then the paradigm is called ‘split’. A SPLIT
NON-SINGULAr paradigm is the opposite of a VERTICAL HOMOPHONOUS paradigm.
To exemplify this definition, two rather arbitrarily chosen examples of vertical ho-
mophony are presented below. First, the independent pronouns of the Slavey dialect
of Slave, an Athabascan language spoken in Canada, are presented in (5.5). In this
paradigm, the category 2+3 is identical to the unified first person complex, resulting
in a homophonous form naxi  that is used with the equivalent reference to the combi-








3 edi egedi 3+3
The second example of a vertical homophony is attested in the pronominal suffixes
from Shuswap, a Salish language from Canada. In this paradigm, the category 3+3 is
identical to the exclusive first person plural. The category 3+3 is also identical to the
singular category 3. This is a case of horizontal homophony, a subject that will be dis-





1 …-wn …-s 1+3
2 …-x  …-p 2+3
3 …-s 3+3
Among the 265 cases that form the sample for the present discussion, there are 55
cases with vertical homophony. These 55 cases are found among various paradigmatic
structures. However, amidst the variety, the 55 cases have some interesting corre-
spondences. None of these correspondences are universal characteristics; all generali-
sations that will follow in this section (and in subsequent sections) have exceptions.
Still, there are some strong statistical effects that can not be left unnoticed.
5.3.2 Some restrictions on vertical homophony
The first notable effect that has been found is between vertical homophony and the
inclusive/exclusive opposition. As can be seen in Table 5.1, there is a strong inverse
correlation between vertical homophony and the inclusive/exclusive opposition: if
there is a vertical homophony in the paradigm, then there is a strong preference not to
mark an inclusive/exclusive opposition. The distribution as presented in this table can
be summarised by an implication ‘vertical homophony  no inclusive/exclusive op-
position’.
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Inclusive/Exclusive
– +
– 103 107 210Vertical
Homophony + 41 14 55
144 121 265
Table 5.1: Implication ‘vertical homophony  no inclusive/exclusive opposition’
(Fisher’s exact p = .001, 	 = –.208)
Another notable correlation holds between vertical homophony and the morphological
status of the paradigm. As can be seen in Table 5.2, there is a strong correlation be-
tween the presence of a vertical homophony in the paradigm and the paradigm being
inflectionally marked. The distribution can be summarised by an implication ‘vertical
homophony  inflectionally marked’.
Inflectional
– +
– 105 105 210Vertical
Homophony + 12 43 55
117 148 265
Table 5.2: Implication ‘vertical homophony  inflectionally marked’
(Fisher’s exact p = .000, 	 = .230)
The numbers that were shown in the cells of the two previous tables are almost identi-
cal. In both tables, the cases without a vertical homophony are evenly distributed; the
cases with a vertical homophony are divided roughly in a ration of one to three. How-
ever, this correspondence between the two tables is purely due to chance. The two in-
tersecting dimensions, ‘inclusive/exclusive’ and ‘inflectional’, are differently distrib-
uted over the languages with a vertical homophony as opposed to the ones without. I
will discuss the relation between inflection and the inclusive/exclusive opposition first
for the cases with a vertical homophony; followed by the ones without a vertical ho-
mophony.
This distribution of the 55 cases WITH A VERTICAL HOMOPHONY over the two dimen-
sion ‘inflectional’ and ‘inclusive/exclusive’, as presented in Table 5.3 below, looks
like that Holy Grail of the typological textbooks: a tetrachoric table with one (almost)
empty cell (Croft, 1990: 47-49). This distribution of the 55 cases might suggest an im-
plication ‘inclusive/exclusive opposition  inflectional’. However, this is an unwar-
ranted inference. One of the cells in the table is indeed almost empty, but the expected
value for this cell is also very low. Only 25.4% of the 55 cases have an inclu-
sive/exclusive opposition, and only 21.8% of the 55 cases is not inflectional. This re-
sults in a chance of 5.5% (0.254 * 0.218 = 0.055) for the combination inclu-
sive/exclusive and no inflection. Computing 5.5% of the total of 55 cases results in an
expected frequency of three cases for this combination. The actually attested two
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cases (in the lower left cell of the table) are thus not a sign of an almost empty cell.
Two cases are roughly just as much as would be expected from the already intrinsi-
cally skewed distribution of the two parameters. The intersection of the two parame-
ters does not show any supplementary interaction between an inclusive/exclusive op-
position and inflectional marking (as can also be inferred from the far from significant
Fisher’s exact: p = .709).
Inflectional
– +
– 10 31 41 74.6%Inclusive/
Exclusive + 2 12 14 25.4%
12 43 55
21.8% 78.2%
Table 5.3: For the 55 cases with a vertical homophony, no correlation is attested
between inflectional marking and an inclusive/exclusive opposition
(Fisher’s exact p = .709, 	 = .107)
In contrast, for the 210 cases WITHOUT A VERTICAL HOMOPHONY, a (slight) correlation
is attested between inflectional marking and the absence of an inclusive/exclusive op-
position in the paradigm. At first glance, the distribution in Table 5.4 is not the kind
of distribution a typologist would find interesting, as all possible combinations of
features are attested in rather large numbers. Still, this distribution shows a significant
correlation between inflectional marking and the absence of an inclusive/exclusive
opposition. This correlation can intuitively be understood by noting the consistently
higher frequencies in the one diagonal as opposed to the other diagonal.1
Inflectional
– +
– 42 61 103Inclusive/
Exclusive + 63 44 107
105 105 210
Table 5.4: For all 210 cases without a vertical homophony, a (slight) inverse
correlation between inflectional marking and an inclusive/exclusive opposition is
attested (Fisher’s exact p = .013, 	 = –.181)
This (slight) inverse correlation between inflectional marking and an inclu-
sive/exclusive opposition is not strong enough to warrant any meaningful theoretical
                                                 
1 In the typological literature, a (near) zero cell in a tetrachoric table has been automatically interpreted
as an implicational universal (Croft, 1990: 47-49). However, contrary to this widespread kind of typo-
logical reasoning, nothing can be inferred from the distribution as shown in Table 5.3, even though
one of the cells is almost empty. In contrast, the distribution from Table 5.4 presents something note-
worthy, although all cells are filled with many examples. The observation of an (almost) empty cell in
a tetrachoric table is not enough to warrant an implication: the distribution of the other three cells has
also to be taken into account. This case shows that an empty cell in a tetrachoric table alone does not
suffice to argue for an implicational universal: a significant correlation is also necessary.
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consideration. It only hints at a deeper level of analysis that might lead to interesting
insights (see section 5.8 for an extensive discussion). For now, the main conclusion to
bear in mind is that the 55 cases with a vertical homophony behave rather differently
from the 210 cases without a vertical homophony. This difference can be captured by
two implications, repeated here in (5.7) and (5.8).
(5.7) vertical homophony  no inclusive/exclusive opposition
(5.8) vertical homophony  inflectional marking
These implications are to be read as summaries of the attested distributions, not as
universal characteristics of human language. The implications summarise the obser-
vation that vertical homophony is restricted by two parameters: inflectional marking
and the absence of an inclusive/exclusive opposition. Both these restrictions will be
used in subsequent sections to develop a theoretical framework to explain the struc-
ture of pronominal paradigms. Anticipating the complete framework, the implications
can roughly be explained by noting that vertical homophony is a relatively rare phe-
nomenon that will mainly occur on condition that the status of the addressee is not
consistently marked through the paradigm (viz there is no inclusive/exclusive opposi-
tion) and on condition that the salience of the paradigm for the language user is rela-
tively low (viz it is inflectionally marked). I will return at length to these explanations
in the following sections.
5.3.3 The internal structure of vertical homophony
In the rest of this section, I will scrutinise the structure of the 55 paradigms with a
vertical homophony. Different kinds of vertical homophony are attested and it is
highly instructive to take a closer look at the frequencies of the various kinds of ho-
mophonies. In general, the participants that are involved are an important basis on
which to explain why certain kinds of homophony occur more often than others. The
relevant parts of the person hierarchy (see section 5.2) are used to account for the dif-
ferences in frequency. A higher position in the person hierarchy generally leads to a
greater frequency. In this section, the 41 cases of a vertical homophony without an
inclusive/exclusive opposition will be discussed first. Following that, the 14 ‘excep-
tional’ cases of a vertical homophony with an inclusive/exclusive opposition are ex-
amined. In both cases, the person hierarchy will be of help explaining the attested
preferences.
Without an inclusive/exclusive opposition, the paradigm has maximally three differ-
ent non-singular morphemes: the ‘unified-we’ (ie 1+2, 1+2+3 and 1+3 combined), the
second person plural (ie 2+3) and the third person plural (ie 3+3). There are four theo-
retically possible kinds of vertical homophony with these three elements. These four
theoretical possibilities are presented in the first column of Table 5.5. All these four
theoretical possibilities are attested; the frequencies of each homophony is shown in
the second column. On the basis of these frequencies, roughly three different grades
can be distinguished. First, the most commonly found structure is separate marking of
3+3 opposed to a homophony of the other categories. Second, separate marking of
2+3 against the rest and separate marking of ‘unified’ first person complex against the
rest are equally frequent. Finally, a complete homophony of all non-singular catego-
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ries is least frequent. This frequency-effect is summarised in the hierarchy (5.9),
which mirrors part of the person hierarchy.
(5.9) speaker and addressee separate > speaker or addressee separate > none separate
This hierarchy correlates with inflectional marking. As was argued above, all para-
digms with a vertical homophony together show a strong tendency to be inflectionally
marked (see Table 5.2). Indeed, 75 percent of the 41 cases from Table 5.5 are inflec-
tionally marked. Relative to these general preferences, the stages in the hierarchy
(5.9) correlate with the number of inflectional paradigms. The higher in the hierarchy,
the lower the proportion of inflectional cases and vice versa. Explicit marking of
speaker and addressee (ie high in the hierarchy) shows a preference for independent
marking. Less explicit marking (ie lower in the hierarchy) has a preference for inflec-
tional marking. This correlation between explicitness of the paradigm and morpho-












1+2/3, 2+3, 3+3 6 0 6 100%
Total 41 10 31 75.6%
Table 5.5: Kinds of vertical homophony without inclusive/exclusive opposition
In contrast to these 41 cases, there are 14 other cases that show a vertical homophony
alongside an opposition between the inclusive and the exclusive. These 14 cases are
the exceptional cases to the implication ‘vertical homophony   no inclu-
sive/exclusive opposition’. Most of these 14 cases mark the categories 1+2 and 1+2+3
together (ie inclusive) against 1+3 (ie exclusive). Five different kinds of homophony
are attested. They are presented in the first column of Table 5.6. There is one case,
attested in the Papuan language Kunimaipa, where the category 1+2+3 is marked
identical to 1+3 and 2+3, but different from 1+2. This exceptional structure is added
at the bottom of Table 5.6. Two kinds of homophony occur clearly more often than
the others. The first of these is a homophony between the inclusive and the category
2+3. This cluster of categories can be called the ‘second person complex’ (the com-
plement to the ‘first person complex’). This second person complex is the combina-
tion of all non-singular categories that include at least the addressee (ie 1+2, 1+2+3
and 2+3). The other relatively common homophony is the precise opposite of this
‘second person complex’: the ‘non-second person complex’. This homophony com-
bines the exclusive with the third person plural. This cluster includes all non-singular
categories that do not include the addressee (ie 1+3 and 3+3). The special status of
these two kinds of homophony can be elucidated by referring to the second part of the
person hierarchy as described in (5.1) above: speaker > addressee. The speaker has in
general greater salience than the addressee. The two relatively common kinds of ver-
tical homophony are both centred around the category ‘addressee’. If the more salient
category ‘speaker’ would be taken as the centre, this results in the ‘first person com-
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plex. This cluster of categories was taken as the starting point for the classification
because it is a characteristic of the large majority of the pronominal paradigms. The
relative salience of speaker > addressee is reflected by the much larger number of
cases that mark the first person complex by one morpheme (ie all languages that have
‘unified we’) when compared to the few cases that mark the second person complex
by one morpheme (ie the five cases noted in the table below). In this sense, the few
cases that are marked around the second person are really exceptional cases from a
cross-linguistic point of view. Finally, it is tempting to draw conclusions from the fact
that the only two independently marked paradigms are found among the relatively
more ‘regular’ kinds of homophony. However, the total number of examples is much
too low to conclude anything from the distribution of these two cases. The only thing
to note is that, across the board, these 14 ‘exceptional’ cases are almost exclusively








inclusive and 2+3 5
exclusive and 3+3 4
2 7 77.8%
inclusive and 3+3 2
exclusive and 2+3 1
2+3 and 3+3 1
1+2+3, 1+3 and 2+3 1
0 5 100%
Total 14 2 12 85.7%
Table 5.6: Kinds of vertical homophony with inclusive/exclusive opposition
5.3.4 Summary
Vertical homophony is not a widely acknowledged possibility for pronominal para-
digms. It is not a very widespread property, but it is definitively a possibility for hu-
man language (55 cases in the total set of 265, which is 20.8%). In this section, the
structural characteristics of such paradigms were scrutinised. Two structural con-
straints were noted on the occurrence of vertical homophony. First, vertical homoph-
ony mainly occurs in paradigms that do no have an opposition between inclusive and
exclusive in the first person plural. Second, there is a strong tendency for paradigms
with a vertical homophony to be inflectionally marked. Next, the internal structure of
the different kinds of vertical homophony was discussed. Different parts of the person
hierarchy were used to explain the relative frequency of the various forms of vertical
homophony. Without an opposition between inclusive and exclusive in the first per-
son plural, the following hierarchy was established:
(5.10) speaker and addressee separate > speaker or addressee separate > none separate
                                                 
2 The vertical homophony between inclusive and third person plural is not a common strucure, only
attested in two cases in the present sample. Yet, Rodrigues (1990) argues forcefully that in the (ex-
tinct) language Tupinambá a parallell is made between ‘You and I’ (ie the inclusive) and ‘Neither You
nor I’ (ie the third person plural). Cross-linguistically, this might be an uncommon strategy, but for a
particular language it can be completely normal and logical to categorise the world in this way.
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When an opposition between inclusive and exclusive is present in the paradigm, the
situation is quite different. There seems to be a preference for either the combination
of all addressee-based categories into one morpheme, or the combination of all non-
addressee-based categories into one morpheme. Finally, it has been observed that
paradigms that mark less explicitly the difference between the three basic categories
‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and ‘other’ in the non-singular, are more often found to be in-
flectional paradigms. This observation will be elaborated on in section 5.8.
5.4 Singular Homophony
5.4.1 Preamble
Singular homophony is characterised by the fact that the three singular categories
(‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and ‘other’) are only marked by two different morphemes.
Two of the three categories are morphologically homophonous. These two function
together in paradigmatic opposition to the third category. An example of this phe-
nomenon is presented in (5.11). These suffixes are the Standard Dutch present tense
suffixes (without inversion). The categories ‘addressee’ and ‘other’ are marked iden-
tical with a suffix …-t. This is an example of a singular homophony. In contrast, when











The occurrence of a singular homophony is highly constrained. It occurs only in 25 of
the 265 cases in the present sample. This amount is probably even higher than it
would be in a balanced sample of the world’s languages, as I have included every at-
tested case with a singular homophony, but left out cases of more widespread para-
digmatic structures. However, by including all cases of singular homophony, the
number of examples of this exotic phenomenon is raised to a level that allows for a
structural analysis.
5.4.2 Some restrictions on singular homophony
Generally, singular homophony is not a preferred structure for a pronominal para-
digm. Three different structural constraints on the occurrence of singular homophony
will be discussed in this section. First, singular homophony does not occur when there
is an inclusive/exclusive distinction; second, it mainly occurs together with a vertical
homophony and, finally, it occurs only in inflectional paradigms. As will be argued,
these three constraints all lessen the importance of a clearly marked opposition be-
tween the participants, opening up to the extreme case of not distinguishing formally
between these three singular categories in the paradigmatic structure.
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The first observation is that singular homophony is only found with ‘unified-we’ or
with ‘no-we’ paradigms. Singular homophony is unheard of when an inclu-
sive/exclusive distinction is attested in the paradigm. The frequencies of the possible
combinations are presented in Table 5.7. The distribution of singular homophony can
be captured by the implication ‘singular homophony  no inclusive/exclusive oppo-
sition’. Singular homophony is blocked by an inclusive/exclusive opposition. Or for-
mulated in reverse: singular homophony is made possible by the absence of such an
opposition. An explanation can be found in the nature of the inclusive/exclusive op-
position. Such an opposition overtly marks the difference between the combination
speaker-addressee and speaker-other. Only if this distinction is neutralised, is it possi-
ble to conflate singular categories (this insight will be further investigated in section
5.7). It is still not clearly preferred, as only 25 out of 144 cases (17.4%) without an
inclusive/exclusive distinction show a singular homophony.
Inclusive/Exclusive
– +
– 119 121 240Singular
Homophony + 25 0 25
144 121 265
Table 5.7: Implication ‘singular homophony  no inclusive/exclusive opposition’
(Fisher’s exact p = .000, 	 = –.296)
Next, the structure of the non-singular marking is an important factor for the occur-
rence of singular homophony. In Table 5.8, the occurrence of vertical homophony is
crossed with the occurrence of singular homophony. It turns out that singular ho-
mophony is most commonly found when there is also a vertical homophony in the
non-singular. The distribution reveals a strong implication ‘singular homophony 
vertical homophony’. The explanation for this implication is similar to the one given
for the previous restriction. If a vertical homophony is present in the paradigm, this
means that the categories 2+3 and 3+3 are homophonous with the first person com-
plex or with each other. In such paradigms, the distinction between the three persons
is already neutralised to a large extent in the non-singular, opening up the possibility
for a singular homophony. In a paradigm with a vertical homophony, the reference to
participants is already mixed up to a great extend, up to the point where it becomes




– 206 34 240Singular
Homophony + 4 21 25
210 55 265
Table 5.8: Implication ‘singular homophony  vertical homophony’
(Fisher’s exact p = .000, 	 = .503)
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Finally, the morphological status of the paradigm is an important factor for the occur-
rence of singular homophony. Singular homophony is only attested in inflectional
paradigms. This constraint that was already noted in section 2.4.5 and is quantified
here in Table 5.9. The distribution of the 265 cases reveals a strong implication ‘sin-
gular homophony  inflectional marking’. This constraint can be explained by noting
that an opposition that is marked by an inflectional morpheme is cognitively less sali-
ent. Of course, inflectional marking has a meaning/function, but it is normally not in-
tuitively clear to the language user (and often neither to the linguist) what is the pre-
cise communicational value of an inflectional morpheme. In independent pronouns,
the situation is radically different. Independent pronouns are complete words, and
words have a great salience to the users of the language. The three categories
‘speaker’, ‘addressee’ and ‘other’ are not to be intermingled in this case. In contrast,
in inflectional marking, the possibility exists for a neutralisation of the overt three-




– 117 123 240Singular
Homophony + 0 25 25
117 148 265
Table 5.9: Implication ‘singular homophony  inflectional marking’
(Fisher’s exact p = .000, 	 = .287)
5.4.3 Summary
Singular homophony is a rather unusual phenomenon, although not unheard of in hu-
man language. The examples attested are widely dispersed over the world’s lan-
guages; they are clearly not areally or genetically conditioned incidents (see chapter
2). Structurally, singular homophony is a highly constrained phenomenon. It mainly
occurs when no inclusive/exclusive opposition is present in the paradigm, when there
is a vertical homophony in the non-singular and when the paradigm is inflectional. All
these constraints open up the possibility for singular homophony, because they cause
the paradigm to be less explicitly in the marking of PERSON. The dimension of explic-
itness of a pronominal paradigm will be further developed in the next sections.
5.5 Explicitness Hierarchy
5.5.1 Preamble
The occurrences of vertical homophony and singular homophony are highly corre-
lated, as was shown in the preceding sections. There is even a strong implication be-
tween the two: singular homophony  vertical homophony. In fact, this implication is
part of a larger hierarchy, which I will call the EXPLICITNESS HIERARCHY. The Ex-
plicitness Hierarchy will be formulated as a series of four different kinds of opposi-
tions that can be marked in a pronominal paradigm. Such an opposition will be called
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a SPLIT. The definitions of the four different kinds of split that are used in the hierar-
chy are the following:
Split inclusive: there is a special morpheme for the minimal inclusive (ie the
category 1+2), differently marked from the augmented inclu-
sive (ie the category 1+2+3);
Split ‘we’: there are two different forms for ‘we’: a difference is marked
between the inclusive (ie the categories 1+2 and 1+2+3 com-
bined) and the exclusive (ie the category 1+3);
Split non-singular: there is no vertical homophony, ie the categories 2+3 and 3+3
are marked separately from the first person complex and from
each other;
Split singular: there is no singular homophony, ie the three singular catego-
ries 1, 2 and 3 are marked separately.
These four kinds of split are all different ways to discriminate categories of person.
Starting with the last, a SPLIT SINGULAR means that all three singular persons are
marked differently from each other. This is the most basic discrimination of person.
The other three kinds of split are different kinds of person discrimination in the non-
singular. A SPLIT NON-SINGULAR is, in a way, the mirror-image of a split singular. The
‘plural’ forms of the three singular persons have to be discriminated to be split non-
singular. Then there are first two kinds of split, both referring to the first person com-
plex. The first person complex can be split into an inclusive and an exclusive part
(SPLIT ‘WE’), and the inclusive part can be split into a minimal and an augmented in-
clusive (SPLIT INCLUSIVE). A paradigm that has all of these four kinds of splits is
maximally explicit as to the marking of the different possible categories of person. A
paradigm without any of these splits is minimally explicit in marking person.
5.5.2 The building blocks of the hierarchy
The different kinds of split are correlated with each other in various ways. Many cor-
relations have already been discussed in different places in the present work. A selec-
tion of these correlations will be repeated in this section. They will be slightly refor-
mulated to show that the different kinds of split form a hierarchy.
The first correlation to be repeated here was formulated above in section 3.7. There it
was argued on qualitative grounds that a paradigm with a split inclusive always has
also an exclusive counterpart. This finding is reformulated in (5.12) as an implication.
A split inclusive can only occur if there is also a split ‘we’.
(5.12) Split inclusive  Split ‘we’
This implication can now also be shown to hold quantitatively in the sample of 265
paradigms. The distribution of the different kinds of split over the different 265 para-
digms is presented in Table 5.10. The implication is substantiated by the distribution
as shown in this table. The four cases with a split inclusive but without a split ‘we’ are
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– 144 4 148
Split ‘we’
+ 90 27 117
234 31 265
Table 5.10: Implication ‘split inclusive  split inclusive/exclusive’
(Fisher’s exact p = .000, 	 = .315)
The second correlation to be repeated here is a reformulation of the implication ‘verti-
cal homophony  no inclusive/exclusive opposition’ that was first formulated in sec-
tion 5.3.2. In the terminology as proposed at the start of this section, the absence of an
inclusive/exclusive opposition is the equivalent to showing no split ‘we’. A vertical
homophony is the same as ‘no split non-singular’. The implication, after it has thus
been reformulated, is shown in (5.13). Reversing the direction of the implication re-
moves the negations, resulting in the implication (5.14). For completeness, the distri-
bution as discussed in section 5.3.2 is repeated in Table 5.11 with the new terminol-
ogy for the two intersecting dimensions.
(5.13) No Split non-singular  No Split ‘we’
(5.14) Split ‘we’  Split non-singular
Split ‘we’
– +
– 41 14 55Split Non-
Singular + 103 107 210
144 121 265
Table 5.11: Implication ‘split we  split non-singular’
(Fisher’s exact p = .001, 	 = .208)
The last correlation to be repeated here is a reformulation of the implication ‘singular
homophony  vertical homophony’ that was first formulated in section 5.4.2. Just as
in the previous reformulation, vertical homophony is replaced by ‘no split non-
singular’. The other part of the implication, singular homophony, is replaced by ‘no
split singular’. The implication, after it has thus been reformulated, is shown in (5.15).
Reversing the direction of the implication removes the negations, resulting in the im-
plication (5.16). For completeness, the distribution as discussed in section 5.4.2 is re-
peated in Table 5.12 with the new terminology for the two intersecting dimensions.
                                                 
3 These four cases are taken together with the 117 cases of split ‘we’ in all other counts that follow.
This is not completely along the lines of the definitions presented, but is seems even less appropriate
to classify the four exceptional cases with the 144 cases that have no inclusive/exclusive opposition
whatsoever.
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(5.15) No Split singular  No Split non-singular
(5.16) Split non-singular  Split singular
Split Non-Singular
– +
– 21 4 25Split
Singular + 34 206 240
55 210 265
Table 5.12: Implication ‘split non-singular  split singular’
(Fisher’s exact p = .000, 	 = .503)
5.5.3 The hierarchy
The three implications (5.12), (5.14) and (5.16) form a hierarchy, as shown by the
frequencies in Table 5.13. The five most frequent types, labelled as ‘common’, ac-
count for 92.1% of the 265 paradigms. The types that are part of the hierarchy are
clearly more common than the other attested possibilities. This hierarchy is called the
EXPLICITNESS HIERARCHY because it reflects the order in which different forms of
split are expected to occur in a pronominal paradigm: the more referential categories
are split (ie marked by different morphemes), the more explicit a paradigms marks
referential categories. The most explicit paradigms are the ones that mark all four
kinds of split (left on the hierarchy); the least explicit paradigms are the ones that do
not adhere to any of the four kinds of split (right on the hierarchy).
common semi-common rare
Split inclusive + – – – – + – – + + + + + + – –
Split ‘we’ + + – – – – + – + + – + – – + +
Split non-singular + + + – – + – + + – + – + – + –
Split singular + + + + – + + – – + + – – + – –
Number of cases 26 78 99 20 21 3 12 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
244 (92.1%) 21 (7.9%)
Table 5.13: The Explicitness Hierarchy
There are five stages in the Explicitness Hierarchy. Note that each stage in the hierar-
chy does not just stand for one single paradigmatic structure, but that various kinds of
paradigms are subsumed in each stage. Selected examples of each stage are presented
in Figure 5.3. A few kinds of variation are glossed over in this presentation. First, for
all five stages, there are also paradigms with different kinds of horizontal homophony,
not shown here (see section 5.6). Second, for stages 4 and 5, there are also other kinds
of vertical homophony possible (see section 5.3.3). Finally, for stage 5, there are also
other kinds of singular homophony possible (see chapter 2). Notwithstanding this di-
versity, the examples presented in Figure 5.3 present a clear illustration of the ration-
ale behind the hierarchy.
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1: 2: 3: 4: 5:
> > > >
Figure 5.3: Selected examples of the five stages of the Explicitness Hierarchy
The Explicitness Hierarchy starts out with a completely differentiated set of 8 pro-
nominal elements (stage 1). Then more and more non-singular categories are com-
bined into morphemes that are less explicitly marking the referential categories
(stages 2, 3 and 4). Only at the very end of the spectrum, it is possible for the singular
categories not to be distinguished completely. This comprises the following hierarchy:
(5.17) Explicitness Hierarchy (rough outline)
totally explicit > less explicit non-singular > less explicit singular.
The middle part of this hierarchy (‘less explicit non-singular’) consists of three differ-
ent stages; the stages 2, 3 and 4 from Figure 5.3 above. The difference between these
three stages is governed by the PERSON HIERARCHY. This can be inferred from the
verbal description of the five stages Explicitness Hierarchy as presented below.
(5.18) Explicitness Hierarchy (complete)
1) all categories are different;
2) all non-singular categories that include SPEAKER AND ADDRESSEE are
marked together;
3) all non-singular categories that include AT LEAST THE SPEAKER are
marked together;
4) different non-singular categories that include THE SPEAKER OR THE
ADDRESSEE are marked together;4
5) some singular categories are marked together on top of that.
The middle part of this hierarchy is based on a special form of the person hierarchy,
applied to non-singular categories (see also section 5.2):
(5.19) Person Hierarchy (non-singular)
speaker and addressee > at least speaker > speaker or addressee
Looking back at the frequencies of the different types from the Explicitness Hierarchy
in Table 5.13, it is clear that relative to each other the five major types are not equally
common. The preference for the mid-types in the hierarchy is strengthened by the
predominance of horizontal homophony in these types (see especially section 5.6.3).
Among the other attested types (the ones not observing the Explicitness Hierarchy in
                                                 
4 This description of stage 4 subsumes many different kinds of paradigms. To be precise, the list should
be expanded with all the possibilities of vertical homophony that were discussed in section 5.3.3.
These are the following (in order of descending frequency): A: all categories which INCLUDE AT LEAST
THE SPEAKER OR THE ADDRESSEE are marked together (ie 1+2, 1+2+3, 1+3 and 2+3); B: all categories
which DO NOT INCLUDE THE SPEAKER are marked together (ie 2+3 and 3+3); C: all categories which
DO NOT MARK THE ADDRESSEE WITHOUT SPEAKER are marked together (ie 1+2, 1+2+3, 1+3 and 3+3);
D: ALL NON-SINGULAR CATEGORIES are marked together (ie 1+2, 1+2+3, 1+3, 2+3 and 3+3).
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Table 5.13), it is not complete randomness that rules. Three types are attested in more
than one case. These are designated as ‘semi-common’ in Table 5.13. These three
‘semi-common’ types also follow the Explicitness Hierarchy, although in a slightly
deformed way. If the hierarchy is seen as an ordered sequence of choices, then these
three types are the result of a single premature decision. Reading the Explicitness Hi-
erarchy from left to right, the first choice is whether to split the inclusive or not. The
26 cases in the first column decide ‘yes’: the inclusive is split into two different mor-
phemes. As a result, all other decisions down the hierarchy are also fixed. The Ex-
plicitness Hierarchy predicts that only if the answer is ‘no’, a further choice comes
into the picture. In this way, the choices are linked through the hierarchy. However,
the ‘semi-common’ types show that it is possible (though strongly discouraged) to go
one choice down the hierarchy if the decision on a choice is ‘yes’. These three types
follow the Explicitness Hierarchy, but after the first ‘yes’, there follows one ‘no’, only
to be continued with other ‘yes’-decisions. The Explicitness Hierarchy allows for a
little tinkering, but only at the boundary of the hierarchy. Just as with the real Explic-
itness Hierarchy, a preference for the mid-type is attested in this deformed hierarchy.
The type halfway through the deformed hierarchy is clearly more common than the
other two. This frequency difference is probably an effect of the frequency variation
of the Explicitness Hierarchy. The more frequent types from the Explicitness Hierar-
chy also give rise to more frequent deviations from the hierarchy.
5.5.4 Summary
In the first sections of this chapter, vertical and singular homophony were found to be
typologically related to each other. On this basis, it has been shown here that these
kinds of homophony are also related to the different possible structures of the first
person complex. Together these characteristics of a pronominal paradigm form the
Explicitness Hierarchy. The basic claim of this hierarchy is that paradigms first re-
duce explicitness in the non-singular before the explicitness of the singular is reduced.
(5.20) Explicitness Hierarchy (rough outline)
totally explicit > less explicit non-singular > less explicit singular
The middle part of this hierarchy can be even more strictly formulated. Exactly which
explicitness is lost in the non-singular is also highly constrained by the Explicitness
Hierarchy. First all categories that include both speaker and addressee are combined
into one morpheme. Next, all categories that include at least the speaker are all taken
together. Finally, different possible categories that include either speaker or addressee
are combined:
(5.21) Explicitness Hierarchy (middle part)
speaker and addressee > at least speaker > speaker or addressee
The different stages of the Explicitness Hierarchy are not concerned with horizontal
homophony. Indeed, horizontal homophony is found throughout the various stages of
the Explicitness Hierarchy. In the next section, the structure of horizontal homophony
is scrutinised.
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5.6 Horizontal Homophony
5.6.1 Preamble
Horizontal homophony is characterised by the fact that a paradigm shows an overlap
between singular and non-singular categories. One morpheme in the pronominal
paradigm is used to mark for both a singular referent and a non-singular referential








3 he/she/it they 3+3
The name ‘horizontal’ homophony is obviously chosen because these morphemes are
graphically represented by a horizontal bar in the diagram. However, the definition of
a horizontal homophony allows for more variation. An aberrant case of horizontal
homophony is, for example, found in the German inflectional suffix …-t, presented in
(5.23). In this case, there is no horizontal bar in the diagram, but a diagonal connec-
tion between the third person singular and the second person plural. Such cases of ‘di-
agonal’ homophony are considered to be a subset of horizontal homophony. Diagonal





2 …-st …-t 2+3
3 …-t …-en 3+3
It is possible for a horizontal homophony to co-occur with a vertical homophony.
Such a case is, for example, found in Huave, as shown in (5.24). I have interpreted
such cases as a combination of a horizontal homophony (between 3 and 3+3) and a








5.6.2 A hierarchy of horizontal homophony
There are four different kinds of horizontal homophony. The first person singular can
be homophonous with the inclusive (1+2 and 1+2+3 combined) or with the exclusive
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(1+3), or of course with both.5 These two kinds of homophony will be represented by
the notation ‘1Inclusive’ and ‘1Exclusive’ respectively. Next, the second person
singular can be homophonous with the second person plural (glossed as 22+3) and
the third person singular can be homophonous with the third person plural (glossed as
33+3). Other combinations of singular and non-singular categories are called ‘di-
agonal’. The various combinations of horizontal homophony that are found in the
sample are presented in Table 5.14. There are five combinations that are clearly more
frequent than the others (shown on the left of the table). Diagonal cases are rather
scarce.
1  Inclusive – – – – + – – + + + – – + + + +
1  Exclusive – – – + + – + + + + + + – – – –
2  2+3 – – + + + + + + – – – – – – + +
3  3+3 – + + + + – – – + – + – + – + –
diagonal
136 38 22 18 23 6 3 2 4 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 7Number of
cases 237 (89.5%) 21 (7.9%) (2.6%)
Table 5.14: The Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
The five most frequent combinations of horizontal homophony form a hierarchy. This
hierarchy, presented in (5.25), shows in which order the non-singular categories are
marked by horizontal homophony (the brackets are only added for typographic clar-
ity). This hierarchy exactly follows the person hierarchy as presented in section 5.2.6
(5.25) Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
No Homophony < (33+3) < (22+3) < (1Exclusive) < (1Inclusive)
The five types that form the hierarchy are not all equally frequent. No horizontal ho-
mophony at all is clearly more common than the other options (136 cases). The next
stage of the hierarchy, a homophony 33+3, is also more common than the other
three stages (38 cases). The remaining three combinations are all roughly equally fre-
quent (22, 18 and 23 cases). This frequency effect follows the leftmost part of the
Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy. The resulting frequency-hierarchy can be formu-
lated as follows (the most frequent side is less marked):
(5.26) Frequency of Horizontal Homophony
no homophony < speaker NOR addressee involved < speaker OR addressee involved
                                                 
5 There is only one case in the sample (the perfective suffixes from the Papuan language Kunimaipa,
see page 89) that shows a horizontal homophony involving only the category 1+2 only. In all other
cases, the two inclusive categories 1+2 and 1+2+3 are given the same treatment as far as horizontal
homophony is concerned. For this section, I have classified the exceptional case of Kunimaipa to-
gether with the other ‘combined’ inclusive cases.
6 Hierarchies closely resembling the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy were proposed by Forchheimer
(1953: 12) and Croft (1990: 149). There is an indirect link between these two claims, as Croft based his
claim on the data from Ingram (1978) and Ingram’s work was based completely on the data from
Forchheimer. In between these two, Ingram completely missed this hierarchy, because he only based
his analyses on the four major paradigmatic structures that he identified amidst the wide variety of
structures discussed by Forchheimer.
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The other combinations of horizontal homophony are not distributed randomly. The
most frequent cases still follow the upper part of the Horizontal Homophony Hierar-
chy, but mess up on the lower part. As can be seen in Table 5.14, the relatively most
frequent combinations only miss the homophony 33+3 (total 11 cases). The next
two cases do not follow the hierarchy in both 33+3 and 22+3 (total 6 cases).
These cases are again less frequent.
5.6.3 Horizontal homophony and the Explicitness Hierarchy
It is very well possible for horizontal homophony to occur in different stages of the
Explicitness Hierarchy. However, there are strong typological constraints on the oc-
currence of horizontal homophony. The Explicitness Hierarchy is crossed with the
Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy in Table 5.15. The combinations that are most fre-
quent are printed in boldface. As can be seen, the amount of horizontal homophony is
highest in the middle of the Explicitness Hierarchy; at both ends of the Explicitness
Hierarchy the fraction of horizontal homophony is almost absent. The two middle
stages in the Explicitness Hierarchy account from more than 75% of the occurrences
of horizontal homophony.7
Explicitness Hierarchy
+ – – – –
+ + – – –
+ + + – –
+ + + + –
others
none 24 38 38 14 14 8
33+3 1 14 19 0 1 3
22+3 0 8 10 0 1 3
1Excl 0 15 3






others 1 3 12 6 2 4
Table 5.15: Correlation between the Explicitness Hierarchy and the Horizontal
Homophony Hierarchy. Horizontal homophony is most commonly found in the
middle range of the Explicitness Hierarchy (
2 = 51.78; DF = 20; p < .0001).8
This curious distribution can be summarised in two strong constraints. First, para-
digms with vertical and/or singular homophony disfavour horizontal homophony.
Second, paradigms with a division between minimal and augmented inclusive disfa-
vour horizontal homophony. The first of these constraints can be inferred from the
lower right part of the table. The two rightmost columns of the Explicitness hierarchy
represent the paradigms with a vertical and/or singular homophony. These columns
                                                 
7 Three boxes in the table are bigger than the others, since for the lower part of the Explicitness Hierar-
chy the opposition between inclusive and exclusive is not relevant.
8 For the calculation of the chi-square, the 1exclusive and 1inclusive rows are combined into one
row. Note that the cases that do not follow either of the two hierarchies have roughly chance distribu-
tion.
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hardly show any horizontal homophony. It seems as if a pronominal paradigm has to
choose from a certain point onward in which way to reduce the explicitness of mark-
ing. The paradigm may have horizontal homophony, but then it can not also have ver-
tical and/or singular homophony, and vice versa. The combinations of both kinds of
homophony in a paradigm is strongly disfavoured. The second constraint is that a di-
vision between minimal and augmented inclusive disfavours horizontal homophony.
This can be inferred from the lower left part of the table. The leftmost column of the
Explicitness Hierarchy represents the paradigms that are completely explicit in the
marking of the non-singular categories. The principal characteristic of these para-
digms is the opposition between the minimal inclusive (1+2) and the augmented in-
clusive (1+2+3). These paradigms hardly show any horizontal homophony. This con-
straint can be explained by considering the difference between the minimal and the
augmented inclusive as the ultimate addition for a pronominal paradigm. This opposi-
tion is only found in paradigms that distinguish all other referential categories as well.
The curious form of this correlation between the Explicitness Hierarchy and the Hori-
zontal Homophony Hierarchy will be used as a hypothesis to describe the diachronic
dynamics of pronominal paradigms. The attested changes of paradigmatic structure
will roughly follow the lines of the interrelated hierarchies as sketched in this section.
This theme will be extensively dealt with in the next chapter.
5.6.4 Summary
Horizontal homophony is characterised by the fact that a morpheme is used for both
singular and non-singular referential categories The occurrence of horizontal ho-
mophony in a pronominal paradigm is highly constrained. Of all the theoretically pos-
sible combinations of the singular and the non-singular categories, only 4 are attested
with relative frequency. These four are the combinations (1Inclusive),
(1Exclusive), (22+3) and (33+3). These four are most of the time attested in
combinations following the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy. This hierarchy paral-
lels the person hierarchy.
(5.27) Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
No Homophony < (33+3) < (22+3) < (1Exclusive) < (1Inclusive)
This hierarchy describes the kind of horizontal homophony that is found in roughly
90% of the paradigms in the current sample. The hierarchy also governs two fre-
quency effects. First, the paradigms that are described by the left side of the hierarchy
are the most frequent. Second, the majority of the remaining 10% that does not follow
this hierarchy, behaves differently on the left side of the hierarchy. In other words, the
more to the right, the fewer the exceptions. Finally, the Horizontal Homophony Hier-
archy turns out to correlate in a peculiar way with the Explicitness Hierarchy. Two
constraints were formulated. First, paradigms with vertical and/or singular homoph-
ony disfavour horizontal homophony. This can be explained by noting that both verti-
cal and horizontal homophony lessen the explicitness of a pronominal paradigm.
Seemingly, these two ways to reduce complexity are preferably not combined. Sec-
ond, paradigms with a division between minimal and augmented inclusive disfavour
horizontal homophony. This constraint can be explained by noting that the mini-
mal/augmented opposition is the last opposition to be included in a pronominal para-
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digm. Only after all the other (seven) person categories are distinguished morphologi-
cally, this opposition can be added to the others.
5.7 Building a semantic map
A semantic map is a special method to summarise the attested patterns in a typologi-
cal study (Anderson, 1982; Haspelmath, 1997: 59-63; Stassen, 1997: 577-610). In a
semantic map, meanings which are similar are depicted close to each other so as to
convey an impression of the internal structure of a semantic field.
‘We can determine “similarity” of meaning typologically. If two particular meanings
are often expressed by the same surface form (across a random sample of languages),
then we can assume that the two meanings are “similar” to the human mind. … From
“similarities” it is a short step to maps of grammar/meaning space. We arrange differ-
ent meanings on a map so that “similar” meanings are close together, non-similar
meanings farther apart.’ (Anderson, 1982: 227-228)
For the present case, it turns out that it is most helpful to draw two different semantic
maps. The similarity between the various categories of pronominal reference changes
drastically once there is an opposition between inclusive and exclusive ‘we’ in the
paradigm. If there is no inclusive/exclusive opposition, many different kinds of ho-
mophony are attested. Under this condition, the semantic map is a closely knit web of
categories. However, once an inclusive/exclusive opposition is present in the para-
digm, the possibilities for homophony are strongly restricted. Accordingly, the
matching semantic map looks rather different.
First, the various kinds of homophony are counted in the subset of 144 paradigms
WITHOUT an inclusive/exclusive opposition. The results are presented in Table 5.16.
Each number in the table refers to the number of times a particular homophony is at-
tested among the 144 paradigms. A particular paradigm can have more than one ho-
mophony, so each number in the table has to be interpreted relative to the total of 144
cases. For example, there are eight cases of a speaker-addressee homophony among
the 144 paradigms in the sample. These eight cases are 5.6% of the total of 144 para-
digms. A first impression from this table is that almost all possible kinds of homoph-
ony are attested and that many kinds of homophony occur in ample quantity.
2 3 1+2(+3), 1+3 2+3 3+3
1 8 (5.6%) 9 (6.3%) 31 (21.5%) 1 (0.7%) –
2 8 (5.6%) 4 (2.8%) 42 (29.2%) –
3 – 2 (1.4%) 58 (40.3%)
1+2(+3), 1+3 22 (15.3%) 16 (11.1%)
2+3 15 (10.4%)
Table 5.16: Occurrence of homophony among the 144 paradigms WITHOUT an
inclusive/exclusive opposition (the percentages are the proportion
relative to the total number of 144 cases)
The kinds of homophony that occur in more than one case are depicted Figure 5.4.
This figure takes the form of a semantic map. Categories that are frequently found to
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be marked homophonous are shown near each other. Roughly, the farther apart the
categories in the figure, the less likely they are to be homophonous. The lines that
connect the categories in the figure represent the percentage of cases for each par-
ticular homophony. The thickness of the lines is proportional to this percentage. The
semantic map is drawn as two concentric circles. The outer circle consists of the sin-
gular categories, which are incidentally homophonous (singular homophony). All
combinations in the outer circle are equally frequent. The inner circle is formed by the
non-singular categories. Homophony between these categories (vertical homophony)
is clearly more frequent than homophony between the categories in the outer circle. In
the inner circle, the homophony between ‘we’ and ‘you-all’ is slightly more frequent
than the others. Most frequent are the connections between the inner and the outer cir-
cle (horizontal homophony). The frequency rises with the Person Hierarchy 1 < 2 < 3.
Finally, there are a few incidental cases that cross through the cognitive map (diago-
nal homophony).
Figure 5.4: Semantic map of paradigms WITHOUT an inclusive/exclusive opposition
(the percentages indicate the proportion of each kind of homophony relative to
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Next, I turn to the subset of 121 paradigms WITH an opposition between inclusive and
exclusive. These paradigms behave rather differently from the previous set as far as
homophony is concerned. They show much less vertical homophony and no singular
homophony. In contrast, horizontal homophony is common. The occurrence of the
various kinds of homophony in these paradigms is shown in Table 5.17. The percent-
ages for each kind of homophony indicate the proportion of occurrence relative to the
121 paradigms with an inclusive/exclusive opposition.
2 3 1+2(+3) 1+3 2+3 3+3
1 – – 1 (0.8%) 23 (19.0%) – –
2 – – – 31 (25.6%) –
3 – – – 47 (38.8%)
1+2(+3) 5 (4.1%) 1 (0.8%)
1+3 1 (0.8%) 4 (3.3%)
2+3 1 (0.8%)
Table 5.17: Occurrence of homophony among the 121 paradigms WITH an
 inclusive/exclusive opposition (the percentages are the proportion
relative to the total number of 121 cases)
Figure 5.5: Semantic map of paradigms WITH an inclusive/exclusive opposition
(the percentages indicate the proportion of each kind of homophony relative to
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The kinds of homophony that occur in more than one case are shown in Figure 5.5.
This semantic map looks remarkably different from the previous one. The two con-
centric circles are gone, only the connections between the singular and the non-
singular categories have remained (horizontal homophony). The percentages for these
connections is roughly identical to the analogous percentages in the previous figure.
Except for this correspondence, nothing binds this cognitive map to the previous one.
The differences between the two semantic maps are obvious. In this second map,
there is no connection between the various singular categories (singular homophony)
and only two ‘thin’ connections between the various non-singular categories are at-
tested (vertical homophony). To summarise, once there is an inclusive/exclusive op-
position in the paradigm, the possibilities for homophony are strongly restricted.
5.8 Correlations with Morphological Status
5.8.1 Preamble
The present study encompasses the structure of both morphologically independent and
inflectionally marked pronominal paradigms.9 The morphological status of the person
marking was not a priori considered to have an influence on the structure of a pro-
nominal paradigm. It is only now, after the structural analysis of the paradigms is
completed, that a difference between the two can possibly be shown to exist. In the
discussion up till now, there have been a few indications that the morphological status
plays a role after all. First, it was discovered that singular homophony can only occur
in inflectionally marked paradigms (see sections 2.4.5 and 5.4.2). Second, there is a
strong correlation (although not without exceptions) between vertical homophony and
inflectional marking (see section 5.3.2). Finally, there is an indication of a (slight) in-
verse correlation between an inclusive/exclusive opposition and inflectional marking
(see also section 5.3.2). In this section, these correlations will be shown to be caused
by a general correlation between the morphological status of a paradigm and the two
structural hierarchies that were developed in the preceding sections. I will show that
both the Explicitness Hierarchy and the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy are corre-
lated with morphological status. In both cases, the correlation points in the same di-
rection: the more oppositions in a paradigm, the larger the proportion of morphologi-
cally independent paradigms in the sample. Towards the other side of both hierarchies
(viz for paradigms with less oppositions marked), the proportion of inflectional para-
digms rises in the sample. Interestingly, the paradigms that do not fit into the hierar-
chies are even more likely to be inflectionally marked than the least explicit para-
digms within the hierarchies. Exceptions tend to occur with greater chance in inflec-
tional paradigms. Throughout the following analysis, it should be kept in mind that
the chances for a paradigm to be inflectional in the present sample of 265 cases is a
little higher than 50%. The mean percentage of inflectional cases is 55.8% (148 in-
flectional and 117 independent paradigms).
                                                 
9 The difference between independent and inflectionally marked paradigms is not a clear dichotomy,
but more of a continuum. I have not bothered too much with the intermediate ‘clitic’ forms. At face
value, these are not very frequently described as such in the grammars, and it would be a study in its
own right to develop a useful cross-linguistic definition for clitics. Probably, most paradigms that
could be classified as clitics ended up as inflectional in this study.
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5.8.2 Explicitness Hierarchy
The Explicitness Hierarchy is repeated below in Table 5.18. The percentages of
inflectionally marked cases for each stage of the hierarchy have been added. Two cor-
relations that were found earlier can be found in these percentages. First, the para-
digms with a singular homophony were all found to be inflectional, as can be seen in
the rightmost column of the hierarchy (100% inflectional). Second, the paradigms
with an inclusive/exclusive opposition were found to be slightly more independent, as
can be seen in the two leftmost columns of the hierarchy (19.2% and 47.4% inflec-
tional). These two correlations turn out to represent the extremes of a continuous cor-
relation between the Explicitness Hierarchy and the percentage of inflectionally
marked paradigms, as is shown in Figure 5.6, below the table.
Split Inclusive + – – – –
Split ‘we’ + + – – –
Split Non-Singular + + + – –
Split Singular + + + + –
others
Number of cases 26 78 99 20 21 21
Independent 21 41 42 10 0 3
Inflectional 5 37 57 10 21 18
% Inflectional 19.2% 47.4% 57.6% 50.0% 100% 85.7%
Table 5.18: Percentage of inflectional paradigms in the Explicitness Hierarchy
Figure 5.6: Correlation between the Explicitness Hierarchy
and proportion of inflectional marking
The graph in Figure 5.6 is not continuously rising. On closer inspection, the ‘dips’
turn out, to be caused by the combination of the various building blocks into one hier-
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section 5.5.2). In Table 5.19, the hierarchy is dissected into these three parts, and the
percentages of inflectional marking are added to each part individually. The three
parts all show a clear correlation with inflectional marking (and the exceptions to the
hierarchies are always on the high end). Also, a clear correlation between the three
parts is found, as can be seen in Figure 5.7. Each graph subsequently starts and ends
higher than the preceding one. The ‘dips’ in the combined graph (see Figure 5.6) oc-
cur because most exceptions are found in the middle part of the hierarchy.
Split Inclusive + – – + Split ‘we’ + – – +
Split ‘we’ + + – – Split Non-Singular + + – –
Number of cases 27 90 144 4 Number of cases 107 103 41 14
Independent 21 43 52 1 Independent 63 42 10 2
Inflectional 6 47 92 3 Inflectional 44 61 31 12
% Inflectional 22.2 52.2 63.9 75.0 % Inflectional 41.1 55.3 75.6 85.7
Split Non-Singular + – – +
Split Singular + + – –
Number of cases 206 34 21 4
Independent 105 12 0 0
Inflectional 101 22 21 4
% Inflectional 49.0 64.7 100 100
Table 5.19: The Explicitness Hierarchy subdivided into its three
component hierarchies
Figure 5.7: Correlation between the subdivided Explicitness Hierarchy
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5.8.3 Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
The Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy is also analysed for the proportion of inflec-
tionally marked paradigms. The results are shown in Table 5.20. The percentages are
plotted in Figure 5.8. Again, the graph shows a correlation between less explicitness
in the paradigm (viz more horizontal homophony) and more inflectionally marked
pronominal paradigms in the sample. The correlation is less strong than the one that
was found with the Explicitness Hierarchy, but a trend is visible. The paradigms that
do not fit into the hierarchy are once again found to be peripheral, with a high propor-
tion of inflectional marking.
1  Inclusive – – – – +
1  Exclusive – – – + +
2  2+3 – – + + +
3  3+3 – + + + +
others
Number of cases 136 38 22 18 23 28
Independent 73 16 7 5 10 6
Inflectional 63 22 15 13 13 22
% Inflectional 46.3% 57.9% 68.2% 72.2% 56.5% 78.6%
Table 5.20: Percentage inflectional marking in the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
Figure 5.8: Correlation between the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy and
proportion of inflectional marking
The only point on the graph that is slightly off, represents the last stage of the hierar-
chy. These paradigms are slightly more often independent than expected. The 10 in-
dependent paradigms in this stage are the paradigms of the ‘Salt-Yui-type’ (see sec-
tion 4.4.2). These paradigms are independent pronouns that have no plural pronouns
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ence, in other cases this seems to be impossible. For these examples, the concept of
horizontal homophony is perhaps not applicable. Some paradigms simply have no
possibility at all to mark non-singular reference. Other linguistic constructions have to
be used for that purpose (eg conjunction, compounding, a comitative or an associative
construction). These paradigms might be out of place in this category, but because I
do not see any better place for them, the ‘dip’ in the graph has remained.
5.8.4  Amount of morphemes
The analysis of the Explicitness Hierarchy and the analysis of the Horizontal Ho-
mophony Hierarchy point in the same direction. The more opposition a paradigm has,
the likelier it is that the paradigm is morphologically independent. This can also be
shown to hold for the present sample if the paradigms are analysed to the number of
different morphemes in each paradigm. Exactly what is marked by the different mor-
phemes is left aside, only the number of different morphemes is taken into account
here. The number of cases for each amount of morphemes is presented in Table 5.21.
The percentage of inflectionally marked paradigms is shown in Figure 5.9 below. As
expected, there is a clear correlation between fewer morphemes and more inflection-
ally marked paradigms.
Amount of morphemes 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Number of cases 22 44 57 53 58 26 5
Independent 18 29 26 23 11 10 0
Inflectional 4 15 31 30 47 16 5
% Inflectional 18.2% 34.1% 54.4% 56.6% 81.0% 61.5% 100%
Table 5.21: Percentage inflectional marking for amount of morphemes in a paradigm
Figure 5.9: Correlation between amount of morphemes and
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This correlation only holds within the boundaries of the present sample. Gender oppo-
sitions are not counted; honorific forms are ignored; number marking (dual, paucal
etc.) is left out; et cetera. Only the person oppositions in the singular and non-singular
were included for the counts, resulting in a maximum range from 2 to 8 forms. Also,
the correlations are not absolute; there are very extensive pronominal paradigms that
are inflectionally marked and very small paradigms that are independent pronouns.
Notably, the inflectional paradigms in the Iroquoian languages in North America and
the Gunwingguan language in Australia are among the largest pronominal paradigms
to be found in the world. Still, as far as person oppositions are concerned, the
correlations clearly show that paradigms with more person oppositions tend to be
more often independently marked, and vice versa.
5.8.5 Explanations
These correlations are in need of an explanation. All three correlations point in the
same direction: the more oppositions, the higher the proportion of independently
marked pronominal paradigms and vice versa. These correlations can be made sense
of by two complementary explanations. The first explanation is a cognitive one, in-
voking a difference between inflectional and independent marking in the knowledge
of the language user. The second explanation is structural in nature, invoking different
possibilities for inflectional and independent pronominal marking in linguistic change.
First, independent pronouns are generally more salient to the language user (be it
speaker or addressee) than inflectional person markers. An independent pronoun is
consciously known to the linguistically naive speaker to have a clear referential value.
Of course, language users also know the precise referential usage of inflectional ele-
ments, but this knowledge tends to be implicit, rather than explicit. Independent
words, among them independent pronouns, are known to language users to have a
clear ‘meaning’. This ‘meaning’ will be kept referentially clear as much as possible.
This urge for referential clarity results in a tendency to have more oppositions in in-
dependent pronouns. Also, when a paradigm is not completely explicit, it will nor-
mally follow one of the two structural hierarchies (the Explicitness Hierarchy or the
Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy), which are both governed by the Person Hierar-
chy. As a result, the exceptions to the hierarchies always show a high proportion of
inflectional marking. Second, an inflectional person paradigm is rather fixed in its
structure. It seems to be easier for inflectional person paradigms to lose oppositions
than to gain them. It is very well possible for an inflectional paradigm to lose some
oppositions, for example by a historical merger. However, to insert extra morphemes
in an already existing inflectional paradigm is much more difficult. For independent
personal pronouns, I cannot see a comparable structural reason for a difference be-
tween losing or adding forms. This diachronic asymmetry turns up in a typological
survey as a tendency for inflectional pronominal paradigms to have fewer opposi-
tions.10
                                                 
10 Pending the validity of these two explanations, it has to be noted that the current sample cross-sects
through the different possible functional roles of the paradigmatic structure, like subject, object, erga-
tive et cetera. I expect that the effect of any functional difference between the various cases is evenly
distributed over the sample. However, future research has to bear out whether this intuition is correct
or not.
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5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, a sample of pronominal paradigms has been analysed from the per-
spective of the individual categories in the paradigms. The reference point for the
analyses in this chapter is the ‘maximally explicit’ paradigm, as repeated here in
Figure 5.10. Most paradigms do not distinguish all categories by different mor-
phemes. Strong restrictions are attested in the present sample as to which categories











addressee 2 2+3 second person plural
other 3 3+3 third person plural
Figure 5.10: Maximally explicit pronominal paradigm
Different kinds of homophony are attested between the eight categories from the
maximally explicit paradigm. Particularly, three different kinds of homophony were
distinguished at the start of this chapter (see section 5.2). First, when the three singu-
lar categories are not differentiated, this is called SINGULAR HOMOPHONY; in contrast,
when the three singular categories are differently marked, this is called SPLIT
SINGULAR (see section 5.4). Second, when the second and third person plural are not
differentiated from the first person complex, this is called VERTICAL HOMOPHONY; in
contrast, when they are differently marked, this is called SPLIT NON-SINGULAR (see
section 5.3). Finally, when there is an overlap between singular and non-singular, this
is called HORIZONTAL HOMOPHONY (see section 5.6).
The analysis of the various forms of homophony resulted in two hierarchies. Singular
homophony, vertical homophony and the possible divisions of the first person com-
plex make up the EXPLICITNESS HIERARCHY (see section 5.5). The various kinds of
horizontal homophony form the HORIZONTAL HOMOPHONY HIERARCHY (see section
5.6). Both hierarchies were shown to follow the Person Hierarchy, as repeated below
in (5.28). The middle part of the Explicitness Hierarchy showed a slight variant on
this hierarchy (see section 5.5.3). The Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy exactly fol-
lowed the Person Hierarchy (see section 5.6.2). Also, the frequency of the various
kinds of vertical homophony was ordered along the lines of the Person Hierarchy (see
section 5.3.3). This Person Hierarchy represents a sort of cross-linguistic majority
view of the cognitive order in the speech-act situation. A special kind of paradigmatic
structure occurs once the highest stage of the Person Hierarchy is reached. If there is a
opposition in the paradigm between ‘speaker and addressee included’ and ‘speaker
included’ (normally this opposition is referred to as ‘inclusive versus exclusive’), then
the variability of the paradigm is strongly constrained (see section 5.7).
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(5.28) Person Hierarchy
speaker and addressee > speaker > addressee > neither speaker not addressee
Both the Explicitness Hierarchy and the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy can be
summarised as different ways that lead from a minimally to a maximally explicit pro-
nominal paradigm; one path follows through the Explicitness Hierarchy; the other
goes through the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy. Before I present both pathways,
two clarifications are necessary. First, there is no indication that these paths are unidi-
rectional. The perspective that is taken here (with a direction from minimal to maxi-
mal explicitness) is only a metaphor chosen for convenience to summarise the attested
restrictions on the cross-linguistic variation. Second, the two paths are not independ-
ent from each other. Notably, the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy only operates in
the middle part of the Explicitness Hierarchy (see section 5.6.3).
The first path from minimal to maximal explicitness leads through the Explicitness
Hierarchy (see especially section 5.5.3). This path is illustrated in Figure 5.11 by a
few selected paradigmatic structures. It starts out with paradigms with a distinction
between singular and non-singular, but the person distinctions are blurred. Homoph-
ony is found both in the singular and in the non-singular. Proceeding to the next stage,
the singular categories are the first to be separated. Then, once the singular homoph-
ony is resolved and the three singular categories are distinctively marked, the non-
singular (= ‘vertical’) homophony is removed. At this point, a paradigm is found with
separate second and third person plural, but with a ‘unified’ first person complex.
Next, the inclusive/exclusive opposition in the first person complex is introduced and,
finally, the distinction between a minimal and an augmented inclusive is added, lead-
ing to the maximally explicit paradigm.
> > > >
Figure 5.11: Path to maximal explicitness through Explicitness Hierarchy
(shown are a few illustrative paradigmatic structures, not all possibilities)
The second path from minimal to maximal explicitness leads through the Horizontal
Homophony Hierarchy (see especially section 5.6.2). This path is illustrated by a few
selected paradigmatic structures in Figure 5.12.
> > > > >
Figure 5.12: Path to maximal explicitness through Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
(shown are a few illustrative paradigmatic structures, not all possibilities)
At the outset of this path, there is no separation between singular and non-singular.
There is horizontal homophony throughout the paradigm. The first non-singular cate-
gory to be separated from the singular is the inclusive, then follows the exclusive.
Next comes the second person plural and, finally, the third person plural completes
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the separation. At this point, there is no overlap between singular and non-singular
anymore. The minimal inclusive can only now be separated from the augmented in-
clusive.
Both paths correlate with the morphological status of the marking. At the minimally
explicit side, a preference for inflectional marking is found. In contrast, a preference
for morphologically independent marking is attested at the maximally explicit side.
This correlation is explained by two different corroborating tendencies. First, lan-
guage users are consciously using independent pronouns, whereas inflectional mark-
ing is much less salient to the naïve language user. This leads to more explicitness in
independent pronouns. On the other hand, an inflectional paradigm can be more easily
reduced (through historical merger) than grow in size (through addition of new in-
flectional categories in a paradigm). This asymmetry is not applicable to independent
pronouns. This diachronic difference between inflectional and independently marked
pronouns leads to a predominance of inflectional paradigms at the less explicitly
marked side of the spectrum (see section 5.8). Both explanations can also shed light
on the observation that ‘irregular’ paradigms have a strong tendency to be inflec-
tional. With ‘irregular’ paradigms, I refer to those paradigms that do not fit into either
of the two hierarchies. The referential structure of such paradigms is strangely organ-
ised, something which speakers mainly allow to develop by merger in inflectional
paradigms.
Towards the end of this chapter, more and more diachronic metaphors were used to
describe the typological patterns that have been found. In all cases, these descriptions
should be read as metaphors and not as real diachronic claims. The analyses presented
have been purely synchronic, so that no diachronic conclusions are permitted. In the




Person paradigms through time and space
6.1 Introduction
Pronominal elements are among the most popular linguistic items for comparative
research into the history and prehistory of language. For example the famous Analyti-
cal Comparison of the Sanskrit, Greek, Latin and Teutonic Languages by Bopp
(1820), one of the major early landmarks of the historical-comparative method, is a
comparison of pronominal elements in different Indo-European languages. Pronomi-
nal elements have remained an important source of information in the historical-
comparative line of research until the present day. In this extensive body of work, the
locus of investigation has always been the individual pronominal elements. Although
it is widely acknowledged that pronominal elements are bound into a paradigm, the
paradigmatic structure as a whole has never been consistently included in a diachronic
investigation. Such an investigation would ideally lead to a history of the structure of
the paradigm, which is a different level of analysis altogether.
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to formulate a first outline of a theory on
change of pronominal paradigms as a whole. This outline will be based on the typo-
logical investigations from the previous chapter. In the previous chapter, the major
restrictions of the occurrence of particular oppositions were summarised in two hier-
archies: the Explicitness Hierarchy and the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy. In this
chapter, these synchronic hierarchies will be taken as hypotheses for the options in the
change of paradigmatic structure. In section 6.2, I present the method that will be used
in this chapter for testing whether typological restrictions as formulated in the previ-
ous chapter can be interpreted diachronically. The basic principle is to compile exam-
ples of cognate paradigms, ie pronominal paradigms from closely related languages
that show only small differences. Such small differences present a window on possi-
ble historical changes. In the next two sections, the two hierarchies that were formu-
lated in the previous chapter are evaluated on the basis of attested cognate paradigms.
First, in section 6.3, the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy is scrutinised. This hierar-
chy turns out to be only partly interpretable in diachronic terms; paradigms seem to be
able to move with big strides through this hierarchy. It is not necessary for a paradig-
matic change to follow all separate stages of this hierarchy. However, it is not all
chaos that rules; there remain some barriers that paradigms do not seem to cross di-
rectly when moving through time and space. Second, in section 6.4, the Explicitness
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Hierarchy is tested on the diachronic interpretation. This hierarchy turns out to stand
the test rather well. At least, this hierarchy remains a good candidate for further dia-
chronic investigation. Finally, in section 6.5, the remaining diachronic connections
from the two hierarchies will be combined into a cognitive map of interconnected
paradigmatic structures.
6.2 Cognate paradigms
The method that will be used to approach the diachronic dimension is to compile ex-
amples of COGNATE PARADIGMS and then interpret such exemplars as a window on the
interrelations among different paradigmatic structures. The basic idea behind a set of
cognate paradigms is that the paradigms are highly similar, but have a slightly differ-
ent paradigmatic structure. Such cognate paradigms will be interpreted as showing a
small (and perhaps even the smallest possible) paradigmatic change. In most cases
that will be discussed, no stance will be taken as to the direction of the change. It
would entail much more in-depth analysis of the individual cases to establish a direc-
tion and would require too much analytic work to be able to retain the world-wide
(and thus a somewhat coarse-grained) perspective that is taken in the present work.
Only a first step towards unravelling the diachronic dynamics of paradigmatic struc-
ture is taken in this chapter. This first step is to lay out the general lines of variation in
the form of a cognitive map of interrelated paradigmatic structures. I hypothesise that
paradigmatic change will proceed along the lines of this cognitive map.
For two pronominal paradigms to be branded as ‘cognate’, a few criteria have to be
met. First, the two paradigms have to be found in two closely related languages. This
criterion ensures that the similarity between the various paradigms is not a chance
phenomenon. The relatedness between the languages has to be established on inde-
pendent grounds, not on the basis of the form of the pronominal elements alone. For
example, the Trans New Guinea Phylum (a well-known problematic case for genetic
classification in itself) is to a large extent established on the basis of resemblance
between pronominal elements. This basis is far too small to take the next step and
compare the form of the pronominal paradigms. In general, the cognate paradigms
that are presented in this chapter are found in very closely related languages, often on
the verge of being dialectal variants. In most cases, the close relatives that will be
taken into the comparison are both extant languages that are geographically not too
distant from each other. However, in some of the cases that will be discussed in this
chapter, the cognate paradigms come from ‘diachronic’ close relatives, ie from vari-
ants of the same language from different points in time. It is of lesser importance to
the current aim whether the earlier variant is a direct precursor of the later variant or
whether it is a separate though extinct branch. For example, Gothic and present day
German are such diachronic close relatives, although Gothic is not a direct precursor
of present day German. The method used here is not a historical comparison, but a
typological comparison that starts from the broad typological generalisation and tunes
in on the fine-grained differences within a genetic group. It is necessary, but not suffi-
cient for the languages to be cognate. A second criterion for pronominal paradigms to
be called ‘cognate’ is that the paradigms at hand have to be cognate themselves. This
means that the individual elements in the paradigm are related both in form and func-
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tion and that the syntagmatic role of the paradigm is roughly identical within the
structure of both languages. Consider as an example the present tense suffixes from
Standard German and Standard Dutch (without inversion), as shown in (6.1). There is
no doubt about the close relationship between the two languages within the West
Germanic branch of the Indo-European stock. More importantly, the suffixes them-
selves show a strong resemblance; this resemblance is seen most strongly in the suf-
fixes …-t and …-en, which are related both in form and function. Also, both para-
digms play a roughly comparable role in the structure of the language as both are used
to mark present tense by suffixation to a verb. A comparison between the German in-
flection and the Dutch independent pronouns would not be a valid case of cognate
paradigms because the role of these paradigms in the language is utterly different.1
(6.1) GERMANIC






The final criterion for two paradigms to be called ‘cognate’ is that the paradigms have
to show small paradigmatic differences. These paradigmatic differences are the crux
of the present chapter, as they present a window on the dynamics of paradigmatic
structure. The preceding criteria ensure that the compared paradigms are almost iden-
tical. The attested differences in paradigmatic structure are thus small (and possible
the smallest possible) differences in paradigmatic structure. For example, the singular
homophony in Dutch present suffixes (addressee and other are marked identical by
…-t) is not found in German.
To summarise, four criteria have to be met. Cognate paradigms have to be found in
cognate languages, and the great majority of the individual morphemes in the para-
digms have to be cognates themselves. Also, the paradigms have to have a function-
ally and formally comparable status within the language as a whole. Finally, the para-
digms have to show some differences in their paradigmatic structure. This whole set
of criteria is designed to leave only those cases that unambiguously show differences
in paradigmatic structure that are small. These small differences can probably arise
easily. More precisely, the small differences in paradigmatic structure may arise
quickly when compared to phonological changes. The differences between cognate
paradigms may arise before the phonological changes have made it difficult (or even
impossible) to establish a relation between the paradigms. On the (somewhat precari-
ous) assumption that phonological change is roughly a constant factor in language
change, the paradigmatic differences between cognate paradigms represent minimal
changes. However, I will not argue for any diachronic interpretation of the cognate
                                                 
1 Of course, in this case, the German inflection and the Dutch independent pronouns are also com-
pletely dissimilar in form, which already disqualifies them as cognate paradigms on the morphopho-
nological criterion alone. This is not necessarily so.
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paradigms.2 Examples of cognate paradigms are used to argue that certain paradig-
matic structures are similar. Paradigmatic structures can be shown to be closely con-
nected by the existence of a set of cognate paradigms. All the examples of cognate
paradigms that will be discussed in this chapter result in a web of interrelated para-
digmatic structures; some more closely related than others.
A major problem with this method is that it is difficult to deal with connections that
are not attested as a set of cognate paradigms. It is very well possible that, given a
more extensive search, other examples would turn up eventually. In incidental cases,
it is possible to construct an argument for the implausibility of an unattested connec-
tion by analysing the areal distribution of the various patterns. If two different para-
digmatic structures are never found in the same geographical area, this is taken as an
indication that the two structures are not closely connected (see especially section
6.4.2 below). In most cases, however, the method of cognate paradigms can only be
used as a way to test the validity of an independently formulated claim of paradig-
matic connections. Given a hypothesis about how pronominal paradigms might be
interrelated, examples of cognate paradigms can substantiate such a claim. It is in this
sense that the examples in the present chapter should be interpreted.
‘Synchronic typologies function merely as heuristic, though often indispensable, de-
vices in defining the problems and in assembling the relevant data.’ (Greenberg,
1969: 194)
The hypothesis to be tested in this chapter is that pronominal paradigms change along
the lines of the two hierarchies that were formulated in the previous chapter: the Ex-
plicitness Hierarchy and the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy. These two hierarchies
were formulated independently, but turned out to be correlated (see section 5.6.3).
The intersection of the two hierarchies showed a clear preference for particular para-
digmatic structures. These preferred structures are shown in Figure 6.1, ordered along
the lines of the two hierarchies. The Explicitness Hierarchy is shown horizontally and
the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy is shown vertically. The arrows between the
paradigmatic structures represent the hypothesis about the expected cognitive map of
paradigmatic structure. If paradigmatic change conforms to the lines of the hierar-
chies, then examples of cognate paradigms are expected to turn up as links between
adjacent paradigmatic structures in the cognitive map. These examples only indicate
that the hypothesis is feasible; they should not be read as an argumentation for a uni-
versal theory of paradigmatic change. Far from that, the possibilities for change are
numerous and the examples that will follow shortly are only the first step to a ency-
clopedic collection of attested cases, which hopefully will lead in the future to a fully-
fledged theory of possible changes of a pronominal paradigm. Examples of cognate
paradigms form a window on a small part of the cognitive map, and a large set of such
windows will hopefully give a better view on the outline of the whole landscape of
paradigmatic variation. It is this prospect that drives the search for the minutiae of
paradigmatic variation.
                                                 
2 The different paradigms in a set of cognate paradigms are probably derived from some common an-
cestor. This ancestor could be very similar to one of the extant variants, in which case one of the vari-
ants could be said to be historically derived from the other. Otherwise, both variants go back to a fur-
ther – different – paradigmatic structure at the proto-stage.
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The search for cognate paradigms has been restricted to the kinds of paradigm shown
in Figure 6.1. These paradigmatic structures represent the nine common cases and the
six semi-common cases summarised in section 4.8. Together, these 15 paradigmatic
structures account for 78% of the attested variation.3 The remaining 22% ‘rare’ cases
do not fit into either of the two hierarchies that will be tested in this chapter. They will
be disregarded in this chapter. This restriction to the more widely occurring paradig-
matic structures has been made in order to have a chance to find multiple cases of a
particular connection between two paradigmatic structures. Good examples of cognate
paradigms are not easy to find, which makes it necessary to claim some flexibility if a
















































Figure 6.1: Hypothesised cognitive map of the major paradigmatic structures ordered
by the Explicitness Hierarchy and the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
6.3 Up and down the horizontal homophony hierarchy
6.3.1 Preamble
Most cases of horizontal homophony are attested among the paradigms with ‘unified-
we’ (eg the English pronoun ‘we’) and the paradigms with an inclusive/exclusive op-
                                                 
3 The six semi-common paradigmatic structures are subsumed under the categories ‘singular and verti-
cal homophony’ and ‘only vertical homophony’. The nine common paradigmatic structures are all rep-
resented individually in the figure.
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position (see Figure 6.1). The various paradigmatic structures on the Horizontal Ho-
mophony Hierarchy are repeated in Figure 6.2. The labels that are added to the para-
digms in the figure refer to the marking of the first person complex, as discussed in
section 3.6. As a hypothesis, I propose that the paradigmatic structure will develop
diachronically along the lines of the hierarchy, which would give rise to changes as
indicated by the arrows in Figure 6.2. If this hypothesis is any good, it is to be ex-
pected that there are pronominal paradigms in closely related languages that only dif-
fer in one morpheme on this hierarchy. In this section, I will review a large set of ex-
amples attested to substantiate this hypothesis.
no-we unified-we
– – –
– X – X – X –
– – –
only-inclusive inclusive/exclusive
Figure 6.2: The Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
The connections attested will be described in two parts. First, in section 6.3.2, the
connections between the ‘small’ paradigms in the upper left corner of Figure 6.2 are
presented. These paradigms (‘small’, as they have only few oppositions) seem to be
tightly interwoven, because numerous examples of cognate paradigms are attested
between the various paradigms. Second, in section 6.3.3, the connections between
these ‘small’ paradigms and the larger paradigms, up the horizontal homophony, hier-
archy are presented. The picture becomes somewhat blurred here, indicating that the
hypothesis can only be an approximation of the diachronic dynamics of paradigmatic
structure. An improved hypothesis is proposed in the summarising section 6.3.4.
6.3.2 Interconnecting the small paradigms
The minimally marked pronominal paradigms are found at the far end of the Hori-
zontal Homophony Hierarchy. These paradigms have horizontal homophony in (al-
most) all persons; the only specialised non-singular forms are found in the first person
complex. In this section, examples of connections between the three smallest para-
digms (as highlighted in Figure 6.3) will be discussed.
Connections between these three paradigms are relatively easy to find. Examples from
Siouan, Chimbu and Waris are presented to illustrate the connection between these
three paradigmatic structures. Some more examples will be shown en passant in the
next section. In that section, the examples from Arawakan and Macro-Gé are of spe-
cial interest, as they show that the diagonal connection in this triple is also attested.
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– – –
– X – X – X –
– – –
Figure 6.3: The small paradigms of the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
Siouan prefixes
The first set of cognate paradigms to be reviewed here is found among the Siouan
languages, spoken in northern USA. The agent prefixes of the different Siouan lan-
guages show only slightly different paradigmatic structures. This set of cognate para-
digms presents an example of the connection between the three small paradigms.
(6.2) SIOUAN








The agent prefixes from Hidatsa are shown in (6.2 a). There are no specialised non-
singular morphemes in this paradigm, although number can be marked by suffixes
(Robinett, 1955: 177; Matthews, 1965: 55, 71). A specialised morpheme for ‘unified-
we’ is found in the agent prefixes from Mandan, shown in (6.2 b). Otherwise, this
paradigm from Mandan is completely identical to the paradigm from Hidatsa (Mixco,
1997: 8). Finally, the agent prefixes from Winnebago are shown in (6.2 c). This time,
there is a specialised morpheme for inclusive-‘we’ only (Greenberg, 1988: 4-5, citing
Susman 1943).
Chimbu pronouns
The Chimbu family is part of the Border stock, one of the parts that constitute the
Trans-New-Guinea Phylum in Papua New Guinea.
(6.3) CHIMBU
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The pronouns from the Chimbu family present an example of the smallest kind of
paradigm that exists among the world’s independent pronouns. These paradigms fur-
ther illustrate the link between two different small paradigms. The independent pro-
nouns from Golin (Foley, 1986: 70, citing Bunn 1974) and from Salt-Yui (Irwin,
1974: 74) are identical. Both paradigms, shown in (6.3 a, b), fail to distinguish any
specialised non-singular forms. The independent pronouns from Kuman are slightly
different, as can be seen in (6.3 c). Most salient for the present discussion is the exis-
tence of a specialised form for ‘unified-we’ (Foley, 1986: 70, citing Piau 1985).
Waris pronouns
The Waris family belongs to the East New Guinea Highlands stock, which is also a
part of the Trans-New-Guinea Phylum in Papua New Guinea. The paradigms pre-
sented in (6.4) are the short forms of the independent pronouns. These short forms are
normally used in fluent speech. The long versions (with more oppositions) are used
only when it is necessary to be referentially more explicit.
(6.4) WARIS





In these paradigms, the phonological correspondences between Manem, shown in
(6.4 a) and the other two languages are rather opaque; only the first person singular is
a clear cognate. On the (precarious) assumption that these paradigms are cognate
paradigms, another connection between the various small paradigmatic structures is
attested here. The Manem paradigm does not have any non-singular forms, although
the plural marker ki can be used to pluralise the reference (Voorhoeve, 1975: 416;
Foley, 1986: 71). A specialised inclusive pronoun is attested in the related languages
Amanab (Minch, 1991: 31) and Imonda (Seiler, 1985: 44), as shown in (6.4 b, c)
6.3.3 Up the hierarchy
The paradigmatic structure can be extended up the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy.
The structures that will be considered in this section are shown in Figure 6.4.
– – –
– X – X – X –
– – –
Figure 6.4: The larger paradigms that will be linked to the small paradigms
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From the examples that will be presented in this section, it seems to be possible to
take big strides through the hierarchy without passing through each stage separately.
Once the first-person-hurdle has been taken, the other non-singular forms can follow
more easily. Examples from Quechuan, Arawakan, Macro-Gé and Chinese will be
discussed in this section. All these families show pronominal paradigms that vary
along the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy, linking the smaller paradigms to the
larger paradigms.4
Quechuan suffixes
The following case of cognate paradigms comes from the Quechuan languages in
Western South America. These paradigms show a connection between the smaller
paradigms (that were already discussed previously) and the larger paradigms with
more specialised non-singular forms. The paradigms presented all mark the intransi-
tive subject in the various languages.
The paradigmatic structure with the smallest number of oppositions is the paradigm of
Tarma Quechua, a Quechua variety spoken in Peru. This paradigm is shown in (6.5 a).
Plural marking exists, but is not part of the pronominal paradigm (Adelaar, 1977: 89-
93, 127-128). A slight departure from this paradigmatic structure is found in Huánuco
Quechua. In Huánuco Quechua, the nominal plural marker …-kuna is found in the
pronominal suffixes with the first person singular only. The resulting paradigm is
shown in (6.5 b). The first person plural is an integral part of the pronominal para-
digm, as it is an aberrant case among the pluralisation strategies of Huánuco Quechua
(Weber, 1989: 95-96, 143-144). Both Huánuco and Tarma Quechua are part of sub-
group I of the Quechuan languages. The corresponding paradigm in the southern vari-
ants of Quechuan (subgroup IIc) is slightly different from these two central Quechua
variants. Specialised marking of non-singular is found in all persons in southern
Quechua. The suffixes from Bolivian Quechua are shown in (6.5 c). This is the most
extensive paradigm of the various Quechuan subject paradigms (van de Kerke,
1996: 120-125). All three cases reviewed until now mark an inclusive/exclusive oppo-
sition in the paradigm. However, in the northern variants of Quechuan (subgroup IIb),
the inclusive form …-nchi(k) encompasses the same referential possibilities as the
English pronoun ‘we’. This is rather different from the other varieties, where the mor-
pheme …-nchi(k) has only inclusive reference. The suffixes from Ecuadorian
Quechua are shown in (6.5 d), as described by Muysken (1977: 43-45).5 The suffixes
from Inga Quechua, a variant spoken in Columbia (also from subgroup IIb), is slightly
different. As can be seen in (6.5 e), also an opposition between singular and non-
singular in the third person is attested here. The pluralised …-cuna is used to mark
this opposition; the same morpheme is used in a different function in the paradigm
from Huánuco (Schwartz, 1986: 423).
                                                 
4 There are more examples of connections between the various larger paradigms, but these will be dis-
cussed in section 6.4 as examples of cognate paradigms that follow the Explicitness Hierarchy.
5 Exactly the same paradigm as in Ecuadorian Quechua is also found in Imbabura Quechua (Cole,
1982: 143-145).
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(6.5) QUECHUAN
a: Tarma b: Huanuco c: Bolivian
…-ñc ik …-nchi: …-nchik
…-: …-: …-:kuna …-ni …-yku
…-n ki …-nki …-nki …-nkichik
…-n  …-n …-n …-nku





…-ngi …-gichik …-ngui …-nguishi
…-n …- …-cuna
It will be left to the specialist to propose the precise diachronic development that led
to this variable situation (cf Campbell, 1997: 188-189). For the present purpose, it is
sufficient to notice that these five paradigmatic structures are closely related and that
the similarities are roughly in line with the proposed connections as presented above.
The two small paradigms (Tarma Quechua and Huánuco Quechua) are connected to
larger paradigms (Bolivian Quechua, and in a different development to Ecuadorian
and Inga Quechua). Apparently, these paradigmatic differences can arise in a rela-
tively short time; the morphological changes that led to the presented variation have
been quicker than the phonological changes that would lead to large differences in the
morphemes themselves. If phonological changes had been more effective, then the
correspondences between the morphemes would be much more concealed, making it
much harder to track the cognates by the superficial diachronic method that is used
here.
Macro-Gé prefixes
The next set of examples of paradigmatic cognates is formed by the pronominal pre-
fixes from various Macro-Gé languages, spoken in Brazil. These languages have vari-
ously organised strains of ergativity, which makes it difficult to compare functionally
identical paradigms. The following paradigms are chosen because they show unmis-
takable similarity.
(6.6) MACRO-GÉ




-… i-… i-… xe-…
a(i)-… a-… a-… ta-…
da/-… ih-… u/- e-…
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The first case is the paradigm of the absolutive object prefixes from Xerente, shown
in (6.6 a). The prefix wa-… has ‘unified-we’ reference (Wiesemann, 1986b: 365). The
other two cases are paradigms of subject prefixes. The subject paradigm from Canela-
Kraho is shown in (6.6 b). In this case, the morpheme pa-… has only-inclusive refer-
ence (Popjes & Popjes, 1986: 175). The final case is the paradigm from Bororo, as
presented in (6.6 c). This paradigm has specialised morphemes for almost all non-
singular categories (Crowell, 1979: 206). The similarity between the Bororo and the
Canela-Kraho paradigm is much stronger when compared to the Xerente paradigm.
This indicates that the extra morphemes in the Bororo paradigm are probably added
relative to the Canela-Kraho paradigm.6
Arawakan prefixes
Another group of cognate paradigms is found among the Arawakan languages. The
Arawakan languages are spread out over a large part of South America. Still, the sub-
ject prefixes as shown in (6.7) present a strong similarity between the widely dis-
persed languages. Differently from the Macro-Gé case above, the Arawakan examples
present a link to a large paradigm without an inclusive/exclusive distinction. Exactly
how these differences are to be explained by a diachronic change is a question that
must be left to the specialists.
(6.7) ARAWAKAN





pi-… pi-… bi-… in(i)-…
i-… ir/o-… i/wu-… na-…
The first paradigm is the subject paradigm from Ipuriná, an Arawakan language spo-
ken in Brazil. The subject prefixes from Ipuriná are shown in (6.7 a). This paradigm
has one prefix for all first person plural reference; the prefix á-… (Polak, 1894: 7).
The next case is the subject paradigm from Campa, an Arawakan language spoken in
Peru, shown in (6.7 b). The individual prefixes are almost identical to the morphemes
from Ipuriná, but they form a slightly different paradigmatic structure as the prefix
a-… has only inclusive reference (Payne, 1981: 34; Reed & Payne, 1986: 325). Fi-
nally, the subject prefixes from Bare, an Arawakan language spoken in Venezuela, are
shown in (6.7 c). These prefixes are rather different from the other two, although the
similarity is strong in the singular forms. The most important difference is the set of
overt non-singular forms for the second and third person (Aikhenvald, 1995: 27).
                                                 
6 This proposed close link between the paradigmatic structures from Bororo and Canela-Kraho as op-
posed to Xerente does not coincide with the genetic classification (Campbell, 1997: 195-196), nor with
the areal distribution (Grimes, 1996: 22-23). Impressionistically, this situation seems to be widespread.
The comparison of the paradigmatic structure often indicates a slightly different classification from
the grouping based on mainly morpho-phonological characteristics.
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Chinese pronouns
The final case rigorously cuts through the whole Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy in
one go. In Chinese, diachronic data show that a pronominal paradigm without any
specialised non-singular forms developed a complete set of non-singular forms in one
move, and in some parts added an inclusive/exclusive distinction on top of that.
(6.8) CHINESE










qí/zhi/yan ta tamen ta tamen
The classical Chinese language did not have specialised non-singular pronouns. The
classical pronouns, as shown in (6.8 a), show many different forms, probably distin-
guished by case. The history that led to the modern singular pronouns as shown in
(6.8 b) is rather complex, but the forms are undeniably related (Norman, 1988: 89-
90, 117-118). The modern Chinese varieties have specialised non-singular forms of
the pronouns derived with a suffix …-men. This suffix probably goes back to a com-
pound nominal, meaning ‘every person’ (Norman, 1988: 121). In most modern varie-
ties of Chinese, there is a pronominal paradigm with a grammaticalised singular vs.
non-singular opposition, as shown in (6.8 b). In some northern variants, including the
standard language, an inclusive pronoun zìjia  developed from the words for ‘self-
family’. This development led to the modern inclusive form zánmen, as shown in the
(6.8 c) paradigm (Norman, 1988: 120-121, 157-158).7
6.3.4 Summary
The Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy is a strong typological generalisation over the
paradigmatic structures of pronominal paradigms among the world’s languages. How-
ever, it is far too strong when interpreted as a hypothesis for diachronic change. Most
clearly, the connections on the upper side of hierarchy are not followed strictly by the
cases that were discussed. Paradigms jump through the hierarchy rather easily.
Generalising over the examples presented, a few tendencies for possible cognate
paradigms can be formulated. First, the connection between the ‘small’ paradigms are
rather strong. Many cases are attested showing a connection of these paradigmatic
structures (see section 6.3.2). In contrast, the connections to the larger paradigmatic
structures are much messier than the hierarchy specifies. Various steps of the hierar-
chy can be skipped; paradigms can rather easily add (or lose) many of the non-
singular morphemes. The different paradigms with ‘unified-we’ and ‘inclu-
sive/exclusive’ marking do not seem to be strictly ordered along the lines of the Hori-
zontal Homophony Hierarchy (see section 6.3.3). Finally, the diagonal connections
are not very prominent among the examples attested. However, some diagonal con-
                                                 
7 I disregard here the honorific distinction in the second person singular.
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nections are found. The examples indicate that there is a possible connection between
the ‘unified-we’ and the ‘only-inclusive’ paradigms (viz Siouan, Quechuan, Macro-
Gé and Arawakan). However, the other diagonal is rather problematic. I did not find
any connection between the ‘no-we’ paradigm and the paradigms with an overtly
marked inclusive/exclusive opposition (both paradigms are highlighted in Figure 6.5).
These two paradigms are too distinct to be connected easily be a diachronic change.
Both an inclusive ‘we’ and an exclusive ‘we’ do not seem to be normally added (or
lost) at once. The route over one side or the other occurs more easily – adding one





Figure 6.5: Not attested (diagonal) connection between no-we and inclusive/exclusive
A more accurate picture of the possible connections between the various paradigms is
obtained when only the structure of the first person complex is taken into account.
From this perspective, the finely grained connections from Figure 6.5 are collapsed
into more broadly defined associations between paradigmatic structures. The resulting
graph is shown in Figure 6.6. The only connection that is not attested is the connec-
tion between ‘no-we’ and ‘inclusive/exclusive’.
Figure 6.6: Connections attested between various types of the first person complex
6.4 Up and down the explicitness hierarchy
6.4.1 Preamble
The Explicitness Hierarchy fares much better than the Horizontal Homophony when
reinterpreted as a hypothesis for diachronic change. The five stages of the Explicit-
inclusive/exclusiveunified-we
only-inclusiveno-we
210 PART TWO: PARADIGMATIC STRUCTURE
ness Hierarchy are repeated in Figure 6.7. As a hypothesis, I propose that pronominal
paradigms will develop diachronically along the lines of the hierarchy. If this hy-
pothesis is any good, it is to be expected that there are pronominal paradigms in
closely related languages that only differ in one stage on this hierarchy. In this sec-












   
Figure 6.7: The Explicitness Hierarchy
The presentation of the examples will follow the hierarchy from right to left; from
more explicit to less explicit. First, in section 6.4.2, the arguments for a connection
between the minimal/augmented and the inclusive/exclusive paradigms will be dis-
cussed. Second, in section 6.4.3, the link between the inclusive/exclusive and the uni-
fied-we paradigms is taken up. Finally, in section 6.4.4, the connections between the
unified-we paradigms and the paradigms with singular and/or vertical homophony is
discussed.
6.4.2 Minimal/augmented inclusive (or not)
The first step down the explicitness hierarchy is the connection between the mini-
mal/augmented paradigm and the inclusive/exclusive paradigm. This connection is
rather strong. This opposition is only added when all other referential categories have
already been grammaticalised. Two examples of this connection will be presented,
one from the Philippines and one from the Chadic languages. Finally, some areal and
structural considerations will be brought forward to show that the minimal/augmented












   
Figure 6.8: Paradigms with or without minimal/augmented opposition
Philippine pronouns
The first case of a set of cognate paradigms on the Explicitness Hierarchy comes from
the Philippines. These paradigms present a connection between a completely explicit
paradigm (with eight different morphemes) and an almost completely explicit para-
digm (with seven different morphemes).
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(6.9) PHILIPPINES




akú kamí ako kami
ikáw kamú ikaw kayo
siyá silá siya sila
The independent pronouns from Cebuano are shown in (6.9 a). There is a full set of
non-singular forms, only the two kinds of inclusive reference are not distinguished
(Wolff, 1966: 14). The additional opposition between the minimal and the augmented
inclusive is found in the closely related language Tagalog, as shown in (6.9 b). The
pronouns of Cebuano and Tagalog are almost identical. Only the Tagalog morpheme
tayo is not found in Cebuano.
Chadic pronouns
The Chadic pronouns present another example of cognate paradigms at the high end
of the Explicitness Hierarchy. Just as in the Philippine case above, the Chadic pro-
nouns illustrate a connection between the minimal/augmented paradigm (which dis-
tinguishes all eight referential categories) and the inclusive/exclusive paradigm
(which distinguishes all categories except for the two different inclusives).
(6.10) Chadic




ná jà yà Nà -y¨$ -'yà
kà kwà kà kwà -g¨$ -nyì
 (?) à tà -jà -ndà
The Ngizim perfective pronouns are shown in (6.10 a). The third person plural forms
are given as zero in the source, but zero independent third person pronouns are highly
suspect (see section 2.6.4). Yet, all other tense/aspect variations of the pronouns also
show a homophony between third person singular and plural (Burquest, 1986: 76).
The paradigmatic structure of the Mandara completive pronouns, shown in (6.10 b), is
identical to Ngizim except for the opposition in the third person (Burquest, 1986: 78).
Most interesting for the present purpose, Margi adds a minimal/augmented opposition
(Hoffmann, 1963: 73-74; Burquest, 1986: 82), as shown in (6.10 c).8
Disconnected from’ only-inclusive’
These examples from the Philippines and from Chadic show that there is a close con-
nection between the minimal/augmented paradigm and the inclusive/exclusive para-
digm. Greenberg (1988: 3-5) proposes another connection: between the mini-
mal/augmented paradigm and the only-inclusive paradigm. Because of certain refer-
                                                 
8 The dashes in (6.10c) indicate that the Margi pronouns are clitics which are added to a root ‘nà’.
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ential correspondences, this might seem a tempting proposal, but the areal distribution
of the paradigmatic structures does not support the idea.
The reasoning by Greenberg goes as follows. The minimal/augmented paradigm
(6.11 a) is normally analysed with the inclusive dual 1+2 on a par with the singular
persons, as shown in (6.11 b). The second column is now formed by the ‘augmented’
versions of the first column. A natural connection for such a paradigm seems to be a
connection to the same paradigms without the augmented forms (6.11 c). Such a para-
digm, with only the ‘minimal’ categories, is identical to what has been called ‘only-
inclusive’ in the present work, as shown in (6.11 d). Concluding, the mini-
mal/augmented paradigm and the only-inclusive paradigm seem naturally connected.
(6.11)
a: b: c: d:
1+2 1+2
1+2+3 1+2 1+2+3 1+2, 1+2+3 1+2+3
1 1+3 = 1 1+3 ~ 1, 1+3 = 1 1+3
2 2+3 2 2+3 2, 2+3 2 2+3













However, the areal distribution of these two paradigms brings a clear end to this strain
of thought. The two paradigmatic structures never even come close geographically,
nor do they belong to the same genetic family. In the world-wide survey, as described
in section 4.7.2, I found four regions where almost all minimal/augmented paradigms
are attested. These areas typically include languages with large pronominal systems
rather than small ones. The four typical minimal/augmented regions are the Philippi-
nes, Nigeria/Cameroon (ie the ‘elbow’ of Africa), California and northwest Australia
(‘non-Pama-Nyungan’).9 The only-inclusive paradigm is never found in these regions.
The only-inclusive type is typically found in completely different areas: New Guinea
and South America.10 This geographical disconnection substantiates the typological
picture that has been developed above, in which the only-inclusive type is far re-
moved from the minimal/augmented type (cf Figure 6.1). Another argument against a
direct connection between the minimal/augmented and the only-inclusive paradigms
is found in the morphological structure.11 If there were a set of ‘minimal’ and a set of
                                                 
9 See section 4.7.2 for the complete references; I will here only shortly summarise the attested cases.
For the Philippines, see, for example, Tagalog, Maranao and Hanunóo. For the ‘elbow’ of Africa, see,
for example, Marghi, Gude, Limbum, Bamileke, Dii and Dan. For California, see, for example, Ute-
Southern Paiute, Chemehuevi, Southern Sierra Miwok. Finally, for northwest Australia, see, for ex-
ample, Maranunku, Malakmalak, Bardi, Nyulnyul and Tiwi.
10 See section 4.5.2 for the complete references; I will here only shortly summarise the attested cases.
For New Guinea, see, for example, Nimboran, Imonda and Amanab. For South America, see, for ex-
ample, Jaqaru, Campa, Maka, Canela-Krahô, Trio and Carib.
11 Greenberg already notes that the morphological structure of the minimal/augmented paradigms does
not support his diachronic proposal. He tries to get around this problem by including morphological
[continued on next page]
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‘augmented’ morphemes, one would expect that at least some of these paradigms
show indications of a regular morphological derivation of the augmented set. In a
sense, the augmented set should look like a regularly derived plural. Of course, not all
cases have to show a regular morphological structure, but at least a few should do.
However, there is not even one pattern among the various cases of the mini-
mal/augmented paradigm that indicates a regular morphological markedness of the
augmented set. This can be illustrated by an example. Blake (1988; 1991) reconstructs
a minimal-augmented paradigm for Proto non-Pama-Nyungan, shown here as (6.12).
This paradigm turns out to have a regularly derived augmented set by the plural suffix
…-rrV. However, the roots of the minimal and the augmented set are different. The
plural marking is not necessary for the distinction. It is probably added as a rein-
forcement, added only after the complete eight-way paradigm arose.
(6.12) PROTO NON-PAMA-NYUNGAN
minimal augmented
1+2 *nya *nga-rrV 1+2+3
1 *ngay *nyi-rrV 1+3
2 *nginy *nu/ku-rrV 2+3
3 *nu/ngaya *pu-rrV 3+3
6.4.3 Inclusive/exclusive opposition (or not)
The next step of the Explicitness Hierarchy connects paradigms with an inclu-












   
Figure 6.9: the connection between unified-we and inclusive/exclusive
These two kinds of paradigms include all the major variants with some kind of hori-
zontal homophony that were discussed in section 6.3 above. In that section, various
cases were presented that linked paradigms with an inclusive/exclusive opposition to
paradigms without such an opposition. For the sake of completeness, I add two cases
of cognate paradigms here, found among the Western Nilotic pronouns and among the
Dravidian pronouns.
Western Nilotic pronouns
An example of this connection can be found in the independent pronouns of the Luo
subgroup of Western Nilotic, spoken in Sudan. In (6.13 a), the pronouns from Lango
are shown (Bavin, 1981: 90). Shown in (6.13 b) are the pronouns from Päri (Andersen,
                                                 
[continued from previous page]
elements from outside the pronominal system into the analysis (viz separate number marking). This
definitional move is not followed in the present work. A person paradigm is strictly defined as con-
sisting of only prefixes or suffixes.
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1988: 297). The only paradigmatic difference is the exclusive form in Päri that is not
found in Lango.12
(6.13) WESTERN NILOTIC










Another example is found in the independent pronouns of the Dravidian languages.
The Dravidian independent pronouns usually do not have specialised third person
forms, using demonstratives instead. The general structure of Dravidian pronouns is
exemplified in (6.14 b) with pronouns from Malayalam (Asher & Kumari, 1997: 226-
227, 255-258). In Kannada, the exclusive-inclusive distinction that is found in many
Dravidian languages, has been lost. The pronouns from Kannada in (6.14 a) probably
have lost the inclusive-exclusive opposition under influence of the neighboring Indo-
European languages (Sridhar, 1990: 203).
(6.14) DRAVIDIAN





ni:nu ni:vu nii nia
(demonstr.) (demonstr.)
6.4.4 Vertical and singular homophony (or not)
The final step on the Explicitness Hierarchy links the ‘complete’ unified-we paradigm
to the paradigms with various kinds of vertical and/or singular homophony. It turns
out to be much harder to find examples that illustrate this connection than it has been
for the other connections that have been discussed. The reason is probably that there
are much fewer paradigms with singular and/or vertical homophony when compared
to the abundance of examples of the other paradigmatic structures. Also, the variation
is large within the group of paradigms with singular and/or vertical homophony. Still,
a few cases of cognate paradigms have been attested, in the Arawakan family, in the
Germanic family and possibly in the Gorokan family.
                                                 
12 These two languages are only taken to exemplify the pronouns in the Luo languages. Other lan-
guages from this family have strongly resembling paradigms. The pronouns from and Anywa (Lusted,
1976: 499; Reh, 1996: 164) are almost identical to the pronouns from Päri in. The pronouns from Shil-
luk (Westermann, 1911: 13) and Acholi (Kitching, 1907: 9; Crazzolara, 1955: 64) are almost identical
to the pronouns from Lango.












   
Figure 6.10: Connections between unified-we and different kinds of homophony
Arawakan prefixes
A connection between a unified-we paradigm and a vertical homophony is attested in
the Arawakan languages in South America. Some other Arawakan structures were
already discussed in section 6.3.3. For the present purpose, the agent prefixes from
Bare (Aikhenvald, 1995: 27) and Warekena (Aikhenvald, 1998: 293) are of interest;
they are presented in (6.15). The prefixes from Bare show a complete unified-we
paradigm, distinguishing second from third person non-singular. In the cognate para-
digm from Warekena, these two forms are identical, possibly a historical merger.
 (6.15) ARAWAKAN







A well-known case connecting various forms of homophony is found in the Germanic
languages. The suffixes shown in (6.16) are the present indicative inflections (dual
forms are disregarded) from a few Germanic languages. The Latin suffixes are added
in (6.16 a) to represent the Proto-Indo-European structure, distinguishing six different
morphemes. The Gothic equivalents to the Latin suffixes in (6.16 b) still do not show
any vertical or singular homophony, although the curious ‘diagonal’ homophony be-
tween the third person singular and the second person plural is found here. This ‘di-
agonal’ homophony is also attested in German (and in Middle Dutch), but in German
also a vertical homophony is found. The suffix …-en marks both the first and third
person plural. Finally, in (6.16 d), the Standard Dutch inflection (without inversion)
has extended the vertical homophony of the suffix …-en to all non-singular referential
categories, and has added a singular homophony for addressee and other reference.
(6.16) GERMANIC AND LATIN







…-s …-tis …-is …-i …-st …-t
…-t …-unt …-i …-and …-t …-en
…-t
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Gorokan pronouns
Another example is found in the Gorokan family, part of the East New Guinea High-
lands stock in Papua New Guinea. (Foley, 1986: 248-249) reconstructs the independ-
ent pronouns from Proto-Gorokan as shown in (6.17). The non-singular shows a ver-
tical homophony. However, none of the Gorokan languages (Foley discusses para-
digms from Gende, Siane, Benabena, Kamano-Yagaria and Fore) synchronically dis-
plays such a vertical homophony. All languages distinguish second from third person
non-singular. So, if this reconstruction is valid, all these Gorokan languages lost the








The examples presented indicate that he Explicitness Hierarchy fares rather well in
the diachronic interpretation. The different stages of the hierarchy are all attested by
some examples of cognate paradigms. Examples that jump over different stages of the
hierarchy are not attested, at least not in the current set of examples. Of course, differ-
ent kinds of cognate paradigms might turn up in further research, which would indi-
cate that more possibilities for the diversification of pronominal paradigms exist
through time and space. However, from the present data it can be concluded that the
Explicitness Hierarchy is a good model to describe some aspect of the diachronic dy-
namics of pronominal paradigms.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the hypothesis was tested whether the synchronic restrictions on the
structure of pronominal paradigms (as formulated in the previous chapter) can be re-
interpreted diachronically. If this turned out to be feasible, then (part of) the explana-
tion of the synchronic restrictions could be attributed to diachronic reasons (cf Plank
& Schellinger, 2000). If the structure of human language tends to change in specific
directions (for whatever reason), the result of these changes will be shown as a
skewed distribution of the possible types in a sample of the world’s linguistic diver-
sity.
The method that was used to test the diachronic validity of the synchronic restrictions
was to search for ‘cognate paradigms’. Cases of such ‘cognate paradigms’ are pro-
nominal paradigms from genetically closely related languages. Ideally, these pro-
                                                 
13 Foley’s argument for this peculiar reconstruction is that the second person plural can only be recon-
structed as a compound of first and third plural. When it is taken into consideration that this kind of
homophony is rather frequently attested among the non-Austronesian languages in New Guinea, this
surprising paradigmatic structure for a reconstruction seems to make sense.
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nominal paradigms are functionally identical and the individual morphemes in the
paradigm are phonologically closely related. Under these conditions, any differences
that might occur in the paradigmatic structure is probably the result of a very shallow
change. Examples of such shallow changes present a window on the diachronic con-
nections between the various paradigmatic structures.
Only the major paradigmatic types were included in the present search for cognate
paradigms. As was shown in the previous chapter, these major types are structured by
two interrelated hierarchies, the Explicitness Hierarchy and the Horizontal Homoph-
ony Hierarchy. The Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy did not prove to be a good hy-
pothesis for diachronic change, although some aspects of it could be retained. It
turned out that the fine-grained stages of the hierarchy could easily be passed by dia-
chronically. However, a coherent picture emerged when the hierarchy is condensed to
the structure of the first person complex only. The Explicitness Hierarchy fares much
better as a hypothesis for the diachronic change. From the evidence presented, it can
be concluded that this hierarchy is a model for some aspect of the diachronic dynam-
ics of pronominal paradigms. Finally, the remaining connections from the two indi-
vidual hierarchies can be brought together in one cognitive map of interconnected
paradigms, as shown in Figure 6.11. This map is put forward as an informed hypothe-
sis about the lines along which paradigmatic change will happen. More research in
detail is needed before the diachronic dimension can be said to be anywhere near be-
ing understood. However, the upshot of the present chapter is that a first outline of a
theory of paradigmatic change is presented; one that is not based on individual stories
of change from incidental examples, but based on the general patterns of pronominal
paradigms as attested among the world’s languages.








“I never ask advice about growing,” Alice said indig-
nantly.
“Too proud?” the other enquired.
Alice felt even more indignant at this suggestion. “I
mean,” she said, “that one can’t help growing older.”
“One can’t, perhaps,” said Humpty Dumpty; “but two can.
With proper assistance, you might have left off at
seven.”
Lewis Carroll, Through the looking-glass and
what Alice found there
In this Part Three, I will deal with the subject of number in the domain of person
marking. The structure of these chapters is parallel to the discussion in the preceding
two parts. First, the cross-linguistic possibilities of number marking are investigated
in chapter 7. In this chapter, I will address the variable forms in which pronominal
systems mark specific restrictions to the number of participants in a group. Most
widely known are special forms for the dual. Other claimed possibilities for marking
quantity in human language are the trial (referring to three participants), the quadral
(referring to four participants) and the paucal (referring to a few participants). The
paucal is a number category that roughly ‘leaves off at seven.’ In chapter 8, a typol-
ogy is presented of the various paradigmatic structures that show some kind of dual
marking. At the end of this chapter, this variation is also analysed quantitatively,
which results in the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy. Finally, this hierarchy is interpreted
as a guideline for diachronic change. In chapter 9, this diachronic interpretation of the
hierarchy is tested by a collection of cognate paradigms. This crypto-diachronic




Redefining number in the pronominal domain
7.1 Introduction
The marking of quantity – more traditionally called ‘number’ – in human language is
a complex and multifaceted subject. In The Philosophy of Grammar Otto Jespersen
introduces the discussion of number with the warning that grammatical number is
more complex than basic counting.
‘Number might appear to be one of the simplest natural categories, as simple as ‘two
and two are four.’ Yet on closer inspection it presents a great many difficulties, both
logical and linguistic.’ (Jespersen, 1924: 188)
Jespersen continues with an extensive discussion of various aspects of number mark-
ing in the grammars of human languages. Among many other things, he notes the
problematic status of the plural in the pronominal domain, characterizing the pronoun
‘we’ as being ‘essentially vague’ (Jespersen, 1924: 192). Still, he does not conclude
that the analysis of ‘we’ as a plural had better be reconsidered. Yet this is exactly
what is being proposed in the present work. The traditional use of the concept ‘plural’
in the pronominal domain implies that the number of participants is important. How-
ever, as has been argued before (see especially chapter 3), the categories that are tra-
ditionally called ‘plural’ are better interpreted as unmarked for number. The differ-
ence between the traditional approach and the perspective that is taken in the present
work, is illustrated in Figure 7.1.1
                                                 
1 In line with the objective of the present work, I will restrict myself to the marking of number within
the pronominal domain, and ignore the marking of number on nouns. There is a powerful universal
saying that ‘the differentiation of number with nouns implies that with pronouns’ (Plank, 1989: 298).
More recent research still substantiates this claim, although more counterexamples have been found
(Plank, 1996: 124). This claim was first formulated by von Humboldt (1827: 156-157), later repeated
by Schmidt (1926: 316) a by Forchheimer (1953: 12). Schmidt puts it thus:
‘Die Numerusbildung ist überall zuerst vom Personalpronomen ausgegangen und hat sich dort am reich-
sten entwickelt. Es gehört deshalb auch zu den Ausnahmen – die semitischen Sprachen stellen eine solche
dar –, daß eine reiche Entwicklung des Numerus beim Nomen vorhanden wäre, aber beim Personalpro-
nomen fehlte.’ (Schmidt, 1926: 316)
If this claim is true, then it implies that the present investigation of number within the pronominal do-
main encompasses also a large part of the variability of number marking on nouns. However, the in-
vestigation of the relation between the nominal and the pronominal marking of number falls outside
the scope of the present work.


















Figure 7.1: Different perspectives on ‘number’ in the pronominal domain
In the previous chapters, the discussion was restricted to pronominal marking that is
unmarked for number; viz the marking of singular participants and groups of partici-
pants. A group of participants has been defined as a specific combination of various
singular participants. The notion ‘group’ is unmarked for number as it is not directed
to the number of participants. Of course, a group necessarily refers to more than one
person. Yet, the definition of a group is based purely on qualitative characteristics of
the constituting parts. The KIND of participants that form the group is important, not
the AMOUNT of the included participants. In this chapter, I will turn to cases where
amount is marked explicitly in the pronominal domain. The main concept that will be
used to describe the marking of amount will be ‘restriction’. Groups, I will argue, can
be restricted to the MINIMUM amount of participants, or, eventually, to a SMALL
amount. The concepts ‘minimal’ and ‘small’ are proposed as the basic pronominal
categories for marking cardinality. In most cases, the concepts ‘minimal amount’ and
‘small amount’ can be freely translated as ‘dual’ and ‘paucal’. All this terminology for
the discussion of cardinality may seem to be rather confusing, but the various terms
will be used consistently throughout this chapter. The words ‘amount’ and ‘quantity’
are used interchangeably in this chapter; both refer to semantic aspects of cardinality.
In contrast, the term ‘number’ will refer to the grammatical form in which aspects of
cardinality are grammaticalised in human language. When the phrase ‘amount of X’ is
used, this is explicitly intended to mean ‘a specific quantity of X’.2
In this chapter, I will first address the method that will be used to describe the differ-
ent forms of cardinality in pronominal paradigms. An important aspect of cross-
linguistic research is a meta-language on the basis of which the variable forms of hu-
man language can be compared. The meta-language for the marking of cardinality
will be presented in section 7.2. The complete typology of the various forms of mini-
mally restricted group marking (ie dual marking) that is attested cross-linguistically in
pronominal paradigms is too extensive to be dealt with in the context of this chapter.
This typology will be postponed to the following chapter. The next section in this
chapter deals with the claim that a minimally restricted group (ie dual) is more
marked than an unrestricted group (ie plural). Roughly speaking, this is true for pro-
nominal paradigms. Still, there are some counterexamples and problematic cases,
                                                 
2 In many cases, the phrase ‘number of X’ would be a more idiomatic expression for the phrase
‘amount of X’ as it is used here. However, I have not used the word ‘number’ in these cases so as to
minimise the confusion with the word ‘number’ as a grammatical term. Incidentally, the phrase ‘num-
ber of X’ will be used in the meaning ‘some X’. I have tried to restrict this usage to unambiguous
contexts in order not to enlarge this terminological muddle even more.
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which will be discussed in section 7.3. The other categories of number – trial, quadral
and paucal – turn out to be much less resistant to cross-linguistic comparison than the
dual. Their variety is much more restricted compared to the wide variation in marking
of the dual. These kinds of marking will be discussed in section 7.4. This chapter will
be concluded in section 7.5.
7.2 A meta-language for dual marking
This and the following chapters deal with the marking of number in its various ap-
pearances, but most space will be devoted to the marking of the dual. Duals are forms
that specifically refer to a group of two participants. They appear in different guises,
and are found all over the world. The structural diversity of the dual is large, and
equally extensive is the difference between the analyses that are made of the dual in
different languages. A complete investigation of the various forms of dual marking in
the pronominal domain will be postponed to the next chapter. In this section, the
meta-language for the analysis of the dual in pronominal paradigms will be presented.
This meta-language is a necessary prerequisite for the comparison of the different
patterns of dual marking further on.
I have chosen to use a representation of the dual in pronominal paradigms that is
slightly overweighted, but this surplus power will become of use later on. The repre-
sentation is shown in Figure 7.2. The first two columns consist of the categories as
discussed in the previous chapters. The new column is simply a copy of the group









Figure 7.2: Representational scheme for number marking paradigms
(the categories to be translated into English as ‘we’ are shaded in grey)
The idea behind the label ‘restricted group’ is that the number of participants in the
group is restricted to what is minimally needed.3 For example, to form a group ‘1+3’,
at least the speaker and an unspecified set of others is needed. A minimum of two per-
son is needed: the speaker and only one other participant. In other words, the category
‘restricted 1+3’ is a dual. The restricted forms are mostly dual in nature, but not in all
cases. A special case is the category ‘restricted 1+2+3’. This category can never be a
dual, as there are at least three persons involved in the category 1+2+3. Traditionally,
the category ‘restricted 1+2+3’ is analysed as a trial. Glasgow (1964: 109-110) was
                                                 
3 The word ‘restricted’ is also used by McGregor in the context of pronominal marking, but in a rather
different sense. He uses it to describe the unusual structure of pronominal reference in Gooniyandi,
which was discussed in section 3.6.6 (McGregor, 1989: 439; 1990: 167-169).
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the first to notice that for some languages the name ‘trial’ is referentially correct,
while the morphological structure of the language puts this ‘trial’ on a par with the
duals. Glasgow used the name ‘dual honored’ for this phenomenon. McKay (1978)
later introduced the name ‘unit augmented’. I opted for the name ‘restricted group’ as
this label is referentially accurate and it captures both the traditional ‘dual’, and the
‘trial 1+2+3’ form.4 The labels ‘group’ and ‘restricted group’ are intended as a pro-
posal to replace the traditional labels ‘plural’ and ‘dual’ in the pronominal domain.
There are two practical issues concerning the representation as shown in Figure 7.2.
Contrary to common practice, the ‘restricted group’ column (ie the dual) is placed to
the right of the unrestricted ‘group’ column (ie the plural). Normally, the dual is found
in between the singular and the plural columns. However, to emphasise the fact that
morphemes in the restricted column mark an extra dimension relative to the group
forms (viz the quantity of persons in the group), the restricted forms are added se-
quentially onto the existing framework as it is developed in the previous chapters.
This follows the general consensus that the dual is more marked than the plural (see
also section 7.3). The second practical issue is that, for reasons of readability, the term
‘dual’ is often used instead of the label ‘restricted group’.5 The term ‘dual’ should al-
ways be interpreted as meaning ‘minimally restricted group’ in this and subsequent
chapters.
As was said before, this framework is slightly overheavy. In the representation in
Figure 7.2, there are six different categories that would be translated into English as
‘we’ (shaded grey in the figure). However, these six different forms for ‘we’ are never
distinguished morphologically in a paradigm. Five different boxes would suffice to
represent the variability of the world’s languages. A better representation for the pos-
sible categories would be the structure as shown in Figure 7.3. The two different
boxes for 1+2 are joined to one category because the ‘group 1+2’ and the ‘restricted
group 1+2’ have the same reference: the pair of speaker and addressee. The represen-
tation from Figure 7.3 is referentially sufficient for describing the various forms of the
restricted group marking. However, there are numerous pronominal paradigms that
emphasise the dual character of their first person pronouns, and in those cases the rep-
resentation in Figure 7.3 is problematic.
                                                 
4 There is an important difference between the labels ‘restricted group’ and ‘unit augmented’. The label
‘restricted group’ is an etical label (cf footnote 7 on page 228 on the etic/emic distinction). This label
is independent of the structure of a particular language. Such language-independent labels are neces-
sary for a comparison of different structures from different languages. In contrast, the label ‘unit aug-
mented’ is an emic label, intended to capture the categorisation that is made by a specific language.
The benefits of the label ‘unit augmented’ for the description of the structure of particular pronominal
paradigms has been convincingly illustrated for some Australian languages by McKay (1978; 1979;
1984; 1990), but this does not make it effective as the basis for a cross-linguistics comparison (cf sec-
tion 8.6).
5 This improper usage of terminology is not appropriate for the ‘trial 1+2+3’, but this category is
grammaticalised only in a small number of cases. The label ‘dual’ will not lead to any misunder-
standing until section 8.6, which will deal extensively with this ‘trial 1+2+3’.









Figure 7.3: Alternative representation for the paradigms with restricted group marking
The crux of the problem is the double nature of the category 1+2. This category, tra-
ditionally called ‘dual inclusive’, has been aptly named an ‘ambiguous category’ by
Greenberg (1988). The label ‘dual inclusive’ refers to a group of two people (dual),
including the speaker and the addressee (inclusive). Some pronominal paradigms with
a ‘dual inclusive’ mark the linguistic form overtly as dual. In such a paradigm, the
‘dual inclusive’ is surrounded by other dual forms. An example of this marking pat-
tern is found in the independent pronouns from Maori, as shown in (7.1). The dual








1 au ma-tou ma-ua 1+3
2 koe kou-tou kor-ua 2+3
3 ia ra -tou ra -ua 3+3
Other paradigms take a different perspective. The independent pronouns from
Umpila, a Pama-Nyungan language from Australia, are structured rather differently,
as shown in (7.2). The ‘dual inclusive’ from Umpila does not follow the pattern of the







1 ayu ana ana-baamu 1+3
2 anu uula uula-baamu 2+3
3 nhulu bula bula-baamu 3+3
For languages such as Maori, the ‘dual inclusive’ is explicitly a dual form (that is also
inclusive), but for other languages, like Umpila, it is mainly an inclusive form (that is
also dual). The referential value is identical in both cases, but the paradigmatic struc-
ture that surrounds the ‘dual inclusive’ is different in each case. This ambiguity of the
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‘dual inclusive’ can be incorporated by using the representation as shown in Figure
7.2. In that representation, both sides of the ambiguity can be indicated by a different
graphic arrangement of the categories. Both variants of the inclusive dual are shown
below in Figure 7.4 in the arrangements as they will be represented in the present
work. A horizontal combination of categories represents a dual inclusive with empha-
sis on the inclusivity. A vertical combination of categories represents the dual inclu-
sive, with focus on the duality.6
inclusive dual inclusive dual
Figure 7.4: The ambiguous nature of the ‘dual inclusive’
A special situation occurs when the emphasis of the ‘dual inclusive’ is on the inclu-
sivity (as shown in the leftmost paradigm in Figure 7.4 above), a. In these cases, the
dual inclusive is best analysed along with the singular forms, as shown in Figure 7.5.
Of course, referentially, the inclusive dual is never a singular form, but some lan-
guages align this dual inclusive structurally with the singulars. In other words, etically






Figure 7.5: The singular-like status of the inclusive dual
                                                 
6 In the framework as shown in Figure 7.3, it is not possible to highlight this ambiguous character of
the ‘dual inclusive’. Only one of the two natures of the ambiguous ‘inclusive dual’ can be shown in a
structure such as Figure 7.3.
7 The etic-emic distinction originates from Pike (1954: 8-26). Pike’s ETIC approach to language is
strongly reminiscent of what in typology has come to be called the ‘tertium comparationis’: the (lan-
guage-independent) reference structure on the basis of which a cross-linguistic comparison is based.
He puts it thus:
‘One of the component goals [of the etic approach] may be said to be nonstructural or classificatory in the
sense that the linguist, in using this approach, devises logical categories of systems, classes, and units
therein without attempting to make them reflect the structuring discoverable in particular individual lan-
guages.’ (Pike, 1954: 8)
A typology can be seen as a catalogue and interpretation of the various EMIC instances of the ETIC
categories. Each language groups the extra-linguistically defined categories into its own mould.
‘[The emic approach] is an attempt to discover and to describe the pattern of that particular language or
culture in reference to the way in which the various elements of that culture are related to each other.’
(Pike, 1954: 8)
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In the transition as shown in Figure 7.5, the labels of the columns change. In the etical
presentation (the leftmost version) the labels are ‘singular’, ‘group’ and ‘restricted
group’, respectively, as discussed above. In the emical presentation (the rightmost
version), these labels cannot be used because they are referentially incorrect. In the
rightmost version, the labels ‘minimal’, ‘augmented’ and ‘unit-augmented’ are more
appropriate (McKay, 1978). Only for reasons of cross-linguistics comparison, have I
retained the dual inclusive category in its etically justified position in the presentation
of the various paradigms that will be shown in the following chapters. However, in all
the cases where the inclusive dual is depicted as a horizontal bar, this should be inter-
preted as signifying that this category is emically singular.
Let me add a last word on the terminology that will be used in the text. As already
noted, I will often use the word ‘dual’ where ‘restricted group’ would be more appro-
priate. In the same sense, the words ‘group’ and ‘plural’ will be used interchangeably
in this chapter. Also, the word ‘plural’ is sometimes used in a general sense, encom-
passing everything that consists of more than one object. Confusingly, this includes
the dual. In those instances where I judged the word ‘plural’ to be misleading, I use
the term ‘non-singular’ for the general sense of the term ‘plural’.
7.3 Markedness reversals
The analysis of number marking in pronominal paradigms is based on an important
assumption. The analysis assumes that restriction to the number of participants in a
group is linguistically marked relative to reference to an unrestricted amount. Put
more clearly, the analysis starts from the typology of group marking (as established in
the previous chapters) and from that point onwards develops an analysis of the mark-
ing of number (dual, trial, et cetera). With this method, I suggest that everything there
is to say about number marking can be formulated as an addendum to group marking.
In this section, I will raise some doubts as to this assumption, only to conclude in the
end that it is still safe to proceed this way.
There is a general claim in the literature that the dual is marked relative to general
non-singular marking. The basic claim was formulated by Greenberg in one of his
well-known universals:
‘Universal 34. No language has a trial number unless it has a dual. No language has a
dual unless it has a plural.’ (Greenberg, 1963: 94)
Roughly speaking, this is also true within the pronominal domain. Still, there are
some counterexamples and problematic cases in which the markedness is reversed (cf
Plank, 1989: 318). These examples once again highlight the fact that general tenden-
cies among the world’s languages are never to be interpreted too rigorously as univer-
sal characteristics. The cases in which the markedness is reversed can be subdivided
into three groups. First, there are pronominal paradigms that show REFERENTIAL
markedness reversal. Such paradigms have non-singular forms, but the unmarked ref-
erential value of these non-singular forms is dual. Second, there are pronominal para-
digms that show MORPHOLOGICAL markedness reversal. Such paradigms have both
dual and plural forms, but the plural is morphologically derived from the dual. Fi-
nally, there are pronominal paradigms that show PARADIGMATIC markedness reversal.
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Such paradigms have both dual and plural forms, but there are more categorial dis-
tinctions in the dual than in the plural. Each of these cases of markedness reversal will
be discussed separately.
The first group of counterexamples to Greenberg’s Universal 34 is the set of para-
digms that show REFERENTIAL markedness reversal. In these cases, the unmarked non-
singular prototypically refers to a group of two persons. Reference to more than two
persons can, if necessary, be explicitly marked with an extra morpheme. More spe-
cifically, such paradigms have only one non-singular column. These non-singular
forms encompass both dual and ‘more-than-dual’ reference. However, in those con-
texts where a distinction is needed, it is the reference to ‘more-than-dual’ that is in
need of extra marking. An example of referential markedness reversal is found in the
Athabascan independent pronouns, here exemplified with the pronouns from Navaho
(Reichard, 1951: 80-89). The form nxíh can be used meaning ‘we’ with plural and
dual reference. At first glance, this strongly resembles a normal plural, just as the
English pronoun ‘we’ can be used for both plural and dual reference. Interestingly
though, in Navaho, when it has to be made explicit that there is a difference between
two or more than two persons, then the bare form nxíh is used for the meaning ‘we
two’. A prefix da-… is used to form the pronoun da-nxíh, meaning ‘we, more than
two’. In the description by Reichard, it is put as follows:
‘Speakers often fail to distinguish dual and plural, using the same forms for both, un-
less a distinction is needed, when da- is prefixed to the dual forms [to produce plural
forms].’ (Reichard, 1951: 80)
The same situation can be found in the Californian language Achumawi. In the in-
dicative mood, Achumawi uses a suffix …-má to disambiguate the plural from the
dual. This suffix is not part of the pronominal paradigm, because the pronominal ele-
ments are prefixes. The unmarked meaning of the non-singular pronominal prefixes is
dual; reference to more than two has to be made explicitly by adding …-má (de An-
gulo & Freeland, 1931: 91).8
The second group of counterexamples to Greenberg’s Universal 34 is the set of
pronominal paradigms that show MORPHOLOGICAL markedness reversal. In these
cases, the paradigms have different forms for dual and ‘more-than-dual’ reference.
However, when the morphophonological structure of these forms is scrutinised, it
turns out that the forms with ‘more-than-dual’ reference are morphologically marked
relative to the dual forms. An example of morphological markedness reversal is found
in the independent pronouns from the Uralic language Nganasan. These pronouns are
shown in (7.3). The ‘more-than-dual’ pronouns are derived fully regularly from the
dual by a suffix …- (Helimski, 1998: 501-502). Note that the morphology reverses
the markedness, while the structural markedness is unimpaired: all specialised dual
forms have a specialised plural counterpart. There are at least as many group mor-
phemes as there are dual ones.
                                                 
8 See example (8.47) on page 268 for the pronominal prefixes from Achumawi.










2 tn tï- ti 2+3
3 sïtï sïtï- sïtï 3+3
Another example of morphological markedness reversal is found in Damana, an
Aruak (Chibchan) language from Colombia. The independent pronouns from Damana
are shown in (7.4). The plural pronouns are clearly derived from the dual pronouns by
using a suffix …-nyina (Amaya, 1999: 76). For comparison, the independent pronouns
of Ika, a language closely related to Damana, are shown in (7.5). The (morphologi-
cally unmarked) dual morphemes in Damana are identical to the plural forms in Ika.
The forms with the suffix …-nyina are not attested in Ika (Frank, 1990: 26). Probably,
Damana has reanalysed the plural pronouns into dual pronouns, and added a new set










2 ma mabi-nyina mabi 2+3







2 ma miwi 2+3
3 a ika 3+3
There are some more examples such as the Damana-Ika case, in which the dual forms
of a particular language are identical to the plural forms of a close cognate. These ex-
amples show that diachronically the dual forms sometimes dominate over the plural
ones. An example is the inflectional paradigm from Kwamera, an Oceanic language
from Vanuatu as discussed on page 261 below, and the closely related paradigm of
Lenakel, as discussed on page 143 above. The dual morpheme k-… from Kwamera is
found as a general non-singular in Lenakel. The plural from Kwamera is not found in
Lenakel. Another example is found in the independent pronouns from two other Oce-
anic languages, Maori (on page 227 above) and Rapanui (on page 260 below). The
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dual morphemes of the second and third person (as still found in Rapanui) have taken
over the reference of the plural in Maori.
The third group of counterexamples to Greenberg’s Universal 34 contradicts the
markedness structure as proposed by the universal. The universal can be interpreted as
a markedness cline, for example to be formulated as ‘plural is less marked than dual’.
In markedness-theory, the occurrence of more oppositions is generally interpreted as a
sign of low markedness (Greenberg, 1966: 27). Accordingly, paradigms that have
categorial oppositions in the dual that are not attested in the plural do not follow this
markedness cline. I will call this phenomenon PARADIGMATIC markedness reversal,
because the form of the paradigm does not follow the direction of markedness as pro-
posed by the universal. I have found a few examples of paradigmatic counterexamples
to Greenberg’s Universal 34. All cases have an inclusive-exclusive opposition in the
dual but not in the plural. However, in all these cases, the descriptions are not exhaus-
tive and doubt can be raised as to the analysis. Still, as it stands now, these descrip-
tions exist and have to be reckoned with. The first example, shown in (7.6), is the















3 y yã/diy ili 3+3
Another example with the same structure is the paradigm of the pronominal prefixes
from the extinct American language Coos, presented on page 254 below
(Frachtenberg, 1922a: 321). A final example of paradigmatic markedness reversal is
the paradigm of independent pronouns from Wik-Munkan, a Pama-Nyungan language
from Australia, presented on page 253. This last example highlights the problematic
status of the description of these markedness reversals, as the same author describes
slightly different forms for the paradigm on different occasions. One of these descrip-
tions shows paradigmatic markedness reversal; the other does not.
It can be concluded from these examples that reversal of number markedness exists.
These examples indicate that not all pronominal paradigms in the world’s languages
consider the dual to be a marked category relative to the general non-singular. How-
ever, the number of examples with markedness reversal is low and it is generally hard
to find examples of the kind that are discussed in this section. The cases that were
presented in this section highlight that general tendencies in the structure of human
language are never simply universal laws. I will disregard these cases in the subse-
quent chapters and discuss number marking as a specialised variation of group mark-
ing.
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7.4 Other Numbers
The previous sections have laid the foundation for the discussion of the different ways
in which number is marked in pronominal paradigms. The most prolific number-
category in the pronominal domain is the dual. However, the variability of dual
marking is too extensive to be dealt with here. The next, rather lengthy, chapter is de-
voted to the description and the analysis of the complete variation of dual marking. I
will now turn to other reported categories marking specific amounts. Analogously to
the dual, categories such as the ‘trial’ (referring to a group of three), ‘paucal’ (refer-
ring to a few) and even an incidental case of a ‘quadral’ (referring to a group of four)
have been described in the literature. In this section, I will present a review of the dis-
tribution and the structural diversity of the pronominal paradigms with trial, quadral
or paucal marking. Although these categories might indeed exist, they are not as
widespread as the dual. Also, it is questionable whether the categories ‘trial’ and
‘quadral’ are really strictly used to refer to a specific amount of participants. In many
cases (and maybe even in all) ‘paucal’ seems to be a much more useful label.
A major observation on the areal/genetic distribution of these paradigms is that they
are found only in the Pacific. I have never come across a pronominal paradigm with a
trial, a quadral or a paucal other than among the Austronesian languages or among the
non-Austronesian languages from New Guinea and the surrounding islands. Put dif-
ferently, number marking (other than the dual) seems to be a Melanesian characteris-
tic (Lynch, 1998: 102).9 Of course, the linguistic variation in the Melanesian region is
immense. Still, this clear geographical restriction gives the impression that these cate-
gories are highly marked. The main origin of these categories seems to be the large
family of Austronesian languages. These languages are known to have strongly influ-
enced other languages in the Pacific.10 Only because the trial, quadral and paucal hap-
pen to be found in one of the most extended and widespread linguistic families of the
world (the Austronesian language family), do these categories appear to be common.
Typologically speaking, they are not. Also, the structural diversity of these kinds of
number marking is restricted. Most examples of trials, quadrals or paucals simply add
a complete set of slightly changed dual forms to the paradigm. Only two incidental
cases do not follow this typical structure. This regularity confirms the impression that
the marking of higher amounts is a highly constrained phenomenon. The various
forms of higher number marking are all morphophonologically related to the dual
forms in the paradigm. Consequently, trials, paucals and quadrals will all be inter-
preted as specialised versions of ‘restricted group’ marking. In section 7.2, a dual has
                                                 
9 I know of one, although poorly described, exception. In the Gé language Apinayé, the pronominal
prefix vam is translated as ‘they four’ (Callow, 1962: 115, fn. 4).
10 Schmidt (1926: 318-320) proposes an influence in the other direction. In his view, extensive number
marking originated among the Papuan languages, and was borrowed by the Austronesian languages.
This scenario seems less likely once the immense diversity of the Papuan languages is taken into ac-
count. Only very few languages out of the many different Papuan languages have a trial or paucal. In
contrast, trials are relatively common among the surrounding Austronesian languages. Maybe Schmidt
underestimated the diversity of the Papuan languages, wrongly taking the trial of Kiwai, shown here in
(7.7), as representative for all Papuan languages. Even so, Schmidt’s section describing the variety of
Papuan languages is impressive for his time (1926: 148-154). This indicates that he must have known
about the exceptional structure of Kiwai among the Papuan languages.
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been analysed as a MINIMALLY restricted group. Extending this proposal, other num-
ber categories will be analysed as SPECIFICALLY restricted groups; restricted to either
three, four or a few participants. The paradigms of the various number categories will
be depicted with extra columns in between the already present dual and group col-
umns; all the columns that mark number are gathered under the heading of ‘restricted
group’.11
A paradigm with a trial is attested in the Papuan language Kiwai. The independent
pronouns from Kiwai are shown in (7.7) below (Foley, 1986: 72, quoting Ray 1933).
This is the only example of a complete set of trial forms in a paradigm without an in-
clusive/exclusive opposition. I have no information on the exact referential possibili-









2 ro nigo nigoibi nigoto 2+3
3 nou nei neibi neito 3+3
Examples of a trial are numerous among the Austronesian languages. These para-
digms always differentiate between an inclusive and an exclusive trial. The dual is
diachronically related to the plural plus a suffix meaning ‘two’ and the trial is related
to the plural with a suffix meaning ‘three’. This is exemplified in (7.8) with the sub-
ject pronouns from the Oceanic language Lonwolwol Ambrym. The dual is formed
with the numeral …-ro, meaning ‘second’ and the third with a suffixed numeral







1 ni gnm gnmsUl gnmro 1+3
2 nk gami gamsUl gamro 2+3
3 ae e erUl ero 3+3
                                                 
11 The division between a minimal inclusive (1+2) and an augmented inclusive (1+2+3) is not attested
with higher number marking. Still, I have decided to retain these labels in the diagrams to enhance the
visual similarity to the other paradigms that are discussed in the present work.
12 It is rather easy to find examples of this type among the Oceanic languages. The independent pro-
nouns of Tolai also have a dual and a trial inclusive and exclusive (Mosel, 1984: 93). Lynch
(1998: 102) mentions Anejom as another example of the same structure.
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It is questionable, though, whether the forms for the dual and the trial are indeed used
for precisely two and three persons, respectively. The exact referential possibilities for
the dual and trial are taken for granted in most grammars. Only in a few descriptions,
is the usage of these categories extensively described. In those cases, it turns out that
it is possible to deviate from the exact number of participants. A good example is
found in the description of another Oceanic language, Paamese, shown in (7.9) below.
The structure of the pronominal paradigm resembles the paradigm from Lonwolwol
Ambrym in (7.8). This time, the suffigated numerals are …-lue and …-telu, meaning
‘two’ and ‘three’ respectively (Crowley, 1982: 80-81). Yet, Crowley prefers to call the
‘trial’ by the name ‘paucal’. The following lengthy quote describes extensively how
intricately the reference of the trial/paucal is construed.13
‘The conditions governing the use of the paucal and the plural are rather more complex.
The basic factor that is involved is the absolute size of the group being referred to. In-
tersecting with this parameter however is the question of relative size, ie whether the
group being referred to is contrasted with some larger group within which it is sub-
sumed. When the absolute number is low (say between three and about half a dozen),
the paucal is generally used, whether or not there is any contrast with a larger group.
(However, the plural will still very occasionally be used even with these low numbers
when there is no such contrast.) When the absolute number is in the middle range (say
between about half a dozen and a dozen or so), the most significant parameter is that of
relative number. For example, one’s own patrilineage will be referred to paucally when
it is contrasted with the village as a whole, which will be plural. On the other hand, the
patrilineage will be expressed in the plural when contrasted with the nuclear family,
which will be in the paucal. As the absolute number increases over the middle range,
relative number again becomes less significant, and the plural is generally used for all
numbers over a dozen. (However, even with very large numbers, the paucal is occa-
sionally used when the contrast in number is expressed. So while the entire population
of Paama will normally be expressed in the plural, even when contrasted with the







1 inau komai komaitelu komalu 1+3
2 kaiko kamii kamiitelu kamilu 2+3
3 kaie kaile kaitelu kailue 3+3
                                                 
13 The independent pronouns of Kwaio are also described using the label ‘paucal’, although the suffix
that marks these forms …-oru is the numeral three (Keesing, 1985: 27-34). Lynch (1998: 102) men-
tions the Nadrau dialect of Fijian as another example of this same structure.
14 In Paamese, the dual can be used for reference to more than two persons. However, this phenomenon
is comparable to the usage of a plural pronoun in addressing a singular person. I will follow Crowley
and still use the name ‘dual’ for this category, although this name should not be taken too literally.
‘The dual forms are generally used to refer to only two referents. However, a speaker who is addressing a
large crowd, which would normally be addressed in the plural, will sometimes use the dual inclusive forms
instead. This is particularly so if the speaker wants to persuade his audience to a particular point of view.
The speaker is effectively speaking to each addressee individually, and the use of the dual in such circum-
stances is more directly appealing to the individual in the large group.’ (Crowley, 1982: 80)
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Taken at face value, it seems that there are two different types of pronominal systems
in the descriptions of Austronesian languages: one with a trial category and one with a
paucal (cf Lynch, 1998: 102-103). However, it is unclear whether there really is a dif-
ference in linguistic structure between these languages, or whether there is only a dif-
ference in descriptive practice. The case for a ‘real’ trial (which would be a mor-
pheme with referential value of exactly three and nothing else) is to my knowledge
never explicitly made. When the precise referential possibilities of the trial/paucal are
discussed in a grammar, then the vote always goes to paucal reference. Only when no
in-depth discussion of the exact referential possibilities is presented, is the name
‘trial’ used. Often, reference will be made to the origin of the trial as a grammatical-
ised numeral ‘three’. However, in the process of grammaticalisation, the meaning of
the morphemes changes frequently. In the case of the numeral ‘three’, the meaning
normally changes to ‘few’ in the process of grammaticalisation. This is, for example,
argued for the history of the pronouns from the Malaita family of the Solomon Is-
lands. The numeral ‘three’ is grammaticalised into the pronominal paradigm, but in
the majority of cases, the meaning changes in this grammaticalisation process from
‘trial’ to ‘paucal’.
‘Only one language, ‘Are’are, has retained the original four number system with a true
trial number. Other southern languages, including Kwaio, Sa’a, Langalanga, and Lau,
have retained the four number system, but the original trial forms have changed their
meaning to “few” or a restricted plural. That the original meaning was “trial” is evident
from the fact that the trial pronouns were a compound with the number ‘three’.’
(Simons, 1986: 33)
Another case that can shed some light on this issue is the structure of the pronouns
from Bolaang Mongondow, spoken on Sulawesi in Indonesia.15 The pronouns are
shown in (7.10) below. The most interesting aspect of these pronouns is a special set
of ‘determined’ pronouns that can only be used with an adjacent numeral. This nu-






kita kita + numeral kitada
1+2+3
1 aku’oy kami kami + numeral kaminda 1+3
2 ikow mo’ikow kamu + numeral kamunda 2+3
3 sia mosia tara + numeral tara dua 3+3
The dual forms are already highly grammaticalised constructions with the numeral
dua meaning ‘two’. It is from this situation that a numeral ‘three’ can possibly gram-
maticalise into the pronominal system. In the change from a numeral to the category
of number, the meaning of ‘three’ will probably change to ‘few’.16
                                                 
15 The data and analyses presented from Bolaang Mongondow were kindly given to me in personal
communication by Ruben Stoel from Leiden University.
16 Cf the grammaticalisation of the English couple from meaning ‘exactly two’ into meaning ‘a few’.
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And what about the quadral? A quadral is said to occur in the pronominal paradigm of
the Oceanic language Sursurunga, shown in (7.11). Although Hutchisson (1986: 5)
uses the label ‘quadral’, his description does not restrict this form to referential usage
with groups of four participants only. The ‘quadral’ can also be used for more partici-
pants, reminiscent of the use of the paucal as described by Crowell for Paamese. The
use of the ‘quadral’ is rather clearly described in the following quote from Hutchisson
as being paucal in nature. Corbett (1997) labels this quadral more suitably a ‘greater
paucal’.17
‘Since plural pronouns are never used with relationship terms, the use of these terms
skews number reference for both trial and quadral forms (although not for dual) that
trial comes to mean a minimum of 3, and quadral a minimum of 4. Either can stand for
plural, although quadral is probably more frequently used.’ (Hutchisson, 1986: 10)
 ‘Actual numbers as definitions are less accurate than terms like <few> or <several>,
and reflect less the flexibility with which Sursurungas approach their language.’








git gitat gittul gitar
1+2+3
1 iau gim gimat gimtul giur 1+3
2 iu gam gamat gamtul gaur 2+3
3 on,i di diat ditul diar 3+3
There are a few paradigms where a trial/paucal is not consistently marked throughout
the paradigm. I will only list the two examples attested as an illustration of yet more
possible structures for pronominal paradigms. A paucal without an inclusive-
exclusive distinction is found in the independent pronouns from the Papuan language
Yimas, shown in (7.12). Foley describes the referential properties of the paucal as re-
ferring to ‘a few, from three up to seven, but variable depending on context’ (Foley,












3 (locative deixis) 3+3
                                                 
17 Schmidt (1926: 319) mentions Ambrym and Marina from Vanuatu, as well as Gao from the Solomon
Islands, as other examples showing a quadral. I was unable to track down the original sources de-
scribing these languages.
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Besides the paradigm from Yimas, I have come across one other special paradigm
with number marking higher than dual. In the independent pronouns from the Aus-
tronesian language Biak, as shown in (7.13), a trial is found only in the third person
(Steinhauer, 1985: 470, 479-480).18 A comparable situation is found in Bolaang Mon-
gondow, as shown in (7.10) above. In that language, the second and third person plu-







1 ai’a no nu 1+3
2 ’au mo mu 2+3
3 i si/na so su 3+3
To summarise, number marking higher than dual is neither areally nor structurally
very diverse. Areally, the examples are only found in Melanesia. Structurally, almost
all patterns are completely regular extensions of one of the standard dual patterns. The
only structural exceptions are the patterns from Yimas and Biak as discussed above.
More importantly, it remains to be seen whether ‘real’ trials and quadrals exist. When
the description of the referential possibilities is made explicit, it almost always turns
out that these categories are better rephrased as ‘paucal’ and ‘greater paucal’, even
though the historical formation invokes the numeral elements.19 Historically, these
elements clearly mean ‘three’ or ‘four’, but once they become grammaticalised into
the pronominal paradigm, the meaning changes to paucal and greater paucal.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the marking of number in the pronominal domain has been redefined
around the concept ‘restricted group’. Previously (in chapter 3) a GROUP of partici-
pants had been defined on a qualitative basis: the kind of participants that form a
group is important, not the number. Expanding on this basis, a RESTRICTED GROUP of
participants has been defined in this chapter as a group that is marked for the specific
number of participants. In this sense, the concept ‘restricted group’ is intended to re-
place the traditional concept ‘number’ in the pronominal domain.
                                                 
18 Hein Steinhauer (personal communication) suggest that the pronouns with the ending …-o are his-
torically related to the numeral three. The referential value of this numeral has been extended to en-
compass all group reference (cf morphological markedness reversal as discussed in section 7.3). This
proposal fits with the observation by Schmidt that many unrestricted plurals in the Austronesian lan-
guages are related to former specific number markers:
‘Die eine [Bildung] läßt den Plural überhaupt fallen und macht den bisherigen Trial zu einem Plural; das
ist die typische Form der sämtlichen polynesichen Sprachen, die aber auch schon in den melanesischen
Sprachen auftritt. … Die andere Bildung fügt zu den Formen Singular, Dual, Trial noch einen Quatral, eine
Vierzahl hinzu und macht diese zum Plural.’ (Schmidt, 1926: 319)
19 G. Corbett (personal communication) commented that the Austronesian language Larike, spoken on
Maluku in Indonesia, has a real grammaticalised trial. I have not been able to check this claim.
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Cross-linguistically, the most abundantly attested marking of number is the
MINIMALLY RESTRICTED GROUP. In such a group, the number of participants is re-
stricted to the minimally required quantity. For example, the group 1+3 minimally
needs two participants (one speaker and one other) for it to retain its characteristic
constitution. In most cases, the minimally restricted group is identical to what tradi-
tionally has been called a dual. However, this terminology also includes the para-
digms that have a minimally restricted 1+2+3 group. This minimally restricted group
consists of three participants (one speaker, one addressee and one other) and has been
referred to, traditionally, as a trial. The full discussion of the various attested possi-
bilities for the marking of minimally restricted groups in pronominal paradigms will
be discussed in the next chapter.
In most cases, the minimally restricted group is marked relative to the unrestricted
group. However, there are a few troublesome instances and counterexamples to this
markedness cline. Three different kinds of markedness reversal have been discrimi-
nated. First, there are cases that show REFERENTIAL markedness reversal. In such
cases, the default referential value of an unmarked group morpheme is dual. Second,
there are cases that show MORPHOLOGICAL markedness reversal. In these cases, the
unrestricted group morphemes are derived morphologically from the restricted forms.
Finally, there are cases that show STRUCTURAL markedness reversal. In these cases,
the set of restricted group morphemes has more oppositions than the set of unre-
stricted group morphemes. Notwithstanding these counterexamples, the discussion of
the marking of number will be built on the assumption that the restricted group is
marked relative to the unrestricted group.
There are various other categories that mark quantity in the pronominal domain. Other
categories that have been described in the literature are trials (referring to three par-
ticipants), quadrals (referring to four participants) and paucals (referring to a few par-
ticipants). These categories have been attested almost exclusively in the Pacific. The
areal and genetic diffusion of these categories is strongly restricted. Moreover, the
structural diversity of these paradigms is low. Most cases are simply regular exten-
sions of the paradigms with duals, adding a slightly changed copy of all dual forms to
the paradigm. Another point is that, from the existing descriptions, it is questionable
whether ‘real’ trials and quadrals exist. In those case in which a description goes into
detail about the referential possibilities of such forms, the conclusion is that ‘trials’
and ‘quadrals’ are in fact ‘paucals’ and ‘greater paucals’. The use of the label ‘trial’
and ‘quadral’ is only attested in those sources that do not expand on the referential
possibilities of these forms. These sources seem to take it for granted that the dia-
chronic source of the affix (often a numeral meaning ‘three’ and ‘four’ respectively)
is a correct description of the grammaticalised pronominal form. It is doubtful
whether this is accurate. Pending more in-depth analyses of the referential possibili-
ties, it seems better to interpret a grammaticalised trial as being in fact a paucal. In the
present framework, a paucal can be reformulated as a SMALL restricted group.

Chapter 8
The diversity of minimal number
A typology of dual marking in the pronominal domain
8.1 Introduction
It has often been claimed that duals are most prominent in the marking of ‘we’. The
oldest of these observations was made by Humboldt in his paper on the dual:
‘Einigen dieser Sprachen nehmen die Ansicht des Dualis von der redenden und angere-
deten Person, dem ICH und dem DU her. In diesen haftet derselbe am Pronomen, geht
nur so weit in die übrige Sprache mit über, als sich der Einfluss des Pronomen er-
streckt, ja beschränkt sich bisweilen allein auf das Pronomen der ersten Person in der
Mehrheit, auf den Begriff des WIR.’ (von Humboldt, 1827: 156, italics added, MC)
In a thorough reappraisal of Humboldt’s work, Plank (1989) repeats the special status
of the first person when it comes to duals. He summarises his findings in two impli-
cational universals:
‘If only one person differentiates a dual, it will very likely be the 1st rather than the 2nd
or 3rd. If only two persons differentiate a dual, the 1st is much likelier to be one of them
than the 3rd.’ (Plank, 1989: 305)1
The results of this chapter will suggest a slightly different generalisation. Indeed, if
there are specialised dual forms in a pronominal paradigm, it is extremely rare for
there to be no dual involving at least the speaker. However, when there are grammati-
calised dual forms, then it is also extremely rare for there to be no dual involving the
other persons as well. Dual forms normally seem to show up across the board of the
paradigm.2
Still, there is massive variation in the paradigmatic structure of dual marking. This
chapter starts off in section 8.2 with a quick survey of the method that is used to make
a typology of this variation and with some short notes on terminology. Subsequently,
the various forms of dual marking will be discussed according to the number of dif-
                                                 
1 Cf Universal 46 from Sokolovskaya (1980: 97).
2 There may appear to be a special status for a dual first person, as claimed by Humboldt and Plank, but
on closer inspection this apparent predominance is due to the ‘inclusive dual’. When the dual is only
attested in the first person inclusive, I have classified such a paradigm as a case of the mini-
mal/augmented paradigm. In languages with a minimal/augmented paradigm, no sign of duality is
found in the language except for this ‘inclusive dual’ (cf the data in table 11 from Plank, 1996: 131).
As argued in sections 3.6.5 and 4.7, the ‘inclusive dual’ is not really a dual, but a special form of
group marking. Due to this interpretation, the special status of the first person when it comes to dual
marking is strongly diminished (see especially section 8.8.3 below).
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ferent forms that include at least the speaker – the number of forms that are to be
translated into English as ‘we’. First, I will deal with paradigms with two forms for
‘we’ in section 8.3, leading up to paradigms with five different forms for ‘we’ in sec-
tion 8.6. Finally, in section 8.7, those paradigms are discussed that have dual forms in
the pronominal paradigm, but do not have any dual forms including the speaker.
These cases are real counterexamples to the claims by Humboldt and Plank above. In
section 8.8, a sample is assembled on the basis of the attested diversity to analyse the
structural characteristics of the various paradigmatic possibilities. These quantitative
analyses will result in the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy. A summary of the paradig-
matic variation attested is presented in section 8.9.
8.2 Method and terminology
In this chapter, the diversity of pronominal paradigms with specialised dual forms will
be organised into a typology. For this survey of the various attested structures, the
same representation will be used for all examples. This representational structure has
been described extensively in the previous chapter; it is repeated here in Figure 8.1.
Dual reference in the pronominal domain has been analysed as a ‘minimally restricted
group’. A GROUP, as, for example, 1+3, has been defined qualitatively as a set of par-
ticipants that includes the speaker and others. A MINIMALLY RESTRICTED GROUP 1+3
has been defined as the set of participants that is minimally necessary to form this
group – viz two, at least one speaker and one other participant (see chapter 7.2 for a
detailed discussion). The minimally restricted groups are in most cases duals, except
for 1+2+3, in which case three participants are minimally needed; in other words, the
minimally restricted 1+2+3 is a trial. Practically, the labels ‘group’ and ‘restricted
group’ are unusual and therefore rather cumbersome. In the running text, the more









Figure 8.1: Representation for paradigms with dual forms
The discussion of the various paradigmatic structures will be ordered by the number
of morphemes that are to be translated into English as ‘we’ (these categories are
shaded grey in Figure 8.1). In this way, the resulting typology of the dual can be eas-
ily compared with the results obtained in the previous chapters in which the same
‘first person perspective’ was taken. A paradigm that is included in this chapter has
minimally two forms for ‘we’ (a plural and a dual form) up to maximally distin-
guishing five different forms. Some paradigmatic structures will be discussed under
the heading of ‘incomplete’ paradigms. The word ‘incomplete’ will consistently be
put in quotation-marks to avoid the suggestion that these paradigms are less functional
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or deteriorated versions of any ‘complete’ versions. The label ‘incomplete’ is only a
result of the classificational strategy that is used for the typology. The classification
starts in each section from the paradigmatic structure with maximal distinctiveness
and describes other patterns relative to these paradigms. Two characteristics of ‘in-
complete’ paradigms will be distinguished: VERTICAL HOMOPHONY – which means
that there is an overlap between various categories within one column – and
HORIZONTAL HOMOPHONY – which means that there is an overlap between the various
columns.
8.3 Two different forms for ‘we’
8.3.1 Preamble
Paradigms with two different forms for ‘we’ come in two guises. One possible divi-
sion of the two forms for ‘we’ is the inclusive-exclusive opposition. The various para-
digmatic structures with such an opposition have already been discussed extensively
in chapter 4. The other possible division between the two different forms for ‘we’ is
the dual-plural distinction, which will be discussed in this section. These two possible
divisions might seem completely different, but they are not. An inclusive ‘we’ proto-
typically refers to the speech-act dyad of speaker and addressee, which is also a dual.
The difference between an inclusive-exclusive opposition and a dual-plural opposition
is not that large. A clear criterion to distinguish between the two possible oppositions
is needed. The basic criterion for deciding that there is an opposition dual vs. plural
(and not inclusion vs. exclusion of the addressee) is the presence of dual forms for all
other non-singular categories. The presence of specialised morphemes for the dual
second person plural and the dual third person plural indicate that the two forms for
‘we’ are also to be distinguished by number. Such cases, with a full series of dual
forms, are discussed in section 8.3.2 under the name of DUAL-UNIFIED-WE paradigm.
Next, in section 8.3.3, some examples are presented of paradigms that have a special-
ised dual ‘we’, but miss some of the other dual categories. There are different kinds of
missing referential categories. A difference will be made between HORIZONTAL ho-
mophony (different numbers of the same person are taken together in the reference of
one morpheme) and VERTICAL homophony (different person of the same number are
taken together). Finally, section 8.3.4 will summarise the variation of paradigms with
two forms for ‘we’.
8.3.2 The dual-unified-we paradigm
The first paradigmatic structure involving dual marking to be discussed in detail is the
dual-unified-we paradigm. Such a paradigm does not distinguish between inclusive
and exclusive (viz it has a unified-we structure) and it has dual forms throughout the
paradigm. In total, this paradigm consists of nine morphemes: three singular mor-
phemes (1, 2 and 3), three non-singular morphemes (the ‘plural’ forms of the singular
categories) and three dual versions of these non-singular morphemes. This is a very
common structure for a pronominal paradigm. In his typological analysis of personal
pronouns, Ingram (1978: 219) classified this paradigm as one of the ‘four systems that
are more frequent than the others.’ In this section I will give a review of the world-
wide distribution of the dual-unified-we type among the world’s languages. More ex-
amples are rather easily found in the areas or families as indicated.
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Starting in Europe, a dual pronominal inflection can be reconstructed (partly) for
Proto-Indo-European (Szemerényi, 1990: 235), but there is hardly a trace of a dual to
be found in the pronominal reference of contemporary Indo-European languages. A
full dual set is found in Lithuanian (Schmalstieg, 1998: 470). In Lower Sorbian, a
Slavic language, a complete dual-unified-we paradigm is found in the nominative
form of the independent pronouns, shown in (8.1). Note that there is a gender distinc-










2 ty wy wej 2+3
3 won(o/a) woni wonej 3+3
Travelling east through Eurasia, this paradigmatic type is common in Siberian lan-
guages of the Uralic family.3 A complete dual-unified-we pronoun system can also be
found in Tibeto-Burman.4 Crossing the Bering strait to America, duals of this type are
attested in Eskimo-Aleut.5 However, the pure dual-unified-we pronoun paradigms
with duals are not very widespread in the remaining American languages, as most
pronominal paradigms with duals also distinguish inclusive from exclusive.6 The
dual-unified-we pronoun system is also commonly found among the non-
Austronesian languages of Papua New Guinea.7 Finally, the dual-unified-we para-
digm is common in Australia. It is exemplified in (8.2) by the independent pronouns










2 yinda yura yubala 2+3
3 nyula dyana bula 3+3
                                                 
3 Eg Khanti (Abondolo, 1998a: 373-375) and Mansi (Keresztes, 1998: 398-399).
4 Eg the independent pronouns from Meithei (Chelliah, 1997: 79), Chepang and Kham (Bauman,
1975: 273, 282).
5 Eg the North Slope Iñupiaq suffixes (MacLean, 1986: 62-63) and the Central Yup’ic independent pro-
nouns (Woodbury, 1981: 231-233).
6 Yet, examples of a pure dual-unified-we system can be found. An example is the paradigm of the
independent pronouns from Lake/Bodega Miwok (Freeland, 1947: 35; Callaghan, 1974).
7 Numerous examples can be found in Wurm (1975b) and in Voorhoeve (1975), eg the Bosavi family
(ibid. 393-394) and the Duna-Bogaya family (ibid. 396).
8 Dixon (1980: 329) also mentions Warrgamay and Pitjantjatjara as examples of this paradigmatic type
and reconstructs a dual-unified-we paradigms for Proto-Pama-Nyungan (cf Blake, 1988: 6).
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8.3.3  ‘Incomplete’ dual-unified-we paradigms
Next, I turn to the paradigmatic structure of ‘incomplete’ dual-unified-we paradigms.
By using the term ‘incomplete’, I do not want to suggest that these paradigms are less
functional or deteriorated variants of the ‘complete’ paradigms. The only reason to
approach them under the heading of ‘incompleteness’, is because they will be dis-
cussed as variants relative to the dual-unified-we paradigm.
‘Incomplete’ dual-unified-we paradigms come in two guises. First, different persons
within the same number can be coded by one and the same morpheme. I will call this
VERTICAL homophony, as two categories in the same (vertical) column are combined
into the marking of one morpheme. The other kind of homophony, which I will call
HORIZONTAL, marks the same person in different numbers by one and the same mor-
pheme. In such paradigms, two categories in the same (horizontal) row are taken to-
gether. Ultimately, there are two paradigms with only a dual in the first person and no
other duals. These examples are somewhat problematic, as the paradigmatic structure
resembles the cases with an inclusive-exclusive distinction. However, the grammati-
cal descriptions of these two examples emphasise the dual character of the distinction,
which justifies their inclusion in this chapter. Examples of ‘diagonal’ homophony, in
which different persons of different numbers are marked by the same morpheme, are
extremely uncommon. The only example that I have come across, the Yareba inde-
pendent pronouns, is presented at the end of this section.
Vertical homophony is mainly found among the non-Austronesian languages from
New Guinea. All these cases from New Guinea have a homophony of the second and
third person. As an example of this pattern, the independent pronouns from Kalam are
shown in (8.3), with a homophony between second and third in the restricted group














                                                 
9 The same structure as in Kalam is also found in the Papuan languages Baruya (Wurm, 1975b: 499,
citing Lloyd 1973) and Fore (Foley, 1986: 74, citing Scott 1978). There are different claims about the
independent pronouns of Wiru. Wurm (1975b: 489, citing Kerr 1967) describes the Wiru paradigm as
identical to the structure as found in Kalam in (8.3) but Foley (1986: 72, citing Kerr 1966) describes a
paradigm identical to the structure as found in Yagaria in (8.4). The same paradigm is also found at
the other side of the globe, in the person inflection of the Slavonic languages Slovene (de Bray,
1951: 415-416; Priestly, 1993: 418) and Upper Sorbian (de Bray, 1951: 743; Schuster-Sewc, 1996: 161-
162).
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The homophony between second and third person is often found both in the dual and
in the plural (Wurm, 1975b: 487; Foley, 1986: 71-72). As an example, the past/future














Interestingly, the opposite situation (homophony in the group marking, but not in the
dual) is not attested. This asymmetry substantiates the claim the dual is more marked
than the plural. Any opposition that is distinguished in the dual is also found in the
plural; or, stated differently, the dual will normally not show a distinction, unless the
plural has it (pace the cases with ‘paradigmatic’ markedness reversal, see section 7.3).
The conflation of second and third person is incidentally extended into the singular.
As an example, the ‘past’ suffixes from Siroi are presented in (8.5). The vertical ho-















The only example outside New Guinea of a vertical homophony is found in the Aleut
inflection (Geoghegan, 1944: 51). This time, the first and third person are coded iden-
tically, a pattern not found in New Guinea. The paradigm is shown in (8.6). There are
morphophonological different forms of this paradigm, but the homophony between
the first and the third person in the dual and the plural is attested in all variants.
                                                 
10 The same paradigmatic structure as in Yagaria is also found in Amele, both in the independent pro-
nouns and in the verbal inflection (Roberts, 1987: 208), in the inflection of Kewa (Franklin, 1971: 57-
58) and in the inflection of Kuman (Foley, 1986: 70, citing Piau 1985).
11 Exactly the same paradigmatic structure as in Siroi can be found in the suffixes from Magi
(Thomson, 1975: 631-632).










2 …-min …-mci …-m‘dik 2+3
3 …-‘gan …-‘gin …-gkin 3+3
In the case of horizontal homophony, one morpheme is used for different numbers of
the same person. An example is the ‘preterite’ inflection of the Uralic language
Mansi, shown in (8.7). Although there are differences between singular, dual and plu-
ral in the first and third person, there is only one form for the second person non-











2 …-n …-en 2+3
3 …- …-t …-i 3+3
Another variant of horizontal homophony is described for Gothic, where specialised
dual forms only exist for the first and second person. The dual forms are not very of-
ten found in the Gothic corpus: ‘Sie sind ziemlich selten belegt’ (Streitberg,
1920: 140). Shown in (8.8) are the suffixes for the ‘Präsens Aktiv’ of the strong verb
nim-…, meaning ‘to take’. This pattern is found throughout the inflection classes of










2 …-is …-i …-ats 2+3
3 …-i …-and 3+3
Still another variant of horizontal homophony is found in the independent pronouns of
Kewa, a non-Austronesian language from Papua New Guinea, shown below in (8.9).
This paradigm has a horizontal homophony between third singular and third dual
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(Franklin, 1971: 34). The same structure is also found in the Uralic language Nga-










2 ne nimi nipi 2+3
3 nipú nimú nipú 3+3
There are two more cases of horizontal homophony that require some special atten-
tion. In these paradigms, there is only one specifically dual form: only for the first
person. All other dual reference is taken together with the group marking. As there is
only dual marking in the first person complex, these paradigms do not satisfy the ba-
sic criterion for dual marking. This criterion dictates that for paradigms to be included
in this chapter, there should at least be dual marking outside the first person complex.
However, the descriptions of the following two languages below explicitly mention
that different forms for ‘we’ are to be distinguished on the basis of the amount of par-
ticipants. The dual ‘we’ has a preference for an inclusive reading (referring to the
speech-act dyad), but this dual ‘we’ can also be shown to have possible exclusive ref-










2 undu undu:ba 2+3
3 (demonstratives) 3+3
The first of these languages is Yidi, a Pama-Nyungan language from Australia
(Dixon, 1977). A specialised dual form is only found in the first person, as shown in
(8.10). Dixon explicitly mentions the dual (and not inclusive) meaning of ali: 12
‘The main point to note is that ali forms are seldom used. In fact, ai is frequently
used to refer to two people (one of whom is the speaker). … ali is used particularly
when it is desired to emphasise TWO people (as opposed to three, etc.). … [ali] is most
frequent used in an ‘inclusive’ sense, for referring to speaker and addressee … but it is
clear that it can have ‘exclusive’ reference, to speaker and a third party.’ (Dixon,
1977: 165-166, 179)
                                                 
12 The dual form ali is hardly used. If it would disappear, then the dual will be completely lost in
Yidi. The complete loss of the dual has already happened in Tjapukai, a language closely related to
Yidi. In the short sketch of Tjapukai by Hale (1976a: 237) no mention at all is made of the existence
of any dual pronouns.
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A similar paradigm is found in the Papuan language Arapesh, shown in (8.11). The
paradigm presented is used as the intensive variant of the pronouns, but the other pro-
nominal paradigms in the language have the same paradigmatic structure (Fortune,
1942: 45-49). Just as in Yidi, there is only a dual attested in the first person. There is
no dual in the second person, neither is there any dual marking in the class markers or
anywhere else in the language. However, in the description it is noted explicitly that
the distinction between the two forms for ‘we’ is one of number, not a difference be-
tween inclusive and exclusive.
‘There is no distinction between first person exclusive and first person inclusive, such











2 ak ipak 2+3
3 (class markers) 3+3
The final example from Yareba combines horizontal and vertical homophony. The
independent pronouns from the Papuan language Yareba are shown in (8.12). It looks
like a ‘diagonal’ homophony, but it is probably better regarded as a combination of
two different kinds of horizontal homophony. Compare it, for example, with a typical
Papuan pattern, as the paradigmatic structure of the Kalam pronouns, shown in (8.3)
above. Probably, a historical merger resulted in the unique structure as attested in

















The ‘complete’ dual-unified-we paradigm is found widespread over the world’s lan-
guages. This paradigmatic type is attested in many cases, independently of areal or
genetic bonds. Also, a large variety of ‘incomplete’ dual-unified-we paradigm is at-
tested. Paradigms with horizontal homophony as well as paradigms with vertical ho-
mophony are found. This situation, characterised by a large amount of variation, is
reminiscent of the situation that was attested with the unified-we paradigms (without
dual, see section 4.3). In general, paradigms without an inclusive-exclusive opposition
are relatively free to show homophony between different parts of the paradigm. Once
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a difference between inclusive and exclusive is marked in the paradigm, less variation
is found.13
Almost all cases with vertical homophony have a homophony between second and
third person. Other kinds of vertical homophony are not attested (pace the indispensa-
ble exception to the cross-linguistic rule). This is rather different from what has been
found for paradigms without a dual. Among paradigms without a dual, all possible
variants of vertical homophony are attested and the second/third homophony is the
least frequent (see section 5.3.3). Also, vertical homophony without duals in the para-
digm is attested throughout the world. In contrast, the examples of vertical homoph-
ony with a dual are almost all found among the Papuan languages from New Guinea.
Finally, for a few of the ‘incomplete’ examples that were presented in section 8.3.3,
the homophonous duals are characterised as ‘hardly attested’ or ‘disappearing’ (viz
Aleut, Gothic and Yidi). At least for these cases, it seems correct to characterise the
homophony as a form of deterioration of the paradigm. However, in the other cases,
and notably in the Papuan examples, there is no sign indicating that the lack of ex-
plicitness in reference is felt as poverty of the system. The term ‘incomplete’ is not to
be taken literal in these cases.
8.4 Three different forms for ‘we’
8.4.1 Preamble
The paradigms with three different forms for ‘we’ are a hybrid group. They look
alike, but there are slight and possibly important differences between the cases that
will be presented in this section. There are two characteristics that limit the various
paradigms to be discussed in this section. First, the paradigms have dual forms and,
second, they distinguish three different forms for ‘we’. These two characteristics
prompted the name ‘dual-3we’ for this type of paradigmatic structure. The dual-3we
paradigms which I have found are all incidental exemplars within their close family.
Still there are many of these ‘incidents’, indicating that the dual-3we pattern is a clear
possibility for the structure of human language.
Before the various examples of dual-3we paradigms will be discussed, a clarification
of the defining features is needed. Earlier in the present work, a paradigmatic type
was introduced with three different forms for ‘we’: the Maranao-type paradigm with a
minimal/augmented opposition in the inclusive (see section 4.7.2). The three forms
for ‘we’ in this paradigmatic structure are 1+2 (minimal inclusive), 1+2+3 (aug-
mented inclusive) and 1+3 (exclusive). The paradigms to be discussed in this section
are rather different. The main difference is the marking of the dual. The Maranao-type
paradigms do not have dual forms for second or third person. In general, the category
‘dual’ is of no importance to these paradigms. In contrast, the dual-3we pronominal
paradigms clearly have dual forms. All instances of dual-3we have at least second and
                                                 
13 This observation will be further discussed at the end of section 8.5.3 and in section 8.8.2, after the
inclusive-exclusive distinction in the realm of dual marking has been discussed.
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third person dual forms. The difference between these two structures is schematically
shown in Figure 8.2.
Maranao-type paradigm: Dual-3we paradigm:










2 2+3 2 2+3
3 3+3 3 3+3
Figure 8.2: The difference between minimal/augmented and dual-3we paradigms
In the dual-3we paradigms, the three different forms for ‘we’ also distinguish dual
forms, but it is in this part of the paradigm that the hybrid character of these paradig-
matic structures prevails. One possibility is that the dual is only attested in the exclu-
sive (section 8.4.2) or only in the inclusive (section 8.4.3). It is also possible to have
an inclusive-exclusive opposition in the dual, but not in the plural (section 8.4.3).
Conversely, it is possible to have an inclusive-exclusive opposition in the plural, but
not in the dual (section 8.4.5). It is possible that the slight differences between the ref-
erential values of the three forms for ‘we’ are due to different practices in the descrip-
tions, but it is also possible that there are real linguistic differences at stake here. My
estimate is that both factors play a role. An argument for the variable descriptions is
the case of the Wik-Munkan pronouns, shown in (8.16) below. The same grammarian
presents different analyses of this paradigm on different occasions. In contrast, an im-
portant argument for the inherent variability of this kind of paradigm will be pre-
sented in the next chapter. It will be argued there that the various dual-3we paradigms
have cognates showing many different paradigmatic structures. This indicates that the
variability of the dual-3we paradigm may be caused by different historical pathways
that all lead to this kind of paradigm. If that is the case, then the hybrid character of
this paradigmatic type has linguistic saliency. Future in-depth analysis of these lan-
guages has to reveal which factors are at stake to explain the attested variability. To
preclude a decision on the ‘real’ structure of these paradigms, I have tried to represent
the different descriptions as accurately as possible within the present framework.
8.4.2 Dual in exclusive only
The first example of a dual-3we paradigm, shown in (8.13), is the paradigm of the in-
dependent pronouns from Yagua, a genetically isolated language from Peru. The three
different forms for ‘we’ are described as ‘exclusive dual’, ‘exclusive plural’ and ‘in-
clusive’ (Payne, 1993: 20). This is a rather unusual distribution that has not been de-
scribed before in any typological survey of pronominal systems, as can be inferred
from the following claim by Moravcsik (1978):
‘No language has been encountered which distinguishes a dual and a plural in the ex-
clusive but not in the inclusive.’ (Moravcsik, 1978: 352, fn.11)








1 ráy núúy nááy 1+3
2 jíy jiryéy sa "a"dá 2+3
3 níí ríy naadá 3+3
Moreover, this unusual paradigmatic structure is not only attested in Yagua. The in-
dependent pronouns from the Australian language Ngankikurungkurr are another ex-
ample, shown in (8.14). In the description of this language, a plural form of the inclu-
sive is added to the paradigm, using a postposition nime meaning ‘all’. Strictly









1 ngayi ngagurr ngagarri 1+3
2 nyinyi nagurr nagarri 2+3
3 nem/ngayim wirrim wirrike 3+3
To bring home the point that this pattern is indeed attested, a third example is shown
in (8.15), from the Papuan language Savosavo (Todd, 1975: 813). Note that both in









1 añi ave age 1+3
2 no me pe 2+3
3 lo/ko ze(po) to 3+3
                                                 
14 In the short note on Savosavo by Capell (1969a: 9-14), the dual forms of the inclusive and exclusive
are reversed. This is probably a mistake. Also, a special form edo mai is presented for the inclusive
dual. However, the word edo is the numeral ‘two’ (Todd, 1975: 839). Strictly speaking, this word does
not belong in the pronominal paradigm.
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8.4.3 Dual in inclusive only
The next example of a paradigm with three different forms for ‘we’ comes from the
Australian language Wik-Munkan. This example highlights the problematic status of
the description of these paradigms, as the same author describes slightly different
paradigmatic structures on different occasions. The paradigm shown in (8.16a) comes
from Godfrey & Kerr (1964: 76) and the paradigm shown in (8.16b) from Godfrey
(1964: 14). Apart from some slight phonemic changes, and the general drop of the fi-
nal vowel in (8.16b), the pronominal elements in these paradigms are identical. How-
ever, the analysis of the three forms for ‘we’ presents a paradigmatic difference be-
tween the two descriptions. The first description in (8.16a), is a case of paradigmatic
markedness reversal, as there are two dual forms but only one plural form. In (8.16b),
a dual-plural opposition is only found in the inclusive. Whatever the ‘real’ structure of
the Wik-Munkan pronouns is, these two paradigms show that it is often difficult to











2 ninta niya nipa 2+3








1 ngay ngan 1+3
2 nint niiy nip 2+3
3 nil tan pul 3+3
8.4.4 Inclusive-exclusive in dual only
The next set of paradigms with three different forms for ‘we’ are just as unusual as the
preceding examples. In the following cases, the three forms for ‘we’ are described as
‘inclusive dual’, ‘exclusive dual’ and ‘plural’. The first example, shown in (8.17), is
the paradigm of the independent pronouns from the Papuan language Samo
(Voorhoeve, 1975: 391-392). The second example, shown in (8.18), is the paradigm of
                                                 
15 Wik-Munkan is part of the Middle Paman sub-family. In a comparative study of Middle Paman, Hale
(1976b: 56-57) confirms the analysis from (8.16 b). Probably, the analysis as shown in (8.16 a) has been
a mistake. The description of the Tübatulabal pronouns by Voegelin (1937a: 135) present another
cases of a comparable mistake (cf footnote 49 on page 156).
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2 e-… cîn-… îc-… 2+3
3 -… î…-… úx-… 2+3
8.4.5 Inclusive-exclusive in plural only
The next set of examples shows yet another kind of dual-3we paradigm. The descrip-
tions of these languages present, again, a different division of the referential possibili-
ties of the three different forms of ‘we’. This time there is only one dual form, but
there is an inclusive-exclusive opposition in the plural. The kind of dual-3we structure
appears to be the most widespread variant. The first example, shown in (8.19), is from
the Australian language Kuku-Yalanji (Oates & Oates, 1964: 7). The second example,
shown in (8.20), is the paradigm of the independent pronouns from the Tibeto-
Burman language Jiarong (Bauman, 1975: 131-132, 276). The third example, shown in
(8.21), is the paradigm of the independent pronouns from the Papuan language Tu-












2 yuudu yurra yubal 2+3
3 ñulu jana bula 3+3
                                                 
16 These paradigms from Samo and Coos were examples were already discussed in section 7.3 as cases
of paradigmatic markedness reversal. These paradigms show more forms in the dual than in the plural.











2 no ño ndzA 2+3











2 a(o) e(o) euka 2+3
3 are(o) ere(o) ereuka 3+3
Two further examples of this pattern come form the Binanderean group. This family
of Papuan languages is also found in the southeastern tip of Papua New Guinea, al-
though the Binanderean languages are spoken on the opposite New Guinean coast as
the Eleman languages. Shown in (8.22) is the paradigm of the independent pronouns
from Guhu-Samane (Richard, 1975: 781). The other example, shown in (8.23), is from
Korafe, a language closely related to Guhu-Samane. This paradigm has a typical Pap-
uan vertical homophony between the second and third person. Morphologically, it ap-
pears that the exclusive pronoun namane is a later addition. The suffix …-mane is
consistently glossed as ‘plural’ in the short sketch by Farr (1975: 734-735), although it











2 nii nike nipe 2+3
3 no noko nopo 3+3
                                                 
17 The difference between inclusive and exclusive can also be marked in the dual, by preposing either
the second person singular pronoun to make ni nangae for inclusive reference, or the third person sin-
gular pronoun to make nu nangae for exclusive reference. These forms ‘rarely occur’ (Farr & Farr,
1975: 734). More importantly, these forms are strictly speaking not part of the pronominal paradigm,
but are better seen as some sort of compound of different pronouns.















8.4.6 The case of Burarra
Finally, there is one paradigm that also belongs in this hybrid dual-3we type, but it
shows yet another distribution of the three forms for ‘we’ over the various referential
possibilities. The case in question is the paradigm of the independent pronouns from
the Australian language Burarra, as first described by Glasgow (1964). She ap-
proaches the description of the pronouns of Burarra in a special way, anticipating
what later will be called a ‘unit-augmented’ analysis (see section 8.6). However, two
pairs of pronouns in her scheme are identical, leaving only three different forms of
‘we’ (Glasgow, 1964: 110-111; 1984: 15). Interpreting her description in the frame-
work as used here, the nominative pronouns divide the referential person space as
shown in (8.24). The most interesting part is the morpheme ngatippa. This pronoun
combines the references that are traditionally called ‘inclusive trial’ and ‘exclusive
dual’. A highly remarkable combination in traditional terminology, and unusual cross-











2 nginyipa anagoyburrpa anagotippa 2+3
3 nipa birripa bitipa 3+3
8.4.7 Summary
The impression that arises from all these examples is one of disorder. It is possible
that there are simply many possibilities for the paradigmatic structure, but another
option is that some of the descriptions are sloppy with regard to the precise referential
properties of the various forms for ‘we’. For most of the examples in this section, the
pronominal elements are not extensively documented. Normally, only the paradigm is
presented without further arguments for the division of reference. It might well be that
the division of the reference between the three forms for ‘we’, once they are studied in
                                                 
18 The presented paradigm comes from Glasgow (1984). In this more recent description, Glasgow
added feminine variants for the dual forms (not shown here), and made some slight corrections in the
spelling of the forms.
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more detail, is less variable than appears from these examples. It also might not. A
clue that points in the direction of the inherent variability of the dual-3we paradigms
is that the examples are almost all incidental cases within their narrow family. Close
relatives of the languages that were discussed here show various different paradig-
matic types, as will be discussed extensively in the next chapter (see especially sec-
tion 9.5). This gives the impression that the dual-3we paradigms are an intermediate
pattern between other paradigmatic structures. A final observation on the set of dual-
3we patterns is that they are mostly found in a restricted area. Nine out of the twelve
examples presented are found in southeastern New Guinea and northwestern Austra-
lia.
8.5 Four different forms for ‘we’
8.5.1 Preamble
The next pattern to be discussed distinguishes four different forms for ‘we’. In almost
all examples to be discussed below, the four forms for ‘we’ arise by a cross-section of
the oppositions ‘dual versus plural’ and ‘inclusive versus exclusive’. The most com-
mon structure has also a dual-plural opposition for the second and third person. The
examples with such a full set of dual forms are discussed in section 8.5.2 under the
heading of DUAL-INCLUSIVE/EXCLUSIVE. Next, in section 8.5.3, the paradigms are dis-
cussed that do not have a full set of dual forms. The number of ‘incomplete’ patterns
with four forms for ‘we’ is much smaller than the ‘incomplete’ patterns with two
forms for ‘we’ (cf section 8.3.3). The few examples of ‘incomplete’ paradigms with a
dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm are mostly cases with horizontal homophony: the
missing dual reference is taken over by the plural form of the same person. Vertical
homophony, as has been attested extensively in dual-unified-we paradigms, is only
attested in two exceptional cases here. In section 8.5.4, a special paradigmatic struc-
ture with four forms for ‘we’ is discussed. Referentially, these paradigms are identical
to the dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigms. However, the morphological structure of
these paradigms is rather different; different enough to deserve separate mention and a
separate name PARTIAL-UNIT-AUGMENTED. Next, in section 8.5.5, the exceptional case
of Palaung is discussed. In Palaung, four forms for ‘we’ are distinguished, but possi-
bly there is no inclusive-exclusive opposition. Instead, a distinction is claimed be-
tween ‘present’ and ‘absent’. Finally, section 8.5.6 will summarise the discussion of
paradigms with four forms for ‘we’.
8.5.2 The dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm
The first kind of the various paradigms with four different forms for ‘we’ is the dual-
inclusive/exclusive paradigm. This paradigm consists of 11 different morphemes:
three singular morphemes (1, 2 and 3), four group morphemes (inclusive, exclusive,
second plural and third plural) and dual versions of these four group morphemes. This
is a rather common type of paradigmatic structure, characterised by Ingram
(1978: 219-220) as one of the ‘four systems that are more frequent than the others’.
However, outside the Pacific it is not so easy to find examples of this type. In this
section, I will present a survey of the distribution of this type of paradigm over the
languages of the world.
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A complete dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm is regularly found in Oceanic (Aus-
tronesian) languages. Lynch (1998: 102) gives examples from Yapese, Nakanai, A’jië









1 au matou maua 1+3
2 koe koutou korua 2+3
3 ia ra tou ra ua 3+3
Such paradigms are also commonly found among the independent pronouns in Aus-
tralian languages.19 Outside the Pacific, examples of the dual-inclusive/exclusive
paradigm are not so easy to find. There are only a few examples, and they often do
not have a complete 11-morpheme system. Either there are gender distinctions in the
third person, or the third person morphemes are borderline cases to demonstratives.
Some cases are attested among the Tibeto-Burman languages.20 In North America, the
dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm is found rather often.21 Finally, an exceptional case
of a dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm is found in Africa. In (8.26) the independent
pronouns from Kunama (Bender, 1996: 18) are shown. As far as I have seen, this is a
unique pattern for an African language. Although it might be an unusual case, it is
exceptionally stable. Over a century ago, Reinisch (1881: 17) described exactly the








1 ‘aba ‘ame ‘aame 1+3
2 ‘ena ‘eme ‘eeme 2+3
3 ‘unu ‘ime ‘iime 3+3
                                                 
19 Dixon (1980: 329, 335-336) mentions Dhalandji, Gupapuyu, Gumbaynggir, Nyanwaygi and Thar-
gari. Also Warlbiri belongs in this list (Hale, 1973: 315-316).
20 In the Tibeto-Burman languages, third person pronouns are often diachronically related to demon-
strative elements (Bauman, 1975: 107). Yet, Bauman (1975: 265-304) lists Bahing, Bunan, Kanauri
and Manchati as examples of full dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigms with ‘real’ third person forms.
21 On the West Coast, eg Siuslaw (Frachtenberg, 1922b: 468) and Chinook (Boas, 1911a: 580-581, 626).
Dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigms are also found among the Iroquoian languages, but with gender
marking in the third person, eg the intransitive prefixes from Oneida (Lounsbury, 1953: 60-61),
Cherokee (Cook, 1979: 22) and Tuscarora (Williams, 1976: 156). The same structure is found in the
pronouns in the Oto-Manguean language Mazahua, which shows gender in the third person (Suárez,
1983: 81-82).
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8.5.3 ‘Incomplete’ dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigms
There are a few examples of paradigms with four different forms for ‘we’ that are not
‘complete’ dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigms. I will analyse these under the heading
of ‘incomplete’ paradigms, although it should be noted that these examples do not
show any signs of diachronic instability or deterioration. It is only because I am tak-
ing the first person complex as the main classificatory dimension that these examples
come out as an ‘incomplete’ subcategory of the dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm.
The ‘missing’ categories in these ‘incomplete’ paradigms will be analysed as cases of
either horizontal or vertical homophony. I have predominantly found cases of
HORIZONTAL homophony of the dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm. Such examples
combine different numbers of the same person into the marking of one morpheme.
The alternative VERTICAL type of homophony – homophony of different person with
the same number – is not attested (pace the obligatory exception to the cross-
linguistic rule).
‘Incomplete’ dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigms are found, for example, in Tibeto-
Burman. Shown in (8.27) are the independent pronouns of Limbu. Note the horizontal
homophony in the third person (van Driem, 1987: 25-28). The same structure (not
shown here) is described for the independent pronouns from the closely related lan-








1 aga anige anchige 1+3
2 khn kheni khenchi 2+3
3 khun/khy khunchi/khka 3+3
An ‘incomplete’ dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm with a horizontal homophony in
the second person is found in the Australian language Dhuwal. Shown in (8.28) are
the nominative pronouns from the Djapu dialect (Morphy, 1983: 51-55). The same
structure (not shown here) is described for the independent pronouns of Sedang, a








1 arra anapurr iliny(u) 1+3
2 nhe nhuma 2+3
3 ayi walal manda 3+3
Another example of horizontal homophony in the second person is found in the inde-
pendent pronouns from Kilivila, an Oceanic language spoken on the Trobriant Islands
(Senft, 1986: 46-47). Note that the markedness of the four different forms of ‘we’ is
260 PART THREE: NUMBER INCORPORATED
here different from the Limbu case above. In Limbu there seems to be an EXCLUSIVE
suffix …-ge, but in Kilivila there is a PLURAL suffix …-si (Senft, 1986: 31). The









1 yegu yakamesi yakama 1+3
2 yokwa yokwami 2+3
3 (demonstratives) 3+3
Finally, a horizontal homophony is attested in Rapanui, an Oceanic language from
Easter Island (Du Feu, 1996: 140). The pronouns are almost identical to the pronouns
from Maori in (8.25) above, except for the horizontal homophony in the second and
third person. Note that the dual forms for the second and third person have persisted
in Rapanui; they have taken over the plural reference. Again, this is a sign that the
dual is morphologically sometimes more persistent than the plural (cf the discussion








1 au matou maua 1+3
2 koe korua 2+3
3 ia raua 3+3
HORIZONTAL homophony is possible in paradigms with a dual, although it is not
really widespread among the world’s languages. A handful of cases have been shown
in this section and another handful of cases (without inclusive-exclusive opposition)
has been presented in section 8.3.3. VERTICAL homophony is even less widespread
from a cross-linguist perspective. Moreover, the few attested cases of vertical ho-
mophony show an interestingly skewed distribution. Vertical homophony is almost
exclusively found in paradigms that do not have an inclusive-exclusive opposition.
Back in section 8.3.3, many cases of vertical homophony were presented, all without
an inclusive-exclusive opposition. Now it turns out that there are no cases of vertical
homophony with an inclusive-exclusive opposition (see section 8.8.2 below for a
quantitative analysis). This observation can be captured by an implication (8.31).
(8.31) inclusive/exclusive opposition  no vertical homophony 22
                                                 
22 The same implication has been formulated in section 5.3.2. In that section, the implication was for-
mulated in reverse order: ‘vertical homophony  no inclusive/exclusive opposition’. The reversal as
presented here is logically equivalent to that one.
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Of course, the world’s languages will never let one get away without counterexam-
ples. I have found a vertical homophony in an dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm in
the Papuan language Suena, shown in (8.32). However, it is only found in the inflec-
tion of the indicative mood and in the remote tense. Other pronominal paradigms in













Finally, a special paradigmatic structure is found in Kwamera, an Oceanic language
from Vanuatu. Kwamera has pronominal subject prefixes on the verb. The subject
prefixes are normally followed by a number prefix to disambiguate the reference, but
the subject and number paradigms can be separated morphologically (Lindstrom &
Lynch, 1994: 12). The subject paradigm is shown in (8.33) below. The exclusive ref-
erence is taken care of by the singular form iak-… that is used for reference to the
speaker. This general use of iak-… can be seen as an extended case of HORIZONTAL
homophony. In the same paradigm, the dual form k-… shows a VERTICAL homophony
between the inclusive dual and the third person dual reference. This paradigm from
Kwamera is the only example I am aware of that combines a separate horizontal and
vertical homophony; a very unusual structure indeed. Some example sentences have
been added to exemplify the referential possibilities of these prefixes. In (8.34 a,b), the
two different inclusive forms for ‘we’ are shown. However, (8.34 a) can also refer to a
third person dual. The prefix for ‘I’ and the exclusive ‘we’ (1+3) are identical, as can










3 r-… -… k-… 3+3
                                                 
23 Compare the Kwamera prefixes with the prefixal paradigm of the closely related language Lenakel,
which has been discussed on page 143. In Lenakel, the prefix k-… has general plural reference. No
dual prefixes are attested in Lenakel.




‘We two (inclusive) drink’, ‘They two drink’
(Lindstrom & Lynch, 1994: 11)
b. sa-ha-puta
1+2+3-PLUR-climb
‘We (inclusive) climb’ (Lindstrom & Lynch, 1994: 14)
c. ia-pkata-mha
1-see-NEG
‘I didn’t see it’ (Lindstrom & Lynch, 1994: 14)
d. ia-ha-vehe
1-PLUR-come
‘We (exclusive plural) come’ (Lindstrom & Lynch, 1994: 11)
8.5.4 The partial-unit-augmented paradigm
A different kind of paradigm with four different forms for ‘we’ is a paradigm that I
will call PARTIAL-UNIT-AUGMENTED. At first glance, such paradigms are identical to
the ‘complete’ dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigms. However, once the morphopho-
nological structure of these paradigms is scrutinised, a slight, but potentially impor-
tant difference can be observed. As an example of this pattern, the independent pro-
nouns from the Australian language Umpila are shown in (8.35). The dual forms are
marked by a special dual suffix …-baamu. The only dual form that does not use this








1 ayu ana ana-baamu 1+3
2 anu uula uula-baamu 2+3
3 nhulu bula bula-baamu 3+3
Because of this difference in the morphophonological structure of the dual forms, I
propose to represent the Umpila pronouns as shown in (8.36). In this representation,
the difference between the two inclusive pronouns ali and ambula is not one of
number, but one of person. The opposition DUAL inclusive versus PLURAL inclusive is
replaced by an opposition MINIMAL inclusive versus AUGMENTED inclusive. In this
way, the connection between these paradigms and other paradigms with a mini-
mal/augmented opposition is emphasised. If the dual forms that are marked by
…-baamu in (8.36) are disregarded, then the paradigmatic structure is of the Ma-
ranao-type (see section 4.7.2). In contrast, if the category 1+2+3 also distinguishes a
separate restricted group morpheme, then the resulting structure is of the unit-
augmented type, which will be discussed in section 8.6. Because of the similarity to
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1 ayu ana ana-baamu 1+3
2 anu uula uula-baamu 2+3
3 nhulu bula bula-baamu 3+3
A somewhat more covert example of this pattern is found in the Australian language
Alawa. Shown in (8.37) are the direct pronouns (with a gender distinction in third sin-
gular). In this case, there is no overt suffix marking the dual, but a regular alternation







1 ina alu aru 1+3
2 ñagana wulu wur u 2+3
3 nul $a/adul$a yilul $a yir ul $a 3+3
This kind of paradigms is found in various linguistic families from Australia. Most
examples are found among the non-Pama-Nyungan languages in the northwestern part
of Australia, except for Umpila that is part of Pama-Nyungan. The partial-unit-
augmented paradigm seems to be a typical Australian phenomenon.24
8.5.5 The case of Palaung
All examples with four different forms for ‘we’ that have been discussed until now
have the same referential division. The four forms for ‘we’ are always characterised
by a cross-section of the oppositions dual-plural and inclusive-exclusive. The only
example with a different referential division of the four forms for ‘we’ is found in the
Mon-Khmer language Palaung as described by Milne (1921: 17-18). The paradigm of
independent pronouns looks like a normal pattern with a dual-plural and an inclusive-
exclusive opposition. However, Milne emphasizes that there is no inclusive-exclusive
opposition. He describes an opposition between ‘present’ versus ‘absent’ instead. Of
course, the present-absent opposition is rather close to the inclusive-exclusive opposi-
                                                 
24 Examples are attested in Warrwa of the Nyulnyulan family (McGregor, 1994: 20-21), in Ngalakan of
the Gunwingguan family (Merlan, 1983: 71), in Maranungku of the Daly family (Tryon, 1970: 16) and
in Jaminjung of the Djamindjungan family (Schulze-Berndt, 2000: 64). Note that both Ngalakan and
Maranungku have a gender distinction in the third person singular. A possible case of a partial-unit-
augmented paradigms outside Australia is attested in the Gé language Apinayé (see section 9.4.2).
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tion. An addressee is always present at the speech act situation, so an inclusive dual is
always ‘present’. However, a third person can be either present or absent. Conse-
quently, exclusive marking is crucial to decide between an inclusive-exclusive oppo-
sition and a present-absent opposition. On this point, Milne’s description is quite







 we, all present, 1+2 or 1+3
1 o y yar we, some not present, 1+3
2 m
% p par you all, 2+3
3 a# ge gar they, 3+3
8.5.6 Summary
The major group of paradigms with four different forms for ‘we’ is the set of DUAL-
INCLUSIVE/EXCLUSIVE paradigms. These paradigms have a dual-plural opposition both
in the inclusive and in the exclusive; in total there are 11 morphemes in such a para-
digm. Examples of the dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm are commonly found among
the world’s languages. Roughly speaking, the main areas/families where this para-
digm is found are the Oceanic family, the Pama-Nyungan family, the Tibeto-Burman
family and the languages from North America. A special variant of the 11-morpheme
paradigm is the PARTIAL-UNIT-AUGMENTED paradigm. The referential structure of this
paradigm is identical to the dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm, but the morphological
structure is significantly different. This paradigm is almost exclusively found in Aus-
tralia. Besides these ‘complete’ patterns, there is a small set of ‘incomplete’ para-
digms. Such ‘incomplete’ paradigms are mainly characterised by horizontal homoph-
ony; vertical homophony is exceptional. This observation led to the formulation of the
implication ‘inclusive/exclusive opposition  no vertical homophony’. Finally, the
aberrant case of Palaung was discussed, which looks like a dual-inclusive/exclusive
paradigm, but replaces the inclusive-exclusive distinction by a present-absent distinc-
tion.
8.6 Five different forms for ‘we’
The last phenomenon that will be tackled under the heading of ‘dual’ marking appears
to be a trial, but is better analysed as a twisted kind of dual. It is a pattern with five
different forms for ‘we’, exemplified here with the independent pronouns from the
Australian language Rembarrnga. The dual-like analysis for Rembarrnga was first
                                                 
25 In the short description of the Palaung pronouns by Burling (1970: 14-17), nothing is found of the
present-absent opposition. Instead, he presents a normal inclusive-exclusive opposition. However, the
work of Burling is not primarily a grammatical description. Also, he does not refer to the grammar by
Milne. I did not find any other sources on Palaung that could shed some more light on the question
which analysis is the right one.
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proposed by McKay (1978).26 The crucial morpheme is the independent pronoun
ngakorrbbarrah. This pronoun is traditionally analysed as an inclusive trial, meaning
‘I, you and one other person’. Following the analysis of McKay (1978: 28), it seems
better to interpret the pronouns of Rembarrnga as an extended version of the Ma-
ranao-type paradigm. The Maranao-type paradigm has an opposition between a
minimal and an augmented inclusive. The MINIMAL INCLUSIVE is used to refer to the
combination of the two principal speech-act participants – speaker and addressee.
There is a special pronoun for this category that is paradigmatically put on a par with
the singular pronouns. Because this pair is categorised as a singular morpheme, it can
be ‘pluralised’. This ‘pluralised’ form is called the AUGMENTED INCLUSIVE. Now, in
Rembarrnga, this ‘singular’ pair is not only ‘pluralised’, but also ‘dualised’. The pro-
noun ngakorrbbarrah refers to the speech-act dyad plus one extra person. This group
consists of three persons, and therefore, in the referential sense, it is a trial. However,
paradigmatically, this form aligns with the other duals, using the suffix …-bbarrah.
Extending the minimal/augmented terminology, McKay dubbed this phenomenon
‘unit augmented’. His analysis of Rembarrnga is shown in (8.39). Note that there is a
gender distinction in the third person singular.
(8.39) REMBARRNGA
minimal augmented unit augmented
1+2 ykk ngakorr ngakorr-bbarrah 1+2+3
1 ngn yarr yarr-bbarrah 1+3
2 k nakorr nakorr-bbarrah 2+3
3 naw/ngad barr barr-bbarrah 3+3
For purposes of comparison and unification, I choose to represent this paradigm
slightly differently, as shown in (8.40). I use this graphic representation only to high-
light the connection with the other paradigms discussed in this work; I do not intend
this representation to have different implications compared to the representation in
(8.39). As described in section 7.2, the label ‘unit augmented’ is replaced here with
the label RESTRICTED GROUP. The name UNIT-AUGMENTED is used to refer to the para-





1 ngn yarr yarr-bbarrah 1+3
2 k nakorr nakorr-bbarrah 2+3
3 naw/ngad barr barr-bbarrah 3+3
                                                 
26 Glasgow (1964) should be mentioned as a clear precursor of this analysis. Her terminology is a little
awkward, but she already had the same ideas as McKay (1978). Compare Glasgow’s analysis of the
Burarra independent pronouns, presented on page 256 above.
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This paradigmatic pattern is found rather often among the non-Pama-Nyungen lan-
guages from northwestern Australia. Many cases of exactly the same paradigmatic
structure as shown in (8.40) are attested.27 A special case is the Burarran family. In
(8.41) the intransitive prefixes from Djeebbana (McKay, 1978: 32) are shown. These
prefixes form a complete unit-augmented paradigm. The intransitive prefixes from the
related language Burarra are shown in (8.42). These prefixes from Burarra distinguish
five different forms for ‘we’, in an unit-augmented-like division (Glasgow, 1984).








1 nga-… njarra-… njirri-… 1+3
2 dja-… narra-… nirri-… 2+3











3 {a} aburr-… {a}birri-… 3+3
Outside Australia, this paradigmatic type is almost unattested. There might be unit-
augmented systems among the Gé languages in South America, but the examples that
I know of are only poorly described.30 The only clear example of a unit-augmented
paradigm outside Australia is found in two Papuan languages. The first example is the
                                                 
27 Rembarrnga is part of the Gunwingguan family; other Gunwingguan languages with the same para-
digmatic structure of independent pronouns are Ngandi (Heath, 1978: 54) and Mangarayi (Merlan,
1982: 102). A unit-augmented paradigm is also found in the Gunwingguan language Nunggubuyu.
However, this paradigm also distinguishes gender in the dual forms (Heath, 1984: 241-248). A unit-
augmented paradigm is also found in the independent pronouns of the Australian language Nyikina of
the Nyulnyulan family (McGregor, 1989: 446, citing Stokes 1982).
28 These forms from Djeebbana are the transitive prefixes marking subject with a singular third person
object (McKay, 1978: 32). I expect these to be rather close to the intransitive forms. However, McKay
(1984: 144) remarks in a later work that these ‘earlier tabulations need some correction and completion
… A more complete discussion is in preparation.’
29 This vertical homophony in the inflectional paradigm of Burarra can be disambiguated by adding an
independent pronoun. However, the independent pronouns are of another atypical paradigmatic struc-
ture with homophony between 1+2+3 and 1+2, presented on page 256 above. The independent pro-
nouns as well as the pronominal inflection allow some representational ambiguity, but together they
function as a full unit-augmented system.
30 Maybe Kayapo has a unit-augmented paradigm (Wiesemann, 1986b: 368-369). See section 9.4.2 for
a discussion of this pronominal marking in the Gé languages.
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Papuan language Weri. The independent pronouns from Weri are shown in (8.43). In
this case, the dual forms are regularly derived from the group morphemes, by using a
suffix …-ip (Boxwell, 1967: 36). The language Kunimaipa is a close relative of Weri;
both are part of the Goilalan family. The independent pronouns from Kunimaipa are
shown in (8.44). The paradigmatic structure turns out to be rather unusual. Strictly
speaking, there are only four different forms for ‘we’ in Kunimaipa (rei, rei-pi, rari
and rari-pi). However, the referential values of these four forms can only be under-
stood if the paradigm is analysed as a variant of the unit-augmented paradigm. The
form rei-pi is a general dual form, used for both inclusive and exclusive dual. The








1 ne ten ten-ip 1+3
2 në ar ar-ip 2+3







1 ne rei rei-pi 1+3
2 ni ari ari-pi 2+3
3 pi paru paru-pi 3+3
The other example outside Australia is described for the East Papuan language Reefs,
spoken in the Solomon Islands. Again, there is a clear suffix for the ‘restricted group’







1 …-n …-o …-ole 1+3
2 …-mu …-mi …-mile 2+3
3 …-gu …-gui …-guile 3+3
                                                 
31 The use of the suffix …-pi in Kunimaipa is said to be ‘optional’ (Geary, 1977: 17). It is added here to
show the resemblance with the Weri paradigm. Without the suffix …pi, the structure of the independ-
ent pronouns in Kunimaipa would be of the same type as the exceptional structure that is also found in
the independent pronouns from Gooniyandi and Yaouré, as described in section 3.6.6.
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To conclude, the unit-augmented paradigm is a typical Australian phenomenon. There
are only a few cases outside Australia, and those are found mainly closely surround-
ing Australia. The same geographical bias is also found in the partial-unit-augmented
patterns, discussed previously in section 8.5.4. As the name indicates, not only the
geographical distribution, but also the paradigmatic structure of the partial-unit-
augmented paradigm is reminiscent of the unit-augmented paradigms discussed here.
The relation between these two patterns is further investigated in the next chapter (see
especially section 9.4).
8.7 Other duals
There are three different kinds of paradigms with duals outside the first person com-
plex. The dual can be found only in the second person; the dual can be found only in
the third person; or finally, the dual can be found both in the second and third person.
There are examples of all three cases described in the literature, although they are not
numerous, nor all equally convincing. Still, this pattern is a clear possibility for the
structure of human language.
I know of one example of a paradigm with only a second person dual. The subject
pronouns from the Omotic language Dizi, shown in (8.46), include a second person
dual, besides a second person plural pronoun (Allen, 1976: 383). Earlier descriptions
do not mention the dual (Allen, 1976: 392, fn.6). Note that the third person singular










2 yetu iti it 2+3
3 itì / iz i isì 3+3
I know of one clear example of a sole third person dual, from the American language









1 s-… s.h-… 1+3
2 k-… gìdz-… 2+3
3 y-… y-… eiy-… 3+3
CHAPTER 8: THE DIVERSITY OF MINIMAL NUMBER 269
In Achumawi, a verb suffix …-má is used to disambiguate plural from dual, but for
the third person there is a separate dual prefix, and the suffix …-má is not used (de
Angulo & Freeland, 1931: 91).32 There are a few more languages that have pronomi-
nal paradigms with only duals in the third person, but all these have gender distinc-
tions as well. I just mention them shortly for completeness. Another American lan-
guage, Tunica, has a separate third person dual in the independent pronouns and in the
prefixal pronominal paradigm (Haas, 1946: 347-363). In Europe, the independent pro-
nouns of Slovene have a third person dual (Priestly, 1993: 408-409). Finally, on the
opposite side of the world, the same phenomenon is described for the independent
pronouns of the Papuan language Buin (Wurm, 1975a: 794, citing Laycock 1978).33
Duals in the second and third person are found in Aleut. Shown in (8.48) are the inde-










2 txin txici txi‘dik 2+3
3 ingan ingakun ingaku 3+3
Finally, mention should be made in this context of the inflectional suffixes from the
Papuan language Kapau. Kapau has a few different pronominal paradigms in the in-
dicative mood. The suffixes for the Immediate Future distinguish 7 different forms,
which form a typical Papuan paradigm such as the one from Yagaria in (8.4) above.
Other tenses have reduced this paradigm to rather strange patterns, involving dual in
non-first person only (Oates & Oates, 1969: 26-35). To conclude, a dual outside the
first person complex is indeed a real possibility for a pronominal paradigm, although
it does not seem to be a pervasive phenomenon.
                                                 
32 The suffix …-má is used to mark the plural. The unmarked form of the non-singular prefixes have
dual reference. This is a case of referential markedness reversal (see section 7.3).
33 Plank (1989: 304) also mentions southern Arabic varieties as examples of languages that only have a
dual in the third person.
34 Plank (1989: 303) mentions ancient Greek (which lost the dual, starting in the first person) and Clas-
sic Arabic as examples with only a second and third person dual. Both language have gender marking
in their pronominal paradigms. From the list of forms that is presented by McElhanon (1975: 548), it
appears that the independent pronouns from the Papuan language Rawa is of the same paradigmatic
structure as the pronouns from Aleut in (8.48). However, the presented first person plural form nâre is
probably a mistake. The comparison with the possessive suffixes suggest that it should be nâne
(McElhanon, 1975: 550).
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8.8 Structural analysis
8.8.1 Preamble
In the preceding survey of the paradigmatic variation, 32 different kinds of paradigms
are presented. Some of these paradigmatic structures are only attested in one isolated
case; others are found widespread through the world’s linguistic variation. In this sec-
tion, the structural characteristics of the variation are analysed. For this analysis, the
individual elements in the paradigm are the locus of investigation, not the paradig-
matic structure as a whole (cf chapter 5). The internal structure of the paradigms is
taken apart. In fact, a paradigm consists of multiple oppositions between the various
elements. The oppositions attested are counted in a sample of pronominal paradigms
and there will turn out to be all kinds of interdependencies between various opposi-
tions. The result will be a hierarchy of oppositions, that will be called the ‘Dual Ex-
plicitness Hierarchy.’
The analysis is carried out on the basis of a sample of 83 cases. These cases are se-
lected from the paradigmatic variation as presented in this chapter. The sample has
been constructed as a diversity sample, including every paradigmatic variant that has
been attested. In contrast, the influence of structures that are attested in widespread
genetic families has been reduced. Maximally two cases per family are counted, inter-
preting ‘family’ rather loosely as a close genetic grouping that shows identical para-
digmatic structures throughout the genetic group. Moreover, the special case of Pa-
laung (see section 8.5.5) and the various paradigmatic structures from Kapau (see
section 8.7) have not been included in the sample. The composition of the sample is
described in detail in Appendix C. These criteria used in constructing the sample have
a few consequences for the interpretation of the results. First, the resulting frequency
of each particular paradigmatic structure is not an accurate representation of the
world-wide proportion. Common structures will be somewhat less common than they
actually are and the frequency of rare structures will be slightly overestimated. Sec-
ond, the resulting sample emphasizes the variability of the structure of human lan-
guage. Every single aberrant case has been included in the sample, but the number of
common paradigms has been restricted. A consequence of this approach is that gener-
alisations become less strong. However, a good theory about human language should
be able to account for the wide variety of possibilities attested, not only for the com-
mon strategies. The following characteristics have been considered in this sample.
First, the structure of the first person complex is included. Second, the presence or
absence of vertical homophony is included. Vertical homophony is defined as an
overlap between the marking of the second and third person dual, or between either
the second or third person dual and the first person complex. Exactly which kind of
vertical homophony is attested in the paradigm is also included in the set of charac-
teristics. Both the structure of the first person complex and vertical homophony will
be discussed in section 8.8.2. Third, the presence or absence of horizontal homophony
is included in the investigation. Horizontal homophony is defined as an overlap be-
tween the marking of dual and non-dual categories. The distribution of the various
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kinds of horizontal homophony is discussed in section 8.8.3. The results of these
analyses are summarised in section 8.8.4.35
8.8.2 Vertical homophony and the Explicitness Hierarchy
Vertical homophony is defined as a cluster of referential possibilities in the restricted
group column that includes at least the second or third person. An example of vertical
homophony is presented in (8.49). This paradigm is the past/future marking form the
Papuan language Yagaria (Renck, 1975: 90-96). A vertical homophony between the














Very few cases of vertical homophony have been attested in paradigms that distin-
guish between inclusive and exclusive (see section 8.5.3). This claim is reformulated
quantitatively for the present sample of 83 cases in Table 8.1. The observation holds,
although the significance is not as strong as the correlations that were found in Chap-
ter 5. The distribution can be summarised by an implication:




– 25 42 67





Table 8.1: Implication ‘inclusive/exclusive opposition  no vertical homophony’
(Fisher’s exact p = .011, 	 = –.299)
                                                 
35 No counts of the proportion of inflectional versus independently marked paradigms have been made
(as had been done for the paradigms without duals, see section 5.8). By collecting the examples for
this chapter, I noticed that comparable paradigms were often found both as independent pronouns and
as verbal inflection. In many of those cases, the independent pronoun paradigm most clearly showed
the paradigmatic structure, and I decided to take the independent pronouns as example for the descrip-
tion of the diversity. Only when the inflection had a different structure, have I included the inflectional
paradigm. Because of this rather ad-hoc decision, I do not expect the proportions of inflectional versus
independently marked paradigms as presented in this chapter to be representative of the linguistic
structure. Future research will have to attend to this dimension more carefully.
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The kind of vertical homophony that is attested is shown in Table 8.2. There is a clear
predominance of the homophony between second and third person dual over all other
possible kinds of homophony. This distribution is rather different from the occurrence
of vertical homophony as attested in paradigms without dual forms (see section 5.3.3).
In those paradigms, the homophony between second and third person was also at-
tested but it was the least frequent kind of vertical homophony. The large number of
paradigms with a second/third homophony as attested in this chapter is mainly due to
languages from the southeastern part of New Guinea, mainly from the languages of
the East New Guinea Highlands. The second/third homophony is a clear areal char-
acteristic, found in many languages in this area (Foley, 1986: 72). Still, the genetic
variety of languages that show this homophony is large; the second/third homophony





second + third person dual 13
first + third person dual 1
Inclusive + third person dual 1
Exclusive + second person dual 1
Table 8.2: Various kinds of vertical homophony of dual forms
The paradigmatic structure of the dual morphemes also shows an Explicitness Hierar-
chy, analogously to the structure of paradigms without a dual (see section 5.5). This
DUAL EXPLICITNESS HIERARCHY is in fact an extension of the implication as discussed
above in (8.50). For the formulation of the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy the structure
of the restricted group column is scrutinised. The structure of the rest of the paradigm
is disregarded temporarily. Three characteristics of the restricted group column are
relevant:
Split inclusive: there is an opposition between the minimal inclusive (1+2) and the
augmented inclusive (1+2+3);
Split dual-‘we’: there are two different forms for ‘we’ in the restricted group col-
umn: a difference is marked between inclusive and exclusive dual;
Split dual: there is no vertical homophony in the dual, ie the second and third
person dual are different from each other and different from the
dual first person complex.
The distribution of these characteristics in the sample is shown in Table 8.3. The ma-
jority of the attested patterns follows an hierarchical ordering of the three characteris-
tics: split inclusive > split dual-‘we’ > split dual. This ordering is called the Dual Ex-
plicitness Hierarchy.36
                                                 
36 The middle range of the hierarchy appears to be overrepresented. However, this is a side-effect of the
sampling method. The middle range includes all paradigmatic structure with horizontal homophony.
Because I wanted to show the complete paradigmatic variation, I have included all different cases with
horizontal homophony (see the next section).
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common rare
Split inclusive + – – – – + + +
Split dual-‘we’ + + – – + – + –
Split dual + + + – – + – –
Number of cases 13 25 28 13 2 1 1 0
79 cases (95%) 4 cases (5%)
Table 8.3: The Dual Explicitness Hierarchy
The Dual Explicitness Hierarchy is schematically presented by the paradigmatic
structures in Figure 8.3. The columns in the figure represent the structure of the re-
stricted group column. To the left, all categories are distinguished by separate mor-
phemes, losing more and more explicitness going to the right.
1+2
1+2+3
1+3 < < <
2+3
3+3
Figure 8.3: Schematic structure of the ‘restricted group’ column
in the different stages of the Explicitness Hierarchy
This Dual Explicitness Hierarchy runs parallel to the Explicitness Hierarchy that was
found for paradigms without dual forms. In the next chapter, these two hierarchies
will be shown to be interconnected by various examples of cognate paradigms.
8.8.3 Horizontal homophony
Next to vertical homophony, horizontal homophony is the other structural character-
istic of a pronominal paradigm to be scrutinised here. Horizontal homophony is char-
acterised by one morpheme that is used for groups of referents with different num-
bers. In the present context, the important question is whether the dual reference is
identical to the reference for any other number category or not. An example of hori-
zontal homophony is presented in (8.51). What is shown are the independent pro-
nouns from Sedang, a Mon-Khmer language. This paradigm has a horizontal ho-








1 á ngin má 1+3
2 eh pó 2+3
3 gá vai préi 3+3
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I have tabulated the frequencies of the possible combinations of horizontal homoph-
ony within a paradigm in Table 8.4. A minus in the table means that there is no hori-
zontal homophony between the dual and the plural, which can also be interpreted as
meaning that there exists a specialised dual form. A plus indicates that there is hori-
zontal homophony, which can also be interpreted as meaning that there is no special-
ised dual form. Two columns in the table below are marked as ‘no dual’ because these
combinations of plusses result in a paradigm that does not mark number anymore.37
Inclusive – – – – + + – + + – – + – + + +
Exclusive – – – + + + – – + + + + + – – –
Second person – – + + + + + – – – + – – + – +
Third person – + + + + – – – – – – + + – + +
Number of cases 59 5 4 (no dual) 4 4 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Table 8.4: Horizontal homophony between dual and non-dual forms
It is tempting to try and see a hierarchy in the frequencies, but the apparent hierarchy
is not very relevant. In fact, the far majority of cases has simply no horizontal
homophony at all (59 cases, which is 71% of the sample). The next two most frequent
cases fall neatly into the apparent hierarchy (respectively 5 and 4 cases, which is 11%
of the sample), but there are still another 15 cases left (18% of the sample) that do not
fit into the hierarchy. The large majority of 15 combinations of horizontal homophony
have at least a specialised dual in the third person. This can be explained by noting the
strong correlation between duals in the 3rd person and nominal dual marking (Plank,
1996: 133).
The claim by Humboldt and Plank that duals are preferebly found in the first person
(see the introduction of this chapter) is only true if the minimal inclusive forms are
counted as duals. The minimal inclusive the category for the pair of speaker and
addressee. This ‘natural pair’ is dual by definition, but I have argued elsewhere that
this category is better interpreted as a special group category, and not as a dual (see
sections 3.6.5 and 4.7.1). When the ‘natural pair’ is not included among the duals (as I
have done), then almost all paradigms take all or nothing.38 The best generalisation
over the presented distribution is that dual marking is preferably found across the
board of the paradigms, or not at all. Intermediate cases with special combinations of
horizontal homophony are rare.
                                                 
37 The column with a minus for inclusive and plusses for all other persons can be interpreted as refer-
ring to the Maranao-type paradigm with a minimal/augmented pattern (see section 4.7.2). The column
with all plusses corresponds to the paradigms without dual marking. These paradigms have been dis-
cussed extensively in Part II of the present work.
38 There are 24 cases in the sample of 83 paradigms that do not have a specialised dual for all persons
(specialised dual forms are marked by a minus in Table 8.4). The claim by Humboldt and Plank is re-
stricted to this set of cases. Out of these 24 cases, 18 paradigms (22% of 83 paradigms) have some
kind of dual ‘we’, 11 paradigms (13% of 83 paradigms) have a second person dual and 15 paradigms
(18% of 83 paradigms) have a third person dual. Indeed, dual ‘we’ is the most frequent (as claimed by
Humboldt and Plank), but the preference is not really impressive.
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Finally, the presence or absence of horizontal homophony is crossed with the Dual
Explicitness Hierarchy. Horizontal homophony is almost exclusively attested in the
middle range of the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy, as is shown in Table 8.5. This
restriction can be explained by two constraints on the structure of a pronominal
paradigm (cf section 5.6.3). First, vertical homophony and horizontal homophony are
preferably not combined into one paradigmatic structure. Second, the opposition
between minimal inclusive and augmented inclusive is the last addition to a
pronominal paradigm. This opposition is only marked in a paradigm after all other
possible opposition have already been expressed.
Dual Explicitness Hierarchy
+ – – –
+ + – –
+ + + –
others
– 13 14 17 12 3Horizontal
Homophony + 0 11 11 1 1
Table 8.5: Correlation between the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy and the presence of
horizontal homophony. Horizontal homophony is almost exclusively found in the
middle range of the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy (
2 = 12.40, DF = 4, p < .015).
8.8.4 Summary
The investigation of the structural characteristics of the dual has resulted in some in-
teresting generalisations. First, it was noted that there is an inverse correlation be-
tween an inclusive-exclusive opposition in the dual and the occurrence of vertical
homophony. This result was already foreshadowed on qualitative grounds in section
8.5.3. In this section, it turned out that also quantitatively a (moderately) significant
inverse correlation is found in the sample. Second, this correlation has been shown to
be part of a larger Dual Explicitness Hierarchy. This hierarchy describes the strong
tendency to explicate the dual categories in a strict order: split dual > split dual-‘we’ >
split inclusive. The higher up the hierarchy, the more explicit the marking of the dual.
This hierarchy is the dual analogue to the Explicitness Hierarchy that was found in
section 5.5. Third, the distribution of the various forms of horizontal homophony did
not show much of interest. There is a faint feeling of a hierarchy, but across the board
the main representatives of the hierarchy are the endpoints (either there is a complete
dual set or there is no dual at all). The intermediate stages of a putative ‘dual’ hierar-
chy 1>2>3 are only sparsely represented and the counterexamples to the hierarchy are
numerous. Finally, horizontal homophony is almost exclusively attested in the middle
range of the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy. This correlation can be explained by posit-
ing two constraints on paradigmatic structure. Horizontal and vertical homophony are
not to be combined into one paradigm, and the minimal/augmented opposition is only
overtly marked after all other possible oppositions have been expressed.
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8.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, the large variety of possibilities to mark the dual in pronominal para-
digms among the world’s languages has been described. In total, 32 different para-
digmatic structures have been attested. A sample has been selected from these exam-
ples to carry out some quantitative analyses on the diversity. The frequency of each of
these 15 paradigms in the sample is shown in Figure 8.4. There is a clear continuum
from the more frequent paradigmatic structures to the rare ones. The dotted lines in
the figure delimit different groups in this continuum that are qualitatively different.
The characteristics of these different groups will be summarised below.
Figure 8.4: Continuum of frequencies of the various paradigmatic structures
(only three of the 21 structures are shown that are attested in only one case)
The two most frequent and most widespread paradigmatic structures are the
DUAL-UNIFIED-WE paradigm (see section 8.3.2) and the DUAL-INCLUSIVE/EXCLUSIVE
paradigm (see section 8.5.2). These patterns are graphically represented by the para-
digmatic structures in Figure 8.5. Both these patterns are attested throughout the
world’s languages, but they are most often found in a few specific areas or linguistic
families. Both patterns are found regularly among the Pama-Nyungan languages,
among the Tibeto-Burman languages and among the languages from North America.
Besides these shared preferences, the dual-unified-we pattern is also attested in Eura-
sia and among the Papuan languages from New Guinea. In contrast, the dual-
inclusive/exclusive pattern is also found among the Oceanic languages.








CHAPTER 8: THE DIVERSITY OF MINIMAL NUMBER 277
Dual-unified-we Dual-inclusive/exclusive
Figure 8.5: The two most frequent paradigmatic structures
The second set of paradigms on the frequency continuum is formed by the two para-
digmatic structures shown in Figure 8.6. Structurally, both patterns have a distinction
between minimal and augmented inclusive. Areally, both patterns are almost exclu-
sively found in northern Australia. The most well known of these patterns is the UNIT-
AUGMENTED paradigm (see section 8.6). A variant of the unit-augmented paradigm is
the PARTIAL-UNIT-AUGMENTED paradigm. The only difference between the two is that
the ‘inclusive trial’ is not attested in the partial-unit-augmented pattern. The resulting
partial-unit-augmented paradigm is functionally equivalent to the dual-
inclusive/exclusive type (cf Figure 8.5 above). However, the morphological structure
of the partial-unit-augmented paradigms indicates a connection to the unit-augmented
paradigm (see section 8.5.4). The partial-unit-augmented paradigm is kept separate,
because it will turn out to play an important role in the next chapter, mediating dia-
chronically between other major patterns.
Partial-unit-augmented Unit-augmented
Figure 8.6: Major paradigmatic structures with a minimal/augmented opposition
The third kind of paradigmatic structure highlighted here is a pattern with three dif-
ferent forms for ‘we’. There are many paradigmatic variants attested for the marking
of the three forms for ‘we’. All these paradigmatic possibilities have been combined
under the heading of DUAL-3WE (see section 8.4). The referential values of these three
different forms for ‘we’ are highly variable. At least five different patterns were dis-
tinguished and there might be even more. The large majority of dual-3we paradigms
is found in northern Australia and in southeastern New Guinea. Another characteristic
shared by all these patterns is that they are idiosyncrasies within their close family.
The paradigms with three forms for ‘we’ are never a general characteristic of a whole
family. In the next chapter, it will be shown that dual-3we patterns are an intermediate
stage in between other paradigmatic structures, which explains their highly variable
nature. Only the most frequent of these patterns is shown in Figure 8.7.
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Inclusive/exclusive only
in the plural
Figure 8.7: The most frequent of the various dual-3we paradigmatic structures
The final set of relatively common paradigmatic is formed by the two paradigmatic
structures that are shown in Figure 8.8. These patterns both have a vertical homoph-
ony between the second and the third person. The KALAM-TYPE shows only a vertical
homophony in the dual; the YAGARIA-TYPE shows vertical homophony both in the
dual and in the plural. Vertical homophony between addressee and other is rather fre-
quent in paradigms with dual marking. Interestingly, in paradigms without dual
marking, this kind of vertical homophony is much less common (relative to other
kinds of vertical homophony). In line with the geographical distribution of the dual-
3we paradigms, all examples of the two paradigmatic structures as shown in Figure
8.8 are from the southeastern part of New Guinea, with a strong emphasis on the East
New Guinea Highlands (see section 8.3.3).
Kalam-type paradigm Yagaria-type paradigm
Figure 8.8: Major paradigmatic structures with a vertical homophony
These various paradigmatic structures are not accidental phenomena. The fact that
exactly these patterns are attested more often than others is the result of a multifaceted
force-field that shapes linguistic structure. As a first impetus towards unravelling the
complex of factors governing the structure of pronominal paradigms, the complete
variation of all 32 different paradigmatic structures has been analysed on structural
characteristics within the paradigm (see section 8.8). A strong typological constraint
on the organisation of the dual marking in pronominal paradigms has been formulated
in the form of the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy. The Dual Explicitness Hierarchy de-
scribes the tendency for dual marking to be more or less explicit along a line of four
stages. These four stages are illustrated by the their most common representatives in
the upper row of Figure 8.9. The least explicit form of dual marking only distin-
guishes a dual ‘we’ from a dual ‘non-we’ (the YAGARIA-TYPE paradigm). In the next
stage, the dual ‘non-we’ is split into a dual second person and a dual third person (the
DUAL-UNIFIED-WE paradigm). In the third stage, the marking of dual ‘we’ is split into
an exclusive and an inclusive form (the DUAL-INCLUSIVE/EXCLUSIVE paradigm). Fi-
nally, an opposition between minimal and augmented inclusive is added to the mark-
ing of explicitness in a paradigm (the UNIT-AUGMENTED paradigm).












Figure 8.9: The Dual Explicitness Hierarchy and some intermediate forms
The paradigms in the upper row of Figure 8.9 all show a symmetry between the dual
and the plural column. The other frequently attested paradigmatic structures are
shown in the second row of the figure. They can be interpreted as intermediate forms
between the major stages of the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy. Together, all these pat-
terns form a web of interconnected paradigmatic structures. The central part of this
web is formed by the two most frequently attested and geographically most wide-
spread paradigmatic structures (the dual-unified-we and the dual-inclusive/exclusive
paradigm). The various paradigms around these two central figures are less common.
Moreover, these patterns are only found in a very restricted geographical area. The
paradigms on the fringes of Figure 8.9 are almost exclusively found in northwestern
Australia and southeastern New Guinea.
In the next chapter, I will investigate how this web of interconnected paradigmatic
structures fares within the confines of the variation between closely related languages.
Miscellaneous cases of cognate paradigms will show that this hierarchy is not only a





Connecting the dual through time and space
9.1 Introduction
A pronominal paradigm is not an isolated, unchangeable structure. The structure of a
pronominal paradigm is highly variable through time and space and the variation in
paradigmatic structure, even between closely related languages, is remarkable. Indi-
vidually, pronominal elements are rather stable, but complete pronominal paradigms
change easily. This variability might make one weary of a typological generalisation
or of a diachronic analysis of the paradigmatic structure because both types of inves-
tigation need an object with some stability to yield results. However, both kinds of
analyses together – typology and diachrony combined – can overcome this variability.
The diachronic study of human language starts from small variations between close
relatives to develop generalisations about historical change. Typology, on the other
hand, abstracts away from the small variations and focuses on the major breakpoints
in the general structure of human language. In the previous chapter, I have outlined a
typology of paradigmatic variation of dual marking in the pronominal domain. In this
chapter, I will bring together this typology with a special type of comparative analy-
sis, which will result in a cognitive map of interrelated paradigms, approximating the
dynamics of paradigmatic structure through time and space.
9.2 Method of comparison
Before I proceed, a few words on this special kind of comparative method are in or-
der. In most typological research, variation between closely related languages is dis-
regarded. However, this seems to be a waste of information, at least for the present
case. It is highly instructive to analyse the variation between close relatives because
large differences are attested within the confines of the narrow linguistic family.
Closely related languages normally show small differences in the paradigmatic struc-
ture of their pronominal elements. Sometimes, these small differences are typologi-
cally salient divisions between major paradigmatic structures. Yet, the morphemes
themselves, of which the paradigms are built, are still clearly recognisable as cog-
nates. Such pairs of paradigms, which consist of different paradigmatic structures, yet
built from clearly cognate morphemes, are called ‘cognate paradigms’. Numerous
cases will be presented in this chapter. The comparison of cognate paradigms comes
close to a historical investigation, but it should not be considered identical to it. A true
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diachronic investigation into paradigmatic structure will need to look much more
closely into the minutiae of variation. In this context, I will look only at cases where
history has led to specific differences in the paradigmatic structure. The cognate para-
digms presented differ only in one morpheme – or in very few semantically related
morphemes. I have searched for cases of paradigms that are extremely closely related,
so various intermediate steps seem unwarranted to explain the change from one para-
digm to the other. Also, for the cases presented, it seems unnecessary to propose that
the cognate paradigms go back to a third, unattested, paradigmatic structure.1 As a
result, the change from one paradigm into the other could be either an addition or a
loss of a few morphemes. Which of the two directions accurately describes the his-
torical change is left undecided in most cases. It is often difficult to establish a concise
historical development that leads to the present situation only on the basis of the dif-
ferent end results. Consequently, I will propose historical developments without the
direction of change for most of the cases to be discussed below. A true historical re-
construction of paradigmatic structure is left for another occasion. The present goal is
to present a rough outline of the paths along which pronominal paradigms can change,
and suggest some restrictions on the possible diachronic modifications of paradig-
matic structure.2
Only a selected set of cognate paradigms will be discussed. The focus will be on the
interrelation between the major paradigmatic patterns that were distinguished in the
previous chapter. These major patterns are repeated schematically in Figure 9.1. In
each of these patterns, the three columns represent ‘singular’, ‘group’ and ‘restricted
group’ respectively. These major patterns are ordered along the Dual Explicitness Hi-
erarchy as formulated in the previous chapter. This hierarchy describes a strong con-
straint on the order in which particular oppositions are marked in a pronominal para-
digm. As a hypothesis, this typological hierarchy is interpreted as a pathway for dia-
chronic change. I will use the examples of cognate paradigms to test this hypothesis.
If the hierarchy stands diachronic interpretation, I expect to find examples of cognate
paradigms linking two paradigms that are adjacent on the hierarchy. In general, the
hypothesis will fare rather well. The examples of cognate paradigms that will be dis-
cussed in this chapter support the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy to a large extent.
                                                 
1 Of course, all cases of cognate paradigms go back to a third, unattested, paradigmatic structure: the
proto-structure. Both extant paradigms – now called ‘cognate’ – are the result of different changes
from a historical predecessor. Literally speaking, the change is never from one cognate to another, but
for both languages from the proto-structure to the extant structures. However, the cases that will be
presented here seem to be situations where one of the extant structures did not (or hardly) change
since the proto-structure that united the two cognates. (At least, the paradigmatic structure of this
‘conservative’ paradigm did not change. Phonologically, the ‘conservative’ paradigm might be highly
‘progressive’; cf the case of Uradhi in (9.30) below.) When I talk of a change from one extant struc-
ture to another, this should be taken as shorthand for a situation where one of the two structure is
much closer to the paradigmatic structure of the proto-language than the other.
2 See section 6.2 for a more extensive discussion of the methodological aspects of the comparison of
cognate paradigms.
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Figure 9.1: Major paradigmatic types with ‘restricted group’ morphemes
ordered along the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy
The complete typology of the paradigmatic structure of dual forms was described in
the previous chapter. Only a few comments are repeated here. First, only the MAJOR
patterns are presented. This is an abstraction from the large variety of paradigmatic
structures that were attested. However, none of the other patterns is attested com-
monly enough to grant it the status of a ‘major’ type. Second, the DUAL-3WE pattern
exists in many different variants. Only one of the five different paradigmatic struc-
tures that were attested is shown in Figure 9.1 (cf section 8.4). The variability of this
type is mirrored in the many cases of cognate paradigms that link the dual-3we pattern
to the various other paradigmatic structures. Section 9.5 will be devoted to the discus-
sion of the connections between the dual-3we pattern and other patterns. It turns out
that the dual-3we pattern is a mediator between the other patterns with dual marking.
Third, two of the various types that are distinguished in Figure 9.1 are FUNCTIONALLY
identical. The dual-inclusive/exclusive pattern and the partial-unit-augmented pattern
mark exactly the same referential categories. The only reason to distinguish between
the two is a difference in their morphological structure (cf section 8.5.4). At first,
these two will be kept apart in this chapter because they show different connections to
other paradigms. However, the two will be equated for the final version of paradig-
matic interconnectivity in section 9.6.
The major types from Figure 9.1 will not only be linked to each other, they will also
be linked to the major paradigmatic structures without a dual. The patterns without a
dual that will be considered in this chapter are presented in the upper row of Figure
9.2. These paradigmatic structures are ordered along the Explicitness Hierarchy,
which runs parallel to the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy. As a diachronic interpretation,
I hypothesise that the two hierarchies are connected to each other. This means that
paradigms are expected to change along the lines as shown in Figure 9.2. If this hy-
pothesis is any good, then cognate paradigms are expected to turn up linking adjacent
paradigmatic structures in the figure.
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 Dual Explicitness Hierarchy 
Figure 9.2: Hypothesised connections between the Explicitness Hierarchy
and the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy
In this chapter, I will present numerous cases of cognate paradigms, which will ap-
proximately confirm the hypothesised connections from Figure 9.2. After each set of
examples, I will give some arguments why specific links are not attested. These ar-
guments are not final, and could be falsified by a good example showing unambigu-
ously that a particular connection exist. However, as long as I do not have any cases
that point towards a direct connection, I assume that these links do not exist. The con-
nections attested between the various patterns will be discussed in three sections.
First, the examples involving the typical DUAL patterns are discussed (the dual-
vertical-homophony, the dual-unified-we and the dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigms).
These paradigms will be linked to each other and to the corresponding non-dual pat-
terns in section 9.3. Second, the MINIMAL/AUGMENTED opposition in all its variations
(the minimal/augmented, the partial-unit-augmented and the unit-augmented para-
digms) will be shown to be connected in section 9.4. These links are added to the
emerging web of interconnected paradigmatic types. Finally, the DUAL-3WE pattern
and its multiple connections are discussed in section 9.5. Abstracting somewhat from
the quirky ways of language, this complete web of interrelated paradigmatic structures
will be reduced to a more conveniently arranged cognitive map in section 9.6. This
cognitive map will be extended with the connections that were already established in
chapter 6. The complete map will be analysed in detail in section 9.7. Finally, this
chapter will be summarised in section 9.8.
9.3 Linking the major dual paradigms
9.3.1 Preamble
In this first part of the discussion of cognate paradigms, I will present examples of
cognate paradigms involving the typical dual paradigms. They will be linked to each
other and to the corresponding paradigms without a dual. The hypothesised intercon-
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nections between the various paradigms are repeated in Figure 9.3. The three struc-

















Figure 9.3: The major dual paradigms within the hypothesised paradigmatic
connections
9.3.2 Cognate paradigms
Examples will be discussed from Finisterre-Huon, Pama-Nyungan, Uralic, Kiranti and
Miwok; a typologically, genetically and areally highly diverse set of examples. The
first two cases are from languages that are spoken in the Pacific area. The Finisterre-
Huon family is a group of related Papuan languages from New Guinea and the Pama-
Nyungan family is a large group of related languages from Australia. The next two
cases come from Eurasia. The Uralic family is a group of far-flung languages spoken
throughout Russia and the Kiranti family is a sub-group of the Tibeto-Burman stock,
spoken in Nepal. Finally, the Miwok languages are spoken in California.
Finisterre-Huon (New Guinea)
The independent pronouns from the Finisterre-Huon language Wantoat are shown in
(9.1). These pronouns have the typical New Guinea Highlands structure, showing a
homophony between the second and the third person non-singular (McElhanon,
1975: 548). Wantoat is a language from the Finisterre-range. In the independent pro-
nouns from Kewieng, another language from the Finisterre range, the same structure
is found. The somewhat loosely related languages from the Finisterre range belong
quite probably to the same stock as the closely-knit Huon family (Foley, 1986: 244).
The independent pronouns from the Huon language Nabak are shown in (9.2). These
pronouns are almost identical to the Wantoat pronouns, except for the opposition be-
tween the second and the third person in the non-singular. The same paradigmatic
structure as found in Nabak is also found in other Huon languages, such as Selepet,
Ono, Kube, Kâte and Kovai (McElhanon, 1975: 548).3
                                                 
3 The third person pronouns in Nabak show signs of recent addition. The singular morpheme ek is
compounded with the second person non-singular morphemes to form third person non-singular
forms. Probably, the Nabak structure is diachronically later than the Wantoat structure.























2 gâ in it 2+3
3 ek eken ekget 3+3
Pama-Nyungan (Australia)
Another obvious link between various dual patterns is the connection between the
dual-unified-we paradigm and the dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm. Starting from
the dual-unified-we paradigm, only an inclusive-exclusive distinction has to be added
(both in the group and in the restricted group morphemes) to arrive at a dual-
inclusive/exclusive pattern. In (9.3), the independent pronouns from the Pama-
Nyungan language Warrgamay are shown (Dixon, 1981: 40). This is a typical para-
digm among the Pama-Nyungan languages. In 9.4), the independent pronouns from
the neighbouring Pama-Nyungan language Nyawaygi are shown (Dixon, 1983: 463-
467).
Almost the same pronouns are attested; the only difference is the appearance of sepa-
rate exclusive forms. These exclusive forms are derived from the inclusive forms by a
suffix …-liu. The inclusive forms in Nyawaygi are the same as the unified-we mor-
phemes from Warrgamay in (9.3). The dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm from Nya-
waygi is derived from a dual-unified paradigm as found in Warrgamay. This devel-
opment is common among Australian languages:
 ‘More than half the languages with a singular/dual/plural pronominal system show an
inclusive/exclusive distinction, but there is no regularity to the distribution – languages
of both types are found in every quarter of the continent. And whereas the four forms
we reconstructed for 1 dual, 1 plural, 2 dual and 2 plural cannot be further analysed, it
is nearly always possible to provide some analysis of inclusive/exclusive forms. …
This suggest most strongly that an inclusive/exclusive distinction should not be attrib-
uted to pA [proto-Australia] but has evolved rather recently in a number of scattered
groups of modern languages.’ (Dixon, 1980: 335-336)










2 inba ura ubala 2+3








1 ayba analiu aliliu 1+3
2 inba ura ubula 2+3
3 aga !ana bula 3+3
Uralic (Russia)
The next two cases of cognate paradigms will highlight the connections between the
paradigms with a dual and the paradigms without a dual. A straightforward link is the
connection between the unified-we and the dual-unified-we pattern. The only differ-
ence between these two patterns is a set of dual markers that is added to the set of
group markers. This link is exemplified with independent pronouns from two Uralic
languages; Udmurt (Csúcs, 1998: 287) and Nganasan (Helimski, 1998: 501) in (9.5)
and 9.6). The Nganasan paradigm has added dual pronouns by inserting a new set of







2 ton ti 2+3










2 tn tï ti 2+3
3 sïtï sïtï sïtï 3+3
                                                 
4 This is a case of morphological markedness reversal, cf Ika and Damana in section 7.3
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Kiranti (Nepal)
The next cognate paradigms are found among the independent pronouns of the Kiranti
languages (part of Sino-Tibetan), spoken in Nepal. The following languages have
been selected out of the large variety of Kiranti languages because the pronominal
forms are almost identical. No argumentation is needed to show that these paradigms
are cognate.5 Still, there are some interesting paradigmatic differences between the
languages. First, the pronouns from Thulung are shown in (9.7). This paradigm has an





1 go goku 1+3
2 gana gani 2+3
3 (not given in source) 3+3
Second, the pronouns from Bahing are shown in (9.8). These pronouns have a dual
column, which results in a dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm (Bauman, 1975: 267).
The dual column is clearly marked relative to the group column by a suffix …-si.
However, it is not unequivocally clear that this represents a diachronically later addi-
tion because the suffix …-si appears infixed in the 1+3 form go:su:ku. These para-
digms from Thulung and Bahing are clearly cognate, but the historical direction of the
changes leading to the present variety remains to be investigated by specialists. For
the present purpose, it suffices to note that the dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm is








1 go go:ku go:su:ku 1+3
2 ga gani gasi 2+3
3 harem haremdau haremdausi 3+3
Miwok (USA)
A striking case of cognate paradigmatic variation is found among the Miwok lan-
guages, spoken in California. This case was already noted by Freeland (1947: 35),
Callaghan (1974: 384-385) and Greenberg (1988: 9-11). The differences between the
independent pronouns of the various Miwok languages are small and it seems to be
within reach to reconstruct the complete history of the paradigmatic changes in the
Miwok pronoun paradigm, though this task falls outside the scope of the present
                                                 
5 In contrast to the cases presented, the pronouns from other Kiranti languages are in need of extensive
historical-comparative backing before it can be maintained that they are related, cf Bauman
(1975: 123-142), van Driem (1987: 25-28) and Ebert (1997: 43) for independent pronouns from some
other Kiranti languages that are not immediately clear as cognate paradigms.
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study. Clearly, a direct change from an extant paradigm of one of the Miwok lan-
guages into another, as proposed by Greenberg (1988: 9-11), does not do justice to the
intricacies of the variation attested. Still, there are clear cognate paradigms with dif-
ferent paradigmatic structures among the Miwok languages. These indicate that there
is a link between the inclusive/exclusive, the minimal/augmented and the dual-
unified-we paradigms. The orthography of the Miwok pronouns is taken from Cal-
laghan (1974).
The differences in paradigmatic structures between the various the Miwok languages
centre around two linguistic elements, reconstructed as *ic.y- and *oti.-. The mor-
pheme *oti.- is a numeral ‘two’. The history of * ic.y- is unknown (Callaghan,
1974: 386). The reflexes of these proto-morphemes will be found in various functions
in the different Miwok languages. The first variant is the paradigm of the independent
pronouns from Southern Sierra Miwok, shown in (9.9). This paradigm has an opposi-
tion between 1+2 and 1+2+3, forming a minimal/augmented paradigm. Both inclusive
forms are made on the basis of the proto-Miwok *oti.-. The second part of these in-
clusive pronouns is, on the one hand, the first person plural suffix …-me for 1+2 and,
on the other hand, the first person inclusive plural possessive suffix …-c.i for 1+2+3
(Broadbent, 1964: 93; Callaghan, 1974: 384). This possessive suffix …-c.i is possibly
historically related to the proto-Miwok *ic.y-.
(9.9) SOUTHERN SIERRA MIWOK
ot $i.me- 1+2
ot $i-c.i- 1+2+3
1 kan.i- mah.i- 1+3
2 mi.ni- mi-ko- 2+3
3 is.ak- i-k.o- 3+3
A different pattern is found in Bodega Miwok, shown in (9.10). In this paradigm, the
pronoun óc.i is the same form as the proto Miwok numeral *oti.- by a regular sound
change (Callaghan, 1974: 385). In this case, the numeral ‘two’ has been reinterpreted
as a first person dual and duals for the other persons are added analogously. In this










2 mí. mí-k.o mí-k.os# 2+3
3 ít $i i-k.o í-k.os# 3+3
                                                 
6 In Lake Miwok (that has the same paradigm structure as Bogeda Miwok) the pronoun ici is used by
one of the informants as an idiosyncratic variant of oci (Callaghan, 1965: 283). This can be inter-
preted in different ways. Maybe an erstwhile opposition between ici and oci has merged, or the pro-
noun oci has replaced an older ici.
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The historical developments that resulted in these structures are not completely clear.
However, a direct link between the minimal/augmented pattern (9.9) and the dual-
unified-we pattern (9.10) seems unlikely. Too many conceptual and morphological
changes have to take place for a direct transition. An inclusive-exclusive pattern, as
found in Plains Miwok, seems a natural intermediate pattern.
The independent pronouns from Plains Miwok are shown in (9.11). The reconstructed
form *ic.y- is attested as the inclusive first person plural ic.y-. The pronoun para-
digm thus forms an inclusive-exclusive pattern. However, the status of ic.y- as a gen-
eral inclusive is doubtful. Callaghan (1974: 386) analysed the reference of this mor-
pheme as being minimal inclusive only (1+2), but she did not explain in which way
the reference to the augmented inclusive (1+2+3) is made. In a later work, she glossed
the meaning of ic.y- as ‘we inclusive?/you & I’ (Callaghan, 1984: 296-297). A com-
parable restriction of the inclusive ic.y- to minimal reference (1+2) is described for a
close relative. The independent pronouns of Northern Sierra Miwok, a neighbouring
Miwok language, show the same paradigmatic structure as in Plains Miwok. Cal-
laghan (1987: 397-398) glosses the morpheme ic.i- in Northern Sierra Miwok as
‘thou & I’.7 This indicates that the morpheme may be a general inclusive, but that it is
prototypically used for the speaker-addressee dyad 1+2. This is represented as the
rightmost pattern in (9.11).




1 kan.i- mas.i- 1+3 1 kan.i-
mas.i-
1+3
2 mi- mok.o- 2+3 2 mi- mok.o- 2+3
3 is.y- i-k.o- 3+3 3 is.y- i-k.o- 3+3
The paradigmatic structures from Plains Miwok and Northern Sierra Miwok, as
shown in (9.11), are intermediate patterns between the clearly DUAL form in Bodega
Miwok and the clearly INCLUSIVE forms from Southern Sierra Miwok. Also geo-
graphically, they represent a mediating position. Plains Miwok and Northern Sierra
Miwok are found in between Southern Sierra and Bodega Miwok. However, the pro-
noun *ic.y- is not indisputable as an intermediate between the other two languages.
The major problem is that it can not be reconstructed as an innovation of the numeral
*oti.-. Still, the Miwok examples suggest two different links: between (9.11) and
(9.9) – from inclusive/exclusive to minimal/augmented – and between (9.11) and
(9.10) – from inclusive/exclusive to dual-unified-we. In other words, the inclu-
sive/exclusive structure mediates between the other two. Whether the inclu-
sive/exclusive structure as found in Plains Miwok can be identified with the proto-
Miwok pronoun paradigm remains an open question.
                                                 
7 However, much earlier, Freeland (1951: 30) analyses the morpheme íc. i from Northern Sierra Mi-
wok as a general inclusive, encompassing both the minimal (1+2) and the augmented (1+2+3) refer-
ence.
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9.3.3 Summary
The five cases that were discussed in this section show different connections between
paradigmatic structures. These connections are summarised in Figure 9.4. The links
on the upper row were already established in chapter 6. Several hypothetically possi-
ble connections remain open in the figure. First, connections to the paradigms with
vertical homophony (on the far left side of Figure 9.4) are only sparsely attested. This
is probably a result of the low frequency of occurrence of these patterns, which makes
it less probable that a connection to these paradigms will be found among the world’s
languages. Second, connections to the paradigms with a minimal/augmented opposi-
tion (on the far right side of Figure 9.4) are not shown here, but they do exist. Cases
of cognate paradigms involving these patterns will be discussed in the next section.
Figure 9.4: First approximation of paradigmatic interconnectivity
The most important missing link among the presented connections is a direct transi-
tion between the unified-we paradigm and the dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm (see
Figure 9.5). This direct change seems to be impossible. There are too many paradig-
matic changes that have to happen at once for this transition to be instantiated by one
change. This transition probably has to be made in several steps, for example, by tak-
ing a route over the dual-unified-we pattern, or over the inclusive/exclusive pattern.
Of course, there might be cases unknown to me that argue for this direct change,





Figure 9.5: Not attested direct link between unified-we and dual-inclusive/exclusive
9.4 Minimal/augmented and its variants
9.4.1 Preamble
In this section, I will present examples of cognate paradigms that link various para-
digmatic structures that have an opposition between a minimal and an augmented in-
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tested frequently. They are schematically shown in Figure 9.6. These three paradig-
matic structures are conceptually highly similar and diachronically they seem to be
closely related as well. Some cases of cognate paradigms will be presented that link







Figure 9.6: Major paradigmatic structures with an opposition
between minimal and augmented inclusive
9.4.2 Cognate paradigms
Examples are presented from Nyulnyulan, Gunwingguan and Gé. The Nyulnyulan
languages and the Gunwingguan languages are both from Australia. The examples in
this section are rather biased towards cases from Australia, probably because the unit-
augmented paradigm and the partial-unit-augmented paradigm are typical Australian
paradigms, only rarely to be found elsewhere. The case of the Gé languages, spoken
in South America, show that it is possible though unusual to find examples outside
Australia.
Nyulnyulan (Australia)
The independent pronouns from the Nyulnyulan languages in Australia nicely illus-
trate the connection between the different variants of the minimal/augmented opposi-
tion. Shown below are the independent pronouns from the languages Nyulnyul
(McGregor, 1996: 23), Warrwa (McGregor, 1994: 20-21) and Nyikina (McGregor,
1989: 446, citing Stokes 1982). The Nyulnyul pronouns in (9.12) form a mini-
mal/augmented paradigm; the Warrwa pronouns in (9.13) make up a partial-unit-
augmented paradigm; and Nyikina in (9.14) has an unit-augmented paradigm. The
morphemes are all clearly cognate. Only for the Nyikina morpheme yarrjoo is there




1 ngay yarrad 1+3
2 juy kurr 2+3
3 kinyingk (y)irr 3+3
                                                 
8 Nyulnyul is a dying language. The independent pronouns as shown in (9.12) are dying with the rest of
the language. Presently, the inclusive forms (1+2, 1+2+3) are hardly used by the last speakers of
Nyulnyul. From older sources, the conclusion seems warranted that the paradigm as shown in (9.12)
existed until a few decades ago. McGregor explains:
‘The 1&2 augmented forms [yadir] are absent from my corpus. The speakers who I worked with all em-
ployed the 1 augmented forms [yarrad] as general first non-singular pronouns, irrespective of whether or
not the hearer was included. The full speaker very occasionally used the 1&2 minimal form [yay] for the
speaker-hearer dyad. However, I was never able to elicit it systematically, and recorded it only a few times
when it was uttered spontaneously.’ (McGregor, 1996: 22)







1 ngayu yaarra yaarra-wili 1+3
2 juwa kurra kurra-wili 2+3





1 ngayoo yarrga yarrga-mirri 1+3
2 joowa goorrga goorrga-mirri 2+3
3 ginya yirrga yirrga-mirri 3+3
Gunwingguan (Australia)
Another example linking different variations on the minimal/augmented theme is
found in the Gunwingguan family in Australia. The independent pronouns from
Ngalakan (Merlan, 1983: 71) and Rembarrnga (McKay, 1978: 28) are presented be-
low. The Ngalakan pronouns form a partial-unit-augmented paradigm; the Rembar-







1 ayka yirka yirka-bira 1+3
2 iñja n#urka n#urka-bira 2+3





1 ngn yarr yarr-bbarrah 1+3
2 k nakorr nakorr-bbarrah 2+3
3 naw/ngad barr barr-bbarrah 3+3
At first sight, these paradigms seem to be rather different. However, there are enough
correspondences that indicate that the paradigms are cognate. The languages use dif-
ferent suffixes to mark these forms as independent pronouns (…-ka in Ngalakan and
…-! in Rembarrnga), but once these are removed, the unrestricted group pronouns are
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rather similar, as shown in (9.17).9 However, for the present purpose, the crucial cor-
respondence between Ngalakan and Rembarrnga is the use of the cognate suffixes
…-bira and …-bbarrah respectively. In Ngalakan, the use of this suffix leads to a
partial-unit-augmented paradigm. In Rembarrnga, the addition of this suffix results in









A final example showing a connection between the partial-unit-augmented paradigm
and full unit-augmented paradigm is found among the prefixes of the Gé languages in
Brazil. This is an interesting case, as it is the only example outside Australia that
shows unit-augmented characteristics. However, it is not completely clear whether the
non-singular marking is really grammaticalised. The sources are not explicit on this
point. Most clearly, the Apinayé pronominal prefixes in (9.18) are described as a par-
tial-unit-augmented structure (Callow, 1962: 115). A cognate paradigm to Apinayé is
found in the absolutive prefixes from Kayapo, shown in (9.19). This paradigm is de-
scribed as a complete unit-augmented pattern, although the morphological status of








1 ic-… mic-… vaic-… 1+3
2 a-… ma-… vara-… 2+3
3 i-… m-… va-… 3+3
                                                 
9 The similarity between the roots of the pronouns in Rembarrnga and Ngalakan cannot be used to ar-
gue for a direct genetic relationship between the languages. In fact, the roots are much more wide-
spread; they are clear instances of the proto-non-Pama-Nyungan pronouns reconstructed by Blake
(1988: 7), shown on page 213. The similarities as noted in (9.17) only argue for the inclusion of both
languages within the non-Pama-Nyungan group of languages. The genetic relation between Rembar-
rnga and Ngalakan is established on other grounds.
10 Note that the names for the categories ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ are reversed in the grammar. Cal-
low (1962: 115: 115, fn. 1) uses the name ‘inclusive’ for what is normally called ‘exclusive’ and ‘ex-
clusive’ for what is normally called ‘inclusive’.






(gu) me  ba-… (gwaj) ba-… 1+2+3
1 i-… me i-… ar i-… 1+3
2 a-… me a-… ar a-… 2+3
3 -… me -… ar -… 3+3
Presumably, the Kayapo paradigm is better interpreted as an only-inclusive paradigm
with separate number marking. The non-singular markers me  and ar are written as
independent prefixes, indicating that these markers are not a full part of the pronomi-
nal paradigm (Wiesemann, 1986b: 368-369). The same prefix me is also found in
Canela-Kraho, but in this case it is clearly described as an independent non-obligatory
particle:
‘Number is sometimes expressed [in Canela-Kraho] by the particle me ‘plural’, usually









Another problem is the difference between the various forms of the inclusive. In
Kayapo, the difference between the minimal inclusive (1+2) and the unit augmented
inclusive (restricted 1+2+3) is marked by the independent pronouns gu and gwaj.
Strictly speaking, this difference is not part of the prefixal paradigm, as it is marked
by independent elements. It is only because gwaj is possibly a contraction of gu with
the dual marker ar that I have included this opposition in this paradigmatic structure.12
If the number marking is not part of the pronominal paradigm at all (like in Canela-
Kraho), then the paradigmatic structure of Kayapo is of the same type as the one
                                                 
11 Actually, the dual forms from Kayapo are designated as ‘paucal’ by Wiesemann (1986b). She does
not present any further argumentation why these forms should have paucal rather than dual reference.
It is possible that she uses the name paucal in an idiosyncratic way to unify the referentially dual
forms with the form (gwaj) ba-…, which is strictly speaking a trial. Interpreted as such, the label ‘pau-
cal’ by Wiesemann refers to the same category that I have called ‘restricted group’; the same group
that is normally called ‘unit augmented’.
12 The independent pronouns are ‘almost obligatory’ in case of the inclusive prefixes. These obligato-
rily used pronouns have been added between brackets.
‘In intransitive nominative clauses, the nominative [independent pronoun] is optional in the first, second
and third persons, but almost obligatory (can be deleted in sloppy speech) in 1+2 person.’ (Wiesemann,
1986b: 369)
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shown in (9.20) for Canela-Kraho (Popjes & Popjes, 1986: 175). More information on
these languages is needed to decide on this issue.13
9.4.3 Summary
The three paradigms that were considered in this section are strongly connected. The
minimal/augmented paradigm, the unit-augmented paradigm and the partial-unit-
augmented paradigm are conceptually closely related (they all have an opposition
between minimal and augmented inclusive). From the examples that were discussed
in this section, it turns out that there are also close diachronic bonds between the
paradigms. The various connections between the different variants of the mini-
mal/augmented paradigm are summarised in Figure 9.7. They are added to the con-
nections already established in the previous section. Note that the dual-
inclusive/exclusive and the partial-unit-augmented are referentially identical para-
digms.
Figure 9.7: Second approximation of paradigmatic interconnectivity
Other direct connections probably do not exist. Only one theoretical link is left unac-
counted for. The only missing link is between the unit-augmented paradigm and the




Figure 9.8: Not attested link between inclusive/exclusive and unit-augmented
I do not see how these paradigms could be directly connected. There are too many
forms to be lost or added at once. This number of forms would not be a problem if it
were not for the diversity of the referential values of these forms. For this transition,
                                                 
13 A case that might shed some light on this situation is found in the Papuan language Amanab (Minch,
1991: 31-32). In some crucial respects, the situation in the Amanab pronominal reference resembles
the structure as described for the Gé languages. In Amanab, the normal form of the pronouns are ‘pro-
clitics’ with an identical 4-way paradigm as found in the prefixes from Canela-Kraho in (9.20). The
emphatic variants of the pronouns in Amanab add plural and dual marking to these ‘pro-clitics’. Inter-
estingly for the comparison with the Gé languages, the paradigmatic structure of these emphatic pro-
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no unifying feature is suitable to account for all forms at once. It is far more probable
that this transition is mediated by other paradigmatic structures. I expect that devel-
opments as sketched in Figure 9.8 will only happen in a few separate steps. However,
this hypothesis is open to falsification.
9.5 Dual-3we as an intermediate
9.5.1 Preamble
In this section, the dual-3we pattern is connected to the other paradigmatic types. The
dual-3we paradigms are not a homogenous group. At least five different paradigmatic
structures were distinguished, which were only grouped together because of two
shared characteristics. First, these paradigms have three different forms for ‘we’
(hence the name) and, second, these paradigms have a second and third person dual.
Dual forms are also present amongst the three forms for ‘we’, but it is in this part of
the paradigm that the variability of the dual-3we pattern prevails (see section 8.4).
This group of similar but not completely identical paradigms turns out to be an inter-
mediate structure, showing many different links to various other patterns. Because of
this diachronic diversity it appears that the structural variability of the dual-3we para-
digms is genuine and not an artefact of descriptive practices.
9.5.2 Cognate paradigms
Examples are presented from Yalandyic, Oregon, Daly, Burarran and Paman. Once
again, these examples are biased towards languages from Australia. Only the case
from a few languages from Oregon is not found among Australian languages. I expect
this Australian bias to be an accidental skewing caused by the areal distribution of the
dual-3we paradigms themselves. The majority of the examples of dual-3we paradigms
are found in northwestern Australia and in southeastern New Guinea.
Yalandyic (Australia)
The first case connecting the dual-3we paradigm to the other paradigms is found in
the Yalandyic family (part of Pama-Nyungan) in Australia. The independent pronouns
in Kuku-Yalanji show a dual-3we paradigm (Oates & Oates, 1964: 7). The neigh-
bouring close relative Guguyimidjir has a dual-unified paradigm (de Zwaan,
1969: 135). As can be seen from the paradigms in (9.21) and (9.22), almost all mor-
phemes are identical. The main difference between the two paradigms is the presence
(in Kuku-Yalanji) or absence (in Guguyimidjir) of a distinction between ana and
anjin. Only one of these, viz andan, which is historically related to anjin, is at-
tested in Guguyimidjir as described by de Zwaan (1969). However, Haviland (1979)
notes that there is a geographical difference between the use of either of the two forms
in Guguyimidjir. The form andan is used in the inland; resulting in the paradigm
from de Zwaan (1969) as shown in (9.22). In the coastal dialect, the pronoun ana is
used instead.14
                                                 
14 Haviland (1979) also reports the existence of an exclusive dual ngalliinh, although this form is not in
common use anymore.
[continued on next page]
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‘most people at the Hopevale Mission now use nganhdhaan in preference to the coastal











2 yuudu yurra yubal 2+3










2 nundu yura yubal 2+3
3 nulu dana bula 3+3
Coos and Siuslaw (USA)
The two neighbouring languages Coos and Siuslaw in Oregon are probably, are as far
as is known today, not genetically related (Campbell, 1997: 119, 309-322). However,
the pronominal inflections of these languages present a clear case of cognate
paradigms linking the dual-3we pattern to the dual-inclusive/exclusive pattern. The
Coos prefixes, presented in (9.23), have a dual-3we structure (Frachtenberg,
1922a: 321). The Siuslaw suffixes, presented in (9.24), form an dual-
inclusive/exclusive paradigm (Frachtenberg, 1922b: 468). It is interesting to note that
the cognate paradigms are prefixes in the one language, but suffixes in the other.
Probably, both paradigms are historically derived from an independent set of pro-
nominal elements that were prefigated in Coos and suffigated in Siuslaw (Siuslaw
shows an overall preference for suffixes for some unknown reason). These ‘proto’
independent pronouns are lost in the mist of time.15
                                                 
[continued from previous page]
‘Most modern speakers do not make a distinction between inclusive (‘you and I’) and exclusive (‘another
person and I’) in the first person dual, instead using ngali for an unspecified 1st person dual (‘we two’).’
(Haviland, 1979: 65)
15 The independent pronouns the lead to the affixal paradigms are not the extant pronouns of either lan-
guage. The extant independent pronouns in both Coos and Siuslaw are derived from the affix para-
digms. In Coos, the independent pronouns are made by adding the prefixes (9.23) to a root …-xka(n)
(Frachtenberg, 1922a: 395). In Siuslaw, the independent pronouns consist of the suffixes (9.24) added
to the roots nà-… and nix(ts)-… (Frachtenberg, 1922b: 576).











2 eE-… cîn-… îc-… 2+3








1 …-n …-nxan …-auxûn 1+3
2 …-nx …-tcî …-ts 2+3
3 …- …-nx …-aux 3+3
Daly (Australia)
For the next case I return to Australia. The Daly languages present a case for a link
between the dual-3we pattern and the partial-unit-augmented pattern. The subject
pronouns of Ngankikurungkurr are presented in (9.25). They form a dual-3we pattern
with a gender distinction in the third person singular (Hoddinott & Kofod, 1988: 94).
The pronouns of the related Daly language Maranungku are shown in (9.26). These
pronouns form a partial-unit-augmented pattern (Tryon, 1970: 16). These two para-
digms are not as clearly related as the above examples. However, on closer inspection,
the differences are restricted to a few secondary aspects of the morphemes. First, the
paradigms have different suffixes to mark number (…-gurr/rrim and …-garri/rrike in
Ngankikurungkurr versus …-tya and …-tamata in Maranungku). When these differ-
ences are disregarded, the roots of the pronouns are almost identical. More important
for the present discussion is the difference between the inclusive forms in the two
paradigms. This difference makes these two paradigms a clear example of a cognate








1 ngayi ngagurr ngagarri 1+3
2 nyinyi nagurr nagarri 2+3
3 nem/ngayim wirrim wirrike 3+3







1 ngany ngatya ngatamata 1+3
2 nina nitya nitamata 2+3
3 nankuny/ngankuny witya witamata 3+3
Burarran (Australia)
The next case links the dual-3we paradigm to the unit-augmented pattern. The
examples presented are the independent pronouns from Burarra (Glasgow, 1984: 15),
shown in (9.27), and the independent pronouns from Ndjébanna (McKay, 1990: 430),
shown in (9.28). Only the masculine forms are shown here. The specialised feminine
forms for the third singular and – quite unusual – for the dual forms are disregarded.
The differences between the two paradigms are rather large. The similarity can best be










2 nginyipa anagoyburrpa anagotippa 2+3







1 ngáyabba njírrabba njirrikébba 1+3
2 njínjdabba núrrabba nirrikébba 2+3
3 nakébba barrayabba birrikébba 3+3
Paman (Australia)
A final case of cognate paradigms, again from Australian languages, connects the
dual-3we paradigm to the minimal/augmented paradigm. This time, the examples are
from the Paman languages, a subgroup of Pama-Nyungan. A dual-3we paradigm is
found in Wik-Munkan (Godfrey & Kerr, 1964: 14). The conventional analysis of the
three forms for ‘we’ is shown in (9.29a). However, in this case, a different lay-out
seems more appropriate. This paradigm is shown in (9.29b), using an unconventional
layout that suggests the possibility for a transition to the minimal/augmented para-
digm.








1 ngaya ngana 1+3
2 ninta niya nipa 2+3







1 ngaya ngana 1+3
2 ninta niya nipa 2+3
3 nila tana pula 2+3
The related minimal/augmented paradigm is found in Uradhi (Crowley, 1983: 352-
356). The Uradhi pronouns, as shown in (9.30), may seem rather different, but they
are closely related to the ones from Wik-Munkan. The difference is of a general
phonotactic nature: Uradhi is one of the initial-consonant dropping languages of
northern Australia. If the initial consonants from Wik-Munkan are removed, the
Uradhi pronouns appear. Only the group pronouns niya (2+3) and tana (3+3) are lost.





1 ayu(ßa) ana(ßa) 1+3
2 antu(ßa) ipu(la) 2+3
3 ulu(ßa) ula(ßa) 3+3
Finally, the minimal/augmented paradigm can be extended with dual marking, leading
back almost full-circle to the paradigmatic starting point from Wik-Munkan. The
newly added dual forms are found in Umpila, yet another Paman language (Dixon,
1980: 355-356). As shown in (9.31), Umpila has a partial-unit-augmented pattern,
                                                 
16 In the description of Uradhi (Crowley, 1983), the labels for the forms ampu(la) and ana(ßa) are
mixed up. They are glossed ‘exclusive non-singular’ and ‘inclusive plural’ respectively (Crowley,
1983: 354-355). This is an error, as can clearly be seen from the example sentences 1-10 of text III
(Crowley, 1983: 397-398). In these sentences, the pronoun ana- is used in what is clearly an exclusive
sense (excluding the addressee to whom the story is told). Terry Crowley adduces his ‘sloppy proof-
reading’ (Crowley, personal communication) as an excuse. He clearly knew better, as the labels are
correct in his description of the related language Anguthimri (Crowley, 1981: 169-171).
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1 ayu ana ana-baamu 1+3
2 anu uula uula-baamu 2+3
3 nhulu bula bula-baamu 3+3
9.5.3 Summary
The dual-3we type turns out to be an intermediate case between various paradigms
with a dual. The various connection that were presented in this section are summa-
rised in Figure 9.9. I do not know of any direct connection between the dual-3we type
and the inclusive/exclusive type. Perhaps some example will turn up in the future, but
I do not expect this to happen.
Figure 9.9: Complete version of paradigmatic interconnectivity
                                                 
17 There is a strong affiliation between the pronouns from various Pama-Nyungan languages that were
discussed in this chapter. All Pama-Nyungan examples are geographically located in the Cape York
Peninsula, but show rather different paradigmatic structures The pronouns from Kuku-Yalanji in
(9.21) and Wik-Munkan in (9.29) are examples of the dual-3we type; Warrgamay in (9.3) and
Guguyimidjir in (9.22) are examples of the dual-unified-we type; and Nyawaygi in 9.4) is an example
of the dual-inclusive/exclusive type; Uradhi in (9.30) is an examples of the minimal/augmented type;
and finally, Umpila in (9.31) is an example of the partial-unit-augmented type. These paradigms are
all clearly related to each other. The proto-Pama-Nyungan pronouns were probably of the dual-
unified-we type (Dixon, 1980: Ch. 11; Blake, 1988: 6). The development from there can probably be
reconstructed as starting at the dual-unified-we, changing through the dual-3we pattern (with a possi-
ble side route over the dual-inclusive/exclusive), to the minimal/augmented pattern, and eventually
ending in the partial-unit-augmented pattern. Dixon (1980: 353-356) speculates about a reconstruction
of a minimal/augmented paradigm for proto-Australian, partly on the basis of this paradigm from
Umpila. The development as outlined here seems to be a much better proposal to explain the structure
of the Umpila pronominal paradigm. There seems to be no need to reconstruct a minimal/augmented
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The overall impression is that the dual-3we pattern is clearly a dual pattern, mediating
between other dual patterns. It is not related to the non-dual patterns such as the inclu-
sive/exclusive or the unified-we. There is a link to the minimal/augmented pattern as
this pattern is an intermediate structure between the paradigms with a dual and the
paradigms without a dual. Another impression that arises from the many different
connections of the dual-3we paradigms is one of inherent variability. Consequently,
the large variety of dual-3we structures (cf section 8.4) is genuine and not an artefact
of inaccurate descriptions.
9.6 Number marking incorporated
Two reductions of the complete set of paradigmatic connection will be made. As a
result, the bewildering number of connections between the different paradigmatic
types from Figure 9.9 will be reduced to a format that presents some promising typo-
logical patterns. This reduced paradigmatic interconnectivity will be brought together
with the analyses from chapter 6. The result will be a cognitive map that shows the
pathways through the similarity space of paradigmatic structure, directly linking para-
digms that are cognitively near to each other.
The first cut to be made is that the dual-3we pattern is left out. This pattern is rela-
tively common, but it is never a typical pattern for a whole group of genetically re-
lated languages. All examples are incidental cases within their close family Moreover,
the dual-3we pattern turns out to be a mediating structure between the other paradig-
matic structure with a dual. The general impression is that the dual-3we pattern is an
incidental ‘in between’ pattern, not a typical stable pattern for a human language (see
section 9.5). Hence, it will be left out in the construction of a general outline of the
dynamic possibilities of paradigmatic structures. Second, the partial-unit-augmented
pattern will be combined with the dual-inclusive/exclusive pattern. Both patterns dis-
tinguish exactly the same referential categories. The main difference (and the reason
to keep them apart in the first place) was the morphological structure. To obtain a
general survey of the relations between the various paradigms, both patterns are col-
lapsed into one type. The remaining set of paradigmatic connections is shown in
Figure 9.10.















304 PART THREE: NUMBER INCORPORATED
This figure shows the connections that remain of the hypothesised connections be-
tween the Explicitness Hierarchy and the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy (cf Figure 9.2
on page 284).
Notably, the diagonals from top-left to bottom-right do not show up. These connec-
tions both involve multiple category-changes, and will consequently always be taken
in at least two steps. First, the path between the unified-we paradigm and the dual-
inclusive/exclusive paradigm needs both a addition of a dual and an addition of an
inclusive/exclusive opposition. These will not be added to the paradigm in one proc-
ess. More likely, the changes will follow a slight detour through other, less divergent,
patterns. The other non-attested diagonal connects the inclusive/exclusive paradigm to
the unit-augmented paradigm. This path needs both the addition of a dual and a sepa-
ration of the two different inclusives. These changes will also not be conceived at
once. In contrast, the two diagonals attested involve multiple category changes that
can be accounted for by a single reanalysis. An inclusive can be reanalysed as a dual,
trading, as it were, one category for the other. This reanalysis can only take place at
the diagonals from upper right to lower left. The other diagonals can not be conceived
as examples of reanalysis. The result of this remodelling of the paradigmatic inter-
connectivity is a cognitive map as shown in Figure 9.11. This map gives an impres-
sion of the similarity of the various paradigmatic structures. The structures that are
connected through a line are cognitively similar. Diachronic change of the paradig-
matic structure will tend to proceed along the lines of the cognitive map.
Figure 9.11: Cognitive map of paradigmatic interconnectivity
In this map, the connections from chapter 6 are added to the web of paradigmatic
connection. The ‘no-we’ and the ‘only-inclusive’ pattern are shown on top of Figure
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the same diagonal is found as in the dual part, linking two paradigmatic types through
reanalysis. Both the only-inclusive and the unified-we paradigm have only one spe-
cialised element for ‘we’. This element has different referential value in both para-
digms, but these two are diachronically related. The other diagonal, hypothetically
linking no-we to inclusive/exclusive, would need two forms to arise or be lost in one
change. This connection is not attested. Probably, a more gradual path is taken, inter-
mediated by one of the other types.
On the lower side of the figure, the two main paradigms with paucal marking are
added. An example of cognate paradigms linking the dual-unified-we to the paucal-
unified-we is found in the Lower Sepik family from New Guinea. The languages
Murik, Yimas and Chambri from this family have a paucal-unified-we paradigm, but
the languages Karawari has only a dual-unified-we paradigm. Foley (1986: 219-221)
argues that the proto-Lower Sepik pronominal paradigm had a paucal-unified-we
paradigm. An example of cognate paradigms linking the dual-inclusive/exclusive to
the paucal-inclusive/exclusive can be found in the Malaita family (a sub group from
the Oceanic languages) from the Solomon Islands. The southern languages Kwaio,
Sa’a, Langalanga and Lau have a paucal-inclusive/exclusive paradigm, but the north-
ern language To’abaita has a dual-inclusive/exclusive paradigm. Simons (1986: 33-34)
argues that the proto-Malaita pronominal paradigm had a paucal-inclusive/exclusive
paradigm.18
9.7 Hierarchies
The labels in the cognitive map only refer to the structure of the first person complex.
These labels describe the kind of marking in the paradigm that is used for the same
reference as the English pronouns ‘we’. This is an abstraction from the rather large
variability of paradigmatic structure. Various kinds of homophony were attested in
rather large quantities, but this variation did not find its way into the cognitive map.
Only the twelve different structures of the first person complex remained as salient
structures to be included in the cognitive map. Prototypical examples for each of the
twelve types of the first person complex are shown in Figure 9.12 to illustrate the
paradigmatic structure of each case. The central four paradigms in the cognitive map
are the structures that were coined as ‘the four systems that are more frequent than the
others’ by Ingram (1978: 219). These patterns are indeed the most frequent ones, but
the other paradigmatic structures are also commonly found and should not be put
aside too easily.
                                                 
18 These paradigms with a paucal are not really common: the only examples of such paradigms are
found in ‘Melanesia’: New Guinea and the surrounding smaller islands. The paradigms with a paucal
have a comparable status to the dual-vertical-homophony paradigms and the unit-augmented para-
digms, which are also only found in a restricted set of cases. These two paradigmatic structures are
attested in southeast New Guinea and in northwest Australia respectively. In general, the four lower
outmost paradigmatic structures in Figure 9.11 are all found in a strongly restricted region: southeast-
ern New Guinea, northwestern Australia and the nearby Oceanic languages.
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Figure 9.12: Examples of the paradigmatic structures in the cognitive map
The vertical dimension of Figure 9.12 can be described as a hierarchical tree of num-
ber oppositions. The four rows will be discussed in turn from top to bottom. The
paradigms that do not distinguish number are located in the upper row (stage N1). The
inclusive that is grammaticalised in the only-inclusive paradigm is not a special kind
of number marking (an impression that might arise from the old name ‘first person
plural inclusive’), but a kind of person marking. The second row (stage N2) is charac-
terised by a consistently marked opposition between singular and group marking. In
fact, there are many paradigms that fall in between stage N1 and N2. The opposition
between singular and group is not marked consistently throughout the paradigm if
some horizontal homophony is present. All paradigms that are only partly horizontal
homophonous fall in between stage N1 and N2. The third row (stage N3) consists of
the paradigms with ‘restricted group’ marking. Most of these paradigms have dual
forms, but the unit-augmented paradigm (on the far right of the third row) has a trial
inclusive that behaves parallel to the dual forms in the other paradigms. The label
‘minimally restricted group’ has been proposed to cover both dual and inclusive trial
of referential values. The fourth and final row (stage N4) consists of the paradigms
with paucal marking. This hierarchical tree of oppositions is shown in Figure 9.13.
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Figure 9.13: Hierarchical tree of number oppositions
The horizontal dimension of Figure 9.12 can be described as a hierarchical tree of
person oppositions. The four columns will be discussed in turn from left to right. The
first column (stage P1) consists of paradigms that have intermingled person categories.
The two paradigmatic structures presented in the first column of Figure 9.12 are the
most common kinds of incomplete person marking. However, many more patterns
belong to this column, for example paradigms with a first + third person vertical ho-
mophony and paradigms with singular homophony. The paradigms that are presented
in the second column (stage P2) make a three-way opposition between ‘speaker and
addressee excluded’ versus ‘speaker excluded and addressee included’ versus
‘speaker included’ throughout the paradigm. These three categories are traditionally
called ‘third person’, ‘second person’ and ‘first person’, respectively. The third col-
umn (stage P3) is characterised by an opposition between ‘addressee excluded’ and
‘addressee included’ within the category ‘speaker included’. The resulting forms are
traditionally known as ‘first person plural exclusive’ and ‘first person plural inclu-
sive’, respectively. The final column (stage P4) specifies a minimally restricted inclu-
sive and an unrestricted inclusive. This opposition is also known as ‘minimal inclu-
sive’ versus ‘augmented inclusive’. The resulting hierarchical tree of oppositions is
summarised in Figure 9.14.
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The person and number dimensions are not independent of each other. Specifically,
number opposition N3 and person opposition P4 describe exactly the same opposition:
‘minimally restricted’ versus ‘unrestricted’. This correspondence between the two hi-
erarchies explains the low variability of the minimal/augmented paradigms. The para-
digms that have an opposition between a minimal inclusive (1+2) and an augmented
inclusive (1+2+3) hardly show any structural variation. There are almost no cases
with vertical homophony or horizontal homophony among these paradigms. This ob-
servation resulted earlier in a description of the opposition between minimal and
augmented inclusive as the ‘icing on the cake’ for a pronominal paradigm. Why this is
so can now be understood. The opposition between ‘minimally restricted’ and ‘unre-
stricted’ is in fact an opposition that refers to the cardinality of the group. It only
makes sense to apply this opposition when there is a difference between singular and
non-singular. The opposition between ‘minimally restricted inclusive’ and ‘unre-
stricted inclusive’ (stage P4) can only be marked in a paradigms when there is a com-
pleted opposition between singular and group (stage N2). The combination of stage P4
with stage N1 does not make sense. I do not expect the hypothetical structure as
shown in the upper right corner of Figure 9.12 to show up after more research. The
other hypothetical structures in the corners in Figure 9.12 could very well exist. How-
ever, they are highly marked structures on the fringes of the possibilities of human
language structure.
9.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, a collection of cognate paradigms has been presented to test the hy-
pothesis that pronominal paradigms change through time and space along the lines of
the previously established typological hierarchies. In previous chapters, the structure
of pronominal paradigms has been shown to be ordered along the lines of two hierar-
chies: the Explicitness Hierarchy and the Dual Explicitness Hierarchy. These hierar-
chies were taken in this chapter as a hypothesis for the possible changes of paradig-
matic structure. The hypothesised connections are repeated here in Figure 9.15.

















 Dual Explicitness Hierarchy 
Figure 9.15: Hypothesised connections along the Explicitness Hierarchies
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To test this hypothesis, examples of cognate paradigms have been collected. Cognate
paradigms are pronominal paradigms from closely related languages that are clearly
related morphophonologically, but that differ in their paradigmatic structure. Numer-
ous cases have been presented, which show that many of the neighbouring paradigms
on the hierarchies are closely related. The hypothesised connections are almost all at-
tested. Only a few connections are missing from the far left side of Figure 9.15. On
the basis of the connections attested as discussed in this chapter combined with the
results from chapter 6, a cognitive map has been constructed that shows how the vari-
ous major paradigmatic structures are related to each other. This cognitive map is
shown here in Figure 9.16, ordered to the number of forms in the paradigm that are to
be translated into English as ‘we’.
Figure 9.16: Cognitive map ordered to the number of forms for ‘we’
This cognitive map summarises a few of the major results of the present work. First,
one of the findings is that the structure of the first person complex is a strong predic-
tor for the variability of the rest of the paradigm (see especially section 5.7). Also, not
all possible structures of the first person complex are attested equally frequently; there
are clear preferences for specific markedness structures of the first person complex
(see especially section 3.6). In the cognitive map, the structure of the major types of
the first person complex are shown. This survey summarises the major possibilities of
person marking paradigms, as characterised by a central feature of such paradigms:
the first person complex. Second, the various types in the cognitive map are intercon-
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tures. Structures that are similar are connected by a direct line. The similarity has been
established by a combination of typological and diachronic reasoning in this chapter
and in chapter 6. The similarity is basically typological, that is, the lines as drawn in
the cognitive map show an accurate representation of the variation attested among the
world’s languages. However, this similarity-space can very well be interpreted as the
paths of ‘least resistance’ for diachronic change. It is surely not necessary for change
to follow along the lines as shown in the cognitive map, yet it is likely. The connec-
tions between the various paradigmatic structures as shown in the map are the ex-







The structural variation among the world’s languages in overwhelming. Yet, this vari-
ability should not be considered a nuisance to linguistic inquiry, but a potential source
of insight into the possibilities of human language. Looking for a balance between
gross generalisations and extreme relativism, I have attempted, in the present investi-
gation, to catalogue the existing variability of the paradigmatic structure of person
marking. Certain structures turned out to be more common than others. However, the
existing variation shows a continuum from commonly occurring paradigmatic struc-
tures, through a set of ever less common structures up to structures that are not at-
tested among the world’s languages at all. Nothing seems to be impossible, although
certain structures are clearly less probable.
In this study, the reference to speech-act participants has been the subject of cross-
linguistic investigation. Such reference is performed by words like the English I and
you, but also by inflectional elements like the English suffix …-s, which marks for
‘not speaker nor addressee’. More specifically, only the reference by specialised shift-
ers has been included in this study. Words like I or you are such specialised linguistic
elements with shifting reference depending on who speaks them. I always refers to the
person who is presently speaking; you always refers to the addressee. When the turn
in a conversation is taken by another participant, the reference of these words
changes. It is impossible for such elements not to shift in reference. This definitional
property is important to delimit the cross-linguistic investigation as reference to
speech-act participants can be performed in many ways. A father can refer to himself
by daddy or a teacher can refer to a student by using the proper name, like in How
would John explain this? The usage of regular nouns (‘daddy’) or proper names
(‘John’) for reference to speaker or addressee is a stylistic device that is rather re-
stricted in English, but in many other language it is much more widely spread. Such
linguistic devices that can be used for speaker or addressee reference, but that do not
necessarily perform that function, are excluded form the present investigation. Spe-
cialised shifters that are used for speech-act reference are called PERSON MARKERS
(see sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.4).
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Person markers are bound into a paradigm. A paradigm of person markers consists of
a set of elements that are syntagmatically equivalent in the structure of a language.
The elements in a paradigm take, so to speak, the same place in the overall construct
that is called a language. They have to belong together both functionally and structur-
ally. Functionally, the elements have to be, for example, all subject markers, or dative
markers, or whatever markers, as long as all elements perform the same function.
Structurally, the elements have to be either all independent or all inflectional; and if
they are inflectional, then they have to be all prefixes or all suffixes, filling the same
inflectional ‘slot’ on a predicate. Each paradigm of person markers should at least
have an opposition between (singular) speaker and addressee reference, as, for exam-
ple, the English subject pronouns I and you. All person markers that belong to the
same paradigm form the PARADIGMATIC STRUCTURE; for the English subject pronouns
this includes the elements I, you, he, she, it, we and they. Note that gender and honor-
ifics, among other pronominal dimensions, are disregarded in the present investigation
(see sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.5).
10.1.2 Person and number
The paradigmatic structure of person marking is traditionally analysed in two or-
thogonal dimensions: person and number. In this tradition, the dimension ‘person’
consists of three persons – first, second and third – and a possible inclusive/exclusive
opposition in the first person plural. The dimension ‘number’ consists of the catego-
ries singular, plural, dual, trial, paucal, and possibly a quadral. I have argued that this
analysis is not ideal as an approach to the cross-linguistic variation in person marking.
Semantically, the notion ‘plural’ is not suitable for words like ‘we’ because ‘we’ is
not the plural of ‘I’. Morphologically, the ‘plural’ person markers are, in the far ma-
jority of cases, not derived from the singular markers. Moreover, the inclu-
sive/exclusive opposition is only relevant in the first person plural, which indicates
that ‘person’ and ‘number’ and not really orthogonal dimensions (see section 3.3).
I have proposed a different analysis of person marking. The categories that are tradi-
tionally called ‘plural’ have been reanalysed as ‘groups’ of singular participants.
These groups are inherently plural as they consist of more than one participant. Yet, it
is the KIND of participants in a group that is important, not the NUMBER of partici-
pants. Five different kinds of groups turned out to be cross-linguistically viable cate-
gories. These five ‘plural’ groups and the three singular categories together, as shown
in (10.1) below, form the basic grid for the typology of the paradigmatic structure of
person marking (see sections 3.4 and 3.5).
(10.1)
1: speaker (‘I’)
2: addressee (singular ‘you’)
3: neither speaker nor addressee (‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’)
1+2: speaker and addressee (minimal inclusive ‘we’)
1+2+3: speaker and addressee and others (augmented inclusive ‘we’)
1+3: speaker and others (exclusive ‘we’)
2+3: addressee and others (plural ‘you’)
3+3: multiple others (‘they’)
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Graphically, these eight categories are depicted as a two-dimensional paradigm as
shown in Figure 10.1. This graphical representation is used throughout the present










addressee 2 2+3 second person plural
other 3 3+3 third person plural
Figure 10.1: The paradigmatic grid that has been used for the typological
classification
As a result of this recategorisation from ‘plural’ into ‘group’, the singular and the
group categories are considered now as ‘unmarked for number’. The dual, trial, and
the other traditional number categories, remain as those categories that are ‘marked
for number’. There are a few cases that show signs of a markedness reversal; in these
cases, the dual is unmarked relative to the group marking. However, such reversals
are only found in a small set of exceptional cases (see section 7.3). Among the num-
ber categories, the dual is clearly most prolific cross-linguistically. Other categories,
like trial, paucal or quadral, occur only sparingly and in a restricted area (roughly the
area that is known under the name of ‘Melanesia’). Moreover, it is questionable
whether the trial really exists as a grammaticalised person category. I have argued
that, on the basis of the published accounts, it seems better to interpret all trials as
being in fact paucals (see section 7.4).
10.1.3 Paradigmatic structure
The typological variation in the markedness structure of these categories is large. In
total, 98 different paradigmatic structures have been described in this investigation; if
even more languages had been included, this number would surely rise.1 This large
variety of attested structures already indicates that the often assumed basic ‘6-way’
paradigm (three persons in two numbers) is not the only possibility. The variation at-
tested was discussed in a few separate parts throughout the investigation. First, the
markedness structure of the three singular categories (speaker, addressee and other)
was investigated in sections 2.3 and 2.4. All possible kinds of homophony between
the three categories are attested. Second, the markedness structure of the first person
complex (the group categories that include at least the first person) was investigated
in sections 3.5 and 3.6. Here, the first restrictions on the typological possibilities of
human language are observed. Only 10 out of 15 possible structures are attested, and
5 out of these 10 are found in only one or two instances. The five remaining ‘com-
mon’ structure of the first person complex are shown in (10.2).
                                                 
1 These 98 different paradigmatic structures are described at different places in the discussion. The first
6 cases are discussed in section 3.6.6; then 55 cases are discussed in chapter 4; the next 5 cases are
discussed in section 7.4; finally, 32 cases are discussed in chapter 8. A list of the various structures is
presented in the Appendices B and C.
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(10.2)
no-we: there is no specialised form for ‘we’ in the paradigm.
The same morpheme that is also used for speaker
reference is used for the first person complex
only-inclusive: there is one morpheme in the paradigm that translates
as ‘we’, but only in the inclusive sense. The
exclusive ‘we’ is marked  by the same morpheme
that is also used for reference to the speaker
unified-we: there is one morpheme in the paradigm that
encompasses all reference of the first person
complex, like the English pronoun we
inclusive/exclusive: there are two morphemes for ‘we’, one for inclusive
reference and one for exclusive reference
minimal/augmented: there are three morphemes for ‘we’, one for minimal
inclusive ‘we’ (only speaker and addressee), one for
augmented inclusive ‘we’ (speaker addressee and
other) and one for exclusive ‘we’.
On the basis of this classification in five major types, a complete discussion of the
paradigmatic variability attested was presented in chapter 4. A summary of this varia-
tion was given in section 4.8. There turns out to be a continuum, ranging from com-
monly attested structures, over semi-common and rare structures, to non-attested
structures. The attested frequencies do not show a clear cut-off point between typo-
logically ‘basic’ and ‘abnormal’ paradigmatic structures. Everything seems to be pos-
sible, yet some structures are clearly more probable than others.
The marking of specialised number categories is discussed in chapter 7. The only
really common number category in the domain of person marking is the dual.
Roughly summarised, only the last three types form (10.2) occur with dual mor-
phemes. A complete discussion of the paradigmatic variation of the dual is presented
in chapter 8. A summary of this variation is given in section 8.9. Again, a continuum
of frequency is attested: some paradigms are clearly more common than others, but
there is no clear cut-off point between ‘basic’ and ‘abnormal’ paradigmatic structures.
In general, the most common paradigmatic structures with a dual are equivalent to the
most common structures without a dual.
10.1.4 Hierarchies
The question remains why certain paradigmatic structures are attested more com-
monly than others. To find a rationale behind this distribution, the internal structure of
the paradigms is scrutinised. The paradigms without specialised number marking are
analysed in chapter 5. The same analyses are repeated for the paradigms with dual
marking in section 8.8. The paradigms with a dual behave roughly equivalent to the
paradigms without a dual. The generalisation from both chapters are combined and
summarised in sections 9.6 and 9.7. Here, I will quickly summarise the analyses from
chapter 5. The result of these analyses is a classification of important characteristics
of paradigmatic structure. Two sets of interdependent paradigmatic parameters can be
distinguished. These two sets can be summarised as hierarchies that describe most of
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the variation of the internal structure of the paradigm: the Explicitness Hierarchy and
the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy.
The Explicitness Hierarchy describes the order in which a particular set of oppositions
in a paradigm is grammaticalised (see section 5.5). The more of these oppositions are
grammaticalised, the more explicit is the reference to the various referential person
categories. At the highest level, all eight person categories, as shown in (10.1) above,
are differentiated by separate morphemes. On the way to a less explicit paradigmatic
structure, there is a strict order in which the various categories are combined into the
reference of one morpheme. The various stages on this hierarchy are described in
(10.3) below. The first oppositions to give way are the oppositions in the first person
complex. Minimal inclusive (1+2) and augmented inclusive (1+2+3) are combined
first, and next this cluster is combined with the exclusive (1+3) to yield a unified ‘we’
(like the English pronoun we). Only after the first person complex has been united,
can other non-singular categories be combined into clusters of referential categories
(this is called ‘vertical homophony’). Finally, only if the non-singular reference is
thus strongly reduced in its referential explicitness, can some of the singular catego-
ries also be combined into the marking of one morpheme. Such a singular homophony
(like, for example, the zero marking in the English inflection, which marks for singu-
lar speaker and addressee) is the lowest rung of explicitness for a paradigm of per-




– all eight person categories, as shown in (10.1)
above, are differentiated
– minimal inclusive and augmented inclusive are
combined in the marking of one morpheme
– all categories of the first person complex are







– the second or third person plural is marked
together with the ‘unified’ first person complex
(‘vertical homophony’)
least explicit:
– on top of that, some of the singular categories are
combined into the marking of one morpheme
(‘singular homophony’)
The Explicitness Hierarchy is graphically represented by a few selected paradigmatic
structures in Figure 10.2. The paradigmatic structures that are shown here follow the
grid as presented in Figure 10.1 above.
                                                 
2 The Explicitness Hierarchy describes a cross-linguistically salient conceptualisation of the notion
‘richness’ of a paradigm. The notion ‘richness’ has been invoked in the generative literature to explain
why certain languages allow pro-drop and others do not. Languages that have a ‘rich’ inflectional
subject paradigm, so the reasoning goes, do not need to add the independent pronoun. However, this
reasoning does not work with the Explicitness Hierarchy. Even paradigms with a singular homophony,
which are on the lowest rung of the Explicitness Hierarchy, are still found to allow pro-drop in many
of the world’s languages (see section 2.5).
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Figure 10.2: Selected examples from the Explicitness Hierarchy
The other main generalisation is the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy (see section
5.6). Horizontal homophony is characterised by a homophony between two catego-
ries, one of which is singular and one of which is non-singular (ie a ‘group’ category).
With three singular and five group categories, there are 15 theoretically possible kinds
of horizontal homophony. However, four kinds of horizontal homophony account for
the far majority of cases: the third person singular is homophonous with the third per-
son non-singular (3  3+3); the second person singular is homophonous with the sec-
ond person non-singular (2  2+3); and the first person singular is homophonous with
the exclusive and/or the inclusive first person non-singular (1  1+3 and
1  1+2/1+2+3). Other kinds (called ‘diagonal homophony’) are only attested in a
few exceptional examples. Moreover, the four common kinds of homophony are con-
nected by a Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy, as shown in (10.4).
(10.4) Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
No Homophony < (3  3+3) < (2  2+3) < (1  1+3) < (1  1+2/1+2+3).
This Hierarchy is graphically represented by a few selected paradigmatic structures in
Figure 10.3. The paradigmatic structures that are shown here follow the grid as pre-
sented in Figure 10.1 above.
   
Figure 10.3: Selected examples from the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
These hierarchies were established on the basis of an investigation of inflectionally
and independently marked paradigms. Beforehand, no separation was made between
different forms of the morphological marking. Simply all kinds of paradigms of per-
son were included. As a result of this broad perspective, it has been shown that both
the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy and the Explicitness Hierarchy correlate with
the morphological status of the paradigms. The higher on both hierarchies, the larger
the proportion of morphologically independent paradigms. Paradigms that are low on
either of the two hierarchies are predominantly inflectionally marked. It should not be
concluded too easily that this correlation means that large person paradigms are there-
fore independently marked. This correlation describes a cross-linguistic generalisa-
tion, and individual languages can, and often will, behave rather differently (see sec-
tion 5.8).
10.1.5 The concept of Pure Person
A central cut-off point for the paradigmatic structure of person marking is the inclu-
sive/exclusive opposition. The paradigms without an inclusive/exclusive opposition
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allow for much greater liberty in combining different referential categories into the
marking of one morpheme. Once there is an inclusive/exclusive opposition in the
paradigm, the possible variation is strongly constrained. This difference is graphically
represented in Figure 10.4 (taken from section 5.7). Paradigms without an inclu-
sive/exclusive opposition are represented on the left; paradigms with an inclu-
sive/exclusive opposition are represented on the right (the opposition between a
minimal and an augmented inclusive is disregarded). In the pictures, the various per-
son categories are connected by lines that represent the number of paradigms in which
the two categories are found to be homophonous. The thicker a line, the more exam-
ples of this kind of homophony are attested in the sample. If there is no line between
two categories, this means that the categories are never homophonous (or attested in
maximally one case).
Figure 10.4: The impact of an inclusive/exclusive opposition
for the paradigmatic structure
In general, the two pictures show a rather different geometry. Yet, there is hardly a
difference as to the occurrence of horizontal homophony. In both pictures, ‘I’ is con-
nected to ‘we’ by relatively thin lines; likewise, ‘you-singular’ is connected to ‘you-
plural’ and ‘he/she/it’ to ‘they’.3 The major difference between the overall geometry
of the two pictures is found in the other kinds of homophony. In the left hand side
picture, there are 12 theoretically possible kinds of homophony left when horizontal
homophony is disregarded.4 Of these 12 theoretical possibilities, 8 kinds of homoph-
ony are actually attested. In contrast, in the right hand side picture, there are 16 theo-
retically possible kinds of homophony left.5 However, in this case only two kinds of
                                                 
3 A clear difference is the kind of horizontal homophony in the first person: in case of an inclu-
sive/exclusive opposition, the first person singular is possibly homophonous with the exclusive, not
with the inclusive.
4 With six categories, there are 5+4+3+2+1=15 possible connections. The three kinds of horizontal
homophony are subtracted, yielding 12 possibilities.
5 With seven categories, there are 6+5+4+3+2+1=21 possible connections. The four kinds of horizontal
homophony (one of which is not attested) are subtracted, yielding 17 possibilities. Also, the theoretical




















homophony are actually attested. Moreover, these two connections in the right picture
are only attested in a few cases (as can be seen from the rather thin lines). To summa-
rise, the paradigms with an inclusive/exclusive opposition show much less occurrence
of homophony between person categories. They predominantly allow for horizontal
homophony, which is constrained by the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy.
These generalisations can all be subsumed under a theoretical concept that I call ‘Pure
Person’. Paradigms of person can be more or less ‘pure’ in their conceptualisation of
the dimension ‘person’. The marking of ‘person’ is directed to the role in the speech-
act, most importantly to the roles ‘speaker’ and ‘addressee’. By definition, the para-
digms that were included in this investigation mark at least some person oppositions.
However, the centrality of the person categories to the paradigm varies. Within the
marking of person, the various roles are valued as more or less central to the speech-
act. Cross-linguistically, there is a strong person hierarchy placing speaker above ad-
dressee above others. In some languages in some specific instances, this hierarchy
might be ordered differently, but generalising over the attested diversity among the
world’s languages, the hierarchy is strongly substantiated by the Horizontal Homoph-
ony Hierarchy. Moreover, the person hierarchy has been found to regulate many more
clines in the diversity of structures (see sections 5.3.3 and 5.5.3). Also, the Explicit-
ness Hierarchy describes a continuum between greater or lesser importance of the per-
son categories. The higher on the Explicitness Hierarchy, the purer the marking of
person. The difference between inclusive and exclusive is a major breaking point on
this continuum. This opposition is the crown on the marking of person, as the differ-
ence between the combination speaker/addressee (inclusive) and speaker/others (ex-
clusive) is marked overtly in the paradigm. Only in cases of total absence of horizon-
tal homophony, is it possible for a paradigm to add an even more stringent opposition
between speaker/addressee/no-other (minimal inclusive) and speaker/addressee/other
(augmented inclusive). Finally, it has been shown that the purer the marking of person
in a paradigm, the larger the proportion of independently marked paradigms (see sec-
tion 5.8). The purer a paradigm of person, the more especially this paradigm is de-
voted to the marking of person. A Pure Person paradigm becomes a specialised sub-
system of a language, functioning to some extent independently of the rest of the lan-
guage.
10.1.6 Diachronic interpretation
Typological hierarchies might be connected to the possible directions of language
change. The hierarchies from the present investigation could, for example, be the re-
sult of certain restrictions on possible changes. To test whether the typological hierar-
chies may serve as hypotheses for language change, examples of cognate paradigms
are collected in chapter 6 and 9. The idea behind such cognate paradigms is that
changes in paradigmatic structure may perhaps be visible in the small differences
between closely related languages. Examples of such cognate paradigms present a
window on the dynamics of language change. By compiling a large collection of ex-
                                                 
[continued from previous page]
homophony between the inclusive and the exclusive is not counted as a possibility, because this oppo-
sition is the defining characteristic of this picture.
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amples of cognate paradigms, an impression can be obtained of which paradigmatic
structures are closely related (for methodological considerations, see sections 6.2 and
9.2). It turned out that the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy does not present a good
hypothesis of diachronic change. Closely related paradigms appear to jump up and
down this hierarchy with great strides (see section 6.3). In contrast, the Explicitness
Hierarchy presents a good format for diachronic change. Both for paradigms without
a dual (see section 6.4) and for paradigms with a dual (see sections 9.3 and 9.4), this
hierarchy is corroborated by the examples of cognate paradigms attested. In general,
the diachronic dynamics of person paradigms are most clearly seen in the structure of
the first person complex. The complete set of connections attested between the vari-
ous types of marking for the first person complex is summarised in Figure 10.5. This
map is a first outline of the similarity space of paradigmatic structure. The types that
are directly connected by a line in the figure are strongly similar, as shown by the ex-
istence of cognate paradigms linking these types (see sections 6.5 and 9.6).
Figure 10.5: Connections attested between paradigmatic types by cognate paradigms
10.2 Prospects
10.2.1 Where to go from here
Even within the rather strong restrictions on the domain of the present investigation,
the paradigmatic structure of person marking as attested in the world’s languages has
turned out to be highly variable. I believe to have presented a step in the direction of a
better understanding of the marking of person in language. Yet, much work remains
to be done. Most importantly, this investigation only addressed the PARADIGMATIC
structure of person markers. The logical next step would now be to compare the



















paradigms that have been discussed in this study perform many different functions
within the overall structure of a language. They mark, for example, the subject or the
object of a predicate. Also, they can be more or less obligatorily required to form in-
telligible utterances in a language. These dimensions have not been separated in this
investigation (cf de Groot & Limburg, 1986; Siewierska & Bakker, 1996). Finally,
there might be large differences (or maybe rather interesting correspondences) be-
tween predicative uses of person markers (I walk) and other linguistic contexts, like
isolated use (it’s me) or pronominal possession (my book, cf Siewierska, 1998). All
these questions can now be investigated with the present analysis of the paradigmatic
structure as a possibly significant variable. The analysis of paradigmatic structure
gives a proper basis for the investigation of the syntagmatic function.
Yet, also within the restrictions of the investigation into the paradigmatic structure of
person marking, there are still many themes to be addressed. Two examples of the
kinds of question that can be asked will be discussed in the next two sections. These
sections address two observations that I have made during my investigations, but that
could not be given a proper place within the main line of this work. The first observa-
tion concerns the place of the marking of gender oppositions within the structure of a
paradigm of person. The second observations addresses a possible difference between
prefixal and suffixal person marking. Both these themes deserve a proper and in-depth
study.
10.2.2 Gender in person paradigms
As one of the main delimitations for the present study, I have discarded all paradigms
that mark different forms for gender (see section 1.2.5). Still, I have had a more than
incidental look at paradigms that mark gender, but this part of the investigation has
not been sufficiently thorough to be reported on in the present study. Yet, there is one
observation on the marking of gender in person paradigms that seems promising as a
hypothesis for further research. Quickly formulated, gender marking is not found in
paradigms that have an inclusive/exclusive opposition. However, gender marking has
to be specifically defined for this hypothesis to be make sense.
When studying gender marking in the domain of person marking, two cases have to
be distinguished. First, gender marking in the third person is a separate question alto-
gether. Many semantic and formal classifications can be found here (Corbett, 1991).
In contrast, natural gender (ie an opposition between male and female) is the only at-
tested markedness strategy in the person markers that include at least speaker or ad-
dressee. Speaker and addressee are always human participants (or at least anthropo-
morphic non-humans). Apparently, the distinction between male and female is suffi-
ciently dominant in the classification of human beings to appear time and again in the
structure of human language. Gender marking in the reference to speaker or addressee
can take many different forms. It is rather uncommon for reference to ‘I’, ie for refer-
ence to the speaker only. However, gender is rather often, cross-linguistically speak-
ing, observed in the grammaticalisation of person markers like ‘you’ or ‘we’ (Plank &
Schellinger, 1997). It is, for example, attested in Spanish, where two different forms
for ‘we’ are found, nosotros for a group of males or mixed and nosotras for a group of
females.
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Now, the hypothesis can be precisely formulated. If there is gender marking in the
reference to any person marker which includes reference to at least speaker or ad-
dressee, then such a paradigm will not also make a distinction between inclusive and
exclusive ‘we’. In traditional terminology, if there is gender marking in the first or
second person (singular or plural), there is no inclusive/exclusive opposition in the
first person plural. From the data as reported on by Plank & Schellinger (1997), it can
be inferred that the hypothesis fares rather well cross-linguistically. Counterexamples
(ie paradigm that contain both an inclusive/exclusive opposition and a gender opposi-
tion in the first or second person) are almost unattested.6
If this hypothesis turns out to hold after further investigation, a possible explanation
can be found in the concept of Pure Person. Paradigms that mark an opposition be-
tween inclusive and exclusive have restricted themselves to mark person, nothing
else. Only if the marking of person is not completely explicit (ie there is no inclu-
sive/exclusive opposition), is there a possibility for marking gender oppositions. One
can look upon this as two different routes for the development of fine-grained refer-
ential categories for participant reference. On the one hand, a paradigm can specialise
for the specific role the participants fulfil in the speech act. In this case, the paradigm
marks ‘person’, and gender is not attested in the paradigm. Otherwise, a paradigm can
specialise for the marking of intrinsic characteristics of the participant. In that case,
the paradigm can mark gender. Yet, when gender is marked, the person-opposition
‘inclusive/exclusive’ is not attested.7
10.2.3 Asymmetry of affixation
Generalising over the world’s linguistic variation, there appears to be a strong prefer-
ence for suffixation over prefixation. Grammaticalised elements predominantly are
found after the root which they modify. For example, in a typological study, Bybee et
al. (1990: 4) found 426 grammatical prefixes (26%) against 1236 grammatical suffixes
(74%). After a thorough investigation of the possible reasons for this predominance,
the authors conclude that the preference for suffixation is due to the predominance of
V-final languages
‘Our proposal for explaining the suffixing predominance, then is that grams at clause
boundaries tend to affix at a very high rate, while the rate of affixation for clause-
internal grams is determined by their meaning and relevance to the verb. The large
number of suffixes in our sample, then, is due primarily to the fact that there are many
more V-final language than V-initial, and the additional fact that the V-final languages
are highly consistent in postposing verbal grams.’ (Bybee et al., 1990: 34).
                                                 
6 The few cases that contradict the hypothesis are the Khoisan language !Xu, the Papuan languages
Baniata and Vanimo and the Australian language Ndjébbana (Plank & Schellinger, 1997: 74-77). Note
that all these cases, except for !Xu, have a combination of gender and inclusive/exclusive marking in
the dual forms. The occurrence of gender and inclusive/exclusive distinctions in the core of the person
marking paradigms is an extremely exceptional structure for human language.
7 Probably, this gender-hypothesis can be extended to cover also honorific marking. Often it is even
difficult to draw a clear dividing line between the marking of gender and honorifics. The hypothesis
then is that paradigms that mark different honorific forms for speaker or addressee reference also do
not mark an inclusive/exclusive opposition. As far as I know, the only exception to this hypothesis is
the person marking of Acehnese (Durie, 1985: 117). However, I have not dealt extensively with the
marking of honorifics in the pronominal domain to be able to present a complete survey of the possi-
ble exceptions.
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As for person markers, this predominance for suffixation is less clear. Reanalysing the
data from Bybee et al. (1990: 9, 13, 15), there are 240 prefixed person markers (40%)
against 354 suffixed person markers (60%) in their sample. There still is a preference
for suffixation, although less strong than the overall preference. Moreover, Bybee et
al. have counted each person marking morpheme individually. They do not correct for
the fact that person markers in a language are found together in a paradigm. The per-
son markers in a paradigm are normally either all prefixes or all suffixes. So it might
be interesting to count paradigms instead of individual person markers.
In the data as presented in chapters 3 and 4 of the present work, there are 148 inflec-
tional person marking paradigms (see section 5.8). Of these 148 inflectional para-
digms, 72 cases are prefixal (49%) against 76 cases which are suffixal (51%).The dif-
ference between suffixation and prefixation has disappeared. However, the results
from Bybee at al. are still correct. It turns out that the suffixal paradigms are generally
larger; they contain more person markers. More specifically, there appears to be a
strong correlation between the prefixal/suffixal status and the Horizontal Homophony
Hierarchy. Paradigms without horizontal homophony are predominantly suffixing,
while paradigms with horizontal homophony are predominantly prefixing (see Table
10.1). Why this should be the case remains a puzzle, the more so since the pre-
fixal/suffixal difference does not seem to correlate with the Explicitness Hierarchy.
There seems to be something specifically relevant in the phenomenon of horizontal
homophony, supporting the occurrence of prefixation. Future research will have to
investigate this correlation with more care and consideration than has been possible so
far.
1  Inclusive – – – – +
1  Exclusive – – – + +
2  2+3 – – + + +





63 22 15 13 13 22 148
Prefixal 10 13 14 12 11 12 72
Suffixal 53 9 1 1 2 10 76
% Prefixal 16% 59% 93% 92% 85% 55% 49%
Table 10.1: Correlation between kind of affixation and horizontal homophony
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Figure 10.6: Percentage of prefixal paradigms on the
Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy
10.3 Wider application of results
Cross-linguistic investigation and linguistic typology, the kind of research strategies
that have been used in the presented investigation, do not stand in isolation from other
fields of linguistic investigation. As has been argued throughout this work, the inves-
tigations build on a long linguistic tradition of analysis, description and classification.
At the end now of my inquiries, the results of this study will hopefully be related to
these domains of investigation and inspire future research.
One of the main insights of this study is that the ‘6-way’ paradigm – the kind of para-
digm with three persons in the singular and in the plural – is in no way to be seen as
the basic paradigmatic structure of person marking. It is indeed a rather commonly
attested structure, but it is not the only common one. There are many other common
paradigmatic structures. This insight can enrich both descriptive practice and histori-
cal reconstruction. The wide variation of paradigmatic structures that has been laid
out in the preceding pages can guide the analysis of yet undescribed or only poorly
described languages. Also, the typology of paradigmatic structure can be used in the
context of a historical investigation to test whether a proposed reconstruction for a
paradigm is in line with the attested distribution of diversity among the world’s lan-
guages. Of course, it is not necessary for a reconstructed paradigm to belong to one of
the commonly found paradigmatic structures. However, the argumentation for the re-
construction of a typologically rare paradigmatic structure has to be much more strin-
gent than the argumentation for a reconstruction of a paradigmatic structure that is
commonly attested among the world’s languages. In this sense, the synchronic typol-

















‘It has been proposed, as a basic contribution of synchronic typology to historical lin-
guistics, that synchronic universals serve as touchstone for the validity or reconstructed
systems.’ (Greenberg, 1969: 174)
Finally, some insights have been presented that can inspire the development of the
theory of linguistic structure. The regularity of the internal structure of paradigms of
person, and especially the central place of the inclusive/exclusive opposition within
this structure, are promising theoretical results. A more widely ranging prospect can
be found in the notions variability and specialisation, as summarised in the concept of
Pure Person. From the analyses presented of the paradigmatic structure of person
marking, there appear to be clines between more and less explicit specialisation of a
sub-system within the overall structure of a language. The more specialised a sub-
system, the less variability is possible. This process can be interpreted as a kind of
‘meta’-grammaticalisation. Not only individual elements within a language can
grammaticalise, but also sets of interconnected elements as a whole can grammatical-
ise. In such a process of paradigmatic grammaticalisation, changes in form and in
function develop in an iconic relationship. Functionally, sub-systems of a language
grammaticalise by streamlining the function of the morphemes included within the
confines of a specific overall function and, formally, regularise the paradigmatic
structure. However, at least in the case of the paradigmatic structure of person mark-
ing, it is doubtful whether this ‘meta’-grammaticalisation process is unidirectional.
Developments in both directions seem possible.
Appendix A
Compound pronouns
Other person categories disqualified
A.1 Introduction
The category of person has been extended in the present work to include ‘general’
plural reference. It has been argued that the categories that are traditionally called
‘plural’ personal pronouns are better seen as a special form of ‘person’ marking, viz
groups of persons. There is a claim in the literature that even more person categories
are attested in the form of so-called ‘compound pronouns’ (Forchheimer, 1953: 132-
135; Hagège, 1982: 112; Wiesemann, 1986a: viii; Noyer, 1992: 182-187). Compound
pronouns are a special kind of compounds made up from two personal pronominal
elements. In some languages such pronominal compounds are (semi) grammatical-
ised, which leads to rather extensive pronominal systems. Some authors propose to
interpret these compound pronouns on a par with the singular and the plural pronouns,
such as, for example, Voorhoeve:
‘It seems as if there are three contrastive levels in the pronominal system: singular sim-
ple pronouns contrasting to plural simple pronouns; and plural simple pronouns con-
trasting to [compound] pronouns.’ (Voorhoeve, 1967: 428)
When these compound pronouns are included as part of PERSON-domain, this would
lead to large paradigms of person. For example, when simple and compound pronouns
are taken together, then there are 18 different pronominal elements in Ghomala’, a
Grassfields language in Cameroon. This leads Wiesemann to claim that Ghomala’ has
‘the most complex pronoun system as far as person categories are concerned’
(Wiesemann, 1986a:viii). However, it can be doubted whether these compound pro-
nouns are really special PERSON markers. In this chapter, I will review the available
descriptions of such compound pronouns, only to conclude that they are indeed a spe-
cial kind of pronouns (and not normal compounds), but that the claim for special per-
son categories is rather weak. Until more specific descriptions of these compound
pronouns become available, it seems best not to include them in the person-domain.
These pronominal compounds are constructed in a very special way. The first part of
the compound is a plural pronoun that incorporates the reference of the second pro-
noun. It looks as if the second pronoun is rather redundant. The second part of the
compound is a specification of the group referred to by the first pronoun. This special
way to form pronominal compounds is explained in section A.2. It will be argued
there that these compounds are (semi) grammaticalised, and can reasonably be seen as
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pronouns, not as compounds. Due to their special characteristics, I will refer to them
as ‘compound pronouns’.1 However interesting these compound pronouns may be,
they are found only in a very restricted region of the world: all examples that I know
of come from central-western Cameroon. These examples are discussed in section
A.3. Also in that section, I present some general characteristics of these compound
pronouns distilled from the rather diverse descriptions in the various grammars. Al-
though the languages are closely related, both areally and genetically, some interest-
ing variation in the construction of the compound pronouns is attested. Some gener-
alisations over the compound pronouns from these languages are presented in section
A.4.2 It remains a question whether these compound pronouns are a viable cross-
linguistic phenomenon, as they are only found in such a restricted region. However,
there is an indication that it could have been more widespread, given a different lin-
guistic world. It turns out that the way these compound pronouns are constructed is
based on a phenomenon which is called the ‘incorporative reading’ of the first part of
the compound (Hyman, 1979: 53). This ‘incorporative reading’ of pronouns is widely
attested in the languages of the world. A few examples of such ‘incorporative reading’
of pronominal reference are discussed in section A.5. This ‘incorporative reading’ is a
precondition for the formation of compound pronouns. As this precondition is found
widely dispersed in the world’s languages, I conclude that the compound pronouns
are a real possibility of natural language. It may just be an incidental fact that they are
only found in a very restricted region.3
                                                 
1 The oldest reference to these compounds as special pronouns is by Meinhof (1906: 54), but he does
not use a special name for them. Forchheimer (1953: 132-135) follows up on the examples given by
Meinhof. Forchheimer calls the elements ‘compound’ pronouns. They are also known as ‘complex’
pronouns. The first to use the term ‘complex’ was Voorhoeve (1967: 427). In the recent descriptive
literature, these pronouns are alternatively called ‘compound’ pronouns (eg Hyman, 1981: 17; Fransen,
1995: 183) or ‘complex’ pronouns (eg Hyman, 1979: 53; Anderson, 1985: 63; Parker, 1986: 134). I will
use the term ‘compound’ pronoun, as this name highlights the dual nature of these elements: partly
specialised pronoun, partly compound of two pronouns.
2 There are many more pronouns in the languages of the world that may be historically related to a
compound of two pronouns. An obvious case is the inclusive, as, for example, yumi from Tok Pisin,
which is composed of the second singular yu and the first singular mi (Foley, 1986: 67). I will not dis-
cuss this kind of morphological compounds. There are some more examples of this sort discussed by
Forchheimer (1953: 98-12) and McGregor (1989: 445). Forchheimer discusses both compounds that
exist of a pronoun-pronoun combination, and compounds of different origins. If only those cases are
considered where a pronoun originates from the combination of two pronouns, it turns out that only
the inclusive ‘we’ is found as composed of two pronouns, ‘I + you’. Such compounds are interesting
for a diachronic account of pronominal systems. However, for the present (synchronically oriented)
work they are not of central importance. The main objective of this work is to develop an account of
the different possible categories that can be found in pronominal paradigms. A compound like yumi
from Tok Pisin does not add any new categories. The opposite is the case with the compound pro-
nouns that are discussed in this chapter. They form a new kind pronouns, different from the possibili-
ties that were discussed in the previous chapters.
3 The restricted distribution of compound pronouns can be compared with the situation of click-sounds,
which are also only found in a few languages in a restricted region in the southern part of Africa.
Clicks are nevertheless an option for human language, although a highly marked one.
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A.2 From compound to pronoun
The idea of compound pronouns is exemplified here by the pronouns from Aghem, a
Grassfields language from Cameroon. Aghem has seven monosyllabic simplex pro-
nouns, a paradigm of the ‘Mandara’-type. The forms that are presented in (A.1) are
the object forms, which are only slightly different from the subject forms (Hyman,
1979: 47, 49). The object forms are shown because there are used as a basis for the





1 mù  ghà  1+3
2 wò` gh  2+3
3 `w&n ´ghé 3+3
Two such simple pronouns can be combined into a complex noun phrases, like them
and me, shown in (A.2 a). In English, a noun phrase like them and me, although syn-
tactically possible, sounds pragmatically rather awkward. A sentence like the photo
shows them and me can only be interpreted with a clear distance between the group of
others, ‘them’, and the speaker, ‘me’. Pragmatically unmarked, one would rather use
an exclusive pronoun, as in the photo shows us. Another possibility in English, with a
slightly different meaning, is the sentence the photo shows them with me. However, in
many languages, including Aghem, there is no special ‘and’ conjunction. These lan-
guages use the comitative preposition ‘with’ as a conjunctor between all noun phrases
(Stassen, to appear). Consequently, there is only the possibility as shown in (A.2 a),
meaning something in between ‘them and me’ and ‘them with me’.
(A.2) AGHEM
a. ghé à mù
3+3 COM 1
‘them and me’ (Hyman, 1979: 53)
b. ghà-à ghé
1+3-COM 3+3
‘us and them’, ‘me and them’, ‘us and him’ (Hyman, 1979: 53)
At first sight, the phrase shown in (A.2 b) is not much different: it shows a noun
phrase meaning something like ‘us and them’. However, this phrase can also mean
‘me and them’ or ‘us and him’. Hyman explains about (A.2 b):
‘all this [phrase] says is that there are at least three people and at least one of them has
to be first person and another one has to be third person. It says nothing about the inter-
nal composition of the group. … The two parts are welded together in a incorporative
bond.’ (Hyman, 1979: 53)
The term ‘incorporative’ refers to the fact that the reference of the second part of the
compound is already incorporated in the first part. In (A.2 b), the group 3+3, ‘them’, is
a fraction of the group 1+3, ‘us’. This is different from both the English us and them,
(where the groups are separate) and the English us with them (where the groups are
joined into one group, but there is still no overlap between the referents of ‘us’ and
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‘them’). These compounds seem to be most naturally translated into English by the
first part only. Example (A.2 b) means ‘us’, although the reference who are these per-
sons is some more specified in Ghomala’. Compounds such as (A.2 b), with an incor-
porative reading of the first pronoun, are considered to be a special structure, called
COMPOUND PRONOUNS. 4
There are nine such compound pronouns in Aghem. They are presented in (A.3). All
compound pronouns consist of two simple (object) pronouns, with the linker ‘à’ in-
corporated morpho-phonetically into the first part. The compound pronouns are or-
dered in the table according to the FORM of the constituting parts: the forms with
identical first parts are put in the same rows, the forms with identical second parts are
put in the same columns. The constitutent parts are identified by the numbers on the
borders of the table. It can be seen that only a selected set of pronoun combinations
are used as compound pronouns. It turns out that the first element of a compound pro-
noun is always plural. This is easily explained, as only plural pronouns can have an
incorporative reading.
(A.3) AGHEM
2 2+3 3 3+3
1+3 ghàà-wò ghàà-gh ghàà-w&n  ghàà-ghé
1+2 sàà-ghé
2+3 ghàà-w&n  ghàà-ghé
3+3 ghèè-w&n  ghèè-ghé
Combinations of pronouns in Aghem are either a ‘normal’ compound, as in example
(A.2 a), or a compound pronoun. Each combination of pronouns only occurs in one of
both guises. The ‘normal’ compounds of two pronouns are called ‘cumulative’ by
Hyman (1979: 52). They are shown in Figure A.1. In this table, the dark-grey areas are
those combinations that yield reciprocal or reflexive meanings – if they are interpret-
able at all. Reflexives and reciprocals are not included in this study, and consequently,
these compounds are disregarded here.5 The light-grey area shows the combinations
that form compound pronouns. Only in these combinations the incorporative reading
of the first pronoun takes place. There is no overlap between the ‘incorporative’ com-
pound pronouns and the ‘cumulative’ combinations of pronouns. There remain a few
combinations that are not used. The meaning of these are taken care of by the refer-
ence of compound pronouns. It remains unclear, though, why only these are not at-
tested as either a (cumulative) compound noun phrase or a (incorporative) compound
pronoun.
                                                 
4 The term ‘incorporative’ was coined by Hyman (1979: 53). The opposite, as in example (A.2 a) is
called ‘cumulative’. Schaub (1985: 198) uses the terms ‘selective’ and ‘additive’, respectively. I will
follow Hyman’s terminology.
5 For Aghem there are indeed no compound pronouns for these combinations (Hyman, 1979: 54), but
this is not necessarily so. For another Grassfields language from Cameroon, Bamileke, reciprocal
compound pronouns are described by Voorhoeve (1967: 427).
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1 1+3 1+2 2 2+3 3 3+3
1 mù à wò mù à gh mù à w&n  mù à ghé
2 wò à mù wò à ghà wò à w&n  wò à ghé
3 w&n à mù w&n à ghà w&n à s w&n à wò w&n à gh –
1+3
1+2 –
2+3 gh à mù
3+3 ghé à mù – ghé à wò –
incorporative compound
pronouns
Figure A.1: Cumulative compound pronouns from Aghem
Also, there remain some questions about the meaning of the compound pronouns.
This is partly because different descriptions describe the meaning of these pronouns
rather differently, or hardly indicate the meaning at all. Some aspects are to be found
in all descriptions of compound pronouns; I will start at this point of consensus. Basi-
cally, there seem to be two cases that should be distinguished: whether the second part
of the compound pronouns is singular or plural. If the second part is a singular, then
the compound pronoun has dual meaning. The pronoun ghàà-wò, literally ‘we-
exclusive with you-singular’, means ‘we including you’, or better: ‘I and you’. If the
second part is plural, then either of the constituting persons can have plural meaning,
or both, as exemplified above in (A.2 b). So far so good. It begins to be unclear when
the relation is examined between the ‘simplex’ pronouns and the compound pronouns.
The difference is not one of reference. For example, the reference of the inclusive
pronoun `sè´ is roughly identical to the compound pronoun ghàà-wò, and for that
matter, also to the cumulative wò à mù. They all refer to a group that consists of
speaker and addressee. I suspect that there is a difference in the grouping of the par-
ticipants between the various possibilities. Probably, a compound pronoun is used
when there are two different groups set up in the discourse, that are now acting to-
gether for a short moment. The two groups are not put together into one new group, as
they will remain separate later on. Parker (1986: 136-137) hints at such an analysis.
However, none of the descriptions gives a clear analysis of the use of the compound
pronouns. The most direct analysis is found in a description by Voorhoeve (1967) on
the compound pronouns (he calls them ‘complex pronouns’) of Bamileke, another
Grassfields language from Cameroon. Voorhoeve states that the compound pronouns
relate to the plural pronouns just as the plural pronouns relate to the singular ones.
‘The meaning of complex pronouns cannot be clearly distinguished form that of simple
plural ones. … However, the composition of the group of participants is much clearer
defined, if complex pronouns are used. It seems as if there are three contrastive levels
in the pronominal system: singular simple pronouns contrasting to plural simple pro-
nouns; and plural simple pronouns contrasting to … complex pronouns.’ (Voorhoeve,
1967: 428)
In a sense, this makes a nice analysis: different singular participants can be combined
into a group to form ‘plural’ pronouns. Then, different groups (whether singular or
plural!) can be combined into a compound pronoun to form yet another kind of refer-
ential morpheme. Still, the fact remains that the reference of plural pronouns and
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compound pronouns overlap. A detailed analysis is needed to decide whether com-
pound pronouns are indeed a further level of group-formation, or whether they are just
a pragmatical side-effect of compounding pronouns. For now, their status as ‘pro-
nouns’ remains doubtful, although promising.
To summarise, there are four characteristics of compound pronouns. The first charac-
teristic is closest to a definitional property: the reference of this first plural pronoun
INCORPORATES the reference of the second part. The reference of the individual parts
of the compound pronoun are not to be added together; the second part is only a clari-
fication of the first part. Consequently, there are often different referential possibili-
ties. A compound pronoun can, for example, refer to ‘we and he’, ‘we and they’ or ‘I
and they’. Second, the linker is FUSED morphophonetically into the first part, or both
parts of the compound are fused. This indicates grammaticalisation of the compound.
Third, the first part of the compound is always a PLURAL pronoun – this characteristic
in fact follows from the first. For an incorporative reading, a non-singular pronoun is
necessary. And finally, the compound pronouns do not mark anything that is not pos-
sible to say with the simple pronouns. The compound pronouns are probably
PRAGMATICALLY MARKED elements, but they do not seem to have a special referential
value. The first two characteristics – incorporative meaning and fusion – are the
strongest indications that there is indeed a special phenomenon here. It is noteworthy,
though, that it is not found more widespread among the languages of the world. The
only descriptions of compound pronouns come from languages that are spoken in a
very restricted part of Cameroon, to be discussed in the next section. However, the
incorporative reading of plural pronouns occurs more often, also when there are no
grammaticalised compound pronouns in the language. A few examples of the incorpo-
rative reading outside Cameroon will be discussed in section A.5.
A.3 The Bantoid compound pronouns
There are numerous descriptions of compound pronouns found in grammars of Ban-
toid languages from Cameroon. All these descriptions take a slightly different view on
the phenomenon, which makes it interesting to combine the insights of the different
grammarians. I will discuss the structure of the compound pronouns from the lan-
guages mentioned in (A.4), all member of the Bantoid subgroup of the Niger-Congo
family. Most examples of compound pronouns are found among the Grassfields sub-
group of the Bantoid languages. All languages in (A.4) are spoken in Western Camer-
oon, on the border with Nigeria (see the map in Grimes, 1996: 188). It is a clearly
areal phenomenon.
(A.4) Bantoid: – Beboid: Noni
– Narrow Bantu: Nkosi
– Grassfields: – Mbam-Nkan: Bamileke, Ghomala’,
Ngiemboon, Limbum
– Momo: Mundani
– Ring: Babungo, Aghem
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The pronouns and compound pronouns in these languages will be discussed in the
following subsections. These subsections are placed in ascending order according to
the number of compound pronouns found in the language, starting from 4, with a
maximum of 10. In each subsection I will rephrase the description of the compound
pronouns as it is found in the grammars. To ensure comparability, I will analyse all
pronominal systems according to a few principles. First, I will split the systems in
monosyllabic forms and polysyllabic forms. The monosyllabic forms will be the sim-
plex pronouns, and the polysyllabic forms will be the compounds.6 The polysyllabic
compound pronouns will be analysed according to the parts they are made of. In al-
most all cases, the compound pronouns are transparent combinations of simplex pro-
nouns. When the compound pronouns are ordered according to the constituting parts,
then it appears that the compound systems are structured highly alike, something
which is not directly obvious from the individual descriptions. 7
Babungo
The simplex – non-compound – pronouns from Babungo are shown in (A.5). Ba-




1 m yìa 1+3
2 gh' vì 2+3
3 wé v 3+3
Babungo has the simplest set of compound pronouns of all languages discussed here.
There are four compound pronouns that are made by compounding the subject pro-
nouns.8 They are shown in (A.6). The first part is a plural first or second person, that
has an incorporative reading (called ‘selective’ in the grammar). The second part is





                                                 
6 I will deviate from this principle slightly in the cases of Limbum and of Noni.
7 I will disregard all forms that have logophoric reference (Hagège, 1982: 105). Special logophoric third
person forms are found regularly in this part of Africa, and in some languages they also take part in
the formation of compound pronouns, eg Noni (Hyman, 1981: 15-18) and Babungo (Schaub,
1985: 198).
8 The compound pronoun ví-yì with a logophoric third person as second part is disregarded here.
9 There are a few more compound pronouns mentioned in the grammar. These, however, all have
obligatory plural reference of the first part. This is comparable to the cumulative compound pronouns
as described in section 2 (they are called ‘additive’ in the grammar). The cumulative compound pro-
nouns are made with a linker v	, an indefinite pronoun (Schaub, 1985: 196, 198). The form yía v	
 v
means either ‘We and he’ or ‘we and they’. There are only three different cumulative compounds:
yía v	
 v,  nsí v	




Relative to Babungo, the number of compound pronouns is doubled in Mundani.
However, there are fewer non-compound subject pronouns, as shown in (A.7). Mun-







2 à b& 2+3
3 tà b 3+3
The first part of the compound pronouns, as shown in (A.8), are the plural pronouns;
the second part is more complicated. The forms nè and n	 
, in the first two columns,
are second person forms that are normally found only after the preposition ne, ‘with’.
In the second and fourth column (the second part of the compound is plural here) a
pluraliser bá is added (Parker, 1986: 135).
(A.8) MUNDANI
2 2+3+ Plur 3 3+ Plur
1+3 bá nè bá n& bá bá to( bá tò bá
2+3 b& to( b& tò bá
3+3 b to( b tò bá
Ngiemboon
The situation in Ngiemboon shows a possible transition between compound and sim-
plex pronouns. It looks as if there is an 8-way pronoun paradigm, shown in (A.9), al-





1 mè pêg 1+3
2 gù/ pî 2+3
3 yé/à p(b) 3+3
The two polysyllabic pronouns p" and pégè are probably fused compound pronouns
(Anderson, 1985: 63). When they are still taken as compound pronouns in origin, the
Ngiemboon system of compound pronouns, shown in (A.10), is identical to the
Mundani system of compound pronouns. A compound meaning ‘we and you’ can
obviously grammaticalise into an inclusive pronoun.
                                                 
10 I was unable to reproduce the exact tonal orthography of the original source with the fonts that I have
a my disposal. The differences are kept as minimal as possible.
11 The paradigm presented in (A.9) consists of the morphemes that are used as subject. There are
slightly different morphemes used for the object. The object form of the compound pronouns is made
from the simplex object pronouns (Anderson, 1985: 68).
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(A.10) NGIEMBOON
2 2+3 3 3+3
1+3 pêg+ > p pêg+a+pi > pégè pèg yè pég-à p
2+3 pì yè pî-a p
3+3 p yè pb-à p
Nkosi
Almost the same situation as in Ngiemboon is also found in Nkosi (Dorsch,
1911: 249-250). There are 8 monosyllabic pronouns, shown in (A.11). The two inclu-
sive pronouns are probably of compound origin. Dorsch (1911: 250) comments that
the minimal inclusive (1+2) su  comes form the compound se + o é #. The origin of the
augmented inclusive (1+2+3) séa is not explained. It is possibly a contraction of the




1 me se 1+3
2 o)é* ny
+, 2+3
3 mo * bo* 3+3
Besides the fused compound su , there are 7 clear compound pronouns, shown in
(A.12). If the pronoun su  is counted as a compound pronoun, then this paradigm has
the same structure as the Ngiemboon system. Whether there is a difference in mean-
ing between the simplex pronoun séa and the compound pronoun seanyi is unclear.
Dorsch (1911: 250) translates séa as ‘we and you-plural’ and seanyi as ‘I and you-
plural’. This seemingly clear difference is not corroborated by the analyses of the
same form in other languages. In other languages, the corresponding form to seanyi is
normally translated as ‘we and you-plural’ (eg Hyman, 1979: 53).
(A.12) NKOSI
2 2+3 3 3+3
1+3 se+oe > su  se-a-nyi su-mo* se-a-bo*
2+3 nyi-mo* nyi-a-bo*
3+3 bu-mo * bo-bo *
Bamileke
A slight variation on the last examples can be found in Bamileke. This time, there are
seven monosyllabic pronouns, as shown in (A.13). The inclusive b 
n belongs in this
paradigm, although it shows slightly different tone-behaviour (Voorhoeve,
1967: 422).12
                                                 
12 Shown here are the simplex object pronouns. The simplex subject pronouns differ slightly from
these. The simplex object pronouns are shown as they are used to make the compound pronouns, also






1 m bag´ 1+3
2 u bin´ 2+3
3 jé bó 3+3
The system of compound pronouns, shown in (A.14), is structurally like the Ngiem-
boon system. Interestingly, there is already an inclusive form in the simplex system,
which seems to makes the ‘we and you’ compound pronouns superfluous (cf. the oc-
currence of séa and seanyi in Nkosi). Still, both forms exist. Probably bâg-u	 and bág-




2 2+3 3 3+3




Limbum has an 8-way simplex pronoun system (Fransen, 1995: 179-180). The two
inclusive forms, as shown in (A.15), do not show a strong indication that they are
composed of two parts. Only the fact that sìì and wìì end identically in ìì could indi-




1 me% wìr 1+3
2 we% wìì 2+3
3 (y)í wo#w"ﬁ 3+3
The compound pronouns, as shown in (A.16), are rather unusual (Fransen, 1995: 183-
185). The most interesting feature are the first two columns (A.16). The two com-
pound pronouns in these columns are composed of a second person plural with the
two simplex inclusives. This kind of compound is not found in any other language
with compound pronouns. These compounds mean the same as the combination first
person plural/second person, like in Ngiemboon and in most languages discussed
here. The meaning of the third column of the complex pronouns (with -y as second
part) is slightly different in Limbum, when compared to the other languages cited
here. In all other languages these forms are strictly dual. The plural first part of the
compound can only have the incorporative reading. In Limbum, however, the com-
pounds shown here in the third column can also be used with reference to more than
two persons, meaning respectively ‘we and he/she’, ‘you (plural) and he/she’ and
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‘they and he/she’ (Fransen, 1995: 184). It is unclear why Limbum deviates from the
other languages in this aspect.13
(A.16) LIMBUM










The use of the simplex inclusive pronouns as part of the compound pronouns in Lim-
bum indicates that these inclusive pronouns are strongly grammaticalised. They are
real parts of the simplex pronominal system. This is quite different from the situation
in Mundani, Ngiemboon and Nkosi, where the inclusives are still overtly related to
the compound pronouns.
Noni
The simplex pronouns from Noni are shown in (A.17). It is a 7-way system with a





1 me bèsèn 1+3
2 w bèn 2+3
3 wvù b 3+3
The compound pronouns are shown in (A.18). Note that the 1+3 part of the compound
pronouns, beè, is different from the simplex 1+3, bèsèn (Hyman, 1981: 17). Histori-
cally, they are probably based on the same element, maybe a compound. Hyman
analyses the simplex inclusive pronoun beènè as a compound pronoun, historically
derived from a combination of the two pronouns beè + bèn (Hyman, 1981: 15, 17). The
resulting pronoun beènè, however, is grammaticalised as a simplex form. It is used in
turn as the first part of the compound bèn
-b.
(A.18) NONI
2 2+3 3 3+3





For comparison with the other languages, I repeat the date from Aghem here from
section A.2. There is a 7-way simplex pronoun system, just as in Noni (Hyman,
1979: 49).14
                                                 
13 Another special aspect of the Limbum compound pronouns is the use of the concord-marker ó- in-






1 mù  ghà  1+3
2 wò` gh  2+3
3 `w&n ´ghé 3+3
The compound pronouns resemble the structure from Noni strongly. The only differ-
ence with Noni is that the compound 1+3 with 2+3 is not related to the simplex inclu-
sive `sè´. Aghem thus has a true 9-way compound pronoun system.
(A.20) AGHEM
2 2+3 3 3+3
1+3 ghàà-wò ghàà-gh ghàà-w&n  ghàà-ghé
1+2 sàà-ghé
2+3 ghàà-w&n  ghàà-ghé
3+3 ghèè-w&n  ghèè-ghé
Ghomala´
Finally, there is Ghomala’, which has the largest inventory of compound pronouns
that I know of. This extensive set of pronouns tempted (Wiesemann, 1986a: viii) to
claim that Ghomala’ has the world’s most extensive pronouns system. Unfortunately,
the short note by Wiesemann is the only information available on this language. I will
analyse these data within the framework that has been developed in this chapter. Still,
there will be numerous questions that remain to be answered on the composition of
the pronouns if and when more information becomes available.
The monosyllabic pronouns from the short note by Wiesemann (1986a: viii, citing
Fossouo) form an 8-way person system. The three forms for ‘we’ – pu, p and py –
show a strong phonological similarity. This makes it probable that both inclusive
forms have a compound origin, like in Ngiemboon. However, the augmented inclu-
sive (1+2+3) p is a constitutent part of the compound pronouns, like the inclusive in
Noni. This shows that the augmented inclusive pronoun is now completely grammati-




1 g py 1+3
2 o po 2+3
3 e wap 3+3
                                                 
[continued from previous page]
14 Shown here are the simplex object pronouns. The reason is identical to the one given for Bamileke
(see footnote 12): the object pronouns are used for the construction of the compound pronouns.
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The 10 compound pronouns exhibit the same basic combinations that were found in
all the other languages: a plural first part with a third person second part. The third
plural morpheme -pu- is not found among the monosyllabic forms in the table above,
but it is clear from the meaning that it is a third person plural. The etymological origin
of the element is unknown to me. The homophony with the monosyllabic 1+2 pu is
probably a coincidence. Note that there is no -a- linker when the second part is a sin-
gular third person (first column). This linker is only found when there is a plural third
person as second part (second column). The last two columns of (A.22) remain prob-
lematic. It is unclear what the forms mean precisely, nor is explained what the origin
of the second part is. The use of the -a- linker in all these forms indicates a plural sec-
ond part.
(A.22) GHOMALA’
3 3+3(?) (?) (?)
1+3 py-é py-a-pu py-a-y py-a-wu
2+3 po-é po-a-pu po-a-y
3+3(?) pu-é
1+2+3 p-a-pu p-a-y
The number of compound pronouns in Ghomala’ is indeed unrivalled by the other
systems that have been discussed in this section. Whether this makes it really the
world’s most complex pronoun system, as Wiesemann claims, depends on the choice
to consider compound pronouns as pronouns or not.
A.4 Generalisations
After the individual languages have been discussed, a few generalisation on the
structure and meaning of compound pronouns can be made. First I will make some
generalisations over the form of the compound pronouns, followed by some observa-
tions on their meaning or referential value.
First, the STRUCTURE of the compound pronoun systems is very similar. However, al-
though there is a strong similarity between the various paradigmatic structures, there
are also strong indications that compound pronouns are an individually acquired phe-
nomenon, and not a genetic feature. In all languages, the compound pronouns are con-
structed out of the simplex pronouns of the particular language. Although the simplex
pronouns might be historically related between the languages, the compound pro-
nouns are clearly made up from the ‘own’ simplex pronouns of a language. The com-
pound pronouns themselves are not directly related to the compound pronouns of
other languages. There are some differences between the languages as to which kind
of compound pronouns are used, and as to how many different compounds are distin-
guished. However, there are a few combinations that are found in all languages. The
kind of compound construction that is commonly found in compound pronouns is
shown in Table A.1. Although these combinations are found in all languages, still,
these compound pronouns in each language are related to the simplex pronouns of
that same language, not to the structurally equivalent compound pronouns of other
languages. From these characteristics, it appears that compound pronouns are an ex-
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ample of structural diffusion. The same principle is found in all languages, but the
languages all use their own inventory to make the compound pronouns. The range of
different compounds that are used, is to be decided by each language alone. The idea
to make compound pronouns is probably borrowed (or developed parallel), not the
compound pronouns themselves.
1+3 compounded with 3 1+3 compounded with 3+3
2+3 compounded with 3 2+3 compounded with 3+3
Table A.1: Compound pronouns that occur in all discussed languages
Another structural characteristic is the linker-element -a-. In many languages that
were discussed, this linker is used between the parts of the compound. In central Af-
rica, this -a- is a widespread morpheme to link linguistic elements. Interestingly in
this context, the linker -a- is mainly found with compound pronouns that have a plural
second part. The only exception to this generalisation is found in Aghem.
Second, the MEANING of the compound pronouns also turns out to be strongly similar.
When the second part of the compound is originally a singular pronoun, then the
compound has dual meaning. A compound of the form ‘we and he’ means ‘I and he’.
The only exception to this generalisation is found in Limbum, where the compound
with the form ‘we and he’ can both mean ‘I and he’ and ‘we and he’. When the sec-
ond part is plural, then both parts of the compound can have a plural reference. A
compound with the form ‘we and they’ can either mean ‘I and they’, ‘we and he’ or
‘we and they’.
Finally, there is a strong referential connection between compound pronouns meaning
‘I and you’ and inclusive pronouns (1+2, 1+2+3). In some of the languages, com-
pound pronouns with the meaning ‘I and you’ are found to grammaticalise into sim-
plex inclusive pronouns. Once they are completely grammaticalised, these simplex
inclusive pronouns can again be used as building part for complex pronouns. Differ-
ent stages in this grammaticalisation are documented by the structures found in
Ngiemboon, Nkosi, Noni and Aghem (in that order).
A.5 The incorporative plural revisited
The central property of compound pronouns as found in the Bantoid languages, is the
peculiar INCORPORATIVE reading of the first pronoun.15 The first part of a compound
pronoun is taken as a reference to the whole, incorporating the reference of the second
part. A phrase that literally says ‘we and you’ means rather something like ‘I and
you’. Although compound pronouns are only found in a restricted area in Cameroon,
the incorporative use of a plural pronoun can be found widespread in the languages of
the world.
                                                 
15 This is ‘peculiar’, of course, only from a European point of view, not from the point of view of those
language that have it.
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Some languages use a plural pronoun where one would expect a singular one in con-
junctions. For example in Bari, a Nilotic language from Sudan, when pronouns are
conjoined, the first pronoun always has to be plural, also when only a single partici-
pant is meant. This is exemplified in (A.23 a, b). However, there are no complex pro-
nouns in Bari, at least, they have never be described as such.16
‘When the conjunctive preposition ko joins pronouns, the pronoun preceding it must
always be plural, no matter whether it stands for a single noun. … In this way there is
no telling whether two or more persons are concerned.’ (Spagnolo, 1933: 212-213)
(A.23) BARI
a. yi ko d
1+3 with 2
‘I and you’ (lit. ‘we with you’) (Spagnolo, 1933: 212)
b. ta ko nan
2+3 with 1
‘You and I’ (lit. ‘you all with me’) (Spagnolo, 1933: 212)
Other examples, outside Africa, can be found in Mundari, a Munda language from
India, and Tagalog, an Austronesian language from the Philippines. Both are exam-
ples of a conjunction of a pronoun with a proper name, not of two pronouns. Still, the
pronoun in both cases has the incorporative reading. The Mundari example in (A.24)
can only mean ‘I and Paku’, because the pronoun is dual. The incorporative reading of
this dual pronoun implies that the total group consists of two persons, one of which is
Paku, and consequently the only other is the speaker. The Tagalog example in (A.25),








‘them/him and Juan’ (Schachter & Otanes, 1972: 116)
A last example of an incorporative reading of a plural pronominal marking comes
from West Greenlandic Inuktitut, an Eskimo-Aleut language from Greenland. Here it
is the inflectional pronominal marking that gets an incorporative reading, as shown in
(A.26). The literal translation may sound like normal English, but there is an interest-
ing difference between the Inuktitut and the English meaning. In the Inuktitut sen-
tence, there are only two persons who will leave, so the best translation is ‘You and I
will leave’. The literal translation in English, ‘we will leave with you’, implies that
                                                 
16 Meinhof (1906: 54) mentions Duala, a Bantu language from Cameroon, as an example with the same
pronoun use. He claims also that this is a widespread phenomenon among Bantu languages. It is diffi-
cult to judge whether compound pronouns really are only found in Cameroon, or whether this strong
areal restriction is a result of descriptive practice. Maybe compound pronouns is a phenomenon only
known to specialists in the languages in and around Cameroon, and stays unnoticed in the description
of other African languages.
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there will be more than two, as the ‘you’ is normally not interpreted as part of the




‘You and I will leave’ (lit. ‘we will leave with you’) (Fortescue, 1984: 257)
These examples can only indicate that the incorporative use of the plural pronouns is
probably widespread among the languages of the world. The examples in this section
are from all over the world (Bari in Africa, Mundari in Asia, Tagalog in the Pacific
and Inuktitut in America) and they are genetically diverse. Compound pronouns can
best be seen as (semi)grammaticalised use of the incorporative use of plural pronouns.
Probably, if compound pronouns would be a wider known phenomenon, they would
be described for other languages as well.
A.6 Conclusion
Pronouns or compounds, that is the question. I have argued in this appendix that the
compound pronouns of the Bantoid languages in Cameroon are to be included as a
special kind of ‘pronouns’. The compound pronouns show a rather different structure
from normal compounds: they are clearly grammaticalised in comparison to normal
compounds, and the semantic interpretation is different from other compounds. This
semantic interpretation is the most salient characteristic of these pronouns. The first
part of the compound pronouns is to be interpreted ‘incorporative’: it includes the ref-
erence of the second part of the pronoun. This ‘incorporative’ reading of a pronoun is
found more widespread among the world’s languages, indicating that the restricted
occurrence of compound pronouns (it is only found in Cameroon) is probably only
incidental.
A different question is whether these compound pronouns are new person categories,
leading to the largest inventory of person categories among pronominal systems, as
claimed by Wiesemann (1986a: viii). I doubt this. The referential value of these com-
pound pronouns is often identical to the simplex group pronouns. However, more in-
depth research is needed on the use of the compound pronouns as opposed to the
group pronouns. If there are contexts which require a compound pronoun, and which
do not allow for the simplex pronouns to be used, that would be an argument for a
special referential status, although restricted contextually. From the available sources,
it appears that the compound pronouns are freely interchangeable with simplex group
pronouns, yielding a different pragmatical value, not a different referential value.
Consequently, until further notice, the compound pronouns are not included as special
person categories.
Appendix B
Survey of person paradigms
In this appendix a survey is presented of the various examples that are presented in chapters 3
and 4. In the tables, first the paradigms are identified by the name of a typical language for
the type of paradigm (‘Paradigm’). Sometimes, the same language-name is used twice for
different paradigms, in which case a number is added between brackets. Then follow the
names of the individual language that have a paradigm of this type (‘Examples’) and the page
number where the examples are discussed (‘Page’). Next, some counts are presented: the
amount of independently marked cases (‘Id’), the amount of inflectionally marked cases (‘If’)
and the total amount of cases (‘To’). In these counts, all named cases are counted once, but
genetic families are maximally counted as four to prevent overrepresentation of some widely
dispersed families. In a few cases, a large family that shows a paradigmatic structure through-
out its members has been counted as four cases without explicitly naming the individual lan-
guages. Then the typology is presented of the characteristics that form the Explicitness Hier-
archy (‘SI’, SW’, ‘SN’ and ‘SS’). An extra column is added (‘VH’) where the kind of vertical
homophony is listed for the cases that have a vertical homophony (ie the cases with minus
SN). The following four columns (‘1In’, ‘1Ex’, ‘2’ and ‘3’) present the kind of horizontal
homophony. Finally, the last column (‘AM’) list the amount of forms with different person-
reference that are present in a paradigm, ranging from minimally 2 to maximally 8.
Id Amount of independently marked cases
If Amount of inflectionally marked cases
To Total amount of cases
SI Split inclusive (in minimal versus augmented inclusive)
SW Split ‘we’ (in inclusive versus exclusive)
SN Split non-singular (in first versus second versus third person)
SS Split singular (in first versus second versus third person)
VH Kind of vertical homophony
(the following abbreviations are used in this column:
‘1’ first person complex, ‘2’ second person plural, ‘3’ third person plural,
‘In’ inclusive, ‘Ex’ exclusive, ‘Spec’ special case-see description in text)
1In Horizontal homophony 1  inclusive
1Ex Horizontal homophony 1  exclusive
2 Horizontal homophony 2  2+3
3 Horizontal homophony 3  3+3
AM Amount of morphemes in the paradigms
Paradigmatic variation with exceptional first person complex
















Bardi–type Bardi, Lakhota 87 1 1 2 + – + + – – – – 7
Kunimaipa–type (1) Kunimaipa 88 0 1 1 + – + + – – – + 6
Yaouré–type Yaouré, Gooniyandi 88 2 0 2 + + + + – – – – 7
Tiwi–type (1) Tiwi 89 0 1 1 + + + + – + + – 6
Kunimaipa–type (2) Kunimaipa 89 0 1 1 + – – + Spec + – – + 4
Binanadere–type Binandere 90 0 1 1 – + – + Ex/3 + – – – 5
Total 3 5 8
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Paradigmatic variation with ‘unified-we’ first person complex




















Chinese, Siau family (e.g.
Sera, Sissau, Ali, Tumleo),
Kiribati, Daga, Asmat,
Waskia, Ika, Epena Pedee
106 18 38 – – + + – – – – 6










Sinhalese–type (Ind.) Sinhalese, Buriat, Lezgian,
Muisca, Sentani, Asmat










Berik–type (Ind.) Berik, Kuman, Xokleng 110 3 10 – – + + – – + + 4






English–type (1) English, South American
Spanish, Xokleng
113 3 0 3 – – + + – – + – 5
Vanimo–type Vanimo 114 0 1 1 – – + + diagonal 5
Spanish–type Spanish, Icelandic 115 0 2 2 – – + – – – – – 5
Icelandic–type Icelandic 115 0 1 1 – – + – – – – – 5
Siciliano–type San Fratello Siciliano 115 0 1 1 – – + – – – + – 4
Slave–type Athabascan family (e.g.
Slave, Navaho, Kato,
Hupa), Awa, Dogon
117 5 1 6 – – – + 1/2 – – – – 5
Svan–type Svan, Waskia, Nez Perce 117 0 3 3 – – – – 1/2 – – – – 4
Lak–type (1) Lak 118 0 1 1 – – – – 1/2 – – – + 3
Dongola–type Kenuzi–Dongola 119 0 1 1 – – – – 1/2 – – – – 4
Ika–type Ika 119 0 1 1 – – – – 1/2 – – – – 4
Omië–type Binanderean area (e.g.
Orokaiva, Korafe, Omië),
Bagirmi





121 0 3 3 – – – – 1/3 – – – – 4
Bagirmi–type Bagirmi 121 0 1 1 – – – + 1/3 – – + – 4
German–type German, Midob 122 0 2 2 – – – + 1/3 diagonal 4
Nez Perce–type Nez Perce, Warekena,
Proto–Gorokan
123 3 0 3 – – – + 2/3 – – – – 5
Kombai–type Kombai, Chitimacha,
Lengua
123 0 3 3 – – – – 2/3 – – – – 4
Koryak–type Koryak 124 0 1 1 – – – – 2/3 – – + + 3
Lango–type Lango 125 0 1 1 – – – + 1/2/3 – – – – 4
Dutch–type Dutch 125 0 1 1 – – – – 1/2/3 – – – – 4
Waskia–type Waskia 125 0 1 1 – – – – 1/2/3 – – – – 4
Old English–type Old English 126 0 1 1 – – – – 1/2/3 – – – – 4
Total 39 69 108
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Paradigmatic variation with ‘no-we’ first person complex





















130 10 20 – – + + + + + + 3








Big Nambas–type Big Nambas 132 0 1 1 – – + + + + + – 4
Ainu–type Classical Ainu, Tairora,
Gubden
132 1 2 3 – – + + + + – + 4
Suki–type Suki 133 1 0 1 – – + + diagonal 5
Aztec–type Aztec family (e.g.
Classical Nahuatl, Pipil,
Milpa Alta)
133 0 3 3 – – + + diagonal 4
Usarufa–type Usarufa 134 1 0 1 – – – + 1/2 + + – – 4
Dargi–type Dargi 134 0 1 1 – – – + 1/2 + + – + 3
Lak–type (2) Lak, Nez Perve 135 0 2 2 – – – – 1/2 + + + + 2
Gadsup–type Gadsup 135 0 1 1 – – – + 2/3 + + – – 4
Megeb–type Megeb 135 0 1 1 – – – – 2/3 + + + + 2
English–type (2) English 135 0 1 1 – – – – 1/2/3 + + + – 2
Koiari–type Koiari 136 0 1 1 – – – – 1/2/3 – – + – 2
Total 13 23 36
Paradigmatic variation with ‘only-inclusive’ first person complex


















(ind.) Jaqaru, Campa, Nimboran,
Border family (e.g.
Imonda, Amanab)
137 5 15 – + + + – + + + 4
(infl.) Sierra Popoluca, Maka,
Jaqaru, Canela–Krahô,




Warrwa–type (1) Warrwa 141 0 1 1 – + + + – + – – 6
Warrwa–type (2) Warrwa 0 1 1 – + + + – + + – 5
Warrwa–type (3) Warrwa 0 1 1 – + + + – + – + 5
Algonquian–type Algonquian family (e.g.
Ojibwa, Menomini)
141 0 2 2 – + – + In/2 – + + + 3
Huave–type Huave 142 0 1 1 – + – + In/3 – + + + 3
Lenakel–type Lenakel 143 0 1 1 – + – + In/3 – + + – 4
Total 5 17 22
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Paradigmatic variation with ‘inclusive/exclusive’ first person complex




















stock (e.g. Aghem, Noni,
Fulfulde, Palor), Chechen,









144 25 38 – + + + – – – – 7
(infl.) Somali, Tungusic family (e.g.
Even, Evenki), Austronesian
stock (e.g. Uma, Trukese,
Toba–Batak, Tondano),










147 8 14 – + + + – – – + 6





Kwakiutl–type (ind.) Apalai, Maxakali, Acehnese 148 3 8 – + + + – – + + 5




Tiwi–type (2) Tiwi 150 0 1 1 – + – + In/2 – – – – 6
Sanuma–type Sanuma 150 1 0 1 – + – + In/2 – – – + 5
Nama–type Nama 151 1 0 1 – + – + In/2 – – + + 4
Shuswap–type Shuswap 151 0 1 1 – + – + Ex/3 – – – + 5
Waiwai–type Carib family (e.g. Waiwai,
Hixkaryana)
152 0 2 2 – + – + Ex/3 – – + + 4
Kunama–type Kunama 152 0 1 1 – + – + 2/3 – – – – 6
Total 38 29 67
Paradigmatic variation with ‘minimal/augmented’ first person complex
























(e.g. Limbum, Bamileke, Dii,
Dan), Chadic family (e.g.
Marghi, Gude), Uto–Southern
Paiute, Southern Sierra Miwok
154 18 22 + + + + – – – – 7
(infl.) Daly family (e.g. Malakmalak,
Maranungku), Uto–Southern
Paiute, Southern Sierra Miwok
4
Ilocano–type Ilocano 156 1 0 1 + + + + – – – + 7
Tiwi–type (3) Tiwi 157 0 1 1 + + – + Ex/2 – – – – 7
Total 19 5 24
Appendix C
Survey of number marking
In this appendix a survey is presented of the various examples that are presented in chapters 7
and 8. In the tables, first the paradigms are identified by the name of the paradigm or by the
name of a typical language with this type of paradigm (‘Paradigm’). Sometimes, the same
language-name is used twice for different paradigms, in which case a number is added be-
tween brackets. Next follow the names of the individual language that have a paradigm of this
type (‘Examples’) and the page number where the examples are discussed (‘Page’). The total
amount of cases is listed in the next column (‘To’). In these counts, all presented cases are
counted once, but genetic families are maximally counted as two cases to prevent overrepre-
sentation of some widely dispersed families. Then follow the various characteristics of the
paradigmatic structure. The first three columns (‘SI’, ‘SW’ and ‘SD’) are the characteristics
that form the Explicitness Hierarchy. An extra column is added (‘VH’) where the kind of ver-
tical homophony is listed for the cases that have a vertical homophony (ie those cases with
minus SD). The final four columns (‘1In’, ‘1Ex’, ‘2’ and ‘3’) present the kind of horizontal
homophony. The horizontal bars in the partly-unit-augmented paradigms and the unit-
augmented paradigms are not counted as horizontal homophony.
To Total amount of cases
SI Split inclusive (in minimal versus augmented inclusive)
SW Split dual ‘we’ (in inclusive versus exclusive dual)
SD Split dual (in first versus second versus third person dual)
VH Kind of vertical homophony
(the following abbreviations are used in this column:
‘1’ first person complex, ‘2’ second person plural, ‘3’ third person plural,
‘In’ inclusive, ‘Ex’ exclusive)
1In Horizontal homophony ‘inclusive dual  inclusive plural’
1Ex Horizontal homophony ‘exclusive dual  exclusive plural’
2 Horizontal homophony ‘second person dual  second person plural’
3 Horizontal homophony ‘third person dual  third person plural’
Paradigmatic variation with 2 forms for ‘we’













dual-unfied-we Indo-European (Lithuanian, Lower Sorbian),
Uralic (Khanti, Mansi), Tibeto-Burman
(Meithei, Chepang), Eskimo-Aleut (Iñupiaq,
Yup’ic), Lake/Bodege Miwok, Pama-
Nyungan (Warungu, Warrgamay), Papuan
(Bosavi family, Duna-Bogaya family)
243 13 – – + – – – –
Kalam-type East New Guinea Highlands (Kalam, Fore),
Baruya, Slavonic (Slovene, Upper Sorbian)
245 5 – – – 2/3 – – – –
Yagaria-type East New Guinea Highlands (Yagaria, Kewa),
Amele
246 3 – – – 2/3 – – – –
Siroi-type Siroi, Magi 246 2 – – – 2/3 – – – –
Aleut-type (1) Aleut 247 1 – – – 1/3 – – – –
Mansi-type Mansi 247 1 – – + – – + –
Gothic-type Gothic 247 1 – – + – – – +
Kewa-type Kewa, Nganasan 248 2 – – + – – – +
Yidinj-type Yidinj, Arapesh 248 2 – – + – – + +
Yareba-type Yareba 249 1 – – – 2/3 – – + –
Total 31
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Paradigmatic variation with 3 forms for ‘we’













Dual-in-exclusive-only Yagua, Ngankikurungkurr, Savosavo 251 3 – + + + – – –
Dual-in-inclusive-only Middle Paman sub-family
(Wik-Mungkan)
253 1 – + + – + – –
Inc/Exc-in-dual-only Samo, Coos 253 2 – + + – – – –
Inc/Exc-in-plural-only Kuku-Yalanji, Jiarong, Guhu-Samane,
Tuaripi
254 4 – – + – – – –
Korafe-type Korafe 256 1 – – – 2/3 – – – –
Burarra-type (1) Burarra 256 1 + – + – – – –
Total 12
Paradigmatic variation with 4 forms for ‘we’













dual-inclusive/exclusive Oceanic (Maori, Samoan), Pama-
Nyungan (Dhalandji, Gumbaynggir),
Tibeto-Burman (Bahing, Bunan),
Chinook, Siuslaw, Iroquoian (Oneida,
Cherokee), Mazehua, Kunama
257 12 – + + – – – –
Limbu-type Tibeto-Burman (Limbu, Camling) 259 2 – + + – – – +
Dhuwal-type Dhuwal, Sedang 259 2 – + + – – + –
Kilivila-type Kilivila 260 1 – + + – – + +
Rapanui-type Rapanui 260 1 – + + – – + +
Suana-type Suena 261 1 – + – 2/3 – – – –
Kwamera-type Kwamera 261 1 – + – In/3 – + + –
partial-unit-augmented Umpila, Alawa, Warrwa, Ngalakan,
Maranungku, Jaminjung, Apinayé
262 7 + + + – – – –
Total 27
Paradigmatic variation with 5 forms for ‘we’













unit-augmented Gunwingguan (Rembarrnga, Ngandi),
Djeebanna, Weri, Reefs, Kayapo
264 6 + + + – – – –
Burarra-type (2) Burarra 266 1 + + – Ex/2 – – – –
Kunimaipa-type (3) Kunimaipa 267 1 + + + – – – –
Total 8
Paradigmatic variation with duals outside the first person complex













Dizi-type Dizi 268 1 – – + + + – +
Achumawi-type Achumawi 268 1 – + + + + + –
Tunica-type Tunica, Slovene, Buin 268 3 – – + + + + –
Aleut-type (2) Aleut 269 1 – – + + + – –
Total 6
Paradigmatic variation with numbers higher than the dual
Paradigm Examples Page To
Kiwai-type Kiwai 234 1
Ambrym/Paamese-type Oceanic (Ambrym, Paamese) 234 2
Sursurunga-type Sursurunga 237 1
Yimas-type Yimas 237 1
Biak-type Biak 238 1
Total 6
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Samenvatting
De paradigmatische structuur van persoonsmarkering
Een wereld vol talen
Op dit moment worden er ongeveer zevenduizend verschillende talen gesproken in de
wereld. Je hoeft maar een klein stuk te reizen om al mensen tegen te komen die je niet
meer verstaat. Nog duidelijker wordt de talige verscheidenheid bij het beluisteren van
de onbegrijpelijke klankenstroom die je tegenkomt in ‘exotische’ talen uit Afrika of
Zuidoost-Azië. Echter, bij nadere bestudering blijken de verschillen tussen al deze
talen helemaal niet zo groot te zijn. Alle talen op de wereld vertonen op een abstract
niveau vele overeenkomsten. Een beschrijving van, laten we zeggen, het Maranungku
(een Australische Aboriginaltaal) lijkt veel op een beschrijving van een willekeurige
andere taal, zoals het Hixkaryana (een Zuid-Amerikaanse Indianentaal). In beide be-
schrijvingen komen zaken voor als naamwoorden en werkwoorden, als vraagzinnen,
negatie, voorvoegsels, enzovoorts. Natuurlijk is de vorm van de woorden in elke taal
weer anders, en natuurlijk verschilt de manier van zinsbouw en woordvorming van
taal tot taal, maar de verschillen worden nooit zo groot dat de talen onvergelijkbaar
worden. Het spanningsveld tussen de grote verschillen en de opmerkelijke overeen-
komsten tussen talen is een centraal thema van taalkundig onderzoek in de afgelopen
twee eeuwen. Vooral in de laatste decennia zijn er veel gedegen beschrijvingen van
allerlei talen ter beschikking gekomen, die het, nu meer dan ooit, mogelijk maken om
een onderzoek te doen naar de talige variatie in de wereld zonder ver te hoeven reizen.
In dit proefschrift is een dergelijk onderzoek beschreven. Ik heb gegevens gebruikt
van ongeveer vierhonderd verschillende talen, goed verdeeld over de geografische en
talige wereld. Alle gebruikte gegevens komen uit gepubliceerde grammaticale be-
schrijvingen (§ 1.3).
Het onderwerp van dit onderzoek is de verwoording van verwijzing naar de deelne-
mers in een gesprek. Hoe drukt een taalgebruiker uit dat de actuele spreker wordt be-
doeld (bijvoorbeeld in het Nederlands door gebruik van het woord ik) of juist de toe-
gesprokene (bijvoorbeeld in het Nederlands door gebruik van het woord jij)? Wat
voor andere vergelijkbare categorieën komen er voor in de talen van de wereld? Het
primaire doel van dit onderzoek is een overzicht te geven van de variatie op dit ge-
bied. Deze doelstelling heeft tot gevolg dat de gegevens vaak op een enigszins eclecti-
sche manier zijn verzameld: taalfamilies met bijzondere kenmerken heb ik veel inten-
siever bestudeerd dan andere taalgroepen om zo de grenzen te verkennen van wat ta-
lig mogelijk is. Door deze aanpak kan ik nu met grote zekerheid concluderen dat er
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geen harde grens is tussen wat wel en wat niet mogelijk is in de structuur van natuur-
lijke taal. Steeds weer blijkt dat bepaalde taalstructuren vaker voorkomen dan andere,
maar dat er is nooit sprake is van een harde breuk tussen ‘gewone’ en ‘uitzonderlijke’
structuren. Er is een continue verbinding tussen de meer en de minder vaak voorko-
mende structuren. Extrapolerend leidt dit tot de stelling dat in de talige wereld niets
onmogelijk is, maar dat bepaalde structuren alleen minder waarschijnlijk zijn.
Persoonsmarkering
De Nederlandse taal biedt allerlei mogelijkheden om als spreker naar jezelf te verwij-
zen. De meest voor de hand liggende manier is om het woord ik te gebruiken. Met de
uiting “ik promoveer” geeft de auteur van dit proefschrift aan dat hij promoveert. Een
speciale eigenschap van het woord ik is dat het noodzakelijkerwijs naar jezelf ver-
wijst. Oftewel, er is geen andere mogelijkheid dan dat het woord ik verwijst naar die-
gene die het woord uitspreekt. Als u, waarde lezer, de zin “ik promoveer” uitspreekt,
beweert u niet dat Michael Cysouw promoveert, maar dat u zelf promoveert. In na-
volging van de linguïst Otto Jespersen worden dergelijke woorden in de taalkunde
‘shifters’ genoemd. Naar wie of wat verwezen wordt met zulke shifters verandert af-
hankelijk van de situatie waarin ze worden geuit. Andere voorbeelden van shifters
zijn woorden zoals nu (een tijdsgebonden shifter) of hier (een plaatsgebonden shifter).
In het voorliggende proefschrift houd ik mij echter alleen bezig met persoonsgebon-
den shifters, zoals de woorden ik, jij en wij.
In de bovenstaande paragraaf zijn nog een paar persoonsgebonden shifters voorgeko-
men, namelijk de woorden auteur en lezer. Wie bedoeld wordt met de woorden au-
teur en lezer is de bovenstaande zinnen is afhankelijk van wie de tekst heeft geschre-
ven en wie hem nu leest. In tegenstelling tot de woorden ik en jij zijn de woorden au-
teur en lezer echter niet noodzakelijkerwijs shifters. In de volgende zin, die zou kun-
nen voorkomen in een literatuurrecensie, zijn de woorden auteur en lezer geen shif-
ters: “Door gebruik te maken van deze stijlfiguur tracht de auteur de lezer op het ver-
keerde been te zetten.” In deze zin verwijst het woord auteur niet naar de auteur van
deze zin zelf, maar naar de auteur van een boek waarover in de recensie wordt ge-
praat. Deze bedoelde auteur blijft dezelfde persoon als iemand anders deze zin had
geschreven. Het woord auteur is dus geen shifter in deze context. Zulke woorden, die
mogelijk maar niet noodzakelijk een shifter zijn, komen veel voor. Andere voorbeel-
den zijn het woord papa, dat een shifter kan zijn als een vader tegen zijn kind zegt:
“Papa gaat even naar boven”, of een eigennaam dat een shifter is als een docent een
leerling vraagt: “En wat zou volgens Jan het antwoord zijn?” Er zijn talen in Zuid-
oost-Azië waar er schijnbaar geen gespecialiseerde persoonsgebonden shifters zijn;
alle equivalenten van het Nederlandse ik hebben een meer of minder duidelijke zelf-
standige betekenis. Dit betekent dat persoonsgebonden shifters niet altijd een gespeci-
aliseerde linguïstische vorm hebben in natuurlijke taal. Natuurlijk kun je in elke taal
“ik” zeggen, maar er zijn talen die hiervoor geen gespecialiseerde talige elementen
hebben (§ 1.2.1).
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In dit proefschrift beperk ik mij tot de gespecialiseerde persoonsgebonden shifters.
Zulke talige elementen noem ik ‘persoonsmarkering’ (§ 1.2.2). Aangezien sommige
talen geen gespecialiseerde persoonsmarkering hebben, is persoonmarkering volgens
de hier gebruikte definitie geen universele grammaticale categorie. Echter, als er per-
soonsmarkering is, kan die in een taal verschillende vormen aannemen. In het Neder-
lands is er werkwoordsvervoeging (loop, loopt, lopen) en zijn er persoonlijke voor-
naamwoorden – verschillend in vorm voor onderwerp (ik, jij, wij, etcetera), overige
zinsfuncties (mij, jou, ons, etcetera) en bezitsaanduiding (mijn, jouw, ons, etcetera).
De werkwoordsvervoeging wordt in het Nederlands slechts rudimentair gebruikt voor
persoonsmarkering: er zijn veel minder werkwoordsvormen dan er persoonlijke voor-
naamwoorden zijn. In andere talen in de wereld speelt de werkwoordsvervoeging een
veel belangrijkere rol. In de Irokezische talen, die gesproken worden in de Verenigde
Staten, zijn er bijvoorbeeld wel zestig verschillende vormen van het vervoegde werk-
woord afhankelijk van wie onderwerp en wie lijdend voorwerp is. Om de verschillen-
de vormen van persoonsmarking wereld goed te kunnen vergelijken heb ik in mijn
onderzoek zowel gekeken naar persoonlijke voornaamwoorden als naar persoonsver-
voeging van het werkwoord (§ 1.2.4).
Paradigmatische structuur
Persoonsmarkeerders zijn geen eenlingen in de structuur van een taal; ze behoren al-
tijd tot een paradigma. Een paradigma is een groep van woorden (of woorddelen) die
allemaal dezelfde plaats innemen in de grammaticale structuur van een taal. Het para-
digma van de Nederlandse persoonlijke voornaamwoorden (in de functie van onder-
werp) wordt gevormd door de woorden ik, jij, hij, zij, het, wij en jullie. De woorden in
een paradigma krijgen hun precieze betekenis in afgrenzing tot elkaar. De betekenis
van het woord ik wordt mede bepaald doordat er ook een woord wij is. Het woord ik
wordt gebruikt voor “de spreker en geen andere personen” en het woord wij heeft de
complementaire betekenis “de spreker samen met andere personen”. Deze afgrenzing
is niet noodzakelijkerwijs aanwezig in een taal. Bijvoorbeeld in het Salt-Yui, een taal
die wordt gesproken in Papua Nieuw-Guinea, is het woord na de vertaling van het
Nederlandse woord ik. Hetzelfde woord na wordt echter ook gebruikt in de betekenis
van het Nederlandse woord wij. De afgrenzing tussen ik en wij is hier niet aanwezig.
In het Mandara, een taal die wordt gesproken in Kameroen, is de situatie precies om-
gekeerd. In deze taal zijn er meer dan twee woorden voor de betekenissen van de Ne-
derlandse woorden ik en wij. Het - woord yá wordt in het Mandara gebruikt voor “de
spreker en geen andere personen” en is geheel equivalent aan het Nederlandse woord
ik. De woorden má en á echter zijn allebei vergelijkbaar met het Nederlandse woord
wij, maar met een speciale wederzijdse afgrenzing. Het woord má wordt gebruikt voor
“de spreker, de toegesprokene en eventuele andere personen” (omdat de toegesproke-
ne erbij wordt betrokken heet dit ‘inclusief’) en het woord á wordt gebruikt voor “de
spreker en andere personen, maar niet de toegesprokene” (omdat de toegesprokene
wordt uitgesloten heet dit ‘exclusief’). Deze drie talen – Nederlands, Salt-Yui en
Mandara – hebben elk hun manier om de begrippen “ik” en “wij” uit te drukken. Ze
verschillen niet in wat ze kunnen uitdrukken, maar ze verschillen in hoe ze de per-
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soonsmarkering verdelen over verschillende woorden. Deze opdeling noem ik de ‘pa-
radigmatische structuur’ (§ 1.2.3).
In een taal zijn er meestal een aantal verschillende paradigma’s voor persoonsmarke-
ring. In het Nederlands zijn er drie verschillende paradigma’s van persoonlijke voor-
naamwoorden en is er één paradigma van de persoonsvervoeging van werkwoorden.
Deze paradigma’s hebben elk hun eigen paradigmatische structuur. De structuur van
elk van deze Nederlandse paradigma’s heb ik opgenomen in mijn verzameling van
paradigmatische structuren, en op dezelfde wijze heb ik gegevens van honderden an-
dere talen in de wereld verzameld.
Enkelvoudige persoonsmarkering
In verreweg de meeste persoonsparadigma’s in de wereld worden minstens drie en-
kelvoudige categorieën onderscheiden: “spreker” (ik, ‘eerste persoon’), “toegesproke-
ne” (jij, ‘tweede persoon’) en “anderen” (hij, zij, het, ‘derde persoon’). Er is echter
een kleine groep paradigma’s die minder onderscheidingen maakt. De Nederlandse
werkwoordsvervoeging onderscheidt bijvoorbeeld maar twee vormen in het enkel-
voud (loop versus loopt). Een paradigma met een dergelijke structuur vertoont ‘enkel-
voudige homofonie’. Dit verschijnsel is vrij zeldzaam, maar de spaarzame gevallen
vertonen veel variatie. Alle theoretisch mogelijke vormen van enkelvoudige homofo-
nie komen voor in de talen van de wereld. Echter, een duidelijke begrenzing van dit
verschijnsel is dat enkelvoudige homofonie alleen maar voorkomt in werkwoordsver-
voeging. Ik heb geen voorbeelden kunnen vinden van persoonlijke voornaamwoorden
met enkelvoudige homofonie (§ 2.4). De algemene indruk is dat enkelvoudige homo-
fonie een uitzonderlijk grammaticaal fenomeen is. Het komt weinig voor, en als het
voorkomt is het nauwelijks aan structurele beperkingen onderhevig. Een dergelijke
vrijheid is blijkbaar alleen mogelijk in werkwoordsvervoeging. Persoonsmarkering in
de vorm van zelfstandige woorden is voor de taalgebruikers dusdanig betekenisvol dat
er geen verwarring tussen de enkelvoudige personen mag ontstaan (§ 5.4).
Meestal wordt persoon gemarkeerd door het uitspreken van een bepaalde klank, of
een combinatie van klanken. Het is echter ook mogelijk een bepaalde persoon te mar-
keren door een zogenaamd ‘nulelement’ te gebruiken, dat wil zeggen door helemaal
geen klank te uiten. Deze afwezigheid van markering kan een betekenis krijgen door-
dat persoonsmarkering in een paradigma georganiseerd is. In wederzijdse afgrenzing
tot de wél aanwezige markering krijgt de afwezigheid van markering betekenis. Deze
truc kan natuurlijk maar één keer per paradigma worden gebruikt. De Nederlandse
werkwoordsvervoeging gebruikt een nulelement voor de eerste persoon (ik loop-
versus jij/hij/zij/het loop-t). In paradigma’s mét enkelvoudige homofonie komen zulke
nulelementen voor in alle mogelijke personen. In paradigma’s zónder enkelvoudige
homofonie daarentegen komen nulelementen bijna uitsluitend voor in de derde per-




Naast enkelvoud is er natuurlijk ook meervoud. In de meeste grammatica’s wordt het
woord ik geanalyseerd als ‘eerste persoon enkelvoud’ en het woord wij als ‘eerste per-
soon meervoud’. Het begrip ‘meervoud’ is echter nogal problematisch in de context
van persoonsmarkering. Normaal gesproken verwijst een enkelvoud naar één exem-
plaar van iets, bijvoorbeeld het woord stoel verwijst naar één stoel. Een meervoud
verwijst naar meerdere exemplaren van dezelfde soort; het woord stoelen verwijst
naar een verzameling van meerdere stoelen. Echter, deze redenering gaat niet op voor
persoonsmarkering. Het woord ik verwijst wel naar één exemplaar, namelijk naar één
spreker, maar het woord wij verwijst normaal gesproken niet naar meerdere exempla-
ren van dezelfde soort. Wij betekent niet “meerdere ik-en”; wij betekent bijna altijd
“ik en een aantal anderen” (behalve in gevallen als we want more, unisono geroepen
na een goed concert). De groep personen waarnaar het woord wij verwijst, bestaat
meestal uit meerdere personen (behalve in het geval van pluralis majestatis), maar de-
ze groep is niet simpelweg het meervoud van ik. Het meervoud van de derde person
zij is daarentegen wel het echter meervoud van hij/zij/het. Het woord jullie tenstlotte
kan zowel het echte meervoud van jij zijn als ook een groep bestaande uit de toege-
sprokene samen met anderen. Gezien de heterogene betekenis van ‘meervoud’ bij per-
soonsmarkering is het beter het begrip ‘meervoudige persoonsmarkering’ te vervan-
gen door het meer algemene ‘groepsmarkering’ (§ 3.3). Er zijn verschillende groepen
mogelijk, afhankelijk van de soort personen die de groep vormen. Er blijken vijf ver-
schillende groepen nodig te zijn om de talige diversiteit in de wereld te kunnen be-
schrijven (§ 3.4):
1+2 alleen spreker en toegesprokene (‘minimale inclusief’)
1+2+3 spreker, toegesprokene en anderen (‘uitgebreide inclusief’)
1+3 spreker en anderen, maar niet de toegesprokene (‘exclusief’)
2+3 toegesprokene(n) en eventuele anderen (‘tweede persoon meervoud’)
3+3 meerdere anderen (‘derde persoon meervoud’)
De spreker maakt deel uit van de eerste drie van deze groepen. Deze drie groepen sa-
men noem ik daarom het ‘1e-persoonscomplex’. Voor de structuur van een paradigma
blijkt het van centraal belang te zijn hoe het 1e-persoonscomplex wordt gemarkeerd.
Drie mogelijke structuren van het 1e-persoonscomplex heb ik eerder al genoemd.
Sommige paradigma’s hebben helemaal geen gespecialiseerde talige elementen voor
deze drie groepen (bijvoorbeeld de bovengenoemde persoonlijke voornaamwoorden
van het Salt-Yui), sommige talen hebben één woord voor alle drie groepen samen
(bijvoorbeeld het Nederlandse woord wij) en sommige talen hebben twee woorden,
één voor de minimale en uitgebreide inclusief samen en één voor de exclusief (bij-
voorbeeld de persoonlijke voornaamwoorden van het Mandara). Daarnaast is het ook
nog mogelijk dat er alleen voor de inclusief een gespecialiseerd element is en dat de
exclusief identiek is aan de eerste persoon enkelvoud. Tot slot is het mogelijk dat alle
drie de betekenissen van het 1e-persoonscomplex door drie verschillende talige ele-
menten worden gemarkeerd (§ 3.5). Naast deze vijf veel voorkomende mogelijkheden
zijn er incidentele gevallen van andere structuren (§ 3.6). De vijf veel voorkomende
structuren van het 1e-persoonscomplex kunnen worden samengevat in twee implicati-
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onele stellingen (§ 3.7). Ten eerste: als er een gespecialiseerde exclusief is, dan is er
ook een gespecialiseerde inclusief (exclusief  inclusief). Ten tweede, als er een ge-
deelde inclusief is, dan is er ook een gespecialiseerde exclusief (gedeel-
de inclusief  exclusief).
De markering van de twee overgebleven groepen (‘tweede persoon meervoud’ en
‘derde persoon meervoud’) vertoont een samenhang met de markering van het
1e-persoonscomplex in de vorm van ‘verticale homofonie’. Als er identieke vormen
worden gebruikt voor de markering van (een deel van) het 1e-persoonscomplex en één
van de andere twee groepen, dan noem ik dat verticale homofonie. Verticale homofo-
nie is als het ware de meervoudige pendant van enkelvoudige homofonie. Een voor-
beeld van verticale homofonie is het meervoud van de Nederlandse werkwoordsver-
voeging. De werkwoordsvorm van het 1e-persoonscomplex (wij lop-en) is gelijk aan
de vorm van de tweede persoon meervoud (jullie lop-en) en van de derde persoon
meervoud (zij lop-en). Opzienbarend is dat verticale homofonie hoofdzakelijk wordt
gevonden in werkwoordsvervoegingen die geen onderscheid maken tussen inclusief
en exclusief. Dit kan ook worden geformuleerd als een implicatie: als er een inclusief-
exclusief onderscheid is in het paradigma, dan is er geen verticale homofonie (§ 5.3).
Generalisaties
Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een opsomming van alle mij bekende paradigmatische structuren.
In totaal heb ik 61 verschillende paradigmatische structuren gevonden in de talen van
de wereld, variërend op een continuum dat reikt van zeer veel voorkomende gevallen
tot structuren die ik maar in één taal heb gevonden (§ 4.8). Er blijkt een duidelijke re-
gelmaat te zijn welke structuren meer voorkomen dan andere. Twee hiërarchieën be-
schrijven de voorkeursstructuren: de Explicietheidshiërarchie en de Horizontale-
homofoniehiërarchie.
De Explicietheidshiërarchie (Explicitness Hierarchy) is een samenvatting van de sa-
menhang tussen de eerder besproken kenmerken van paradigma’s, namelijk de struc-
tuur van het 1e-persoonscomplex, verticale homofonie en enkelvoudige homofonie.
Deze kenmerken blijken in een vaste volgorde op te treden in paradigma’s. De meest
expliciete soort paradigma vertoont geen homofonie en onderscheidt dus alle acht
persoonscategorieën (namelijk drie enkelvoudige categorieën en vijf groepen). De
eerste onderscheiding die weggelaten kan worden is het verschil tussen de minimale
en de uitgebreide inclusief. Het resultaat van deze neutralisatie is een paradigma’s met
een geünificeerde inclusief en een exclusief (zoals in het Mandara). In een volgende
stap op de hiërarchie kan ook het verschil tussen inclusief en exclusief worden weg-
gelaten (zoals in het Nederlands, waar maar één woord wij bestaat). Pas als dit gebeurt
is, kan verticale homofonie opduiken in het paradigma. Met andere woorden, verticale
homofonie komt pas voor in een paradigma als het verschil tussen inclusief en exclu-
sief niet wordt gemarkeerd. Tot slot komt enkelvoudige homofonie pas voor in een
paradigma als er ook verticale homofonie is. Dit laatste stadium van de Expliciet-
heidshiërarchie bevat de minst expliciete soort paradigma’s. Hier komen paradigma’s
voor met soms maar twee of drie verschillende vormen, zoals de Nederlandse werk-
SAMENVATTING 377
woordsvervoeging. Deze hiërarchie kent op alle punten uitzonderingen, maar meer
dan 90% van de onderzochte paradigma’s heeft een structuur die behoort tot één van
de door de hiërarchie beschreven stadia (§ 5.5).
Op de Explicietheidshiërarchie vindt een soort specialisatie plaats van de markering
van deze rol in het gesprek. Er zijn veel manieren om naar een gespreksdeelnemer te
verwijzen, bijvoorbeeld door te verwijzen naar uiterlijke kenmerken, sociale status, of
door een naam te gebruiken. De persoonsconcepten ‘spreker’ en ‘toegesprokene’ heb-
ben echter alleen met de rol in het gesprek te maken, en niet met enige individuele
kenmerken van de gespreksdeelnemers. Voor paradigma’s in de laagste stadia van de
Explicietheidshiërarchie is het begrip ‘persoonsmarkering’ bijna niet meer van toe-
passing (waarbij het begrip ‘persoon’ staat voor de rol van een gespreksdeelnemer in
het gesprek). Persoon wordt slechts marginaal uitgedrukt in deze soort paradigma’s.
Een voorbeeld van een dergelijk marginaal persoonsparadigma is de Nederlandse
werkwoordsvervoeging. Er worden nog wel persoonscategorieën onderscheiden
(loop, loopt, lopen), maar de markering is erg rudimentair. Hoe hoger in de hiërarchie,
hoe zuiverder de markering is van de rol in het gesprek, dat wil zeggen ‘persoon’
(§ 10.1.5).
Een omslagpunt op de hiërarchie is het al dan niet aanwezig zijn van een onderscheid
tussen inclusief en exclusief. Als er geen inclusief-exclusief onderscheid is, is er veel
meer mogelijk in een paradigma. Er is over het algemeen meer structurele variatie
(§ 5.7) en het is bijvoorbeeld mogelijk dat er geslachtsmarkering of sociale markering
van spreker of toegesprokene optreedt in het persoonsparadigma (§ 10.2.2). Als er
daarentegen wèl een inclusief-exclusief onderscheid aanwezig is in het paradigma,
dan is de structuur van het paradigma over het algemeen veel gestroomlijnder. Het
gaat dan alleen nog maar om het markeren van de rol in het gesprek (‘persoon’), niet
om het aanduiden van andere kenmerken van een gespreksdeelnemer.
De andere generalisatie is de Horizontale-homofoniehiërarchie (Horizontal Homop-
hony Hierarchy). Horizontale homofonie is het verschijnsel dat enkelvoudige en niet-
enkelvoudige vormen gelijk zijn. Een voorbeeld is het Engelse you, dat zowel de en-
kelvoudige betekenis “jij” heeft, als de niet-enkelvoudige betekenis “jullie”. Het
vóórkomen van horizontale homofonie volgt in meer dan 90% van de gevallen een
strikte hiërarchie. De eerste stap op deze hiërarchie is dat de derde persoon horizon-
tale homofonie kan vertonen. Als de derde persoon deze homofonie heeft, dan kan
ook de tweede persoon horizontale homofonie vertonen. Pas als tweede en derde per-
soon deze homofonie hebben, dan kan de eerste persoon horizontale homofonie ver-
tonen. De Engelse persoonlijke voornaamwoorden zijn één van de weinige uitzonde-
ringen op deze hiërarchie, omdat de derde persoon geen horizontale homofonie ver-
toont (he/she/it versus they), maar de tweede persoon (you) wel (§ 5.6). De Horizon-
tale-homofoniehiërarchie volgt de zogenaamde ‘persoonshiërarchie’: spreker > toege-
sprokene > ander. Deze persoonshiërarchie komt op meerdere plaatsen in mijn resul-
taten terug als een belangrijke regulator van paradigmatische structuur (zie ook § 5.2,
§ 5.3.3 en § 5.5.3).
Zowel de Explicietheidshiërarchie als de Horizontal-homofoniehiërarchie hangen sa-
men met de morfologische status van de paradigma’s. Paradigma’s kunnen bestaan uit
zelfstandige woorden (zoals de Nederlandse woorden ik en jij) of uit gebonden mor-
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femen (zoals de Nederlandse werkwoordsvervoegingen …-t en …-en). Voor beide
besproken hiërarchieën geldt dat hoe minder vormen er worden onderscheiden, hoe
groter de kans is dat het paradigma bestaat uit gebonden morfemen. En omgekeerd:
hoe meer vormen er worden onderscheiden, hoe kleiner de kans is dat het paradigma
bestaat uit gebonden morfemen. Deze samenhang hangt waarschijnlijk samen met het
feit dat taalgebruikers zich intuïtief bewust zijn van de betekenis van zelfstandige
woorden, in tegenstelling tot gebonden morfemen waarvan de meeste sprekers zich
niet bewust zijn. Die taalelementen waar gebruikers over kunnen reflecteren, zoals de
zelfstandige persoonlijke voornaamwoorden, mogen niet al te gekke vormen van ho-
mofonie vertonen (§ 5.8). Een ander aspect in deze context is dat gebonden morfemen
zowel voor als achter de werkwoordsstam kunnen voorkomen. Ook hier blijken inte-
ressante restricties op de talige variatie te bestaan, die echter in dit proefschrift niet
verder konden worden uitgediept (§ 10.2.3).
Speciale aantallen
Een groep bestaat uit meer dan één persoon, maar hoeveel personen er precies in een
groep zitten is niet van belang. In sommige talen bestaat er echter ook persoonsmarke-
ring waar het aantal personen wel van belang is. In de beschrijving van deze talen
wordt gesproken over speciale elementen voor groepen van twee personen (‘dualis’),
drie personen (‘trialis’), vier personen (‘quadralis’) of een kleine, maar niet precies
gespecificeerde hoeveelheid van personen (‘paucalis’). De meest voorkomende cate-
gorie is de dualis. De empirische status van de andere categorieën is zwak. Al deze
gevallen van speciale aantallen bestaan inderdaad, maar het zijn geen veelvoorko-
mende structuren. De beschreven gevallen komen allemaal uit Melanesië (grofweg
Nieuw-Guinea en omgeving). Bovendien lijkt het erop dat alle gevallen van trialis
eigenlijk gevallen van paucalis zijn. Tot slot heeft het enige mij bekende geval van
een quadralis duidelijk meer mogelijkheden dan alleen verwijzing naar groepen van
vier personen (§ 7.4).
De dualis komt daarentegen relatief vaak voor in persoonsparadigma’s en de beschre-
ven gevallen zijn goed verdeeld over de talige wereld. Een problematisch geval is
echter een persoonsmarkeerder die wel bekend staat als de ‘eerste persoon inclusief
dualis’. Een dergelijk element verwijst naar een groep die alleen bestaat uit de spreker
en de toegesprokene. Deze groep bestaat uit twee personen en is dus strikt gesproken
een dualis. Er is echter een groot aantal gevallen waar deze vorm de enige dualis is in
de hele taal. Zulke talen hebben geen dualis voor zelfstandige naamwoorden en ook
niet voor andere persoonsmarkeerders. In zulke gevallen heb ik de ‘eerste persoon
inclusief dualis’ niet als een dualis geïnterpreteerd, maar als een speciale soort groep,
de zogenaamde ‘minimale inclusief’. Dat deze groep uit twee personen bestaat is een
bijverschijnsel (§ 3.6.5, § 4.7 en § 7.2). In een aantal andere persoonsparadigma’s komt
deze ‘eerste persoon inclusief dualis’ voor in combinatie met andere dualis-
persoonsmarkeerders. In zulke gevallen is er sprake van een ‘echte’ dualis in de per-
soonsmarkering van de taal in kwestie.
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In hoofdstuk 8 wordt een overzicht gegeven van alle ‘echte’ gevallen van een dualis.
In totaal heb ik 32 verschillende paradigmatische structuren met een dualis gevonden.
Net zoals bij de paradigma’s zonder dualis, is er ook in dit geval een continuum, va-
riërend van zeer vaak voorkomende paradigmatische structuren tot structuren die ik
maar in één uitzonderlijk geval heb gevonden (§ 8.9). Er blijkt ook weer een duidelij-
ke regelmaat te zijn in welke structuren meer voorkomen dan andere. Zo is er ook
voor de paradigma’s met een dualis een Explicietheidshiërarchie (§ 8.8.2), maar daar-
entegen geen duidelijke Horizontale-homofoniehiërarchie. In het geval van horizon-
tale homofonie is het meer een kwestie van alles of niets: òf geen horizontale homo-
fonie (en dus een complete set dualisvormen), òf overal horizontale homofonie (en
dus helemaal geen dualis). Er is een aantal tussengevallen, maar deze gevallen verto-
nen geen hiërarchie (§ 8.8.3).
Er zijn aanwijzingen dat er nog meer vormen van persoonsmarkering zijn, in de lite-
ratuur wel aangeduid als ‘complexe’ of ‘samengestelde’ persoonlijke voornaamwoor-
den. Dit speciale fenomeen is alleen beschreven voor een regionaal en genetisch be-
perkte groep van talen in West-Afrika. De precieze functie van deze voornaamwoor-
den is onduidelijk, maar het schijnt wel om een in hoge mate gegrammaticaliseerd
fenomeen te gaan. Nader onderzoek van deze talen is wenselijk (Appendix A).
Historische dynamiek
Taal is onderhevig aan voortdurende verandering. Nieuwe woorden verrijken de taal,
oude woorden verdwijnen uit het taalbewustzijn van een jongere generatie. Ook
grammaticale structuren veranderen; echter in dit geval gaan de veranderingen vaak
veel sluipender en onttrekken zich aan het bewustzijn van de gebruikers. Om een in-
druk te krijgen van de mogelijke veranderingen in de paradigmatische structuur van
persoonsmarkering heb ik een speciale methode gebruikt, die een mix is van synchro-
ne en diachrone taalvergelijking. Het uitgangspunt van deze methode is de aanname
dat cross-linguïstische generalisaties, zoals ze in dit proefschrift zijn beschreven, rele-
vant zijn voor taalverandering. Taalverandering heeft een voorkeur voor structuren
die binnen de ‘gewone’ variatie vallen. Ik heb daarom de gevonden hiërarchieën (Ex-
plicietheidshiërarchie en Horizontale-homofoniehiërarchie) geïnterpreteerd als een
hypothese voor taalverandering. Om mogelijke taalveranderingen op het spoor te ko-
men heb ik paradigma’s uit nauw verwante talen gezocht die maar minimaal van el-
kaar verschillen volgens één van beide hiërarchieën. Als het mogelijk blijkt veel van
dergelijke voorbeelden te vinden, dan is dat een argument dat de hiërarchieën kunnen
dienen als een schets van de mogelijkheden van taalverandering. Als het niet mogelijk
blijkt zulke voorbeelden te vinden, wijst dit erop dat de betreffende stap op de hiërar-
chie niet direct van belang is voor taalverandering (§ 6.2 en § 9.2). De Explicietheids-
hiërarchie houdt zich goed onder deze hypothese. Voor alle stadia van de hiërarchie
heb ik meerdere voorbeelden van verwante paradigma’s gevonden (§ 6.4, § 9.3 en
§ 9.4). Echter, voor de Horizontale-homofoniehiërarchie is dit niet het geval. Alleen
het bovenste deel van deze hiërarchie is terug te vinden in taalverandering. Voor de
andere stadia van deze hiërarchie lijkt van alles mogelijk: talen springen heen en weer
van het ene stadium naar het andere zonder de hiërarchie te volgen (§ 6.3). Het resul-
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taat van dit deel van het onderzoek is een web van samenhangende paradigmatische
structuren dat een schets geeft van de historische dynamiek van persoonsparadigma’s
(§ 9.6).
Conclusie
De belangrijkste conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat het zinnig is om persoonsmarke-
ring te bekijken vanuit een paradigmatisch perspectief. Persoonsmarkering bestaat
niet uit losse talige elementen, maar uit samenhangende structuren van elementen.
Daarnaast heeft de beslissing om zowel morfologisch zelfstandige als morfologisch
gebonden paradigma’s te bestuderen een veel completer beeld opgeleverd van de mo-
gelijke paradigmatische structuren. Natuurlijk blijven er nog veel vragen over voor
nader onderzoek. Vooral de status van bezittelijke voornaamwoorden en de verschil-
len tussen de markering van onderwerp en andere zinsfuncties zijn centrale vragen die
niet konden worden behandeld. De resultaten van het onderzoek dat ik zojuist heb be-
schreven zijn echter een belangrijk uitgangspunt om op zoek te gaan naar antwoorden
op deze vragen.
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